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ABSTRACT 
RE-EVALUATING AUGUSTINIAN FATALISM THROUGH THE  
EASTERN AND WESTERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN  
GOD’S ESSENCE AND ENERGIES 
 
 
Stephen J. Plečnik 
 
Marquette University, 2019 
 
In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism 
in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified 
in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As 
is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and 
continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429), Augustine 
espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to 
accomplish the good is totally a function of God’s elective grace. What, then, does the 
fallen will do to work out its own salvation? There is the further issue of how to reconcile 
Augustine’s rather extreme emphasis on grace in his later works with the more balanced 
picture we receive in his sermones ad populum, written throughout his forty-year 
preaching career. In many of these sermons, even those written during the Pelagian 
controversy, Augustine is careful to leave space for both divine and human initiative in 
the process of our justification within the totus Christus, or ‘whole Christ.’ How we can 
understand Augustine in his role as doctor gratiae and as preacher of human freedom will 
be a major inquiry of this dissertation. 
 
The most serious obstacle to moving forward on these problems has been and 
remains the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by most 
commentators. On their interpretation, Augustine thought that there were no real 
distinctions within the Trinity, with each of the three divine persons and their actions 
sharing in the absolute unity of the divine essence. Holding this interpretation not only 
does away with the distinctness of each of the persons, but also requires all of God’s 
different powers and attributes, including willing and foreknowing, to be coalesced into 
one another without distinction in the divine essence. God’s foreknowledge is thereby 
identified with God’s will, which necessarily leads to theological fatalism: God would 
have to will everything that He foreknows, and God would have to foreknow everything 
that He wills. Since God is omniscient, He wills everything that will happen, including 
the future willings of the fallen human will. 
 
It cannot be denied that there are texts in the Augustinian corpus that seem to 
point to a reading of the Trinity as absolutely simple. But this study will endeavor to 
show that there are also other largely overlooked texts in On the Trinity, the Confessions, 
and his Commentaries on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (among others) that argue 
for various distinctions within the Trinity to make sense of the relation between Creator 
and creature, and the differences between the divine processions of generation/spiration, 
  
 
and the act of creation. These texts will be shown to parallel very closely the position of 
the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, which consistently uses the real distinction 
between God’s essential being and energetic activities (also known as the essence-energy 
distinction) to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. This rich theological and 
philosophical tradition, from the time of the fourth-century Greek Fathers to the 
Byzantine tradition that followed, differs less with Augustine concerning the essentials of 
Trinitarian theology and its practical implications for solving the problem of making 
human freedom and divine grace compatible than has been hitherto thought.
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Chapter 1 
Statement of the Problem 
 
In religion it must be the case that corresponding to every level of devoutness 
there is a form of expression that has no sense at a lower level. For those still at 
the lower level this doctrine, which means something at the higher level, is null 
and void; it can only be understood wrongly, and so these words are not valid for 
such a person.  
 
Paul’s doctrine of election by grace, for instance, is at my level irreligious and 
ugly nonsense. So it is not meant for me since I can only apply the wrong picture 
offered me. If it is a holy and good picture then it is so for a quite different level, 
where it must be applied in life quite differently than I could apply it.1 
 
This quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Culture and Value sums up rather 
well the common reaction to both Saint Paul’s doctrine of election by grace and the 
mature theology of sin and grace defended by Saint Augustine (354-430), who explicitly 
and frequently invited the comparison of Paul’s doctrine to his own. As is well-known, 
beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and continuing through his 
last four works sent to the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429),2 Augustine often espoused the 
Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace from Romans 9: that fallen humanity’s ability to 
do the good, whether in thinking, in willing, or in acting, is totally a function of God’s 
grace, and that, on its own, the fallen will only has the power to accomplish evil, because 
of the damaging effects of original sin. The worry, of course, is that under the thralldom 
of sin, by which we all find ourselves trapped, we can only be freed by God choosing to 
bestow His graces upon us according to His unchanging redemptive purposes. We can do 
nothing to merit or earn these graces, for they are by definition gratuitous (free) gifts of 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (1937), 37e.  
2 These works are On Grace and Free Choice, On Rebuke and Grace, On the Predestination of the 
Saints, and On the Gift of Perseverance. 
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God. Such a position, however, appears to present God’s salvific decisions as being made 
regardless of the lives we may lead. And yet, somewhat paradoxically, He also winds up 
being totally responsible for the lives we end up leading, either by His granting or 
withholding His graces.  
Augustine maintains this somewhat strange-sounding position because of his view 
of God’s grace, which he tells us God grants or withholds solely as the effects of His 
predestination, for which Augustine gives the now famous definition: “This is the 
predestination of the saints, nothing else: plainly the foreknowledge and preparation of 
God’s benefits [or graces], by means of which whoever is to be liberated is most certainly 
liberated.”3 The definition of predestination given here by Augustine has typically been 
interpreted in one of two distinct ways, both of which appear problematic. First, it could 
be taken to mean that Augustine defended a doctrine of predestination whereby God is 
causally responsible for saving those who are righteous, while permitting (i.e., not willing 
to prevent) all others to be damned. Second, it could be taken to mean that he defended a 
doctrine of double-predestination whereby God is causally responsible for both saving 
those who are righteous and damning those who are not. Whichever of these two 
meanings one applies to Augustine’s definition of predestination, there does not seem to 
be a way to integrate his predestinationism into a coherent theology of redemption. 
Indeed, whether God merely permits people to be damned because of their own sinful 
behavior, or whether He contributes to the condemnation of some by directly hardening 
their hearts, He appears lacking in moral goodness. After all, how could an all-good God 
                                                          
3 De dono perseverantiae. 14.35. 
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allow part of his rational creation to be lost forever, or what is even worse, actively help 
to bring this loss about? How could this not be “irreligious and ugly nonsense?”  
The problem that Augustine’s doctrine of predestination poses, in the seemingly 
dominating power God exercises over and against the powerless fallen human will 
remains an infuriating conundrum for theologians and philosophers and, unfortunately, a 
perennial sticking point in efforts at East-West rapprochement. Gerald Bonner, one of the 
most respected twentieth century Augustine scholars, writes: “Predestination is, however, 
too fundamental to Augustine’s mature theology, and too much a part of the heritage of 
Western Christian theology, to be ignored in serious ecumenical debate.” He thinks if we 
are to move beyond publishing statements of mere doctrinal agreement, and if East and 
West are to achieve a “common theological mind” with each other, then the doctrine of 
predestination in Augustine must be dealt with, and not in the typical dismissive fashion 
as being “the rationalization of the mystery of human freedom and divine grace.”4 Bonner 
made this statement in 1986. However, some twenty years later he gives up on this 
admirable idea, claiming instead that Augustine’s doctrine of divine predestination was 
just such a rationalization: one that prioritizes God’s contribution to the accomplishing of 
good works at the expense of the human, with nothing more than the unconvincing, 
inconsistent, and unhelpful explanation that how all of this works will be revealed on the 
Last Day.5 Bonner is not alone in his opinion, with many other scholars offering similar 
                                                          
4 Bonner, Gerald. “Augustine’s Conception of Deification.” Journal of Theological Studies (1986), 
Vol. 37, Issue 2: 369-386. P. 385.  
5 See Bonner, Gerald. Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s Teaching on Divine Power and Human 
Freedom. The Catholic University of America Press: Washington D.C, 2007. P. 109.  
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negative appraisals of Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace and/or its foundation 
in God’s predestination.6 
It must be admitted that prima facie Augustine does not do himself any favors in 
answering these kinds of objections. Two of the more pronounced examples of this can 
be found in his The City of God and Retractions, both of which were works of his 
maturity. First, there is his famous discussion of fatalism and foreknowledge against 
Cicero in The City of God, Book V.IX, where Augustine affirms God’s prescience of the 
future as a necessary “aspect” of His Godhood. Indeed, Augustine will argue that God is 
not God if He does not know the future, “for one who is not prescient of all future things 
is not God.”7 Nevertheless, at the same time, he also affirms man’s freedom of will as 
necessarily part and parcel of his created and rational nature. It is important to note that 
Augustine is dealing here primarily with the issue of divine fatalism, election, 
predestination, or whatever one wishes to call it, but he never viewed this to be 
theologically or philosophically separate from the issue of divine foreknowledge, because 
he believed the former to necessarily hinge on the latter. This is an idea we have already 
seen in Augustine’s definition of predestination given above: God’s granting or 
withholding of His predestinating graces is dependent on His foreknowledge. Speaking 
                                                          
6 See for example, Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. Volume II. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich: 
New York, 1978. Burnaby, John. Amor Dei: A study of the Religion of St. Augustine. Hodder and 
Stoughton: London, 1938. Wetzel, James. Augustine and The Limits of Virtue. Cambridge University Press: 
New York, 1992. Karfikova, Lenka. Grace and the Will according to Augustine. Trans. by Marketa 
Janebova. Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden, The Netherlands, 2012. Pelikan J. The Christian Tradition: A 
History of the Development of Doctrine. Volumes 1 and 2. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1971. 
Cary, Phillip. “Augustinian Compatibilism and the Doctrine of Election,” Augustine and Philosophy. Ed. 
by Phillip Cary, John Doody, and Kim Paffenroth. Lexington Books: Lanham, Maryland, 2010. Louth, 
Andrew. “‘Heart in Pilgrimage’”: St. Augustine as Interpreter of the Psalms,” taken from Orthodox 
Readings of Augustine. Ed. by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou. St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press: Crestwood, NY, 2008. 
7 Ibid. 
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anachronistically, Augustine reports that Cicero has a much different position from his 
when it comes to the issue of fatalism and the precise knowledge of the future it 
inevitably entails.  
According to Augustine, in order to refute the Stoical idea of fate, Cicero thought 
that he needed to destroy the idea of there being divination, and he attempts to do this by 
denying that there is fore-knowledge, i.e., knowledge in the sense of having an exact 
vision of what future actions and events are going to happen and their causal order for 
coming to be. Augustine summarizes Cicero’s objection to there being divination, and so 
foreknowledge, as follows: 
What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it 
was this—that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the 
order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, 
there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of 
things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not 
preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes 
according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, 
all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then there is nothing in our 
own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, 
says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. 
In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is 
no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments 
for the wicked.8  
To avoid these unacceptable consequences, Cicero rejects the idea of knowledge of future 
contingents simpliciter. Knowledge of future contingents, whether this knowledge is had 
by God or by man, and free will are mutually exclusive: If one of them is affirmed, the 
other is immediately denied. In this way, I think, Cicero can be seen as the originator of 
the opinion so commonly held among philosophers and scholars as illustrious as 
Wittgenstein and Bonner in more recent times that divine election (which is the causal 
                                                          
8 City of God 5.9. 
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consequence of divine foreknowledge9) is, quite frankly, nothing more than religious 
mumbo jumbo. Augustine, however, believes that the “religious mind chooses both, 
confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety.”10  
We find the second example of Augustine wholeheartedly embracing the kind of 
doctrine of divine election gainsaid by the scholarly majority in his final statement on 
how God’s grace interacts with the freedom of the human will in Book II of his 
Retractions (ca. 428 AD). It reads as follows: “I labored indeed on behalf of the free 
choice of the human will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point 
where the apostle is perceived to have said with the most evident truth, For who makes 
you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? Now, if you have received 
it, why do you glory as if you received it not? (1 Cor 4:7).11 Here we have Augustine 
apparently conceding that God’s grace overcame the free choice of the human will in his 
theological teaching; that he could do no better than Paul in explaining their interaction 
with each other than to affirm the priority and unmerited nature of God’s grace; and that 
the latter was the only relevant factor in making the elect to differ from the non-elect. 
Augustine does not hesitate to affirm that Paul spoke in all of these respects “with the 
most evident truth.” We might well ask: In what was his final chance to set the record 
straight, did he offer a statement of mere Christian belief as a substitute for a rational 
explanation of how grace co-operates with the human will? While many say that not just 
this final instance but his whole theology of sin and grace is representative of this sort of 
ad hoc solution, I for one think that would be uncharacteristic, to say the least, of a man 
                                                          
9 The relationship between divine election and divine foreknowledge will be discussed in greater 
detail passim Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Retractions, 2.1.2. 
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who took as the motto of his entire theological perspective, “crede, ut intelligas” (believe, 
so that you may understand),12 which points to the fact that Augustine was never 
interested in belief as an end in itself, even if that belief pertained to the faith of the 
Church. For if “faith is not charged with thought, it is nothing.”13 Being satisfied with 
one’s own philosophically untested beliefs might be the stance of someone like 
Tertullian,14 but not Augustine.  
The real question then becomes: How did Augustine understand his belief in the 
Pauline doctrine of election by grace, and did he understand it in such a way that passes 
philosophical as well as theological muster? This is the question of interest to my 
dissertation and, while it is too complex to be answered in a few introductory remarks, I 
will provide some indication of how I will go about answering it in subsequent chapters 
at this point. The good news is that Augustine is actually very forthcoming about how he 
understands God’s elective grace most fundamentally in the person of Christ. He claims 
that there is nowhere else that God’s grace appears to better effect than in Christ, and that 
it is “through Jesus Christ our Lord that we should understand God’s grace. It alone sets 
human beings free from evil. Without it they do nothing good at all, whether in thinking, 
                                                          
12 See for example, Tract. Ev. Jo. 29.6. His motto was itself based on his favorite scriptural quotation 
from Isaiah 7:9: Unless you believe, you will not understand. In a letter to Consentius, Augustine will even 
say that those who understand their faith are better off than those who merely believe it: 
“Heaven forbid, I say, that we should believe in such a way that we do not accept or seek a rational 
account.” (120.3) And a little later on, he says: “One who now understands by true reason what he before 
only believed should certainly be preferred to one who still desires to understand what he believes.” (120.8)  
13 On the Predestination of the Saints, 5. 
14 As is well-known, it was Tertullian who famously warned against the “wretched Aristotle” and 
asked the question of all questions when it comes to the relationship (or lack thereof) between faith and 
reason: “what then hath Athens in common with Jerusalem?” (Tertullian, “On the ‘Prescription’ of 
Heretics,” Chapter 7, taken from Tertullian: On the Testimony of the Soul and On the ‘Prescription’ of 
Heretics, trans. by T. Herbert Bindley (London: SPCK, 1914), P. 45. Shortly after asking this question, 
Tertullian answers his own question by emphatically denying the need for philosophical understanding, for 
“we have no need of speculative inquiry after we have known Christ Jesus; nor of search for the Truth after 
we have received the Gospel. When we become believers, we have no desire to believe anything besides; 
for the first article of our belief is that there is nothing besides which we ought to believe” (Ibid, P. 46).  
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or in willing and loving, or in acting.”15 Speaking of predestination in particular, 
Augustine writes of Christ: “But there is no more illustrious instance of predestination 
than Jesus Himself ... [and] in the end of this [work] I have chosen to insist upon it. There 
is no more eminent instance, I say, of predestination than the Mediator Himself. If 
any believer wishes thoroughly to understand this doctrine, let him consider Him, and in 
Him he will find himself also.”16  
Because of the perfect union of Christ’s human and divine natures, accomplished 
by God’s grace (also referred to as the ‘grace of union’), the singular person of Christ 
lived a life in complete obedience to the will of the Father.17 That is, Christ’s life was one 
of perfect freedom, unable to sin, unable to die, and unable to abandon the good. Christ’s 
human will willed what it willed, but by its own graced liberty it could only will the will 
of the Father, to which it was obedient even unto death on a cross (Phil 2: 8). Since 
Augustine says that Christ’s inability to sin (non posse peccare) is the model of our 
perfect freedom, it is imperative that we get some initial clarity on this concept before we 
explain it further in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. The inability to sin of Christ, 
according to Augustine, should not be understood as being devoid of the consent of his 
human will. If it could, then many questions and objections about the authenticity of 
Christ’s ministry on earth would have to be raised. We might say that Christ’s 
maintaining of his sinless moral character (Heb 4:15), resistance to the temptations of the 
devil, and all of his morally praiseworthy actions were hollow achievements, or that they 
lacked true virtue. If he was a mere conduit of the Father’s will, lacking any initiative of 
                                                          
15 Rebuke and Grace 2.3. 
16 On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 67. 
17 doctr. chr. I.10.10.22-3. 
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his own, then in what legitimate sense could we say that Christ was responsible for his 
triumphs of will that ultimately led to the redemption of human nature? As it is, however, 
Augustine thinks that Christ in his humanity was unable to sin in the sense of being 
unwilling to sin by willingly following not his own will, but that of his Father in heaven. 
This is precisely the same kind of freedom enjoyed by the saints in heaven, whereby they 
cannot fall away from God. Unlike Adam, who had the power not to sin (posse non 
peccare) but sinned, Christ, because of the unique grace given to him, was unable, or 
perfectly unwilling, to sin.  
For Augustine, those who cannot understand Christ’s necessary freedom, which 
was predestined according to the will of the Father, and which is to be a model for our 
true liberty, do not yet have a proper understanding of the Christian faith itself. This is so 
because the Christian faith cannot be understood by those who lack humility, precisely 
because that faith comes from faith in Christ, who is himself only present to us when we 
humble ourselves down to the level at which he chose to live, that of scarred and broken 
humanity.18 He writes in this connection:  
[Christ] whose power was so great hungered, thirsted, grew weary, fell asleep, 
was taken prisoner, was beaten, crucified, slain. This is the way: walk through 
humility that you may come to eternity. Christ-God is the homeland to which we 
are going; Christ-man is the way by which we are going (Deus Christus patria est 
quo imus; homo Christus via est qua imus).19  
 
Augustine further maintains that Christ’s perfected human nature, like our own fallen 
human nature, could not merit the graces it received, or cause itself to differ from the rest 
of sinful humanity in and of itself: “Look at Christ the Lord, Word, soul, and flesh, as I 
said; God is there, there also are you; and it’s one Christ. So what puts you there? For 
                                                          
18 conf. 7.18.24. 
19 Sermo 124.3.3; PL 38.685. 
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what merit, for what free choice, did the Lord take on human nature, was the Word 
clothed with human nature? What merit of that particular human nature came first?”20 
The answer is none whatsoever. There was no merit attributable to even Christ’s human 
nature before the Word took on that particular flesh.  
Augustine’s conception of true human liberty as Christological therefore requires 
us to recognize two important points. First, the grace of God the Father, God the Son, and 
God the Holy Spirit is required for all human beings, including Christ in his humanity, to 
freely carry out anything good and avoid anything evil.21 Second, God’s grace is 
completely unmerited. Since Christ provides us with the brightest example of both 
points,22 it makes sense for Augustine to say that we should understand our graced human 
liberty through him. This is what I intend to do in my dissertation.  
However tempting it may be, we must avoid any desire to import more modern 
notions of freedom and autonomy into Augustine’s philosophical-theological 
anthropology to “save it” from what many view as its theological fatalism. Augustine 
does not argue for a radical form of freedom, or a conception of the human self that is 
proto-Cartesian/proto-Kantian, which is to say a self that is a complete and unconditioned 
law unto himself. For Augustine, not even humanity in its paradisal state enjoyed such a 
freedom. Writing of Adam, Augustine tells us, he was only able not to sin, able not to die, 
and able not to abandon the good; but he possessed all three of these capacities because 
of God’s grace. Once he refused such grace, by insisting to follow his own will, God 
                                                          
20 Sermon 265D.7, 417. See also trin.13.17.22. 
21 Augustine believes, for example, that in the case of Christ in his humanity it is not only the Father 
and the Holy Spirit who provide such graces, but also Christ in his divinity, i.e., the Son. All three persons 
of the Trinity act inseparably in this regard. See trin.1.3.14-21 for Augustine’s position on this and how 
closely it resembles St. Paul’s in his Letter to the Philippians.  
22 See City of God 10.29. 
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justly withdrew from him.23 Whether we are considering humanity’s previous 
unblemished ahistorical state, or its current fallen condition, God always remains 
humanity’s law and life. We are never emancipated from God our creator or God our 
redeemer—the Word made flesh. Any discussion of Augustine’s notion of true human 
liberty must therefore take place in what he believes to be its proper supernatural context.  
As I will show throughout the course of this dissertation, Augustine anchors 
man’s true liberty specifically in his doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and imago Dei. 
Because we were created out of nothing, which is itself a grace according to Augustine,24 
we are totally dependent on God for our being; and because we were created in God’s 
image, we are totally dependent on God for our well-being. In other words, God is the 
source of both our ontological and moral good, respectively. The autonomous (auto-
nomos) human self, in itself, and by itself, at least for Augustine, is a metaphysical and 
moral fiction. As human beings, we have no autonomous good independent from God. 
Augustine takes this as a super-natural dimension of human life, which he thinks has its 
specific point of origin and return in the God-man, Christ, who is himself the mediator 
between God and man. We might say, then, to borrow the expression of Wittgenstein, 
that Christ is the “higher level” through which we may correctly picture man’s supreme 
good and freedom. 
Nevertheless, merely asserting that Christ is the “higher level” through which we 
must understand the supreme good of humanity (including its liberty) under the auspices 
of divine grace will not by itself be enough to legitimately quell the complaints we have 
seen raised against Augustine. To discuss the Christological focus of Augustine’s 
                                                          
23 See for example, Rebuke and Grace 12.33. 
24 See Sermo 258.2. See also On Nature and Grace, Chapter 62. 
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conception of human freedom, and to give it the proper philosophical support, I think 
there is a need to examine how he more broadly conceived of God’s roles in the divine 
economy as creator and redeemer. That is, how Augustine actually saw the two-natured 
Christ as harmoniously interacting with human beings.  
However, this quickly becomes a problem because of the dominant scholarly 
interpretation of Augustine’s approach to God as being fundamentally concerned with the 
unity of the divine essence, and how that essence is radically unlike anything created. It is 
well-known that such an interpretation first gained its foothold in the Western scholarly 
milieu from the work done by Theodore de Régnon, a nineteenth century French Jesuit 
theologian. He argued that, at least since the time of Saint Augustine, the Western 
theological tradition began with the oneness of God (de Deo uno), whereas the Greek 
Fathers began with God as Trinity (de Deo Trino) in the economy of creation and 
redemption.25 Most scholars in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have continued to 
operate under this interpretive paradigm to perpetuate the claim that Augustine’s 
theological conception of God prioritizes the absolute unity of the divine essence over 
and above how that essence is expressed in the distinct persons of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, both in the essential life of the “inner” Trinity (ad intra) and in the economic 
life of the “outer” Trinity (ad extra).26  
                                                          
25 Theodore de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité. Victor Retaux: Paris, 1892. 
Michel René Barnes has an article entitled, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51-
79, that has proven authoritative on the subject of De Régnon’s immense influence on Augustine 
scholarship in this regard.  
26 For some good examples of the De Régnon interpretive paradigm hard at work in the secondary 
literature, see G. L. Prestige’s God in Patristic Thought (London: SPCK, 1952); Duncan Reid’s Energies of 
the Spirit: Trinitarian Models in Eastern Orthodox and Western Theology. Scholars Press: Atlanta, 1997; 
Boris Bobrinskoy’s Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic 
Tradition. Trans. by Anthony P. Gythiel. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press: New York, 1999; and John 
Zizioulas’ Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2006).  
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These scholars often refer to Augustine’s approach to God as ‘Latin essentialism,’ 
both because of its origin in the Latin-speaking West and because of its supposedly all-
encompassing concern with preserving the picture of God as absolutely simple and 
undifferentiated essence. With this said, Latin essentialists do allow for a distinction of 
the divine essence from the three persons and from their various attributes, but they 
diminish the latter two realities in God to preserve His simplicity. They do this, first, by 
labeling the divine persons as purely ‘relational’ entities, not as subsistent individuals 
possessing a real existence of their own. It is their opinion that real, ‘personal’ differences 
in God would amount to differences in the being of God. Latin essentialists, in other 
words, do not understand the existence of Father, Son, or Holy Spirit as one which is 
distinct but not divided from each other and the divine essence which they commonly and 
equally share. Rather, they think that everything in God pertains to and is explained by 
the divine essence, as this is the only way to guarantee that God’s simplicity remains 
unthreatened.  
They do this, second, by claiming that the various attributes of the persons are not 
‘really’ distinct from the three persons, the divine essence, and even from each other, but 
only ‘logically’ distinct. This amounts to them rejecting the less extreme theological 
position wherein the divine attributes are said to be distinct but not divided from the 
various realities that pertain to God as God.27 The unwillingness of Latin essentialists to 
make real distinctions in the Godhead when it comes to the persons and their attributes 
subsequently make it impossible for them to keep distinct God’s temporal missions in the 
economy of salvation from the eternal divine processions. On their view, the economic 
                                                          
27 As we shall see shortly, such is the theological position of the Greek East. 
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missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit must be ontologically identified with the intra-
trinitarian relationships to which they correspond.  
Two theologically unsettling conclusions are left in the wake of the doctrine of 
divine simplicity as defended by Latin essentialism. First, the economic sendings of the 
Son and the Holy Spirit would give us a window through which to view the essential life 
of God, thereby destroying His transcendence. Second, we could no longer make a real 
distinction between God freely creating and redeeming according to the divine will, and 
the intra-trinitarian processions, i.e., the begetting of the Son and the procession of the 
Holy Spirit, all of which take place according to the necessary divine essence. Rather, 
creation, redemption, and procession would be one and the same essential and, therefore, 
necessary activity.28 This in turn would make any kind of real divine and human 
interaction impossible, because the wholly simple, necessary, and eternal being of God 
has no way of interacting with the inherently complex, contingent, and temporal reality of 
human beings.  
Contrary to Latin essentialism, the Greek-East is said to have an appreciation for 
both the essential and economic realities of God, because of the ‘real distinction’ 
(pragmatike diakrisis) but not ‘real division’ (pragmatike diairesis) it maintains between 
God’s essential self, which always remains beyond the horizon of created being, and 
                                                          
28 To avoid this unsettling conclusion, authors in the Greek East will make clear that there must be a 
real distinction made between the divine will and the divine essence, which allows for the corresponding 
distinction between the Trinity’s economic activities of creation and redemption and internal activities of 
begetting, begotten, procession, respectively. In the chapter, “Creature and Creaturehood,” Georges 
Florovsky will cite two key figures in the Eastern Orthodox tradition in this connection: “St. Gregory 
Palamas emphasizes that any refusal to make a real distinction between the ‘essence’ and ‘energy’ [or will] 
erases and blurs the boundary between generation and creation—both the former and the latter then appear 
to be acts of essence. And as St. Mark of Ephesus explained, ‘Being and energy, completely and wholly 
coincide in equivalent necessity. Distinction between essence and will is abolished; then God only begets 
and does not create, and does not exercise his will’” (Florovsky, 68). Creation and Redemption, Vol. III. 
Nordland Publishing Company, Belmont MA (1976).  
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God’s energetic self, which is expressed in creation, missions, and Incarnation. Often 
referred to as the essence-energy (ousia-energeia) distinction, this has been the hallmark 
feature of Eastern Orthodox theology from the time of the fourth century Greek Fathers 
to the later Byzantine theological tradition, found especially in the works of John of 
Damascus and Gregory Palamas. The philosophical groundwork of this distinction is 
found in their unilaterally shared claim that the divine essence cannot lack its 
corresponding energies, or natural activities by which it becomes manifest, through the 
Trinity of the divine hypostaseis that share that essence, to realities other than itself. It 
follows that, if one were to collapse the three persons and their energies into the divine 
essence, then it would lack any kind of real presence or existence beyond itself. That is, it 
would lack subsistence and could not be considered to hypostatically and energetically 
exist ad extra. All of the above Greek-speaking theologians were therefore careful to 
maintain the distinction between ousia, hypostasis, and energeia in God, so that He could 
simultaneously subsist and exist for Himself (essentially) as Father, Son, and Spirit and 
for creation (energetically).  
The essence-energy distinction, unlike Latin essentialism, made it possible for the 
Greeks to ontologically differentiate God’s creating and redeeming, which are free 
activities according to the energy, from the Father’s generation of the Son and procession 
of the Holy Spirit, which are necessary actions according to the essence. It also made it 
possible for them to keep all of God’s energies distinct but not divided from each other, 
and so safeguard against paradoxes that would result from their coalescence. Take, for 
instance, the situation in which God’s will and foreknowledge are identified. If God were 
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to will everything he foreknows, and God foreknows everything that happens whether 
good or evil, He would be responsible for willing evil; which is absurd.29  
It should come as no surprise, then, that the essentialist interpretation of 
Augustine’s approach to God is commonly criticized in Eastern Orthodox circles 
specifically for its lack of an essence-energy distinction. Georges Florovsky, for instance, 
thinks that it is not just Augustine but Western theology in general that fails to make this 
distinction: “The Eastern patristic distinction between the essence and energies of God 
has always remained foreign to Western theology.... St. Augustine decisively rejects it.”30 
Duncan Reid writes of Augustine’s entire corpus that “there is no hint here of the 
distinction between essence and energy that will later (some 1000 years later with 
Palamas) be developed in Eastern Orthodox theology.”31 Rather, he thinks that in its 
place Augustine left us with a view of God in which the outer side of the Trinity—the 
temporal missions—is the same as the inner side of the Trinity—the eternal 
processions.32 Reid calls this the ‘identity principle’ or the ‘simplicity model’ for 
understanding God, which has remained commonplace in western theology from the time 
of Augustine all the way up to the post-Reformation present.  
 Even today no one has been more directly critical of Augustine’s theology than 
John Romanides. In his An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics,33 Romanides notes 
that the key theological error of Augustine was his failure to make an essence-energy 
                                                          
29 For an excellent rendition of this paradox, see Capita 100 of St. Gregory Palamas’ 150 Capita.  
30 Florovsky, Georges. “Creation and Creaturehood,” 274, ftn. 68.  
31 Reid, Duncan. Energies of the Spirit: Trinitarian Models in Eastern Orthodox and Western 
Theology. Scholars Press: Atlanta, 1997. P. 11.  
32 Ibid, 13-14.  
33 John S. Romanides, An Outline of Orthodox Patristic Dogmatics. Trans. by George D. Dragas. 
Orthodox Research Institute: Rollinsford, NH (2004). This book is a translation of Romanides’ “Notes in 
Dogmatics” (1972).  
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distinction such as that found in the Eastern Orthodox tradition since the fourth century 
onwards. This failure in turn made it impossible for him to have an accurate 
understanding of the developmental process in which humanity achieves its finite 
perfection, made possible by the Word’s incarnation and brought about through God’s 
grace or energy in harmonious co-operation (sunergia)34 with the human will, which the 
East refers to as the doctrine of deification (theosis). For Romanides, “St. Augustine 
himself does not appear to have accepted this [sc. essence-energy] distinction.... This 
identification of essence and energy in the West led Western theologians to articulate the 
thought that God is ‘pure energy.’”35 As a result of such an identification, we see that “in 
the theological tradition of the Franks, beginning with Augustine, there is no doctrine of 
deification.”36 Rather, all we see in the West since Augustine is a doctrine of an 
absolutely simple, purely actual, and completely necessary God that exists in and for 
Himself.  
Clearer than most, then, Romanides explains the real practical issue at stake in 
discussions pertaining to divine simplicity in Augustine, i.e., the freedom of humanity 
and its deification. His informal argument above can be broken down into three distinct 
conditional statements: 
1) If Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction, then he cannot make 
sense of the concept of deification.  
                                                          
34 Vladimir Lossky gives a concise definition of synergy at p. 196 of his Mystical Theology, where he 
notes that, when Western theology claims that God’s grace or energy is the cause of the meritorious acts of 
our free wills, that is to miss the point about divine and human interaction: “For it is not a question of 
merits but of a co-operation, of a synergy of the two wills, divine and human, a harmony in which grace 
bears ever more and more fruit, and is appropriated—‘acquired’—by the human person.”  
35 Romanides, 35.  
36 Romanides, 39.  
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2) If he cannot make sense of the concept of deification, then there is no 
harmonious co-operation possible between God and human beings. 
3) Therefore, if Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction, then there 
is no harmonious co-operation possible between God and human beings. 
Romanides’ argument is meant to sharpen what he takes to be the opposition between the 
Latin (and supposedly Augustinian) idea of absolute simplicity and the Greek concept of 
deification. On the one hand, the doctrine of deification holds there to be a harmonious 
co-operation between the divine will and the human will within the context of salvation 
history. On the other hand, the doctrine of essentialism holds that the divine will, 
including its economic functions of creation and redemption, must be absolutely and 
unqualifiedly identified with the divine essence.  
The problem, of course, is that that the reality of the divine essence is completely 
necessary, whereas the divine will is that reality in God which is supposed to be 
completely free. Not merely ‘free’ in the negative sense of being free from constraints to 
will this or that, but ‘free’ in the positive sense to choose amongst different alternatives to 
do this or that, e.g., to create this or redeem that. If one were to identify the divine will 
with the divine essence, then God would cease to be free in the positive sense but able to 
be free in the negative sense. He would cease to have a free will for the activities of 
creation and redemption, all the while remaining free from constraints.37 It also would 
follow that there could not be a synergy between the divine and human wills, because 
                                                          
37 The negative and positive senses of free will I call attention to here are recognizable to anyone, 
including Augustine, familiar with the Neoplatonic philosophical tradition, and especially Plotinus. More 
recently, these different senses of free will have been discussed as two concepts of liberty by Isiah Berlin in 
his seminal 1958 lecture at the University of Oxford aptly titled, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” which was 
then published in his Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press: London, 1969. See for example, pp. 
121-122.  
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there would no longer be a divine will with which the human will could co-operate. This 
entails that there is no freedom possible for human beings, because our freedom, in the 
Augustinian/Pauline sense of the term, completely depends on God’s energies or graces 
co-working with our individual wills in a way that is in consonance with their created, 
rational, and free nature.38 These are meant to conform us to the image of the Son in such 
a way that, God willing, we become like Christ, unable to sin, unable to die, and unable 
to abandon the good.  
As we can see, the validity of Romanides’ argument ultimately comes from the 
perceived truth of the claim that Augustine does not have an essence-energy distinction. 
While the validity of this assumption has been granted by the majority of both Eastern 
and Western theologians alike over the past three centuries, I believe to further illuminate 
the mystery of divine and human freedom we must re-evaluate the assumption that the 
essence-energy distinction was somehow exclusively Eastern in origin and design. To 
that end, one of my primary aims in this dissertation will be to show that there are 
ontological grounds in Augustine’s writings, which are akin to those found in the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, for maintaining a distinction between the necessity of God’s essence 
and His free activities of choosing to create and redeem.  
Through a close analysis of certain passages from Augustine’s earlier and later 
writings, I will prove that he himself uses this distinction in at least three important 
respects that directly resonate with the Eastern Orthodox tradition. First, he uses this 
                                                          
38 This point will be discussed in various places throughout the dissertation, but I do make explicit 
mention of it many times in Chapter 2, where I discuss Augustine’s view of the human will’s dependence 
relationship to God’s will within the context of his doctrinal teaching on the subject; and in Chapter 3, 
where I discuss this relationship within the context of his pastoral teaching on the subject. I argue in those 
Chapters that neither Augustine’s doctrinal nor pastoral views necessarily lead him to abandon, or in 
principle would bar him from accepting, the related conceptions of deification and synergy that are held in 
such high esteem in the Greek-speaking-East.  
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distinction to argue that there is a difference between the eternity of the divine essence 
and the eternity of the divine ideas; the former kind of eternity being unknowable and 
imparticipable by creation, the latter being knowable and capable of being participated in 
by creation. Second, he uses this distinction to prevent the confusion of God’s essential 
activities of generation and procession (ad intra) with His economic activity as the 
productive source of creation (ad extra).39 Augustine believes this in turn safeguards the 
Creator-creature distinction, which is itself meant to prevent a pantheistic conception of 
created reality whereby it would achieve an equal ontological status to God the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. Third, he uses this distinction to maintain that there is a distinction 
without division between God’s essence and God’s will,40 the latter being especially 
crucial to Augustine’s claim in Books II-IV of On the Trinity that the inner trinity, as 
expressed in the eternal processions, cannot be identified with the outer trinity, as 
expressed in the temporal missions. 
While qualitative differences may remain among Eastern and Western theologians 
with respect to the making of this distinction and how it is used in their respective 
theological traditions, I will show that the fundamental metaphysics of each of their 
positions remain consistent with and complimentary of the other. With Augustine’s 
version of the essence-energy distinction and its uses in hand, I will then attempt to 
explain his Christocentric solution to the predestination problem seemingly entailed by 
Paul’s words at 1 Cor 4:7 and by much of what Augustine himself had to say about how 
to reconcile man’s liberty with God’s causality beginning with his second response To 
Simplician onwards. Augustine himself may have never explicitly purposed this 
                                                          
39 See for example, conf. 12.2.7.  
40 See for example, Gn. litt. imp.1.2. 
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distinction to solve the issue of divine and human interaction, but I believe it can be used 
as the logical and metaphysical foundation to construct such a solution, and even a valid 
argument to prove the existence of human liberty, in co-operation with God’s grace. As I 
have suggested earlier, previous attempts at solving this problem have been frustrated, or 
perhaps not even attempted, because of the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology that has predominated in the past and still holds great appeal among 
scholars working today. On such an interpretation, there is simply no ontological room 
for human freedom to live and move and have its own being in the presence of God’s will 
and knowledge, both of which are identified with each other, and both of which are 
collapsed into the necessity of the divine essence. It is my claim, however, that 
Augustine’s approach to God is not of necessity beholden to Latin essentialism, and that 
there are clear non-essentialist tendencies in his extensive corpus that should make us re-
evaluate Augustine’s so-called ‘Western’ Trinitarian theology and his own final solution 
to the predestination problem found in Book II of the Retractions. 
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Chapter 2 
Augustine’s Teachings on Sin and Grace 
 
 In order to come up with a convincing solution to the predestination problem in 
Augustine, we must first gain a clearer understanding of the problem itself. This requires 
us to explore two interrelated themes in Augustine’s thought: sin and grace. Augustine’s 
position on these two themes was not monolithic. In On the Gift of Perseverance, 
Augustine tells his readers that over time he made progress in his understanding of God’s 
grace, and that it would be unfair for them not to allow him to change his theological 
position as is necessary to accord with what is true by reason and what is right by 
Christian doctrine.41 He claims that the biggest change made to his position occurred in 
his second response To Simplician, where for the first time he “realized and stated that 
the beginning of faith (initium fidei) is also the gift of God.”42 Augustine specifically 
cites his greater understanding of Paul’s Letter to the Romans (9: 10-29) as granting him 
this realization. Considering the importance that Augustine places on his second response 
To Simplician for his own better understanding of God’s grace, this work serves as a 
natural entry point for its discussion. 
 Augustine begins his second response To Simplician with what he takes to be St. 
Paul’s main insight from Romans 9, namely: no one should boast of the merits of his 
works, for any merit they do possess is wholly because of God’s merciful grace. 
                                                          
41 Chapter 30. 
42 Chapter 20. Beforehand in the Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula ad Romanos 
(393/394), Augustine claimed that human beings were responsible for their initial faith in God—a claim he 
defends in the first response To Simplician as well (See for example, To Simplician 1.14). In these two 
early works, Augustine held that grace was needed to make the good will effectual, to make it result in the 
performance of good deeds, but faith was willed by us (exp.prop.Rm.61.69).  
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Following St. Paul, Augustine claims that grace is not grace if it is not given gratuitously. 
Grace thus comes before any kind of merit, before good works and faith; and a person 
cannot “do good works unless he has obtained grace through faith,”43 a faith that is given 
to him by an internal or external urging of the Holy Spirit. Grace is not the result of merit, 
but merit is the result of grace. For if “grace comes from merit, it means you have bought 
it, not received it free, gratis, for nothing.”44 To illustrate the utter gratuity of grace, 
Augustine uses an example given by Paul: the twins Jacob and Esau (Rom 9:13). Since 
they did not yet exist, they were deserving of nothing; neither one of them was more 
praevisa merita than praevisa demerita; yet God chose to love Jacob and hate Esau.45 
According to Augustine, it was God’s redemptive purpose that was the deciding factor in 
choosing to give grace to Jacob but not to Esau. The twins’ future merits or demerits 
played no part in God’s choice, which was made ante praevisa merita.46 The same goes 
for all of us: whether our fate is that of Jacob or Esau is a matter ultimately determined by 
God.  
In her recent book, A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs, 
Susanna Ticciati argues that it is precisely this claim, “that only some are predestined to 
salvation, while others are left to perdition,”47 that cannot serve any beneficial, 
transformative, or salvific purpose for the individual. It is a problematic aspect within 
Augustine’s “doctrine of predestination which cannot be integrated into its broader 
trajectory.”48 Essential to her argument is the assertion that Augustine makes God 
                                                          
43 Simpl. 2.2. 
44 Sermo 169.3, 416.  
45 Simpl. 2.3. 
46 Simpl. 2.6. 
47 Ticciati, 54. 
48 Ibid. 
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responsible for both our good and evil wills: “not only is the good will to be attributed to 
God, but so is the evil will... a will which is nevertheless genuinely the human’s own ... in 
such a way that it is to be attributed wholly to God and wholly to the human being.”49 For 
Ticciati, Augustine makes divine agency out to be one part liberating grace for human 
agency and one part divine judgment. This divided “divine agency draws focus back 
again to the question of choice between alternative options: will the human choose good 
or evil? And this question is replicated on the divine plane: will God give or withhold 
grace?”50 While Ticciati admits that God is not the direct cause of the evil will, she still 
makes His withholding of grace from the Esau’s of the world a kind of sin of omission. 
The problem is Augustine believes that God always offers everyone equal access to 
sufficient graces for their salvation.51 Ticciati confuses the point that, while God does not 
give grace to all,52 which is certainly true, this does not mean he does not offer it to all, 
which he does. The distinction made between “giving” and “offering” grace is not mere 
wordplay, but rather a real distinction that Augustine makes use of on multiple occasions 
to avoid just such a confusion. Augustine believed that God offered sufficient salvific 
graces to everyone. Or as he will say, God “makes his sun rise on the good and the bad, 
and sends rain on the just and the unjust, inviting them of course to repentance by his 
patience, so that those who are indifferent to his goodness may experience at the last his 
severity.”53 And elsewhere we are told by him that, “God grants well-being or salvation 
in the present to both human beings and animals, to both good and bad alike.”54 
                                                          
49 Ticciati, 68.  
50 Ticciati, 69. 
51 See for example, Sermon 250.1, 416: “at the present day there is equal access to the grace of God 
for nobles and commoners, for the educated and the illiterate, for the poor and the rich.”  
52 See Ticciati, 74. 
53 Sermon 149.18, 412.  
54 Sermon 319A, date unknown.  
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Augustine makes this point so that not even those who have an evil will can complain of 
God’s justice and goodness. I think it safe to conclude from these texts that Augustine 
believed in the doctrine of universal grace, or that God offers sufficient graces to all for 
their salvation, but not the stronger doctrine of universal salvation, both of which can be 
interpreted as being consistent with the claim found at 1 Tim 2: 4 that God wills all to be 
saved. Certainly God wills all to be saved, but that does not mean everyone will accept 
his grace and actually be saved.  
We might say that God’s “standing offer” to give sufficient graces for everyone’s 
salvation must be co-operatively accepted by our wills to do any real work, to be 
effectual in our lives. After all, for it to be properly said that God makes good on this 
offer of salvation in actually giving us these graces, we must be said to accept them. I 
believe it is therefore helpful to think of God’s giving His graces and our accepting of 
them as two inseparable parts of one redemptive process. Take one or the other part 
away, and there really cannot be said to be a giving or receiving, for if there is no giving 
on the part of God, there cannot be a receiving on the part of man; and if there is no 
receiving on the part of man, there cannot be a giving on the part of God. However, 
God’s offering of grace, as opposed to Him giving it or our accepting it, is perfectly 
intelligible without a faithful response or otherwise from us: God can offer grace, and we 
can either choose to accept it or not; but the offering of His grace does not depend on 
anything we do. As Augustine has said before, God offers sufficient salvific graces to all, 
to all persons who are good and bad alike.  
 Augustine is aware that the preceding—even with the distinctions he makes 
regarding offering, giving, and accepting grace—may still sound disturbing to the 
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believer. God appears to be unjustly arbitrary, giving grace to the Jacob’s of the world 
but not the Esau’s even though there are no relevant differences between them. To defend 
his position, Augustine first appeals to St. Paul: For Moses says, I will have mercy on 
whom I will have mercy, and I will show compassion to whom I will be compassionate 
(Rom 9: 15). Later, he will cite Mt 20: 1-12’s parable of the vineyard to make the same 
point. The master in this parable hired some workers for the whole day and some for only 
one hour, yet he paid both groups of workers the same daily wage. When the first group 
of workers complain, the master answers that the fact that he “willed” to be generous to 
those who worked for one hour did not mean that they were paid an unjust wage. 
Augustine concludes from this parable that God, as our Master, must also be given the 
freedom to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, though it cannot be stressed 
enough that such mercy is not owed to anyone as a result of the whole human race living 
under the tyranny of sin, both original sin and those that are personal. Augustine will 
insist that, because of original sin in particular, we all begin life with a hamstrung moral 
agency and debilitated ontological being: we are dominated by ignorance of the truth and 
lust of the flesh; we sin in every action we perform, unless aided by divine grace; we 
have become mortal; and we all constitute a kind of mass of sin (una quaedam massa 
peccati), and as such deserve damnation.55  
                                                          
55 See for example, Simpl. 2.16. Augustine’s doctrine of original sin is based on an inaccurate Latin 
translation of Romans 5:12: “per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors 
et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit in quo omnes peccaverunt.” For Augustine, no one, not even 
infants, whose life on earth has lasted but a day, is pure of sin (Job 14:5). The entire human race was borne 
from Adam, from the same common root; and in Adam all must die, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). (The 
Literal Meaning of Genesis Book VI, 9, 14). Augustine thinks the in quo refers to Adam (cf. Deserts and 
Forgiveness of Sins 1.10-11) when, in fact, the original Greek text reads eph ho, which is meant to 
introduce an explanatory clause and does not support Augustine’s translation.  
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 Accepting the offer of God’s mercy in this life is thus necessary, for it is only by 
God’s help that we attain to what is true, good, life-giving, and redeeming. Once again, 
however, this idea that God’s grace is the only reality which can aid us in pulling 
ourselves out of the swamp of sin we trudge through on a daily basis must be balanced 
with the fact that God can only save us from sin if we are willing to accept His help. 
Augustine will explicitly claim that God’s mercy is not by itself sufficient for our 
salvation. God’s mercy must be joined to the will’s “consent”56 and considered within the 
context of the will’s effort to which Paul refers in Phil 12:12: Work out your salvation 
with fear and trembling. He makes this quite clear in his discussion of how God calls us 
to salvation. For Augustine, there are many who are called and not chosen, not because 
God does not call them in the appropriate way, as the kind of person they are, but because 
they are not suited to the call since they have hardened their hearts to the Holy Spirit’s 
internal and external urgings.57 It is on account of their demerits that they will be 
condemned, not because God intends some calls not to be accepted.58 God is thus 
sensitive to what they will, and it is they who are the problematic variable in the equation 
of divine and human interaction. It is they who refuse to accept the gift of salvation that 
God is offering. We might well ask: Why does not God call everyone so that they would 
answer? If God were to call them in such a way as to override their freedom of choosing 
                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Simpl. 2.13. There are those who may now be tempted to object that persons only harden their 
hearts because God hardens them through the withholding of His graces. However, as I have pointed out 
already, Augustine believes that God always offers sufficient salvific graces to all of humankind, and not to 
mention that such an objection would go against Scripture, which at various places puts the blame for the 
hardening of one’s heart on the human individual, not on God. Perhaps the most famous example of this 
can be found at Exodus 8:32, where it is made clear that “Pharaoh hardened his heart” and would not let the 
Israelites go. Pharaoh willed something else for the Israelites than God, namely their captivity. We cannot 
say therefore that Pharaoh’s hardness of heart was a result of God’s choice.  
58 See for example, Wetzel 1992, p. 157, who thinks God actually wills some persons to not be saved 
by deliberately giving them an unsuitable call. 
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what is lower, then He would be forcing them to answer His call. Then, however, His call 
would cease to be a call, becoming rather a compulsion, and their answer would cease to 
be a free response. Augustine’s position here remains consistent with 1 Tim 2: 4ff: 
Almighty God wills that all men without exception be saved, although all are not saved. 
Now, that certain ones be saved, this is the gift of Him who saves; and that certain ones 
perish, this is the fault (meritum) of those who perish. 
 Augustine’s view of sin and grace elaborated in his second response To 
Simplician would take center stage during his polemical bouts with the Pelagians and the 
semi-Pelagians, whose contrary positions, as well as Augustine’s responses to them, will 
now be briefly considered. We shall begin chronologically with the Pelagian controversy, 
which began around 412. The main opponents of Augustine here were Pelagius and his 
followers, Celestius and Julian of Eclanum. Pelagius himself is thought to have been a 
British monk, perhaps of Irish descent, who lived in Rome from 384 until its fall in 410 at 
the hands of the Visigoths. Fleeing to Africa, he soon came into conflict with Augustine, 
then Bishop of Hippo, who wasted no time in publishing two works against Pelagius’ 
teachings around 411 or 412, the De peccatorum meritis and the De spiritu et littera. In 
these works, Augustine accuses Pelagius of heretically teaching that: 
1) Adam would have died whether he sinned or not.  
2) Adam’s sin was purely personal, affecting him and him alone.  
3) Infants are born into the same sinless state Adam enjoyed before his fall, hence 
infant baptism is superfluous (Pelagius believed that adult baptism did confer 
certain benefits on the believer, however, such as the remission of personal sins).  
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4) Adams’s sin did not cause the death of all, and so Christ’s resurrection is not 
needed for the redemption of all.  
5) Following the Law and Gospel are sufficient for salvation.  
6) Before Christ’s redemptive work there were men wholly without sin. 
Since Pelagius’ writings are not extant, it is difficult to get a clear and unbiased picture of 
his position. What cannot be historically questioned, however, is the fact that the above 
teachings of Pelagius were condemned at two African councils at Carthage and Mileve in 
416, and later by Pope Innocent I in 417, who excommunicated Pelagius and his follower 
Celestius. Julian of Eclanum then inherited the mantle of Pelagianism, but it was a mantle 
that proved to be too heavy for his shoulders as well. He was eventually banished by 
Pope Zozimus, and is said to have died in Sicily around 455. 
 While there are many points over which Augustine and Pelagius battled, the entire 
controversy can really be seen as one concerned with the power of the human will in its 
fallen condition, and how to characterize the help afforded to it by God’s grace. 
Augustine, from his own personal experience of the vicissitudes of fallen human nature 
and the oppressive hold his bad habits had over his own will,59 and from his zeal to 
defend what he took to be right Christian doctrine in accord with the teaching of St. Paul, 
emphasizes the fragility of the fallen will’s power. Our desperate need for grace is found 
in scripture, which Augustine thought to be authoritative: Without me you can do nothing 
(Sine me nihil potestis facere) (Jn 15:5). Pelagius, on the other hand, was more confident 
in the power of unaided human nature and its corresponding faculties, emphasizing 
instead the sufficiency of these natural gifts given to us by God for right action, provided 
                                                          
59 As, for instance, we get a vivid description of in his Confessions, 8.9.21. 
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they are used properly. He argued that God would never command us to do anything 
unless we had the power to do it (a version of the “ought implies can” principle), and 
even cited Augustine’s early work On Free Choice of the Will to make his case.60 His 
faith in the strength of human nature and its powers led Pelagius to view God’s grace as 
something beneficial to the believer, but not as something necessary to bring about one’s 
salvation. While most would agree that Pelagius’ Christian Stoicism does not adequately 
acknowledge the positive benefits of God’s grace for the believer, Augustine appears to 
go in the opposite extreme direction, portraying human nature and the will as so weak 
and so lost without God’s helping hand that there is no possibility for human freedom. 
 Much more could be said about the Pelagian controversy itself and the many 
works that Augustine wrote during this period in response to it. However, my interest at 
this point rests primarily in getting clear on what has commonly been seen as problematic 
in Augustine’s conception of sin and grace, so that we can more readily come up with an 
appropriate solution, and, in particular, a solution that would be acceptable to both East 
and West. To that end, the semi-Pelagian controversy proves even more relevant to the 
project of this dissertation, in that Eastern Christianity has long viewed the semi-
Pelagians as witnesses to their tradition. Vladimir Lossky, for instance, will call St. John 
Cassian of Marseilles—who was perhaps the most prominent of all the semi-Pelagians in 
his time—a “representative” of the Eastern tradition in what he wrote concerning the 
relationship between God’s grace and the human will.61 Lossky believes he is justified in 
making this claim because Cassian, like the entire Eastern tradition, “has always asserted 
                                                          
60 The passage Pelagius cited can be found at de. lib. arb. 3.18.50.171. 
61 Mystical Theology, 199.  
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simultaneity in the synergy of divine grace and human freedom.”62 However, because 
Augustine and the Pelagians lacked such a divine and human synergy in their writings, 
they can never be considered as in accord with Eastern Christianity in this regard. My 
brief examination of the Pelagian controversy shows that this is a fair estimation of 
Pelagius’ position, but can we really transfer the same criticism over to Augustine? To 
find out, I will examine in some detail certain relevant parts of the last four major 
doctrinal works Augustine wrote and that were sent to the semi-Pelagians at Hadrumetum 
and Provence, the latter being mainly from southern Gaul, in the monastic communities 
at Marseilles and Lérins.  
 The first two of these works are On Grace and Free Choice and On Rebuke and 
Grace, both of which were sent to the monks at Hadrumetum around 426-427. Like many 
modern commentators today, these monks thought that Augustine’s doctrine of grace left 
no room for free will, thereby destroying any notion of moral responsibility. Augustine’s 
response in these two works, however, seems to tell a different story.  
 On Grace and Free Choice begins with Augustine affirming the necessity of both 
grace and free will, and their undeniable complementarity found in the Old and New 
testaments. We see this first and foremost, he thinks, in the commandments present 
throughout scripture, which reveal that the will of man is free:  
The divine precepts would themselves be pointless for human beings unless we 
had free choice of the will, by which we might reach the promised rewards 
through carrying them out. For the precepts were given to human beings in order 
that they not have an excuse on the grounds of ignorance, as the Lord says of the 
Jews in the Gospel: Had I not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin; 
but now they have no excuse for their sin (Jn 15: 22).63  
 
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 Grace and Free Choice, 2.2. 
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Augustine then goes on to cite many specific passages from scripture which point to there 
being free will in man, for instance, Sir 15: 12-18: It was He who made human beings 
from the beginning, and left them in the hand of their own counsel. If you are willing, you 
shall keep the commandments and keep good faith with his pleasure. He sets fire and 
water before you: stretch forth your hand to whichever you will. God could not bid us to 
follow such commandments if we did not have free will. Further, there are many 
commandments that explicitly reference the will, including: Be unwilling to be overcome 
by evil (Rom 12:21); Be unwilling to become as the horse or the mule, which have no 
understanding (Ps 31:9); Be unwilling to fall away from the teaching of the Lord (Prv 
3:7); and many more.64 It is important to note that all of Augustine’s examples are 
rendered using the Latin nolle, which means “to be unwilling [to].” Though commonly 
these negative imperatives are translated into English as “Thou shalt not...” or “Do 
not...,” I think it is more accurate to recognize the role of the will in these commandments 
by translating it more literally, to mirror the original Latin text of Augustine. Taking 
scripture as authoritative, Augustine thinks that all of these examples are “sufficient proof 
of free choice.”65  
 Nevertheless, one should not understand these examples as leaving no room for 
the necessary help of grace in the carrying out of these commandments. Pelagius made 
such a mistake, placing his faith in the natural power of the will to do the good. 
Augustine on many occasions would respond to this with the words of the prophet 
Jeremiah: Cursed is the man who has his hope in man, and makes strong the flesh of his 
arm, and whose heart abandons the Lord (Jer 17:5). Augustine takes “arm” to mean 
                                                          
64 Ibid, 2.4ff.  
65 Ibid. 
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power of acting and “flesh” to mean human weakness. It follows that anyone who goes 
along with Pelagius in thinking that humanity’s weak and inadequate power is “sufficient 
by itself for acting well makes strong the flesh of his arm.”66 What any holy person 
should do, however, is put their faith in God’s power. Augustine writes in this 
connection: “No holy person rejoices in his own power, but in the power of Him from 
whom is derived all potency for fitting action. He knows that it is a mightier thing to be 
united in willing worship to the omnipotent, than to display in his own power and will a 
potency which is fearful to those who have it not.”67 The freedom of the will is actually 
freer in proportion to its inability to display this kind of prideful potency: 
One should not think that free choice has been taken away because the apostle 
said: God is the one who works in you both willing and doing works in conformity 
with good will [Phil 2:13]. Blessed, after all, is the one whose helper is the God of 
Jacob, his hope in the Lord his God (Ps 146:5). In addition, if freedom were taken 
away, he would not have said immediately before that: Work out your own 
salvation with fear and trembling [Phil 2:12].68  
 
But now we appear to wind up in a paradoxical situation, in which God commands us to 
do the good but also grants us this very same good. Or as Augustine famously says in the 
Confessions, “Command what you will, and give what you command,”69 a statement that 
particularly annoyed Pelagius when he heard it during a public reading of the Confessions 
in Rome, as it seemingly asked the impossible of human beings.70  
 In On Grace and Free Choice, Augustine does not back down from this claim, 
writing: “It is certain that we will, when we will. But God brings it about that we will 
something good.... It is certain that we act, when we act. But God brings it about that we 
                                                          
66 Ibid, 4.6.  
67 trin.8.11.  
68 trin.9.21.  
69 Conf.10.29.40.  
70 Augustine will actually describe this event in On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 53. 
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act by furnishing our will with efficacious strength.”71 Essentially what Augustine is 
saying is that we work with God and God works with us to accomplish good things; and 
it is by “working along [with us that] He perfects what He began by working [in us]” 
(cooperando perficit quod operando incipit).72 If taken literally, the Latin here reads “by 
co-working He completes what by working [alone] He started.” This famous phrase is 
commonly seen as the origin of the doctrine of co-operative grace in the West, though 
one might argue its beginnings are found just as clearly in St. Paul, who actually uses the 
Greek term sunergia.73 Regardless, Augustine believes we must acknowledge God as the 
                                                          
71 Grace and Free Choice, 16.32. 
72 Ibid, 17.33. There is a great variability with respect to how the Greek sunergia is translated into 
Latin. As a result, no general claim can be made as to how it ought to be translated. Conducting a lexical 
study of selected works from Augustine’s Cappadocian contemporaries (i.e., Basil the Great, Gregory 
Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa) in J-P Migne’s Patrologia Graeca (PG) bears this out quite clearly. The 
following are some representative examples of this I have found in the PG, for which I have provided the 
official Volume and Column reference numbers: sunergia = cooperante (Vol. 29b, Col. 29A); sunergou = 
operis (Vol. 29b, Col. 56A); sunergou = simul operabatur (Vol. 29b, Col. 208A); sunergon = 
cooperatorem (Vol. 29b, Col. 760B); sunergon = cooperatorum (Vol. 31, Col. 756D); sunergein = 
adjutricem (Vol. 36, Col. 25D); sunergon = cooperarium (Vol. 36, Col. 137D); sunergaths = cooperator 
(Vol. 37, Col. 872A); sunergia = ope (Vol. 44, Col. 140A); sunergias = occupasset (Vol. 44, Col. 141B); 
sunergian = remedium (Vol. 44, Col. 144A); sunergon = efficacem (Vol. 44, Col. 168B); sunergian = 
convenienter actiones (Vol. 44, Col. 237B); sunergei = cooperatur (Vol. 44, Col. 1344A). Cross-
referencing these examples with their English translations shows that most often—though not always—the 
various forms of sunergia and their Latin equivalents are translated by individual words, such as “co-
operation,” “co-working,” or “help” (in the sense of a helper “helping” someone or something else), or 
simple phrases, such as “simultaneous acting” or “suitable co-operation.” This can be seen, for example, 
passim the translations of Volumes 5, 7, and 8 of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, and are in 
themselves perfectly acceptable translations of the original Greek and Latin. I would argue therefore that 
Augustine’s use of cooperando and the concept of sunergia in the works of the 4th C. Greek Fathers are 
meant to denote the same fundamental idea, namely, a kind of “working with,” “acting with,” or “helping” 
someone or something else. In On Grace and Free Choice 17.33, we see this idea is given concrete 
expression in God’s grace “working with” (cooperando) the fallen human will so that it may accomplish 
the good. It is also worth noting that this linguistic trend of viewing the Latin cooperatio (and/or other 
Latin words that connote the same meaning of “co-operation”) as equivalent to the Greek sunergia 
continued beyond the 4th and 5th centuries. For example, the Latin translations of the 6th C. theologian 
Dionysius the Areopagite by Eriugena, Sarracen, and Grossetestes prove this continuing linguistic trend. 
Some examples from the PG Vol. 3, using Sarracen’s Latin translations of the Greek, are as follows: 
sunergon = cooperatorem (Vol. 3, Col. 165B); sunergian = cooperationem (Vol. 3, Col. 168A); sunergias 
= cooperatione (Vol. 3, Col. 212A); sunerghswmen = operabimur (Vol. 3, Col. 953A); sunergia = 
cooperationem (Vol. 3, Col. 393C). Many thanks to my dissertation director, Fr. John D. Jones, for finding 
these instances of sunergia mentioned in Dionysius with their corresponding Latin translations.  
73 There are many of his Letters in which St. Paul will literally use the Greek words sunergein and 
sunergos to refer to himself and his brothers in Christ as active co-workers with God. A few examples: “we 
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primary cause who first works without us so that we might have the power to will what is 
good within us. God offers these beginning graces to all. But once we will, and will in 
such a way so that we may act well, God works within us to make the will efficacious. A 
similar idea is found in Chapter 35 of On Nature and Grace, where Augustine writes: 
“We ourselves bring it to pass; that is to say, we ourselves justify our own selves. In this 
matter, no doubt, we do ourselves, too, work; but we are fellow-workers with Him who 
does the work, because His mercy anticipates us. He anticipates us, however, that we may 
be healed; but then He will also follow us, that being healed we may grow healthy and 
strong.” However, in no uncertain terms does God’s grace take away our free will either 
before, during, or after we act. God’s grace turns the will from seeking lower things to 
higher things, and gives further help once the will is good so that it may persevere in the 
good. He “works in human hearts to incline their wills to whatever he wills, either to 
good due to his mercy or to evil due to their deserts.”74 Yet such providentially graced 
causation does nothing to vitiate the nature of their wills as free. 
Phillip Cary represents the attitude shared in the vast majority of the scholarly 
literature well when he says that the just mentioned passage from On Grace and Free 
Choice (and the many others that express the same basic point) prove that “in the last 
decade of his life Augustine develops a view of free will” that does not allow a person to 
control the development of their own character.75 Cary states that, while this is good news 
for those who are saved, whose wills are irresistibly bended to God’s will, it is equally 
bad news for those who are not. According to Cary, the real problem can be found in 
                                                          
are laborers together (sunergountes) with God” (1 Cor 3:9); “we then, as workers together (sunergountes) 
with him” (2 Cor 6:1); “Timothy, our brother and co-worker of God” (sunergon tou theou) (1 Thess. 3:2).  
74 On Grace and Free Choice, 21.43, emphasis mine. 
75 Cary, 79.  
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Augustine’s doctrine of prevenient grace, which holds that for any of us to will anything 
that would contribute to our salvation, God must literally “come before” and offer 
sufficient graces to strengthen our wills.76 Augustine does adhere to this doctrine: “The 
fact is, his mercy gets in ahead of us every single time; to call us when we were lacking 
the will, and then to ensure we obtain the ability to do what we will.”77 But even more 
problematic is that Augustine “pushes the logic of prevenience back to the very 
beginning of every human life.”78 Augustine’s logic of prevenience thus places all of the 
power in God’s hands, rendering our wills completely inefficacious and unnecessary in 
the process of salvation, and leads to the kind of double-predestination we encounter later 
in the Reformation with Luther and Calvin.79 For Cary, this is the only interpretation of 
Augustine’s mature theology of sin and grace will allow.  
To some extent we can understand Cary’s point, but amassing quotes like the one 
from On Grace and Free Choice without giving it, or Augustine’s doctrine of grace as a 
whole, proper context does not prove that Augustine was a Calvinist before Calvin. A 
fundamental Augustinian idea that Cary’s study completely ignores is that grace has a 
mutual affinity for nature, working in harmony with it. Commenting on his work On 
Nature and Grace, for instance, Augustine writes: “I defend grace, not indeed as in 
opposition to nature, but as that which liberates and controls nature.”80 He will even say 
in the work itself that the gift of grace can never take away the nature of the will as free, 
for this gift only becomes effectual in the life of the man who “humbly uses ... his own 
                                                          
76 Cary, 85. 
77 Sermo 193.2, around 410. See also, Sermon, 176.5, 412. 
78 Cary, 87. 
79 Cary, 86. 
80 Retractions, Book II, Chapter 42. 
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will, and makes no boast of the power and energy thereof, as if it alone were sufficient 
for perfecting him in righteousness.”81 The latter provides more proof of the idea that the 
distinction Augustine makes between God’s offering and giving grace, and our accepting 
that grace, are real distinctions: Grace becomes active in the life of man when and only 
when he humbly and willingly accepts it as necessary for his perfection.  
In Sermo 398 (ca. 425), Augustine further explains why grace cannot override the 
will’s freedom. His explanation is founded on the fact that there are many things that God 
cannot do, because if He could do them, He would no longer be God:  
He is unable to die, unable to be deceived, unable to lie, and as the apostle says, 
he cannot deny himself (2 Tm 2:13). How many things he is unable to do, and he 
is almighty! And that’s why he is almighty, because he cannot do these things. I 
mean, if he could die, he wouldn’t be almighty; if he could lie, could be deceived, 
could deceive, could act unjustly, he wouldn’t be almighty, because if it were in 
him to do that sort of thing, he wouldn’t be fit to be almighty.82  
 
Focusing on the words of the apostle from 2 Tm, Augustine then gives a short argument 
as to why God’s will cannot be contrary to itself: “God, you see, is willingly whatever he 
is; so he is willingly eternal and unchangeable and truthful and blessed and undefeatable. 
So if he can be what he does not wish, he is not almighty; but he is almighty, which is 
why he is capable of whatever he wishes.”83 Coupling this with the fact that the human 
will was created by God to be by nature free, it follows that His grace (in any of its many 
forms) can never be so overpowering as to make the human will unfree, otherwise God’s 
own will would be contrary to itself, thereby contradicting his own almightiness; which is 
absurd. By granting the gift of free will to humankind, God has metaphysically and 
                                                          
81 On Nature and Grace, Ch. 36. 
82 Sermon 398.2. He says the same things in Sermons Sermo 214.4 (around 391) and 140.2 (around 
428).  
83 Ibid. 
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morally bound himself not to interfere with its use, even if it is used by them to perpetrate 
moral evil. Though, of course, God is powerful enough to also bring moral good out of 
their evil, which we can see perhaps most clearly in the death of Christ, unjustly put to 
death by the Jews, but which thereby freed all of mankind from the servitude of sin and 
the road it paves towards eternal death. 
Augustine’s above argument concerning the things God cannot do has been 
infrequently touched upon in the scholarship, but one notable exception is Jacques 
Maritain, who claims that both Aquinas and Augustine held that every rational creature is 
naturally peccable, i.e., capable of sin; and that “God can no more make a creature, angel 
or man, naturally impeccable than he can make a square circle.”84 Maritain believes this 
is a result of their belief that God “plays fair” with His creatures, dealing with them as He 
does according to their natures. When it comes to angels and men, free beings, this means 
God must respect their fallible liberty.  
In the next work written for the monks of Hadrumetum, On Rebuke and Grace, 
Augustine’s main concern is to call attention to what he takes to be the key to 
understanding divine and human co-operation in the realm of moral action. While I have 
quoted this statement once before, it is worth repeating: “It is through Jesus Christ our 
Lord that we should understand God’s grace. It alone sets human beings free from evil. 
Without it they do nothing good at all, whether in thinking, or in willing and loving, or in 
acting.”85 Upon reading this statement and many others like it from Augustine, the monks 
complained that, if God’s grace works in them the thinking and the willing and the 
working in accord with what is good, then they do nothing. Another objection Augustine 
                                                          
84 God and the Permission of Evil, 37. 
85 Rebuke and Grace, 2.3. 
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heard from these monks pertained to the possible rebuke a monastic superior may give to 
his inferiors: if God does not work in them the thinking and the willing and the working 
in accord with what is good, then they cannot be blamed by their monastic superiors for 
what they have done wrong. After all, if they do not do it, then they should not be 
reprimanded; all they should do is pray to God, so that he may give the requisite grace 
that he has not yet bestowed.86 Augustine responds to their first complaint by saying that, 
while indeed they are “led by the Spirit of God (spiritu Dei se agi) to do that which 
should be done,” they are not led in such a way that they do nothing, “for they are acted 
upon that they may act.” 87 And he responds to their second complaint by saying that even 
in rebuke, the synergy between God and man can be revealed, since a rebuke may be just 
the catalyst needed for someone to change the focus of their will from loving evil things 
to loving God, a change that is brought to completion by God’s grace, but one that also 
requires the free consent of the will. Whether in the salutary effect of a rebuke, or in the 
performance of good actions, God gives support “to the weakness of the human will, so 
that by divine grace it [leads] unchangeably and insurmountably (Subventum est igitur 
infirmitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter 
ageretur).88  
 Augustine chooses his words very carefully here, deftly emphasizing both the 
primacy of divine agency and the importance of human agency: divine grace is what 
                                                          
86 Rebuke and Grace, 4.6.  
87 Rebuke and Grace, 2.4.  
88 Rebuke and Grace, 12.38. I have chosen to change the original English translation of the verb 
ageretur by “moves” to “leads,” which is a commonly accepted translation of the Latin. As will be apparent 
shortly, this change is important not only for what I think is a more accurate understanding of Augustine’s 
overall position on how God’s grace works with the freedom of the human will, but also in rebuffing certain 
objections to his position that are based on an inattention to this and other possible meanings of the Latin 
words actually used by Augustine in the original Latin manuscript of On Rebuke and Grace. 
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unchangeably and insurmountably leads the infirm human will in accordance with what is 
good, but the human will must follow in harmony with God’s grace. This passage in 
particular has frequently been interpreted by scholars as necessarily implying a kind of 
moral determinism, when, depending on one’s translation of the original Latin, it need 
not. John Rist, for instance, writes that he takes this passage to mean “that God’s grace 
moulds the human will to its own purposes, without any vestige of self-determination 
remaining for man.... The crux of the problem lies in the meaning of the two adverbs 
[indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter].”89 For Rist, these two adverbs do not just imply that 
grace is irresistible to and transforming of the human agent, so that we will freely from 
our own power, but rather that it is “unswerving and all-conquering,”90 so that we are 
slaves of God’s will. Rist concludes that, for Augustine, fallen human beings are like 
puppets on the controlling fingers of God, “free in the sense only of being arranged to act 
in a way not subject to external pressures.”91 Augustine, however, is not of necessity 
bound to understand these two adverbs in this way, either by themselves,92 or in his 
                                                          
89 Rist, 435.  
90 Rist, 436.  
91 Rist 440. He takes the same position in his Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. See for example, 
p. 133.  
92 After conducting a word search in Volumes 44 and 45 of J-P Migne’s Patrologia Latina (PL), 
which contain most of the major works at issue in the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian controversies, I have 
found that the adverb indeclinabiliter is used only one time by Augustine at Column 0940 in the 
controversial text that I have currently been discussing from On Rebuke and Grace 12.38. Here, the 
meaning of indeclinabiliter is “unchangeably,” which by itself cannot be used by Rist to argue that 
Augustine is a theological determinist. Perhaps more interesting is what my word search turned up (or, 
rather, did not turn up) when it came to the adverb insuperabiliter, which does have the meaning of 
“insurmountably,” “invincibly,” or as Rist likes to say, “unswerving.” I have found that Augustine will 
actually never use the word insuperabiliter in the entirety of Volumes 44 and 45 of the PL. The original 
Latin word he does use at Column 0940 and elsewhere (i.e., Columns 0247, 0275, 0277, 0420, 1132, 1250, 
1541, 1804, 1828, and 1893) is the adverb inseparabiliter, which he consistently takes to mean 
“inseparably” throughout these texts. In the first footnote for Column 0940, the editor explains that many 
manuscripts brought in insuperabiliter, including the 1577 ed. Lov. They did this because the context of the 
larger work seemed to emphasize the grace of God’s powerful influence on the infirm human will. 
However, he notes that in the interest of not committing any possible error with respect to Augustine’s 
original Latin manuscript, he is opting to keep the word Augustine himself used, which is inseperabiliter.  
41 
 
 
 
pairing of them with the imperfect passive subjunctive of the Latin agō, namely ageretur, 
all of which can be collectively translated as that divine grace “unchangeably and 
insurmountably leads” the human will. Translating ageretur in terms of “leads” (not 
“drives” or “moves”) is not only in my opinion an equally accurate conversion of this 
word into English, but also helps to shed the negative connotations of “compels” or 
“determines,” which are meanings usually attendant on these alternate translations, and 
ones which inevitably imply that Augustine is describing a kind of moral determinism 
with God playing the puppeteer. I would argue that Rist focuses too much on the two 
adverbs Augustine uses and not enough on the verb which they are meant to modify and, 
specifically, the different meaning of “leads” this verb can possess. In doing this, Rist 
misunderstands the larger thought that Augustine is attempting to convey about how 
God’s grace works with the fallen human will by unchangeably and insurmountably 
providing it with its proper direction and resting place.  
Nor would Augustine accept the dichotomy Rist sets up between God’s grace and 
the human will. As we have briefly seen in works such as On Nature and Grace, 
Augustine does not view these as mutually exclusive realities that have to somehow be 
reconciled, and that have to be given their own cordoned off areas of existence apart from 
each other; they are, rather, two distinct realities that have a mutual exigency for each 
other: the sole function of grace is to complete all finite natures according to the will of 
God, including human nature and its conative and cognitive powers; and the sole function 
of all finite natures and their corresponding powers is to be completed as such. In short, 
the purpose of God’s grace is to “lead” us to our perfection, and the purpose of our wills 
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is to “follow” that grace to our perfection.93 One can see the entire work, On Rebuke and 
Grace, as a brief attempt to make this point to the monks of Hadrumetum. 
  The monks of Provence, on the other hand, were mainly worried that Augustine’s 
belief in predestination by grace led to defeatism in the moral life. After all, if God has 
already decided who He will elect before the foundation of the world, then nothing any of 
us do can change that, thus rendering our wills inefficacious. To avoid the total 
disempowerment of the will seemingly implied by God’s predestinating grace, these 
monks wanted to reserve certain spaces for human freedom that were liberated from the 
encroachment of divine causality, namely the beginning of faith and perseverance. 
Augustine sent them On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance 
in response, which were originally written as one work between the years of 427 and 429. 
 From the very beginning of On the Predestination of the Saints and all the way to 
its end there is one point that Augustine stresses above all else: It is God’s grace that 
makes us first believe.94 The way he goes about actually proving this is through the citing 
of Church authorities and by giving certain arguments based on what these authorities 
have said. It should come as no surprise that the first of these authorities Augustine 
mentions is Paul, whom he quotes as saying, Not that we are sufficient to think anything 
as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God (2 Cor 3:5). Augustine then reasons that, 
since thought precedes belief, and since God graces us with thought, God is responsible 
for our belief, which is merely thought with assent. It follows that anyone who believes 
                                                          
93 I take the difference in God leading man by His grace and man following God by his will as another 
example of the previously discussed distinction that Augustine makes between God giving grace and man’s 
acceptance of that grace, respectively.  
94 See for example, Chapter 3. 
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also thinks, meaning “no one is sufficient for himself, either to begin or to perfect 
faith.”95  
As mentioned before, God offers sufficient beginning and perfecting graces to all, 
and Augustine never abandoned this idea: “in a certain sense the Father teaches 
all men to come to His Son. For it was not in vain that it was written in the prophets, And 
they shall all be teachable of God (John 6:45).”96 All are teachable of God (i.e., all have 
the capacity for God), but not all actualize it in faith working through the love of God and 
neighbor. Augustine thinks this is why the Gospel writer prefaces this statement with the 
claim, Every man, therefore, who has heard of the Father, and has learned, comes to me. 
Even though His lessons often fall on deaf ears and go unnoticed by blind eyes, 
“God teaches all men to come to Christ, not because all come, but because none comes in 
any other way.”97 For Augustine, this is borne out by the fact that some choose to accept 
the offer of grace and thereby receive it as a gift from God, whether in its beginning or in 
its completion, and some do not, as Scripture clearly bears witness. It follows that both 
those who successfully come to Christ and those who fail in this task do so willingly; the 
former do so willingly and in co-operation with God, whereas the latter do so willingly 
but in separation from God.  
It might be helpful to think of what Augustine is saying in the following way: 
Those who come to Christ are offered the gift of grace by God; they accept such grace in 
co-operation with Him; they then receive that grace, which is both theirs from their 
acceptance of it, and God’s from His having given it. Those who fail to come to Christ 
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97 Ibid. 
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are similarly offered the gift of grace by God; but they reject such grace in independence 
from Him; they then fail (and justly, Augustine might add) to receive that grace, which 
could have been theirs if they had accepted it, but remains only God’s, who never stops 
offering it.98 Augustine thinks the believer should not worry about to which group they 
belong, however, since all deserve condemnation because of Adam’s sin, “so that even if 
none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault 
with God.”99 Augustine’s answer here is consistent with the one already given in To 
Simplician: It is because of our demerits that we will be condemned, not because God 
does not will all to be saved. 
Chapter 19 of On the Predestination of the Saints is where talk of the relation 
between God’s grace and Augustine’s understanding of predestination100 reaches its 
height. To begin the Chapter, Augustine makes a very important distinction between the 
two: “predestination is the preparation for grace, while grace is the donation itself.” The 
preparation for grace is already accomplished in the mind of God, i.e., in God’s rational 
                                                          
98 The Latin words Augustine will generally use for “offer,” “receive,” and “give” are forms of the 
verbs offere/proferre, accipere, and dare, respectively. See footnote 113 for an example of how Augustine 
will actually use some of these Latin words in clarifying the above distinction.  
99 Chapter 16. 
100 Recall that Augustine’s technical, theological definition of predestination is given at On the Gift of 
Perseverance 14.35: “This is the predestination of the saints, nothing else: plainly the foreknowledge and 
preparation of God’s benefits, by means of which whoever is to be liberated is most certainly liberated.” 
(Praedestinationem quippe sanctorum nihil aliud esse quam praescientiam et praeparationem 
beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur). Augustine’s definition of 
predestination will be unpacked and qualified in certain respects that will be made clear in my exegesis of 
the relevant chapters of his On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance in what 
follows. However, it can be briefly noted that his definition shares certain similarities with, but is also 
different from, other major Patristic authors writing before and after him. Matthew Levering (2011) 
attempts a definitional comparison between the major Patristic authors regarding predestination. We learn 
from Levering, for example, that Origin’s definition of predestination is the same as Augustine’s in terms 
of basing it on God’s foreknowledge (i.e., God only grants His benefits or graces according to His 
knowledge of the future), but different from Augustine’s in terms of claiming that it is based on God’s 
knowledge of the future merits or demerits of individual persons (Levering, 39-40). For more helpful 
comparisons between how Augustine understands predestination and that of other theologians form the 
Patristic period, see Levering’s book, Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths (Oxford University 
Press: New York, 2011).  
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plan for creation, whereas the donation itself is dependent on the latter, with God only 
granting grace according to it. As Augustine says, “grace is the effect of predestination,” 
not the other way around. Another distinction Augustine insists upon in this Chapter is 
that between God’s predestination and foreknowledge, where the former cannot exist 
without the latter (because it would be nonsensical to say that God’s predestination was 
accomplished without knowledge), but foreknowledge is capable of existing without 
predestination. This allows Augustine inter alia to say of God that, “He is able to 
foreknow even those things he does not Himself do—as all sins whatever,” which 
effectively safeguards the predestinating will of God from any taint of the moral evil 
rational creatures are prone to commit by their own wills.  
Augustine then uses the example of Abraham’s faith in God’s promise to further 
illustrate his doctrine of predestination by grace:  
Therefore when God promised to Abraham in his seed the faith of 
the nations, saying, I have established you a father of many nations 
(Genesis 17:5), whence the apostle says, Therefore it is of faith, that the promise, 
according to grace, might be established to all the seed (Romans 4:16). He 
promised not from the power of our will but from His own predestination. For He 
promised what He Himself would do, not what men would do.101 
 
What men would do is uncertain, but what God Himself would do is certain and, in fact, 
already accomplished, for He made those things that shall be (Is 45: 11). God’s 
predestinating will does not change: from eternity, God has made up his mind, so to 
speak, to strengthen those who will the thinking of good thoughts, and to let those harden 
their hearts who by their free choice think evil thoughts.  
Again somewhat reminiscent of the Confessions, Augustine notes that, “although 
men do those good things which pertain to God’s worship, He himself makes them to do 
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what he has commanded.” Coming back to Abraham, it was not Abraham that made God 
to do what He had promised. It was God. To say otherwise would make the fulfillment of 
God’s promise placed in the power of Abraham. Abraham did not think this way, but 
rather he believed, giving glory to God, that what he promised he was able also to do 
(Rom 4:21). In the same way, our initial faith in God is a gift from Him: “when it is 
said, ‘If you believe, you shall be saved,’ faith is required of us, and salvation is proposed 
to us as a reward. For these things are both commanded of us, and are shown to 
be God’s gifts, in order that we may understand both that we do them, and 
that God makes us to do them, as He most plainly says by the prophet Ezekiel. For what 
is plainer than when He says, I will cause you to do? (Ezekiel 36: 27).”102 
 On the Gift of Perseverance is quite similar to On the Predestination of the Saints, 
which makes sense since they were originally written as one cohesive work on God’s 
grace. However, as the title of the work indicates, it is concerned primarily with the 
perseverance by which someone perseveres in the good to the end, and to prove that this 
is a gift of God. Here, as in On the Predestination of the Saints, Augustine will rely on 
Church authorities and philosophical argument to make his case. The first authority he 
relies upon in this work, however, is not St. Paul but St. Cyprian, whose On the Lord’s 
Prayer is cited by him as directly contradicting the heresy of Pelagianism in its defense 
of two important points. First, the grace of God is not given according to our merits; and 
second, no man is without sin. Another principle that Augustine adds as in accord with 
right Christian teaching is that we all inherit the condemnation brought about by Adam’s 
sin. He writes that, “Of these three points, that which I have placed last is the only one 
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that is not treated of in the above-named book of the glorious martyr; but of the two 
others the discourse there is of such perspicuity, that the above-named heretics [sc. the 
Pelagians], modern enemies of the grace of Christ, are found to have been convicted long 
before they were born.”103 Augustine’s opening argument to the monks therefore is that 
his position on grace is actually not as radical as they may think, mirroring St. Cyprian’s 
work in at least the two previously mentioned ways.  
 Augustine also rightly notes that it was Cyprian who said, “We must boast in 
nothing, seeing that nothing is our own.”104 Augustine takes this to mean that we only 
have a proper conception of free will “if we give up the whole to God, and do not entrust 
ourselves partly to Him and partly to ourselves, as that venerable martyr saw.”105 To be 
clear, this does not mean  that we must relinquish our idea of human freedom simpliciter, 
but rather that we must relinquish the idea that we can be free in independence from God. 
In his famous biography of the African Bishop entitled Augustine of Hippo,106 Peter 
Brown claims that this point can be used to illustrate the major difference between 
Augustine and Pelagius: 
The basic difference between the two men ... is to be found in two radically 
different views on the relation between man and God. It is summed up succinctly 
in their choice of language. Augustine had been fascinated by babies: the extent of 
their helplessness had grown upon him ever since he wrote the Confessions; and 
in the Confessions, he had no hesitation in likening his relation to God to that of a 
                                                          
103 Chapter 4.  
104 Augustine thinks that we find the same position in St. Paul: We are not sufficient to think anything 
of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God. (2 Corinthians 3:5); and in Ambrose of Milan: “our heart is not 
in our own power, nor are our thoughts.” See also Chapter 49, where Augustine will mention not only 
Cyprian, Paul, and Ambrose, but also Gregory Nazianzen as subscribing to this position. He writes: “let us 
add also a third, the holy Gregory, who testifies that it is the gift of God both to believe in God and 
to confess what we believe.”  
105 Chapter 12.  
106 Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo. University of California Press: Los Angeles (2000). 
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baby to its mother’s breast,107 utterly dependent, intimately involved in all the 
good and evil that might come from this, the only source of life. 
 
The Pelagian, by contrast, was contemptuous of babies. ‘There is no more 
pressing admonition than this, that we should be called sons of God.’ To be a 
‘son’ was to become an entirely separate person, no longer dependent upon one’s 
father, but capable of following out by one’s own power, the good deeds that he 
had commanded. The Pelagian was emancipatus a deo; it is a brilliant image 
taken from the language of Roman family law: freed from the all-embracing and 
claustrophobic rights of the father of a great family over his children, these sons 
had ‘come of age.’ They had been ‘released,’ as in Roman Law, from dependence 
upon the pater familias and could at last go out into the world as mature, free 
individuals, able to uphold in heroic deeds the good name of their illustrious 
ancestry: ‘Be ye perfect, even as Your Father in Heaven is perfect.’108  
 
Unlike Pelagius, Augustine thought we could not cordon off a space for human autonomy 
that exists in and for itself, whether that be how we initially come to have faith in God, or 
how we persevere in that faith to the end, or indeed anything good that we will or think or 
do. In all of these respects, Augustine states we are radically dependent on God, but it is 
nonetheless a willing dependency, because it is a relation we enter into if and only if we 
accept it by the humble consent of our wills. In short, it is a co-operative relationship. 
God does not force us to accept this dependence relationship with Him, even if it would 
be for our own good. For He has left us in the hands of our own counsel (Sir 15: 12-18), 
and the grace that would bring us into such a relationship with Him could not properly be 
called a gift unless it could be accepted or rejected. One thing we can always count on, 
however, is that God is there in the background, constantly working even up until now, 
offering graces that would establish this relation, but not compelling us to accept them. 
Augustine thus encourages the monks that this co-operative relationship he is describing 
leaves room for both humans and God to act freely, inasmuch as when we will what is 
                                                          
107 Augustine also frequently likened his relationship to God to that of the prodigal son and his 
relationship to his father found in Luke 15: 11-32.  
108 Brown, pp. 352-3. 
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good, “God works in us to will also. We therefore work, but God works in us to work 
also for His good pleasure.”109 If, on the other hand, we prefer to will what is evil and 
thereby reject God’s help to work with us to accomplish good things, He will nonetheless 
maintain his “standing offer” to provide help to our fallen wills; but He will respect our 
free choice to stand in separation from Him by not actually giving support to our fallen 
wills by gifting us with His grace. Whether the monks work with God or against God, 
then, Augustine believes their free will is on display for all to see. 
 Starting with Chapter 34, Augustine shifts his focus to the doctrine of 
predestination, and makes the somewhat unexpected claim that predestination, at least 
how he teaches it, and moral exhortation are not opposed to each other. After all, he tells 
us, “Did not that teacher of the heathen [sc. St. Paul] so often, in faith and truth, both 
commend predestination, and not cease to preach the word of God? Because he said, It 
is God that works in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure (Phil 2:13), did he 
not also exhort that we should both will and do what is pleasing to God?” In Chapter 36, 
he also cites Cyprian, saying that he actually “pronounced predestination to be most 
assured. For if we must boast in nothing, seeing that nothing is our own, certainly we 
must not boast of the most persevering obedience.” But the objection rears its head again: 
If God works in us both to will and to do, and if we cannot boast in anything, because 
nothing is our own, then does this not make human beings passive agents in the working 
out of their own salvation? Augustine recounts a story he once heard coming from a 
monastery in which one of the brothers was rebuked for doing things he should not have 
done, and for not doing things that should have been done. When he was rebuked, the 
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monk replied, “Whatever I may now be, I shall be such as God has foreknown that I shall 
be,” implying that he has no control over the development of his character, and so no 
control over what he does or does not do. According to Augustine, what this monk said 
about God’s foreknowledge was true, “but he was not profited by this truth for good, but 
so far made way in evil as to desert the society of the monastery, and become a dog 
returned to his vomit; and, nevertheless, it is uncertain what he is yet to become.”110 Such 
is just one example of how predestination and foreknowledge are often misunderstood, 
resulting in a moral complacency that opens a person up to the alluring danger of sin.  
How, then, should predestination be taught? For Augustine, there is really only 
one suitable way: 
For either predestination must be preached, in the way and degree in which 
the Holy Scripture plainly declares it, so that in the predestined the gifts and 
calling of God may be without repentance [i.e., without dependence on the 
merits/demerits of those who are predestined]; or it must be avowed 
that God’s grace is given according to our merits—which is the opinion of 
the Pelagians. To whomsoever, therefore, God gives His gifts, beyond a doubt He 
has foreknown that He will bestow them on them, and in His foreknowledge He 
has prepared them for them. Therefore, those whom He predestined, them He also 
called with that calling which I am not reluctant often to make mention of, of 
which it is said, The gifts and calling of God are without repentance 
(Rom 11:29).111 
 
Augustine is making the point that the gratuity of God’s grace does not admit of degrees. 
It is either gratuitous or not. It is either as Holy Scripture teaches it to be or not. There is 
no way to escape between the horns of this dilemma by finding a third alternative, even 
though that is precisely what the monks to whom Augustine is writing were trying to do, 
in their holding that the beginning of faith and perseverance in that faith to the end were 
two parts of human agency that were independent of God’s causality. But Augustine will 
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hold his ground along with St. Paul and St. Cyprian in saying that all of the good we 
think and will and do are gifts of God.112 Indeed, they are gifts in the sense of being 
freely ‘given’ to us by God, not depending on our merits, but requiring the consent of our 
wills to be received. The fact that they are gifts, Augustine tells us, does not make them 
any less ours when we willingly receive them, for “ours is anything had by us, ours too is 
anything given to us; I mean, if it isn’t ours, it hasn’t been given. How after all can you 
give anything, if it isn’t to be his or hers, to whom you give it?”113 It follows that all of 
the goods and perfections that come down to us from the Father of Lights (James 1:17) 
can properly be said to be God’s, in that He is the one giving these gifts, and ours, in that 
we are ones accepting and thereby receiving them.  
For the remainder of the work, Augustine then gives advice as to how the above-
mentioned teaching of predestination ought to be preached to the members of the Church, 
so that it does not lead to moral defeatism or theological contradiction. In Chapter 58, we 
receive the most important of these pieces of advice. While rather lengthy, it is worth 
quoting in full: 
Now, therefore, the definite determination of God’s will concerning 
predestination is of such a kind that some from unbelief receive the will to obey, 
and are converted to the faith or persevere in the faith, while others who abide in 
the delight of damnable sins, even if they have been predestined, have not yet 
arisen, because the aid of compassionate grace has not yet lifted them up. For if 
any are not yet called whom by His grace He has predestined to be elected, they 
will receive that grace114 whereby they may will to be elected, and may be so; and 
                                                          
112 See for example, Chapter 48. 
113 Sermon 333.1, 415-420.  
114 The original Latin may help to understand what Augustine is driving at in this sentence when he 
speaks of God’s grace and how it interacts with those persons who are elected but not yet called: si qui 
enim nondum sunt vocati, quos gratia sua praedestinavit eligendos, accipient eamdem gratiam, qua electi 
esse velint et sint. Augustine means that these persons will receive (accipient) God’s predestinating grace, 
which is offered to everyone yet not forced on anyone, only if they will (velint) to receive that grace 
whereby they become elected (electi). Augustine is here once again calling attention to his distinction 
between God’s grace qua offered and God’s grace qua given/received: As offered, everyone has equal 
access to sufficient graces for their salvation, but this offered grace has no ontological relation or causal 
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if any obey, but have not been predestined to His kingdom and glory, they are for 
a season, and will not abide in the same obedience to the end.  
Although, then, these things are true, yet they must not be so said to the 
multitude of hearers as that the address may be applied to themselves also, and 
those words of those people may be said to them which you have set down in your 
letter, and which I have above introduced: The definite determination 
of God’s will concerning predestination is of such a kind that some of you 
from unbelief shall receive the will to obey, and come to the faith. What need is 
there for saying, ‘Some of you?’ For if we speak to God’s Church, if we speak 
to believers, why do we say that some of them had come to the faith, and seem to 
do a wrong to the rest, when we may more fittingly say the definite determination 
of the will of God concerning predestination is of such a kind that 
from unbelief you shall receive the will to obey, and come to the faith, and shall 
receive perseverance, and abide to the end? 
 
When we preach predestination, in other words, Augustine thinks it is better to preach it 
in the third person rather than the second person. For to preach it in the second person “is 
not to be said to be desirable, but abominable, and it is excessively harsh and hateful to 
fly as it were into the face of an audience with abuse, when he who speaks to them 
says, ‘And if there are any of you who obey, and are predestined to be rejected, the power 
of obedience shall be withdrawn from you, that you may cease to obey.’”115 Augustine 
admits that there may be no fundamental difference in the third person and second person 
expressions of this doctrine, but there is a difference in the psychological effect that these 
expressions have on the audience: the one made in second person is unhelpful to their 
salvation, sounding more like a personal attack, or a supererogatory request that they 
cannot work towards achieving; whereas the one made in the third person is helpful to 
                                                          
effect on the human will. As given/received, God has only given his predestinating grace to those persons 
who were willing to accept it and thereby received it. In other words, God’s offered gift of grace becomes 
God’s given gift of grace the moment is has been willingly accepted and thereby received by the individual. 
God’s grace then becomes ontologically one with yet distinct from that individual’s will, strengthening its 
power for action so that it can do the good it wills to do, and not the evil that it hates, but often does 
anyway because of its infirmity (Rom 7:15). Put simply, God’s grace qua given/received is the “primary 
cause” of any person’s good actions. The idea that God’s grace is the primary cause of the human will is 
discussed in the next chapter of this dissertation.  
115 Chapter 61. 
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their salvation, in that it provides a kind of salutary exhortation to fight the good fight, to 
keep the faith, and finish the race.116 According to Augustine, the way predestination is 
preached to the community of the faithful matters because human effort matters. For 
anyone to say that he would switch his preaching of predestination from the second 
person to the third person in order to achieve some end other than aiding in the salvation 
of the faithful, such as to maintain order and peace in his flock, makes Augustine out to 
be no more than a charlatan. Given how seriously Augustine took his pastoral duty of 
preaching, I dare say he would view such an accusation contemptible.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 Ibid. 
117 Ticciati actually believes that Augustine is being disingenuous in Chapter 58, and claims that it is 
easy for him to say, “The gift of grace is given to some and not to others, but I hope that it will be given to 
all” (99) in order to elicit moral effort from his audience. This, in my mind, not only diminishes 
Augustine’s teaching concerning predestination, but also casts unwarranted doubt on the sincerity of 
Augustine’s pastoral practices, which I maintain are beyond reproach. Possidius, a good friend of 
Augustine and his biographer, proves to be a helpful character witness for the Bishop of Hippo in this 
regard: “Right down to his final illness he preached the word of God in the church uninterruptedly, 
zealously, and courageously, and with soundness of mind and judgment.” “He taught and preached the 
word of salvation (Acts 13:22) with complete freedom (Acts 4:29) in private and in public, in the house and 
in the church.” (Possidius, 31, 4). Augustine saw his preaching as a debt he owed to his congregation: “I 
know that I am a debtor to you as Christians; I regard you as creditors.” (Sermon 153.1). Does this sound 
like a man who was insincere about anything he preached concerning the word of salvation? Augustine was 
always aware of the fact that it was not his word that he was preaching, but God’s. He starts a sermon by 
saying, “What I am about to say is not my idea but God’s” (Sermon 51.1). 
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Chapter 3 
Augustine as Preacher of Grace 
 
 The stress that Augustine puts on the primacy of God’s grace in his anti-Pelagian 
and semi-Pelagian writings has led to him being called the “doctor of grace” (doctor 
gratiae). But even in these sometimes highly polemical works, we have seen reason to 
doubt the claim of his theological opponents and scholarly critics that his teaching with 
respect to sin and grace somehow destroy the free choice of the will. We see this to an 
even greater extent in his pastoral writings and scriptural commentaries, which I will 
show allow for the same kind of synergy between God and man that the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition’s conception of deification requires.  
While the concept of deification by grace is not as emphasized in Augustine as in 
the Greek-speaking-East, it still finds a place of great importance in his writings.118 As an 
object of scholarly research, however, it is still true to say that it has received less than 
adequate attention, considering just how much Augustine will rely on it to explain key 
aspects of Christian life, from the reason why God created man to how we are able to 
interact with God (whether in this life or the next) and everything in between.119 As a 
                                                          
118 The contributors to the Augustinus Lexikon did a computer search and found only fifteen 
references to the words deificatus and deificare and their grammatical variants in the totality of Augustine’s 
writings, with seven of these references being unrelated to the theology of deification. The latter seven 
being: Contra Faustum 32.7 and 32.19; Contra Felicem 1.13; De Baptismo 6.15.24; Contra Cresconium 
3.49.80 (two references); De Patientia 17.14. The eight references related to the theology of deification 
being: Ep. 10.2; De Civitate Dei 19.23; Enarratio in Ps. 49.2 (three references) and 117.11; Sermon 
126.10.14 and 166.4.4. Yet as Gerald Bonner points out in his article, “Augustine’s Conception of 
Deification,” the computer they used was not programmed to identify the instances where Augustine 
mentioned deification in his exegesis of Ps. 81 [82]: 6: Dixi, dii estis; nor was it programmed to identify the 
times when he made the claim, following in the footsteps of Athanasius and Irenaeus, that God became 
man so that we might become gods, which is clearly of the utmost importance to the theology of 
deification, but does not actually use the word deification in its elaboration (See Bonner, 369). 
119 The following represents some of the best work written on Augustine’s conception of deification in 
the 20th Century. It is a short list. Since I have already referenced Gerald Bonner’s excellent article on 
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theological concept, deification finds its origin in the famous words of St. Peter: grace 
makes us partakers of the divine nature (“consortes divinae naturae/theias xoinonoi 
phuseos”) (2 Peter 1:4). Because of God’s deifying grace, real human-divine communion 
can take place, as we become in a sense connatural with God through His activity 
towards us that makes us “like Him.” Similarly to the Greek Fathers, Augustine views 
deification to be the New Testament doctrine of uiothesia, or sonship by adoption, made 
possible by the Son’s Incarnation. The Word’s union with human nature in the person of 
Christ as the way to our salvation is a major theme in Augustine’s theological and 
pastoral writings from about the mid-390s throughout the rest of his teaching and 
preaching career. An earlier example of this can be found in Sermo 261.2-3 (ca. 396 or 
397): 
Just as he ascended, you see, and still didn’t depart from us, so we too are now 
there with him ... if he has attached us to himself as his members in such a way 
that even with us joined on he is his very same self (ut etiam nobis coniunctis 
idem ipse sit), ... we too are going to ascend, not by our own virtue, but by our and 
his oneness (sed nostra et illius unitate).  
A later example of this can be found at en. Ps. 121.5: 
Onto what should you grasp? Grasp that which Christ became for you, because 
that is Christ himself, and Christ himself is rightly understood by this name I am 
who I am [Ex. 3.14], inasmuch as he is in the form of God. In that nature wherein 
he deemed it no robbery to be equal to God, there he is the selfsame [idipsum]. 
But that you might participate in the selfsame, he first of all became a participant 
in what you are [ut autem efficiaris tu particeps in idipsum, factus est ipse prior 
particeps tui].120 
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Our participation in God is thus only made possible by Christ becoming man, and it is 
through him that we become deified. The Christological focus of Augustine’s doctrine of 
deification is perhaps best seen in his Commentaries on the Psalms 49.2, where he writes: 
In the same psalm observe to whom it is said, “I have said, ‘you are gods and sons 
of the Most High, all of you, but you will die as men, and you will fall like one of 
the princes.’” It is therefore clear that he calls gods those men who are deified by 
his grace (ex gratia sua deificatos) even though they are not born of his substance. 
For he justifies who is just through himself and not from another; and he deifies 
who is God through himself and not by participation in another. Now he who 
justifies is he who deifies because by justifying he makes them sons of God. For 
he gave them power to become sons of God (Jn 1:12). If we have become sons of 
God, then we have also become gods; but this is by reason of the grace of the one 
who adopts us not by reason of his nature begetting us.121  
This adoptive grace makes us brothers of Christ: “For he who says ‘Our Father’ to God 
says ‘Brother’ to Christ.”122 And Christ himself tells us, Whoever does the will of my 
Father is my brother and sister and mother (Mk 3:35). The adopted Christian in fact 
becomes part of Christ and forms with him ‘the whole man,’ “for if he is the head, we are 
the members: he and we are a whole man.”123 In this regard, Augustine will often refer to 
the Church by the expression “Christus totus”—the whole Christ.124 For Augustine, 
individual Christians are only who they are in relation to Christ and their fellow Christian 
brothers and sisters, in the service of charity. It is a relation in which the fulfillment of 
any member helps bring to fulfillment the whole body. When one Christian, for instance, 
shows hospitality to another who is a stranger, or feeds another who is hungry, or clothes 
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another who is naked, “members are serving members; and the head rejoices, and reckons 
as given to himself whatever has been lavished on a member of his.”125  
As the Archbishop of Ottawa, Monsignor Joseph Plourde, once said:  
[T]he human being, in St. Augustine’s formulation, is ‘an extension of the 
Trinitarian family’; that, when God thinks of man as His image, man is, in the 
first place, Jesus Christ. Consequently, that man is governed by the same 
dynamics as the Trinity itself, that is, by freedom, unity, and love.... [T]his image 
of God which is actualized in a divine surrounding, requires of us a mastery of 
nature; and thus a technical and economic effort. We should move beyond the 
struggle for life and beyond self-centeredness, to a vision of sharing, and the 
essential fulfillment of all humanity.126  
The fact that some members of the body have things to give to other members, or that 
some have things others do not, does not imply any kind of disunity in the body.127 The 
body is a place where the members ought to supply what certain other members are 
lacking, a place where the material and spiritual needs of others are met.128 This is one of 
Augustine’s fundamental theological/philosophical ideas: “that the good of all persons is 
both unified and interdependent (I cannot specify what is good for me without including 
what is good for you in the same calculation).”129  
Augustine gives an example: Suppose in your body your left hand has a ring on it, 
but your right hand does not. Does that mean your right hand is lacking something your 
left hand possesses? It would seem so, if you are only considering your two hands; but if 
you consider your entire body, of which your two hands are parts, you will see that “the 
one which doesn’t have a ring, does in fact have it in the one which does.”130 Similarly, 
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different parts of your body serve different and distinct functions from each other: your 
eyes allow you to see where you are headed, whereas your feet move you to where your 
eyes look ahead; and while it is true that your feet are unable to see, and your eyes are 
unable to walk, it is not true that they lack each other’s functions, when they are 
considered within the context of the unity of the body as a whole. Augustine writes: 
“your foot answers you, ‘I too have the light; not in myself, though, but in the eye; the 
eye, after all, doesn’t see only for itself, and not for me.’ Your eyes too say, ‘We too can 
walk, not in ourselves but in the feet; the feet, after all, don’t only carry themselves, and 
not carry us.’”131 Every function of every part of the body, in other words, is shared in the 
unity of the whole body for the benefit of the whole body. This is how we must 
understand the unity of the body of Christ, i.e., the unity of its members and Head in the 
visible Church. For we, too, are freedom, unity, and love, not in ourselves but in the 
whole Christ, and particularly in our Head, who has sacramentally brought us into this 
unity through his life, death, and resurrection. The unity of the whole Christ, then, cannot 
be understood in individualistic terms, because it is by its very nature a societas grounded 
in the love of the members both for each other and for their Head, and preeminently in 
the love that the Head has for its body. Freedom, unity, and love are not private 
possessions of an individual, but rather are the common goods of all Christians, as they 
relate to each other and to God through Christ.  
 A fitting and not to mention helpful image of this unity is also provided by the 
prophet Isaiah’s discussion of the bride and the bridegroom. In the book of Isaiah, the 
bride speaks to the bridegroom as if they were one person. Augustine comments that it is 
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certain that “it’s one and the same person speaking,”132 and that we can see this in what is 
said: As for a bridegroom he has bound a turban on my head, and as for a bride he has 
decked me out with ornaments (Is 61:10). Isaiah calls “one and the same person 
bridegroom with reference to the head, bride with reference to the body.”133 Another 
biblical example Augustine often relies on to explain the close-knit unity between the 
members of the body of Christ is Paul’s conversion experience recounted in Acts 9. Here, 
the then named Saul is asked the simple question, Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting 
me? (Acts 9: 1-4). Paul could neither see nor touch Christ, but he still said to him, why 
are you persecuting me? Augustine thinks it is of great significance that Christ did not 
say, “Why are you persecuting my family, my servants, my saints—add another title of 
honor—my brothers and sisters.”134 He said you are persecuting me, my members, who 
were being insulted, stoned, and killed on earth, causing the head to cry out from heaven.  
The unity among Christ and Christians is indeed so strong that Augustine claims 
that psalms of praise may be made in honor not only to the Head of the Church but also 
to its body, to us as its adopted sons and daughters.135 Even more emphatic is the image 
of this unity Augustine gives us in his Commentary on the Epistle of John 10.3, where he 
talks of Christ and Christians as being unus Christus amans seipsum, or “one Christ 
loving himself.”136 For Augustine, one becomes a member of Christ’s body only by the 
way of love (via amoris), and through that love “there will be one Christ loving himself. 
For when the members love one another, the body loves itself.”137 
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We must also understand this unity to apply to all members of the body of Christ, 
no matter where they are, no matter past, present, or future:  
The apostle says with the utmost clarity: You are the body of Christ and his 
members (1 Cor 12:27). All of us together are the members and the body of 
Christ—not only we who are present in this place, but all throughout the world; 
not only we who are alive at the present time, but—as I might put it—all who 
have lived or will live from Abel the just man to the end of the world, as long as 
human beings beget and are begotten. Every just man who passes through this life 
is included138; all who exist now, that is, not just in this place, but in this life 
everywhere; all who will be born in the future. All these form the one body of 
Christ.... This Church, which is now on pilgrimage, is united to the heavenly 
Church where we have the angels as fellow citizens.... And there is but a single 
Church, the city of the great king.139  
Apart from the body of Christ (corpus Christi), or what means the same thing, the unity 
of the Church (unitas Ecclesiae), Christians cannot be one with any person, even 
themselves; nor can they find any true and lasting fulfillment as the spiritual beings they 
are meant to become. As a result, Christ “wants his disciples to be one in him, because 
they cannot be one in themselves, split as they are from each other by clashing wills and 
desires, and the uncleanness of their sins; so they are cleansed by the mediator that they 
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may be one in him, not only by virtue of the same nature whereby all of them from the 
ranks of mortal men are made equal to the angels, but even more by virtue of one and the 
same wholly harmonious will reaching out in concert to the same ultimate happiness, 
fused somehow into one spirit in the furnace of charity.”140 Augustine tells us that 
Christ’s desire for our unity in him should be seen as an invitation to live the life of the 
angels, to participate in the Holy Spirit’s love, and to partake in the never ending dinner. 
It is an invitation which is given to us so that we may become Christ’s brothers and 
sisters, so that we may inherit the eternal felicity meant for us from the moment we were 
created in the divine Wisdom. And it is an invitation to live Christ’s life of perfect 
freedom, lived in perfect obedience to his Father in heaven.141 Accepting this invitation 
means that we actually become Christ, “because we too are himself, insofar as he is the 
son of man because of us, and we are sons of God because of him.”142  
 But here we must be careful about in what sense we become Christ, for surely we 
do not attain the divine nature of Christ, nor do we become Christ in the sense of taking 
over his unique role as mediator between God and man, i.e., as the Head of the Church. 
In Sermon 341 (419), Augustine clarifies how we should understand our identification 
with, yet distinction from, the two-natured Christ. He begins this sermon with an analysis 
of choice scriptural passages to show that Christ is to be understood in three ways: the 
first way is “as God and according to the divine nature which is coequal and coeternal 
with the Father before he assumed flesh.” The second way is as he is after the taking on 
of our human nature, i.e., as the God-man—the mediator between God and man, 
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“according to that pre-eminence which is peculiar to him and in which he is not to be 
equated with other human beings.” The third and final way is “in some manner or other 
as the whole Christ in the fullness of the Church, that is as head and body, according to 
the completeness of a certain perfect man (Eph 4:13), the man in whom we are each of us 
members.”143 Only in this third and final way can we properly say we are Christ. 
We will not receive the same divine inheritance as Christ the mediator, however, 
if we shun the unity enjoyed by the whole Christ, preferring our own individual good. 
Indeed, if we do not join together in this societas but set ourselves apart, we will be 
natural human beings and remain as such, for this is what we have of ourselves, by 
ourselves; we will remain psychikoi (natural men), who are slaves to the carnal lusts that 
are natural to our bodily existence, not becoming the pneumatikoi (spiritual men)144 we 
were meant to become, because we will not possess the Spirit, or perhaps better, because 
we will not be possessed by the Spirit. Augustine believes that it is this unity, effected by 
the Incarnation, cemented by the love of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts (Rom 
5:5), that is enjoyed by the true Church. And it is this unity that Saint John was speaking 
of when he said, that they may be one as we are one (Jn 17:22). The Father and Son are 
one not only by virtue of the same substance they share, but also from their will being 
one and the same. So too, all true Christians are one not only by possessing the same 
human nature, but also “by being bound in the fellowship of the same love.”145 Being 
bound by others’ love in this way is not a form of internal compulsion, an obstruction to 
one’s freedom, but rather is how we are reconciled to each other and to God.146 The 
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Church thus cannot be conceived of as a mere natural unity between members of the 
human species. After all, not even the Trinity can be described as just a community of 
three persons which are of the same divine kind. The Church, like the Trinitarian 
communion, is a dilectionis societas. That is, a society of individuals of the same kind 
that is effected by love. According to Augustine, any other kind of societas, whether 
formed for the utilitarian benefit of its members or some other reason, is not a true 
society.  
Augustine was so certain of the reality of man’s deification by grace, occurring in 
and through the unified body of Christ, that he even used it to argue for the true divinity 
of the Son: 
If the word (sermo) of God was so made to men that they should be called gods, 
how can the Word (verbum) of God himself, who is with God, not be God? If men 
are made gods by the Word of God (per sermonem Dei), if by participating 
(participando) they are made gods, is not He in whom they participate not God? 
If lights which are kindled are gods, is the light which enlightens not God? If they 
are made gods being warmed in a certain fashion by the saving fire, is He by 
whom they are warmed not God? You come to the light and are illuminated and 
numbered among the sons of God. If you draw back from the light you are 
darkened and reckoned to be in darkness. But that light does not come to itself, 
because it does not draw back from itself. If therefore the word (sermo) of God 
makes you, how is the Word (verbum) of God not God?147  
Augustine makes clear, however, that our adoption as sons will only be fully realized in 
the next life, when the spiritualization of our bodies is complete: 
Our full adoption as sons will take place in the redemption of our body. We now 
have the firstfruits of the spirit, by which we are indeed made sons of God; but in 
other respects we are Sons of God as saved and made new by hope. In the event, 
however, since we are not yet finally saved, we are therefore not yet fully made 
new nor yet sons of God, but children of this world.148  
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This is not to say that we cannot have any knowledge of our future spiritualized state at 
the present time. Christ’s resurrected form, for those who have the eyes to see and the 
ears to hear, provides us quite exactly with what we will be, God willing, at the 
resurrection of our bodies. The spiritualized form in which “we are to rise again, he has 
shown us himself in his own resurrection. It’s because that specific form, however, will 
have no tendency to decay that the apostle says, But this I must say, brothers, that flesh 
and blood shall not gain possession by inheritance of the kingdom of God; nor shall what 
is perishable gain possession by inheritance of imperishability (1 Cor 15:50).149  
Augustine does not view it to be an abdication of our freedom to conform 
ourselves as far as we can to Christ’s spiritualized form here and now, this side of 
heaven; he in fact recommends us to imitate the example set by Christ in the form of his 
humanity, and the example set by the Son—the divine Image—whose being and will are 
inseparably one with the Father’s:  
For we too are the image of God, though not the equal one like him; we are made 
by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father like that image; we are 
image because we are illuminated with light; that one is so because it is the light 
that illuminates, and therefore it provides a model for us without having a model 
itself. For it does not imitate another going before it to the Father, since it is never 
by the least hair’s breadth separated from him, since it is the same thing as he is 
from whom it gets its being. But we by pressing on imitate him who abides 
motionless; we follow him who stands still, and by walking in him we move 
toward him, because for us he became a road or way in time by his humility, 
while being for us an eternal abode by his divinity.”150  
Even though we are not an equal image of God the Father, like the Son, and even though 
we are radically separated in our being from him, unlike the Son, by imitating the 
humility of Christ, who only came to do his Father’s will, we can achieve a deeper 
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communion in that reality of God which is for us: God’s eternal will and knowledge. Our 
deification as Christians is effected by our imitation of Christ’s obedience to that reality 
on which our salvation and freedom completely turns, by aligning our wills with Christ’s. 
That Christ as humble man is our way to Christ as God is an idea that frequently recurs in 
the Sermons. For instance, Augustine says, “The place for you to stay in, that’s God; the 
way for you to get there, that’s man. It’s one and the same Christ, both the way to go and 
the place to go.”151 Augustine will also frequently refer to the humanity of Christ as being 
a “broad road” or “highway” which leads us back home to our Creator,152 but a road or 
highway which demands from us the same kind of willing obedience displayed by Christ.  
 The model of human free will for which I am arguing in Augustine is not one 
characterized by the dominance of the divine will over the subordinate human will, but 
one characterized by their inseparable, co-operative, and free relation to each other. The 
Greek East picks up on this, too, with Basil offering the same example of the Son’s 
obedience to the Father to show why this is the case: “When then he says, ‘I have not 
spoken of myself,’ and again, ‘As the Father said unto me, so I speak,’ and ‘The word 
which you hear is not mine, but [the Father’s] which sent me,’ and in another place, ‘As 
the Father gave me commandment, even so I do,’ it is not because he lacks deliberate 
purpose or power of initiation, nor yet because he has to wait for the preconcerted key-
note, that he employs language of this kind. His object is to make it plain that His own 
will is connected in indissoluble union with the Father ... so that ‘all things that the Father 
hath’ belong to the Son, not gradually accruing to Him little by little, but with Him all 
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together and at once.”153 And the same goes for the Spirit: “you might learn that in every 
operation the Spirit is closely conjoined with, and inseparable from, the Father and the 
Son. God works the differences of operations, and the Lord the diversities of 
administrations, but all the while the Holy Spirit is present too of His own will, 
dispensing distribution of the gifts according to each recipients worth.”154 Basil’s younger 
brother, Gregory of Nyssa, will even be more extreme in his language, claiming that 
subjection to God is our only chance for real freedom. He writes: “the subjection of men 
to God is salvation for those who are so made subject, according to the voice of the 
prophet, who says that his soul is subject to God, since of Him cometh salvation by 
subjection (Ps lxii.1), so that subjection is the means of averting perdition.”155  
Augustine assures us that such obedience or subjection to God does nothing to 
vitiate the nature of our wills as free: 
When we obey God and are said to do his will by that obedience, we do not do it 
unwillingly, but willingly. Hence, if we do it willingly, in what sense do we not 
do our own will, unless in the language of Scripture that will is called ours, which 
is understood to be our own as opposed to the will of God. Adam had such a will, 
and as a result, we died in him. Christ did not have such a will so that we might 
have life in him.... In terms of the Son’s divinity, the Father and the Son have one 
and the same will, nor can it be different in any way where the nature of the 
Trinity as a whole is immutable. But so that the mediator of God and man, the 
man Jesus Christ, would not do his own will, which is opposed to God, he was not 
only man, but God and man. And through this marvelous and singular grace 
human nature could exist in him without any sin.”156  
Similar themes are brought out in his Commentary on Psalm 93 (ca. 414), where 
Augustine discusses the two wills that Christ revealed in the garden of Gethsemane and 
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on the cross within the larger context of salvation history, and what this should mean for 
the salvation of our own individual wills. He rhetorically asks:  
How did our Lord marry two wills so that they became one in the humanity he 
bore? In his body, the Church, there would be some people who, after wanting to 
do their own will, would later follow the will of God. The Lord prefigured these 
people in himself. He wanted to show that though they are weak, they still belong 
to him, and so he represented them in advance in his own person. He sweated 
blood from his whole body, as a sign that the blood of martyrs would gush from 
his body, the Church.... He revealed the human will that was in him, but if he had 
continued to insist on that will, he would have seemed to display perversity of 
heart. If you recognize that he has had compassion on you, and is setting you free 
in himself, imitate the next prayer he made: Yet not what I will, but what you will 
be done, Father (Mt 26:39).157  
We are able to do the Father’s will here and now by following the commandments 
present in scripture, with the help of God’s grace, of course. In one of his most important 
anti-Pelagian sermons, Sermon 348A (415), Augustine comments on the apostle’s words, 
We pray to God that you may do nothing evil (2 Cor 13:7):  
He could have said, “We warn you not to do anything evil, we teach you not to do 
anything evil, we order you, we command you.” And to be sure, if he had said 
that, he would have said something perfectly in order, because our wills also do 
contribute something; it’s not the case, after all, that our wills do nothing. But 
they are not sufficient by themselves. However, he preferred to say, We pray, in 
order to emphasize the role of grace, so that those correspondents of his might 
understand that when they did not do anything evil, they were not shunning evil 
solely by their own will, but were fulfilling with help from God what had been 
commanded.”158  
Augustine concludes that when a command is given by God, it points to the will’s 
freedom of choice; and when a prayer is made about accomplishing what has been 
commanded, it points to the will’s need for grace to be effectual. The need for both free 
will and prayer can also be found in scripture:  
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Is there any need, my brothers and sisters, to run through many instances? 
Whatever we are commanded to do, we have to pray that we may be able to fulfill 
it; but not in such a way that we let ourselves go, and like sick people lie flat on 
our backs and say, “May God rain down food on our faces,” and we ourselves 
wish to do absolutely nothing about it; and when food has been rained into our 
mouths we say, “may God also swallow it for us.” We too have got to do 
something. We’ve got to be keen, we’ve got to try hard, and to give thanks insofar 
as we have been successful, to pray insofar as we have not.”159  
In emphasizing God’s grace as the primary cause of our free will oriented towards the 
good, Augustine does not cancel human freedom and responsibility. While any good that 
we do is wholly from God as primary cause, it is also wholly from us as secondary cause, 
as actuated or moved by God’s grace, in accord with the praiseworthy specification of 
our will. It is not as if part of a good action belongs to us and part of it belongs to God. 
According to Augustine, from the deepest recesses of our hearts to the hairs on our head, 
no minutiae of our spiritual and corporeal being escapes God’s providential causality.160 
So too with the good actions we perform: from their possibility, to their source and 
specification in the will, and even during and up to their completion, no part of them is 
separated from God’s causality. Augustine gives an example of this in On the Trinity, 
where he uses the language of first or primary causality to explain God’s role in effecting 
someone’s charitable action. He begins by saying that, “Without any doubt the first or 
ultimate cause [of someone’s work of mercy] must be looked for in that changeless 
wisdom which the soul of the wise man serves in charity.... So it is in the will of God that 
the primary and ultimate cause”161 of the man’s work of mercy can be found. Augustine 
continues his example by asking us to suppose that in going about his charitable action 
the wise man hires servants to help complete his good work, even though the servants 
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161 On the Trinity, Book III, 1.8. 
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might be motivated to do so not because they have the same spirit of generosity as the 
man, but because they want to get paid to feed their worldly lusts or to avoid bothersome 
inconveniences as a result of a lack of money. Suppose further that the wise man enlists 
the help of draft animals to complete his good work. Since they are non-rational, clearly 
they do not give a moment’s thought to what they are doing; they only help the man 
because of their natural desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Finally, suppose the wise 
man uses many different kinds of inanimate objects required for his charitable endeavor, 
such as money, clothes, food, drink, oil, books, etc. etc. According to Augustine, the 
application of all of these animate and inanimate bodies to the man’s work leads to their 
being “moved about, damaged, repaired, destroyed, reconstructed, subjected to all sorts 
of changes in time and space”; and all such changes have as their first cause “the invisible 
and unchanging will of God.”162  
If Augustine were asked to specify exactly the role of the secondary causality 
provided by the various animate/inanimate objects in the above example and the 
secondary causality provided by the man performing the work of mercy, he would reply 
that such a question cannot be answered univocally, because the being of created reality 
is not univocal, capable of being divided most generally into the visible and the invisible, 
heaven and earth. This is why Augustine in Book III gives various examples of how 
secondary causation operates with the primary causality of God. He believes that there is 
a difference between stones and living stones (1 Pt 2:5), or non-rational and rational 
creation, respectively.163 It follows that there must also be a difference between how the 
                                                          
162 Ibid. Generally speaking, Augustine takes a strong view of God’s providential causality in Book III 
of On the Trinity, attributing the existence of all secondary causes and events in the world to God’s will.  
163 See trin.3.2.8. 
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divine will operates with causes that come from the soul and operates on causes that 
come from purely material or bodily realities.164 Coming back to the example given 
above, Augustine will attempt to make this point clearer by asking us to suppose that the 
man who performs a work of mercy “wearies his body by toil, and thereby contracts an 
illness.”165 Suppose further that this man goes and asks one physician what caused his 
illness, and the physician replies that it was a dryness of the body; the man then goes and 
sees another physician, who tells him that his illness is due to excessive moisture in the 
body. One of these physicians, from a bodily perspective, gives the true cause of the 
man’s physical ailment, but both are talking about the “proximate cause” of the man’s 
illness. There is yet a higher cause of his illness, however, which is the “freely-assumed 
toil” the man chose to undertake in the carrying out of his work of mercy; and this 
pertains to the soul.166 But even with this psychological explanation, Augustine maintains 
that we have not given an adequate causal explanation of why the man performed his 
work of mercy. For that we must turn to the unchangeable Wisdom itself. According to 
Augustine, by serving the divine Wisdom and obeying its command, “the soul of the wise 
man took upon himself this voluntary toil (voluntarium laborem). Thus, the first cause 
(causa prima) of that illness, in the truest sense of the term, would be found to be nothing 
else than the will of God (Dei voluntas).”167 
But when it comes to our evil actions, God cannot be said to be causally 
responsible for them, directly or indirectly, for it is we who are the first cause of them, 
taking the first initiative towards doing them in rejecting the divine will. In Sermon 229E 
                                                          
164 See trin.3.1.6 and 3.3. 
165 trin.3.3. 
166 Ibid. 
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71 
 
 
 
(after 411), Augustine urges those listening to him to not let sins remain their friends; but 
if certain sins do manage to tempt their hearts, they should only let those sins tempt them 
“against [their] wills,” for then it will be the sins in them that want to do what is evil and 
not them.168 He gives an example: Suppose you are sick with a bodily disease, and the 
doctor comes to see you in order to help make you better. Would not this mean that the 
doctor is a friend to you, but an enemy of your disease? Yes. After all, if the doctor did 
not want you to get better, he would be an enemy to you and a friend to your disease. So 
the doctor hates the disease in you, and “it’s against it that he entered your house, against 
it that he went upstairs to your bedroom, against it that he approached your bed, against it 
that he felt your pulse, against it that he gave you instructions, against it that he mixed 
and applied medicines; all this against the fever, all this for you.”169 If, however, you love 
the disease your body carries, you will be alone in hating yourself, being against yourself. 
Does anyone love being sick? No. Even so, Augustine notes that while no one is fond of, 
for instance, having a fever, people are often fond of what the “fever is asking for,” such 
as cool drinks. Yet the doctor—the enemy of your fever—prescribes that you should not 
consume cool drinks, as it will make you sicker and your time of recovery longer. So 
when the doctor leaves your house, the fever may ask for a cool drink, but you must 
recognize this fondness of yours for a cool beverage “is the fever.”170 It is not you but the 
fever in you that dries up your mouth, making a cool drink appear desirable. If, however, 
you remember the doctor’s advice, and if you ally yourself with him against your fever, 
then there will be two of you fighting against the same enemy, and you will almost 
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certainly achieve victory over your foe. On the other hand, if you ally yourself with the 
fever, succumbing to what it asks for, “the doctor loses—but the loss is the sick person’s, 
not the doctor’s.”171  
Augustine clearly wants to conceive of sinful and righteous action along the same 
lines, holding that we alone “lose” in any sinful actions we perform, whereas both we and 
God “win” in any righteous actions we perform. According to Augustine, Christ, our 
medicus, can never really lose irrespective of what we choose to do, since Christ works 
all things, including moral evil, for the good; and like an experienced doctor, he knows 
more thoroughly what is going on in a morally sick man than that man himself, and just 
how to cure him. As doctors are experts at producing health in the body, so, too, Christ is 
an expert at producing health in the soul.172 The Christus-medicus theme in Augustine 
has a clear basis in Scripture, which constantly speaks of human sinfulness and weakness 
and their need to be healed by Christ.173 It also proves, I think, that Augustine did not 
defend a predominately legalistic interpretation of our salvation, an interpretation which 
has been almost universally supported by Western theologians since the eleventh 
century.174   
                                                          
171 Ibid. 
172 Sermon 229O, 422.1.  
173 See for example, Ps 91: 6; Ps 102: 3; Isa 3:4; Mt 4: 23; Mt 8: 17; Mt 10: 1. See also Th. Martin, 
“Paul the Patient. Christus Medicus and the “Stimulus Carnis” (2 Cor 12: 7): a Consideration of 
Augustine’s Medicinal Christology,” AugStud 32 (2001), pp. 219-256.  
174 Panayiotis Nellas discusses this common soteriological emphasis of Western Christianity very well 
in his article, “Redemption or Deification? Nicholas Kavasilas and Anselm’s Question ‘Why Did God 
Become Man?’” Sourozh (1996), pp. 10-30. Nellas argues that, since the eleventh century with St. Anselm, 
Western Christianity has almost exclusively operated under a juridical model of redemption, according to 
which God became man in the Incarnation for the sole purpose of redeeming man from sin. The Orthodox 
Christian tradition, by contrast, has always defended a deification model, according to which God became 
man so that we might achieve communion in Christ and realize our full potential as capax Dei. For Nellas, 
if one restricts the economy of the Word’s Incarnation to redemption from sin alone, then that results in the 
terrible theological error of reducing Christianity “to a legalistic ethical system” (23) and all of mankind to 
the limited scope of their current fallen condition, not as the gods they were meant to become before the 
foundation of the world. All Christians, he thinks, ought to rid themselves “of the idea that Christ is simply 
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Even in his doctrinal works, Augustine never ceases to primarily emphasize the 
suitability of the incarnation for the healing of fallen humanity. The following is a 
representative text:  
Our enlightenment is to participate in the Word, that is, in that life which is the 
light of men (Jn 1:4). Yet we were absolutely incapable of such participation and 
quite unfit for it, so unclean were we through sin, so we had to be cleansed. 
Furthermore, the only thing to cleanse the wicked and the proud is the blood of 
the just man and the humility of God; to contemplate God, which by nature we are 
not, we would have to be cleansed by him who became what by nature we are and 
what by sin we are not. By nature we are not God; by nature we are men; by sin 
we are not just. So God became a just man to intercede with God for sinful man. 
The sinner did not match the just, but man did match man. So he applied to us the 
similarity of his humanity to take away the dissimilarity of our iniquity, and 
becoming a partaker of our mortality he made us partakers of his divinity. It was 
surely right that the death of the sinner issuing from the stern necessity of 
condemnation should be undone by the death of the just man issuing from the 
voluntary freedom of mercy, his single matching our double.175 
  
Immediately following this text Augustine will then use the harmonious pitch ratio of 1 to 
2 of the musical octave to further explain the fitting application of Christ’s single to our 
double: the incarnate Word bestows on our humanity, in consonance (conuenientia) with 
its fallen nature, “what the Greeks call harmonia”176—a gift which in its oneness heals 
the double-death of our souls to ungodliness and our bodies to perishability which our 
humanity suffered in the fall of Adam and Eve. Accordingly, we can say that Christ’s one 
death saved us from our double-death, and that his one resurrection granted us two 
resurrections, restoring the harmony of our spiritual and material nature. This sacrificial 
                                                          
the Redeemer from sin, and see him once again as Alpha and Omega, as the true savior, which is to say at 
once Redeemer and Recapitulator of the entire world; and give back to the divine economy all its breadth 
and significance” (28). As Christians, our theology of redemption should be Christocentric, not legalistic.  
175 trin.4.2.4; CCSL 50 164-5.  
176 Ibid. Augustine will here coin the word coaptatio to translate the Greek harmonia. Coaptatio is 
used by Augustine to mean a kind of suitable joining together. I find this to be significant insofar as 
Augustine’s use of co-aptatio ties in rather nicely with his overall position on divine and human interaction, 
namely that God always co-works with human nature, not exerting himself over and against it as a 
dominating power.  
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gift on the part of Christ is given by God to unredeemed humanity because he is merciful, 
so merciful that he deigned to take on the likeness of sinful flesh, in which our “mortal 
body and damnable soul are united with the single purpose of divine love so that they are 
made capable of seeing God and being resurrected.”177  
The kind of harmonious healing Augustine speaks of here, and that is more fully 
explained in his doctor-patient analogies, is a very useful way of conceiving of divine and 
human synergy—or what Augustine has deemed to be the harmonious working of 
primary and secondary causality—in moral life:178 The doctor acts and the patient is 
acted on, but the patient, too, acts in his choice to either freely consent to or dissent from 
the prescriptions of his doctor. If he follows them, by conforming himself to the doctor’s 
regimen for him, he gets better; if he does not, he becomes worse; the choice is up to the 
sick patient, who is helped along by the doctor in the former, but not in the latter. 
Augustine considers a possible objection to the synergistic relationship he is envisioning 
between the doctor and his patient, or as he puts it below, that between God as our helper 
(audiutor) and we as helped:  
Someone will say to me, ‘So we are led, acted on, we don’t act.’ I answer: Rather, 
you both act and are acted on; and it is precisely then that you act well, when you 
are acted on by one who is good.179 The Spirit of God, you see, who is leading 
                                                          
177 Williams, 144. 
178 I am not alone in my opinion. In talking about Christ as a doctor, Paul Van Geest thinks Augustine 
avoids any kind of legalistic interpretation of Christ’s salvific work on earth. He notes that Augustine 
“interpreted redemption in terms of healing (ordo sanandi) rather than justification” (170). In her article, 
“Divine Relations of the Trinity: Augustine’s Answer to Arianism,” Calvin Theological Journal 34 (1999): 
327-346, Sarah Heaner Lancaster comments on the passage of Book 4 of On the Trinity I cite: “Christ’s 
death and resurrection match in ‘curative symmetry’ our death and resurrection” (331).  
179 This claim by Augustine is based on the fact that we all are a mass of sin by ourselves, only 
possessing the ability to accomplish evil on our own. In order to act well, we must look to God to provide 
us with the proper conative and cognitive resources for our right action from His abundant goodness. In 
saying this, however, Augustine is not espousing the idea of the depraved nature of man after the Fall of 
Adam and Eve, or that somehow the nature of man after their disobedient act has become fundamentally 
evil. Whenever the text of Gen 1:26 is to be interpreted (Let us make man to our image and likeness) 
Augustine will consistently maintain that it ought to be understood “according to what is within man and is 
his principal part, that is, according to the mind” (DGnI.16.60). The mind is a power of human nature, not 
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you or acting on you, is your helper in your own action. He gave you this very 
word “helper,” because you too have to do something. You must realize what you 
are asking for, realize what you are admitting, when you say, Be my helper, do not 
forsake me (Ps 27: 9). You are, of course, calling on God as your helper. None are 
helped if they do not do anything themselves.... If you were not working, he 
would not be working together with you.180  
 
Augustine’s response to this hypothetical objection points to the fact that God’s grace co-
operates with a man’s own good action, and thus cannot determine it in any fatalistic 
sense. In other words, for a man to will or think or do the good, he cannot be a passive 
pawn in God’s helping hands but must be an active participant in the working out of his 
own salvation. It follows that God will not grant his predestinating grace to persons for 
their salvation who do not help themselves by rendering the secondary causality they 
possess in humble obedience to the primary causality of the unchanging Wisdom.  
Augustine warns us, however, that we must not now fall into the Pelagian heresy 
by overemphasizing the secondary causality we provide, by saying that God’s help is not 
necessary for us to act well, but rather is something that makes acting well considerably 
easier. He likens this to someone on a boat saying, “We can of course get there by 
rowing, though with considerable trouble; oh, if only we had some wind, we would get 
                                                          
human nature itself, the latter being created plumb and sound by God, and remaining as such even after the 
Fall. In his Retractions, Augustine will say with the utmost clarity that “no nature or substance, insofar as it 
is a nature and substance, is an evil.” (I.9). Moreover, he will insist that when he said, “By sin Adam lost 
the image of God according to which he was made” (DGnL.6.27.28), this should not be interpreted “as 
though no image remained in him,” but “that there was need for [its] re-formation” (II.50). For Augustine 
and the Greek-speaking-East, it is not our human nature but the image of God in us that was damaged after 
the Fall—our mental and volitional powers are now often confused and misdirected towards things other 
than God. However, the nature of man remains fundamentally intact. In Augustine’s theology, this is 
witnessed most forcefully in his views on the Incarnation, where we have seen Augustine say things such 
as “Christ became what by nature we are,” and the humanity of Christ “did match” our humanity 
(trin.4.2.4). There is therefore nothing inherently evil about the nature of post-Fall humanity. After all, 
Christ did not become evil after he took on our human nature, nor was Christ without moral evil because of 
his human nature. As Christ himself would often point out, evil is something that comes from inside the 
heart of man (e.g., see Mt 15:19 and Mk 7:21). It is certainly not a function of our God-given human 
nature, which we all share and which was (pre-Fall) and is (post-Fall) fundamentally plumb and sound.  
180 Sermon 156.11, 419.  
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there so much more easily!”181 God’s help in the form of His grace is not given to us so 
that we may “fulfill more easily by grace what [we] are commanded to do by free 
will,”182 which implies the will is sufficient by itself to uphold the commandments, if it is 
used properly, as the Pelagians hold.  
Contrary to the Pelagians, Augustine claims that God’s grace is a necessary 
condition for our acting well, and in fact the “primary” condition, without which we can 
do nothing good. Though it is primary, it does not follow that it determinatively takes 
over human agency in the sense of fatalistically forcing us to act out our “free” choices 
according to a pre-approved divine plan from which we cannot deviate: “After all, God is 
not building his temple out of you as out of stones which can’t move themselves; they are 
picked up, placed in position by the mason. That’s not what living stones are like: And 
you like living stones are being built together into the temple of God (1Pt 2:5). You are 
being led, but you too must run; you are being led, but you must follow.”183 So how do 
you run, how do you follow? How do you build up the temple of God within yourself? 
Augustine answers: you must be like “beams that cannot rot [and] make of yourselves a 
house for God. Let yourselves be squared off together, be chipped and chiseled, by toil, 
by need, in going without sleep, in being kept constantly busy; be prepared for every 
good work; so that you may deserve to find rest in eternal life, as in the well-constructed 
company of the angels.”184  
Augustine will say elsewhere that everything good about our actions comes from 
God, but not “however as though we were asleep, as though we did not have to make an 
                                                          
181 Sermon 156.12.  
182 Sermon 156.13. 
183 Sermon 156.13. 
184 Sermon 337.4, 391-395. 
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effort, as though we did not have to be willing.”185 If we are not awake, if we do not 
make an effort, if we are not willing, then there simply will not be the justice of God in 
us. And while it may be true that the will is prepared by the Lord, strengthened by the 
Lord, and made effectual by the Lord, it does not follow that the will ceases to be our 
own. For Augustine, God does not justify us without our consent; we must let God justify 
us. He writes: “The will, indeed, is only yours, the justice is only God’s.”186 However, 
since God’s justice can exist without your will, but your will can only be just with the 
help of God’s justice, God maintains his primacy.  
It follows that a person can do nothing good or can only do “nothingness,” i.e., 
introduce into what exists the privation of a due good, which Augustine views as “evil,” 
without the help of God’s guiding hand (Jn 15:5); indeed any created initiative that is not 
caused by God can only be an initiative for what is harmful or a deprivation in being, or 
what Maritain will appropriately call a “nihilation,”187 for it is a “defective movement, 
and every defect is from nothing.”188 Augustine will actually compare our feebleness of 
mind and body, which is our natural lot in life because of original sin, to the feebleness of 
a newborn baby. A new born baby cannot talk by itself, walk by itself, or do anything by 
itself; of itself it just lies there. It is so weak that it needs “someone else’s help for 
everything.”189 The position of Pelagius and his followers, that the will can have an 
initiative for the good on its own, and that the grace of God can be merited, must 
therefore be rejected; and a fortiori for the idea of the semi-Pelagians that we are 
                                                          
185 Sermon 169.13, 416. 
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187 God and the Permission of Evil, 33. 
188 On Free Choice of the Will 2.20.54.204. See also de.civ.Dei 12.7, where he speaks of the human 
will separated from God as a “deficient cause.”  
189 Sermon 127.1, between 410 and 420.  
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responsible for the beginning of our faith and its perseverance to the end: “Anybody, you 
see, who wishes to say that he has paid something back to God, is a liar. Absolutely 
everything has to be hoped for from him. From ourselves, apart from him, nothing—
except perhaps sin and lies, because whoever utters a lie, speaks from what is his own.... 
But when it comes to the truth, if he wants to be truthful, it won’t be from what is his 
own.”190 Important to note is that the latter is a point on which Augustine and all major 
Greek theologians agree.191  
To more fully explore the idea of our complete indebtedness to God with respect 
to the conative and cognitive goods we possess, the concept of the interior word (verbum 
interior) that Augustine explains at De Trinitate 9.6.9-12.18 proves useful. Here 
Augustine considers the idea that we know in two ways: 1) we know things in ourselves 
that we can then communicate to others through various signs, such as language; or 2) we 
know things in the Truth itself, which is present to us in such a way that it is not the 
private possession of an individual, but a possible object of knowledge for all 
                                                          
190 Sermon 254.7, 414. 
191 It would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an in depth examination of the Greek 
tradition on this point. However, it is possible to cite some primary texts from this tradition which show its 
agreement with Augustine on the positive benefits of God’s grace for the believer. In On the Holy Spirit, 
for example, St. Basil states that the divine energeiai are responsible for any of the good actions we 
perform, and even for the habitual states of the soul that are the well-spring of those very same good 
actions: “As is the power of seeing in the healthy eye, so is the energeia of the Spirit in the purified soul.... 
And as the skill in him who has acquired it, so is the grace of the Spirit ever present in the recipient, though 
not continuously active (energousa). For as the skill is potentially in the artisan, but only in operation 
(energeia) when he is working in accordance with it, so also the Spirit is present with those who are 
worthy, but works (energei) as need requires, in prophecies, or in healings, or in some other carrying into 
effect of His powers (tisi dunameon energemasin)” (On the Holy Spirit 61, PG 32 180C-D; NPNF 8, 38). 
In his De Fide Orthodoxa, John of Damascus will state that, while it is within our power to choose what 
actions we perform, the actual carrying out of those actions depends on God: “in the one case when our 
actions are good, on the co-operation of God, who in his justice brings help according to his foreknowledge 
to such as choose the good with a right conscience, and, in the other case when our actions are evil, on the 
desertion by God, who again in his justice stands aloof in accordance with his foreknowledge.” (Book II, 
Ch. 29) He even makes a point of saying that all the good that we do is from God, and without “His co-
operation and help we cannot will or do any good thing.” (Book II, Ch. 30). Like Augustine, John of 
Damascus, believes that all goods come from God, which in turn means that every good action we perform 
must be assigned to him as well (See Book IV, Ch. 12).  
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simultaneously. While we know these things, they can be spoken about and thought of in 
the same way by others who know them in the Truth as we do,192 the Truth mentioned 
here being the divine Word. In either form of knowing, we formulate what Augustine will 
refer to as “words of the heart.”193 According to Augustine, these words of the heart 
require not only love to be conceived, but also the knowledge of higher or lower objects 
that direct that love to those objects.194 Because “love ... joins together our word and the 
mind it is begotten from,”195 what we choose to know and how we choose to know it 
matter a great deal: we become what we know insofar as our minds are formed by the 
objects on which we direct our attentive effort.  
These words precede any and every human working, good or bad, occurrent or 
habitual—indeed “there are none that are not first spoken in the heart, and hence it is 
written that the beginning of every work is a word (Eccl 37:16).”196 Augustine will divide 
up these words into two basic categories: words that occur as a result of love for God, and 
words that occur as a result of an inappropriate love for creatures.197 The second category 
                                                          
192 trin.9.6.9. 
193 trin. 9.12.7. Augustine will often use “thoughts” as a substitute for “words of the heart” (See for 
example, trin.15.18), supported by his interpretation of Mt 15: 10ff (“But the things which come forth from 
the mouth proceed from the heart, and they defile the man. For from the heart proceed evil thoughts...”), 
but he never loses sight of their volitional aspect in his use of this more cognitively loaded term.  
194 trin. 9.13.  
195 Ibid. 
196 trin. 15.20.11. 
197 He writes: Quod uerbum amore concipitur siue creaturae siue creatoris, id est aut naturae 
mutabilis aut incommutabilis ueritatis. Ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate (trin.9.7-8.13;CCSL 50A.304). An 
example of how not to love, or how to love improperly, is provided by Augustine himself, who anecdotally 
recalls in the Conf. an incident in his early life involving the death of a close friend, whom he had known 
since he was a teenager. At Conf.4.4-9 he tells us how badly he dealt with this loss: “What mindlessness it 
is not to know how to love human beings humanly [humaniter]! And what a foolish human I was then, so 
impatient in coping with the human condition!” (Conf.4.7). It was an inhuman love because Augustine was 
entrusting his personhood, or identity, in the temporal relationship he had with his friend. However, he 
recognizes that he should have loved his friend (pace for all other temporal goods) in God, i.e., to love his 
friend in relation to God. As Augustine will say in his De doctrina Christiana, we should love all human 
beings “for the sake of God,” propter Deum (doctr.chr.I.22.20); they are signs of the Creator, not signs for 
themselves.  
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of words is then distinguished into the verbum as conceptum and the verbum as natum. 
As conceived, we desire the word’s completion; as born, our desire for the word’s 
completion is actually completed. The only way we can conceive true words, Augustine 
tells us, comes from our knowing and judging in the Truth, in the Word of God; by doing 
so we generate or utter this true word in our mind.198 Unlike words that occur as a result 
of an inappropriate love for creatures, these true words are simultaneously conceived and 
born, and this because the true love (vera dilectio, not cupiditas) by which they are 
conceived instantly possesses what it loves and loves what it possesses. He gives an 
example: a person who loves justice has a will that remains in the knowledge that is 
conceived, so that what he wills is simultaneously present to his knowledge and vice 
versa.199 In our fallen state, however, our love is tinged by concupiscence and our minds 
misled by intellectual error, thus making it impossible to rely on our own conative and 
cognitive powers to be the primary cause of the good we desire and by which we are 
directed in our search for happiness. For any and every word we speak internally, if we 
do so by ourselves, content with our own damaged faculties and powers, is insufficient to 
attain to its proper objects that would lead to our being formed into the image of God.  
As we have seen, Augustine thinks we have a perfect model of how this formal 
causality should work in the conformity of will that is shared between the Father and the 
Son, which St. John speaks of: the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the 
Father doing (Jn 5:19); and Everything that’s mine is yours, and that’s yours is mine (Jn 
17:10). According to Augustine, what the Gospel writer means is that the Son perfectly 
conforms himself to the Father, doing only the same things as the Father does. The Son 
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perfectly patterns himself after the Father out of the perfect love he has for his generator. 
Augustine is aware that some may object to this statement on the grounds that it attributes 
an “inability” to the Son, as it seems the Son cannot do anything according to His own 
will, but he thinks that such inability is actually “true ability,” nor is it weakness but “the 
strength whereby the truth is unable to be false.”200 Again this is a point on which the 
Greek East could not agree on more, with Basil, for instance, writing: “Accordingly, a 
man becomes ‘one’ with another, when in will, as our Lord says, they are ‘perfected into 
one’ (Jn 17:23), this union of wills being added to the connexion of nature. So also the 
Father and Son are one, the community of nature and the community of will running, in 
them, into one.”201  
It is Augustine’s belief that because Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share one and 
the same nature, they share one and the same will.202 But that does not mean that either 
the Son or the Holy Spirit is unfree to do their own will. Certainly there are many 
instances in scripture which point to the Son claiming that he has been sent to do the will 
of the Father. Augustine thinks these show that “the Father willed, the Son put it into 
effect.”203 But there are also examples from scripture that show that this does not prevent 
the Son from willing, with the Father putting it into effect. We have Christ saying, for 
instance, Father, I will. That where I am, these too may be with me (Jn 17: 24); and the 
Son’s power of will is clearly proclaimed at Jn 5: 21: Just as the Father raises the dead 
and gives them life, so too the Son gives life to whom he will. The Son does not give life 
to those whom the Father orders him to give life, but to those whom he will. In the same 
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way, we are truly free when we act according to true words that cannot be false on 
account of their being formally and finally caused by God’s will and knowledge for us, 
all of which are “spoken” by Him to restore the image of God in us. The works we 
perform from those true words are both God’s and ours. Yet we should not glory in our 
contribution to the works we perform; we should follow the example of Christ, in the 
form of his humanity, who would always give the glory to God the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. In addition, we should all strive to understand that just as the Son can only speak 
through the Father, and has everything that he speaks from the Father, so, too, for those 
who are righteous: all the goods they possess, all the good that they will and think and do 
is from God. Indeed, the very good they seek as their ultimate end is God, according to 
which they organize their pursuit of all other goods.  
Following the example of Christ in this regard demands a literal self-sacrifice on 
our part.204 Augustine often pleaded with his flock to believe and understand as far as 
they could the idea that they are most fully themselves when they, as the apostle says, 
clothe [themselves] with the Lord Jesus Christ, and [when they] do not think about how to 
gratify the desires of the flesh (Rom 13: 14).205 This is a lesson he personally learned all 
too well, and which he forcefully recounts in Book VIII.12 of his Confessions, where he 
tells the reader how his self-conversion (and the conversion of his good friend Alypius) 
came about through the Lord Jesus Christ, helped along by his reading of the following 
quotation from Paul’s Letter to the Romans: 
Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in 
contention and envy, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and make not provision 
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for the flesh in its concupiscences (Rom 13:13). I had no wish to read further, and 
no need. For in that instant, with the very ending of the sentence, it was as though 
a light of utter confidence shown in my heart, and all the darkness of uncertainty 
vanished away. Then, leaving my finger in the place or marking it by some other 
sign, I closed the book and in complete calm told the whole thing to Alypius, and 
he similarly told me what had been going on in himself, of which I knew nothing. 
He asked to see what I had read. I showed him, and he looked further than I had 
read. I had not known what followed. And this is what followed: Now him that is 
weak in faith, take unto you. He applied this to himself and told me so. And he 
was confirmed by this message, and with no troubled wavering gave himself to 
God’s good will and purpose—a purpose indeed most suited to his character, for 
in these matters he had been immeasurably better than I. Then we went in to my 
mother and told her, to her great joy.  
 
Augustine urges us to give our wills, our minds, and indeed everything that we are 
metaphysically and morally back to God, who made us for Himself. For apart from God, 
we are nothing: “Of one thing only I am sure—that, apart from you, nothing I have or am 
can be good, and ‘anything I gain is a mere deprivation’ if it be not my God.”206 
Somewhat paradoxically Augustine holds that the only way we can truly and freely will 
is not to do our own will. If we prefer to follow our own will and resist the will of God, 
then we are “harmful”207 to ourselves; and this because as persons we are depriving 
ourselves of a good which is due to the human will and to human nature itself. It is thus 
necessary, Augustine tells us, to put God’s will before our own, and to put love of God 
before love of ourselves.  
Our love of God must reach the point that, “for love of him we even forget, as far 
as this is possible, ourselves.”208 There are many other Sermons in particular where 
Augustine recommends a letting go of ourselves, or a kind of self-sacrifice, so that we 
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might cleave to God more fully, and so that we might understand that God is our life. 
Some examples of this are as follows:  
Don’t stay in yourself, rise above even yourself; place yourself in the one who 
made you and your true self.209 
 
The soul is not its own life, but it’s God who is the life of the soul.210 
 Remove yourself, remove, I repeat, yourself from yourself; you just get in your 
own way. If it’s you that are building yourself, it’s a ruin you are building. Unless 
the Lord has built the house, they have labored in vain, who build it (Ps 127: 
1).211  
 
Ignore your own spirit, receive the Spirit of God. Don’t let your spirit be afraid 
that when the Spirit of God takes up residence in you, your spirit will be squeezed 
into a corner of your body. When the Spirit of God takes up residence in your 
body, it won’t shut your spirit out.212 
 
Augustine makes clear that the self-sacrifice he is recommending does not entail a 
destructive form of self-hatred. Nevertheless, there is still a right way to love oneself and 
a wrong way to love oneself. The latter occurs when you leave God out of your life to 
love your time-bound self, which actually causes you to move away from your true self; 
whereas the former occurs when you love yourself in God. Augustine explains step-by-
step how this proper self-love can come about in us: “Come back to yourself; but again, 
turn upward when you’ve come back to yourself, don’t stay in yourself. First come back 
to yourself from the things outside you, and then give yourself back to the one who made 
you, and when you were lost sought you, and as a runaway found you, and when you had 
turned away turned you back to himself. So then, come back to yourself, and go on to the 
one who made you.”213 According to Augustine, this loving ascent from things in the 
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world to yourself, then from yourself to God, has a scriptural basis in the story of the 
prodigal son. And he exhorts those listening to his sermon, perhaps to their surprise and 
ours, to be the younger son, who wasted his inheritance by living a life of dissipation, and 
subsequently found himself living in the most desperate of straits. Augustine rhetorically 
asks his audience, ‘What does the Gospel say about the younger son?’ And returning to 
himself. He let go of himself in his debauched behavior, but he did eventually return to 
himself, and he did not remain in himself; he found the need to arise and go to his father. 
So after finding himself, he denies himself, which is indicated by what he plans to say to 
his father: And I will say to him, I have sinned against heaven and before you. I am now 
not worthy to be called your son (Lk 15: 17-19). Augustine believes that it is in this 
respect that we should copy the younger son’s behavior. Just as he was in full possession 
of himself once again at the end of the story, by his new desire to be obedient to his 
father’s will, so, too, let us possess ourselves again in virtue of obeying God’s will for us. 
Augustine’s overall advice therefore is “Don’t do your own will, but that of the one who 
is dwelling in you.”214  
In The City of God, Augustine describes the kind of obedience to God’s will that 
he is recommending to us as a form of worship. However, he admits that there is a slight 
difficulty in encapsulating the meaning of this worship in a single word in the Latin 
language: ... “to express this worship in a single word as there does not occur to me any 
Latin term sufficiently exact, I shall avail myself, whenever necessary, of a Greek word. 
Latreia, whenever it occurs in Scripture, is rendered by the word service.”215 Augustine 
tells us that Latreia is better than any other perceived Latin equivalents (worship, 
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religion, piety, etc.), because of its exclusive focus on service to God. A bit later on at 
City of God 10.3, he will discuss the service entailed by Latreia in more detail, and note 
that it requires a total surrendering of ourselves to God. Such surrendering is 
accomplished by loving God with all of our heart, with all of our soul and with all of our 
strength, which allow us to cleave to Him in unity. Augustine views this loving service to 
God as a community effort taken up within the ecclesial body of Christ, since “to this 
good we ought to be led by those who love us, and to lead those we love.”216 When we 
love God with every moral and metaphysical fiber of our being, as it were, and when we 
love our neighbor in God and for God’s sake, we may call both true sacrifices, or works 
in which whatever is done is done so that we might be united to God.217 It is this 
surrendering of self that makes up the righteousness of man, “that he submit himself to 
God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either 
defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God grace to do his duty, and 
the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the blessings he 
receives.”218 Elsewhere, Augustine will say more strongly that being a slave to 
righteousness is what the true liberty of man consists in, but at the same time it is a “holy 
bondage, for he is obedient to the will of God.”219 Once again he looks to a statement 
from St. Paul to bear all of this out and, specifically, the following from Paul’s Letter to 
the Ephesians: For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, 
which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them (Eph 2: 10). Augustine 
takes this to mean that we shall be made truly free when and only when “God fashions us, 
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that is, forms and creates us anew, not as men—for He has done that already—but as 
good men, which his grace is now doing, that we may be a new creation in Christ 
Jesus.”220 This is something that we cannot do by the power of our intellects and wills 
alone, no matter how holy they are, no matter how strong they are, but only with the 
grace of God. One may call this servitude, subjection, slavery, or even, as I have 
suggested earlier, a form of sacrifice of self.221 The good news that Christ proclaims in 
the Gospel of Matthew, however, is that this yoke is easy and this burden is light: Come 
to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon 
you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for 
your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light (Mt 11:28-30).  
The distinction that Augustine is drawing here between selfless service to God 
and selfish service to oneself is the fundamental distinction in what many view to be his 
magnum opus in doctrinal theology, The City of God. It is the fundamental distinction of 
this work in my opinion, because it is the basis on which Augustine will make the 
subsequent division between the heavenly and earthly cities—the histories of which, from 
beginning, to middle, to end, he makes it the purpose of this work to track in excruciating 
historical detail and with insightful theological exegesis. But one need not take my word 
for it. According to Augustine, it is clear that “two cities have been formed by two loves: 
the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of 
God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the 
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Lord.”222 This distinction is made time and time again by Augustine throughout the work, 
and is used as an explanative device to inform the reader as to why certain divisions in 
the human race have taken place throughout history. He will argue, for example, that 
such love of oneself, or of what is created, was the cause of Adam’s forfeiting paradise 
for humanity, Cain’s crime against his brother, and really all divisiveness in the human 
race, which is meant to be one in Christ.223  
Of course, Augustine knows that carnally-minded people, i.e., those who belong 
to the earthly city, those who, to use the common expression, “raise Cain,” will see such a 
total obedience to God’s will as a restriction of their supposed “freedom” to choose as 
they want, or perhaps better, as their flesh wants: “when it’s said that all other things will 
be withdrawn, and there will only be God to delight us, it’s as if the soul feels restricted, 
because it has been used to delighting in many things; and the carnal soul says to itself, 
addicted to the flesh, tied up with fleshly desires, having wings stuck together with the 
birdlime of evil desires to stop it flying to God, it says to itself, ‘What will there be in it 
for me, where I shall not eat, I shall not drink, where I shall not sleep with my wife? 
What sort of joy will I have of that?’ This joy of yours comes from sickness, not from 
good health.”224 Here, as in Sermon 229E, Augustine likens the human soul and its 
fleshly desires to a sick person wanting things they imagine will give them respite from 
their illness but will, in all actual fact, make them worse. Such is a truth that the sick 
person realizes only if and when his good health returns, which in turn eliminates those 
deleterious desires. When it comes to our moral health, we have a similar choice: either 
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we obey the prescriptions of our doctor, Christ, or those of the flesh, our enemy. 
Augustine makes clear that we should not suppose that because we choose the former 
“free will must be withdrawn. It will, on the contrary, be all the more truly free, because 
set free from delight in sinning.”225 Nevertheless, the choice between which of the two 
we decide to take heed of has been, is, and always will be a choice that we make, and we 
and we alone have to live with the corresponding consequences.  
Augustine thinks evidence of this can be found in scripture. Take Mt 23: 27,226 for 
instance, where Christ laments the fact that the Jews exercised their carnal “freedom,” 
rejecting as they did the condescension of his grace: Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill 
the prophets and those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children 
together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing. 
Augustine writes of this scriptural passage that Christ “really was looking after them, as 
he himself was happy to put it, in the way a hen looks after her chicks; in the way, I 
mean, that a hen enfeebles herself too, because of the feebleness of her chicks.”227 It was 
because of their weakness, and the weakness of the whole of fallen humanity, that he was 
willing to enfeeble himself by becoming incarnate of the Virgin Mary, and that he was 
willing to suffer and die for our sins. In Sermons 105.11 and 265.11 (412), Augustine will 
explain in more detail how the hen “enfeebles herself” for its chicks, by lowering its 
voice to the chirps of the chicks, drooping, and ruffling its feathers. But his conclusion is 
simple enough: Christ had to permit the Jews nihilating initiatives, because he had to 
respect their free choice to sin, which resulted in the death of the prophets and those sent 
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to them to effect such a communion. Augustine thinks the Jews provide a perfect 
example of the fact that, while God wills all men to be saved, all men are not in fact 
saved, and this “because men themselves are not willing.”228  
Even for those of us who do accept Christ’s help, who choose to live at the 
humble level at which he chose to live, achieving victory over the flesh is no easy task for 
our wills to accomplish, and especially for those that are weighed down by past bad 
habits. Not to mention that in this life the flesh continually lusts against the Spirit and the 
Spirit against the flesh in such a way that those experienced in this warfare cannot 
completely escape the enticements and pull their flesh exercises upon them.229 Following 
Paul, Augustine believes that it is this warfare that does not allow us to carry out the good 
we want to do: For it is not what I want to that I do; but what I hate that is what I do; but 
if what I hate is what I do, I agree with the law, that it is good. To want to do good is 
available to me, but to carry out the good I do not find in my power. But I see another 
law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me prisoner to the 
law of sin, which is in my members (Rom 7:15-16.18.23). From the time of Plato and 
Aristotle onwards, this is what the Greeks would refer to as akrasia, or weakness of will, 
understood as a condition in which compulsive patterns of behavior (i.e., bad habits) 
prevent us from acting in accordance with what we know to be good.230 For Augustine, 
the good that is always within my power is not to consent to bad desires, but I cannot 
carry the good through by myself. There is a significant difference between these two: the 
former we might say is a power to refuse evil; the latter, by contrast, is a power to 
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cooperate with God to accomplish the good. This illustrates the importance of the 
secondary causality of man—in wanting to do the good—and of the necessary primary 
causality of God—in His making that desire effectual in the realm of human action. 
Hence this is the reason why Augustine can say that no human being, however morally 
strong of will and intellectually adept in mind, can accomplish the good by him/herself; 
and that all human beings, by themselves, can only accomplish what is evil.231  
Augustine explains: “I do good when I do not consent to the evil lust; but I do not 
carry through with the good, so as not to covet or have any lust at all. So again, how does 
my enemy too do evil and not carry through with the evil? It does evil, because it stirs up 
an evil desire; it does not carry the evil through, because it does not drag me into 
committing the evil (Ago bonum, cum malae concupiscentiae non consentio; sed 
non perficio bonum, ut omnino non concupiscam. Rursus ergo et hostis mea quomodo 
agit malum, et non perficit malum? Agit malum, quia movet desiderium malum: 
non perficit malum, quia me non trahit ad malum).”232 Augustine is clear that we should 
not take what the apostle says, It is not what I want to that I do, but what I hate, that is 
                                                          
231 Augustine ultimately credits St. Paul for the idea that God co-operates with us in doing good and 
abandons us when we will what is evil, but he also mentions Ambrose of Milan as teaching this idea. At On 
the Grace of Christ 48, Augustine will note that Ambrose, in his second book of his Exposition of the 
Gospel according to Luke (II, chapter 84, on Luke 3:22), “expressly teaches us that the Lord co-operates 
(cooperari) also with our wills (voluntatibus nostris).” Augustine will actually give us the text from 
Ambrose in question: “You see, therefore, because the power of the Lord co-operates (cooperatur) 
everywhere with human efforts, that no man is able to build without the Lord, no man to watch without the 
Lord, no man to undertake anything without the Lord. When the apostle thus enjoins: Whether ye eat, or 
whether ye drink, do all to the glory of God (1 Cor 10:31). Augustine will then provide similar texts from 
this work of Ambrose that make the same essential point that God’s help is necessary to do anything. For 
example, Book VI, chapter 25 on Luke 7:41 and Book X, chapter 89 on Luke 22, 61. The constant refrain 
of Augustine is that the assistance provided to our wills by divine grace for our justification, “by which 
God co-operates in all things for the good (quo Deus diligentibus eum omnia cooperatur in bonum) with 
those who love Him,” is necessary, life-giving, and eventually leads to the perfection of the human person. 
(Ibid, 55).  
232 Sermon 151.7, 419. This distinction can also be found in Sermon 152.2, 419 and Sermon 154.12, 
419.  
92 
 
 
 
what I carry out, as implying that I want to be chaste, but am actually an adulterer; that I 
want to be kind, but am actually cruel; that I want to be religious, but am actually 
irreligious. While it is true that no matter what we do, no matter how saintly of a life we 
lead, we cannot resist having lusts of the flesh, it is, nevertheless, always within our 
power to resist actually being adulterous, cruel, and irreligious. In other words, we do not 
have to act on the evil lusts of the flesh, even if we cannot help but have them in this 
life.233 This is something we can do, and Augustine views this dissent from evil desire as 
a significant contribution to one’s salvation, writing:  
It isn’t the case, after all, that you don’t carry out anything. Lust rebels, and you 
don’t consent; you take a fancy to another man’s wife, but you don’t give your 
approval, you turn your mind away, you enter the inner sanctum of your mind. 
You see lust kicking up a rumpus outside, you issue a decree against it, to cleanse 
your conscience. “I don’t want to,” you say, “I won’t do it.” Granted it would be 
delightful, I won’t do it, I have something else to delight in. For I delight in the 
law of God according to the inner self.234  
Augustine will describe this elsewhere as keeping the flesh in check,235 which is 
something that we do, but cannot successfully carry through without the grace of God. 
Other anti-Pelagian Sermons of Augustine deal with the notion of the will’s consent, or 
its specification, while under the influence of God’s grace. Take Sermon 165 (417), in 
which Augustine begins with the common anti-Pelagian sentiment that we should not 
place our hope in man but in God; and with the following quotation from Paul: I ask you 
not to be weakened by my tribulations on your behalf, which is your glory (Eph 3:13). 
Augustine interprets this to mean that the apostle is asking them not to lose strength,  
which he wouldn’t do, unless he wanted to rouse their wills. I mean, suppose they 
answered, ‘Why do you ask us for what we don’t have in our power?’ Wouldn’t it 
seem they had given him a fair answer? And yet unless the apostle knew that 
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there was in them such a thing as the consent of their own will, when they too 
were to do something themselves, he wouldn’t have said I ask you. And if he said 
‘I order you,’ the word would come from his mouth quite pointlessly, unless he 
knew they could apply their wills to his order.236  
Of course, without God’s help the human will is weak, and so the apostle added, For this 
reason I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood 
in heaven and on earth is named, that he would give you (Eph 3: 14-16). Paul’s statement 
here can be seen as another version of the famous Augustinian dictum from the 
Confessions, “Command what you will, and give what you command.” And again, we 
might find ourselves asking the question Pelagius asked: How does it make any sense for, 
in this case, Paul, to ask God to give what he is at the same time demanding from his 
audience? Augustine answers for Paul: “because for God to be willing to give, you for 
your part have to accommodate your will to receive. How can you really wish to receive 
the grace of divine goodness, if you don’t open the lap of your will to receive?”237  
 To sum up, there is no textual evidence from Augustine’s corpus that necessarily 
implicates his mature theology of sin and grace into a form of predestinationism that 
would vitiate the nature of our wills as free. Quite the contrary: what we have seen from 
Augustine, in his doctrinal works, sermons, and scriptural commentaries, is a great 
concern to maintain a harmonious working relationship between God’s grace and our free 
will as oriented towards the good. We have seen this particularly in his threefold 
emphasis on: 1) the grounding of the doctrine of deification in the body of Christ, of 
which we are acting members along with its Head; 2) the need for Christians to willingly 
engage in the economic act of self-sacrifice, or obedience to the primary causality of the 
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divine will; and 3) the distinction without division between not consenting to the lust of 
the flesh and being able to carry through the good, according to which both man and God 
help to determine the outcome of salvation history. Even these three interrelated 
elements, however, do not give us the full philosophical-theological picture of 
Augustine’s positive doctrine of predestination. That requires the further examination of 
his theory of the divine ideas, to which we now turn.  
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Chapter 4 
The Divine Ideas: A Predestination of Potentialities 
 
Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas, more than anything else, serves to reveal 
the enduring influence Platonism had on his thought. Indeed, it is almost impossible to 
prevent oneself from making comparisons to key concepts of Plato, such as the Demiurge 
(demiourgos), participation (methexis), and so on, while learning of this theory. Even the 
way Augustine describes it himself, especially in his various commentaries on the Book 
of Genesis, lends a prima facie legitimacy to these comparisons.  
In his Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, for instance, Augustine will 
ask: “Or were all things in fact completed by God as in a craftsman’s thought-out design, 
not in a stretch of time, but in that very power which made to abide in a timeless state 
even those things that we perceive as not abiding, but passing away in time?”238 The 
answer to this question, he thinks, is that God eternally and intentionally “speaks” His 
creative designs in His Word, in whom “all things are primordially and unchangingly 
together, not only things that are in the whole of this creation, but things that have been 
and will be; but there is not a question of “have been” and “will be,” there they simply 
are.”239 Augustine, however, makes the important qualification that we are talking here 
about the eternity of the Creator when we make reference to the divine ideas, not the 
eternity of the divine essence. Indeed, to understand things such as the succession of the 
ages and the resurrection of the dead Augustine believes we must consult “the eternity of 
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the Creator, in whom we live, move, and have our being.”240 It is only in the eternity of 
the Creator that some rare souls (i.e., those souls which are not weighed down by a carnal 
love of temporal things) may understand “the rolled up scrolls of the centuries, which 
there already are and always are, but here only will be and so are not yet; or that they 
could see there the change for the better not only of the minds but also of the bodies of 
men, each to its own proper perfection.”241  
One of the more explicit ways Augustine makes this distinction can also be found 
in Book V of his The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In chapter 15, where he discusses in 
what sense creatures can be said to have life in God, Augustine will cite two texts from 
the Book of Job (28: 12-13 and 28: 22-25), both of which he believes proves that all 
things “before they were made were in the knowledge of God their Creator.”242 Here, 
these things exist in an ideal manner; they are life in God; they are eternal (aeterna) and 
unchangeable (incommutabilia). In addition, if God knew these things before making 
them, then it must follow that “before they were made they were with Him and known to 
Him as they live, and indeed are life, eternally and unchangeably.”243 Augustine will 
caution, however, that as the eternal and unchangeable ideas of things they cannot be said 
to be with God as the Word was with God (Jn 1:1), in that they exist in God as Creator, 
not God as Generator or Spirator.244 In other words, we can say that the divine ideas are 
not separated from the life-giving reality of God, for they are in God as Creator, but they 
are distinct (not divided) from God’s essential life as expressed in the activities of 
                                                          
240 Ibid, 4.4.23. 
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242 Ibid, Book V, 15, 33. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid, Book V, 16, 34. 
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Generation and Spiration.245 Augustine’s distinction without division between the eternity 
of the divine ideas and the eternity of the divine nature directly corresponds to the 
Eastern distinction between the eternity of the divine will and the eternity of the divine 
essence.246  
These creative designs, these rolled up scrolls of the centuries, that are with God 
as Creator, not as Generator or Spirator, are the divine ideas (rationes). According to 
Augustine, these are then placed in creation by God as the rationes seminales, which are 
the inbuilt rational structures that order the coming into being and passing away of things 
in time according to their natures. These rationes seminales are thus what account for 
things following predictable patterns of development, e.g., tadpoles develop into frogs, 
acorns into oak trees, and so on.247 The ontological need for these rationes seminales is 
obvious for Augustine: “because if there were no such seminal force in the elements 
themselves, there would not be so many forms of life spontaneously generated from earth 
where nothing was sown; nor would there be so many animals on land and in water 
                                                          
245 Earlier at DGnL.II.6.12, Augustine will phrase this distinction in terms of whatever has been made 
by the Son is “life in Him,” the Creator, which is different from the “Life of the Son,” the Light of men (Jn 
1:4).  
246 The eternity of the divine will is that of “aeonic” eternity. What is aeonic has a beginning, but that 
beginning is atemporal. Though outside of time, the aeonic is influenced by the establishment of the created 
order. But unlike the created order itself, the aeonic is immutable. In his article, “Creation and 
Creaturehood,” Fr. Georges Florovsky admits that distinguishing between the eternity of the divine essence 
and that of the divine will is “paradoxical” but necessary “for the incontestable distinction between the 
essence (nature) of God and the will of God” (56). Taken from Creation and Redemption, vol. 3, in the 
Collected Works of Georges Florovsky. Nordland Publishing Company: Belmont, Massachusetts, 1976. 
The aeonic realm is not as expressly talked about by Augustine. Nevertheless, he does say that there is a 
“special time” or timelessness that is enjoyed by the angels, who are with God in their contemplation of 
him, but not with Him in the sense of sharing in the divine nature (See for example, Conf.11.4.40).  
247 From the Orthodox perspective, St. Basil gives a similar account of the creation, stating that “its 
most basic structure consists of a series of unchangeable natures decreed in the act of creation, each 
possessing its own intrinsic power that gives rise to the distinctive activities we experience.” (Ayres 315) 
See Hexaemeron.6.3; and 9.2. Given the fact that Basil’s homilies on the creation were translated into 
Latin, and used by Ambrose of Milan in his own work on the creation in 386, I think we should take 
seriously the idea that Augustine was possibly, indirectly, influenced by Basil through Ambrose in his 
Commentaries on Genesis, which have been proven to take some cues from Ambrose. See Ayres 317 for an 
excellent discussion of this possibility.  
98 
 
 
 
which have come into existence without any mating of male and female, though they 
themselves, born asexually, grow up and produce offspring by copulation.” In other 
words, if there were not such seminal forces in the elements themselves, things would 
simply poof into existence from nothing; which is absurd. It follows that God, who is the 
creator of all of these seminal forces is ipso facto the creator of all things, for anything 
that we can observe as being brought to life “receives the beginning of its course from 
hidden seeds, and derives its due growth and final distinction of shape and parts from 
what you could call the original programming (ab originalibus tanquam regulis) of those 
seeds.”248 Here we must make an effort to distinguish between the developmental 
patterns of rational and non-rational things. We can say that rational creatures are not 
bound to their pre-established rational structures in the same way as, say, a horse or rock, 
because of their essential possession of reason and free will. Humans, for instance, are 
unique in that their rational nature allows them to freely choose to turn towards or away 
from God.249 Nevertheless, there is a pre-established number, weight, and measure that 
each human person should attempt to conform themselves to, i.e., the image of the Son 
(Rom 8:29).250 Yet because of their natural capacity for reason and free choice they are 
not deterministically compelled to do so. While a rock cannot help but find its center of 
gravity close to the earth, and a hungry horse cannot help but go for the portion of food 
that looks most attractive to it, a human being can deliberately choose whether it will be 
                                                          
248 trin.3.2.13. 
249 See for example, trin.7.4.12. 
250 One of Augustine’s favorite quotations comes from the Book of Wisdom, namely, You have 
arranged all things by measure and number and weight (Wis 11:20). Augustine holds number (numero) to 
signify the specific form of a thing; weight (pondere) to signify its dynamic power, i.e., its natural tendency 
or “love”; and measure (mensura) to signify its relation to things other than itself, or its proper resting place 
in relation to everything else. These three factors make any created reality into a harmonious whole. For a 
more in depth study of how these three terms are used by Augustine, see W. Roche’s enduringly helpful 
article, “Measure, Number, and Weight in St. Augustine” New Scholasticism, 15 (1941), pp. 350-76.  
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in the image of God or not. The choice is an important one, with equally important 
consequences: “The self opens to God or to nothing, so that apart from God the self has 
no real or true form through which to understand God.”251  
Our brief examination of the divine ideas above seems to suggest that they are at 
least similar to the Forms or Ideas of Plato, namely those realities which are present in 
the Demiurge’s mind, from which are created all things that are spatially and temporally 
conditioned. Yet such comparisons, as I hope to show in what follows, can only be 
pushed so far. And scholars who push this comparison too far wind up misinterpreting 
Augustine to the point where it looks as if he cannot sufficiently, philosophically, explain 
how the eternal causality of God interacts with the temporal causality of man. In what 
follows, I will argue that scholars have grossly misinterpreted Augustine’s view of the 
divine ideas on at least two counts, both of which are due to their over-zealousness to 
make Augustine out to be the “Christian Plato.”  
First, in the often referenced Question 46 (On Ideas), Augustine can be found 
placing the pre-temporal divine ideas in the mind of God. His following definition of 
“ideas” bears this out: they are “the principal forms or the fixed and unchangeable 
reasons of things that have themselves not been formed and consequently are eternal, 
always constituted in the same way and contained in the divine intelligence.”252 
Elsewhere, he states that the divine ideas “existed in God’s knowledge, they did not exist 
in their own nature.”253 Most scholars take the phrases, “contained in the divine 
intelligence,” “existed in God’s knowledge,” to mean, with not even a single sentence of 
                                                          
251 Matthew Drever, 241.  
252 46.2.  
253 The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book V, 18, 36.  
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textual evidence to support their claim, that Augustine equates God’s mind with God’s 
essence. This in turn makes the divine ideas, which are in God’s mind, to reside in the 
eternity of God’s essence.254  
If anything, however, I think Augustine’s placing of the divine ideas in God’s 
mind implies He created with knowledge. As Augustine says, “In this art [i.e., the divine 
ideas] God knows all things that he has made through it, and so when times come and go, 
nothing comes and goes for God’s knowledge. For all these created things around us are 
not known by God because they have been made; it is rather, surely, that even changeable 
things have been made because they are unchangeably known by him.”255 And if there 
were any doubt about my interpretation, Augustine will make the same exact point in 
Question 46 (On Ideas):  
But what religious person imbued with true religion, although not yet able to see 
these things, would nonetheless dare to deny—indeed, would not acknowledge—
that everything that exists—that is, whatever is contained just as in its own genus 
by its own nature—was produced by God as its maker; and that, with him as their 
maker, all living things are alive; and that the universal soundness of things and 
the very order by which those things that undergo change proclaim that their 
trajectories through time are subject to a firm control are contained within and 
governed by the laws of the most high God? Once this has been established and 
conceded, who would dare to say that God created all things without good reason? 
If this cannot be rightly said and believed, it remains that all things were created 
in accordance with reason (ratione), but humankind in accordance with a different 
reason (ratione) than the horse, for it is absurd to think this [i.e., that they were 
created in accordance with the same reason]. Individual things, then, have been 
created in accordance with their own reasons. But where should these reasons be 
thought to exist if not in the very mind of the creator? (Singula igitur propriis sunt 
creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente 
Creatoris?)256  
 
                                                          
254 Maritain appears to take this view with respect to the divine ideas in general, whether speaking of 
Aquinas or Augustine. See The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 305-306. 
255 trin., 6.2.11. Similar statements to this effect can be found all throughout Augustine’s corpus. See 
for example, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book V, 13, 29, and Sermon 177.9, 397.  
256 46.2.  
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In his first tractate on the Gospel of John, Augustine will speak further of these different 
“reasons” according to which different things come into existence: “There is, however, in 
Wisdom itself, in a spiritual way, a certain reason by which the earth was made: this is 
life.”257 Immediately after this statement Augustine will make an analogy concerning a 
craftsman’s creative knowledge and the creative Wisdom in which God made all things. 
He explains that a craftsman can only make a chest if he first has the chest in his “ars,” 
i.e., in his practical or creative knowledge. Once he makes a particular chest, there is still 
the chest in his “ars.” This paradigmatic chest, on which the particular chest is modeled, 
remains unchanging, serving as the blueprint for all other particular chests that will be 
built, and as the standard by which the excellence of all future chests is judged. 
Augustine concludes that as the earth was made by a certain reason, and that was called 
“life” for it, we are justified in saying that the chest in the “ars” of a craftsman is “life” 
for all particular chests that are modeled after it.258 The point Augustine is driving at in 
this analogy should be clear: all created things are life in the creative function of the 
Word, in whom they live and move and have their being. This life just is the divine ideas. 
But as Augustine makes clear, the above analogy has Platonic undertones that can only 
be pushed so far. In his second tractate on the Gospel of John, Augustine continues to 
discuss the craftsman analogy and notes its limitations:  
Do not imagine that [God] was in the world in such a way as the earth is in the 
world, the sky is in the world ... But how was he? As the master builder who 
governs what he has made. For he did not make it in the way a craftsman makes a 
chest. The chest which he makes is external to him; and when it is constructed, it 
has been situated in another place.... Suffusing the world, God creates; being 
everywhere, God creates [deus autem mundo infusus fabricat, ubique positus 
fabricat]; he does not direct the structure which he constructs as someone on the 
                                                          
257 Io. ev. tr. 1.16; CCSL 36.10.  
258 Ibid. 
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outside. By the presence of his majesty he makes what he makes; by his own 
presence he governs what he has made [praesentia sua gubernat quod fecit].259  
 
Augustine knows that as finite beings we have a hard time imagining how God creates. 
When we create something (whether that be a chest, another human being, etc.), that 
creation is always external to us, separated in its being from us. God’s act of creation is 
not like this. God creates through his omni-presence, suffusing all things from the inside, 
from the very depths of their material and moral being; and as we have already 
established, this omni-presence of God does not include his essential existence for 
Augustine. What it does include is God’s will and knowledge, or what Augustine refers 
to as the divine ideas.  
The Eastern Orthodox tradition maintains the same general view of the divine 
ideas. Palamas, for instance, argues that there must be a reality in between the divine 
ousia and creatures, i.e., the divine logoi, for creatures to participate in for their existence. 
If there were not this middle reality, then creatures would have to participate in the divine 
ousia for their existence, an idea which Palamas thinks leads to pantheism.260 For 
Palamas, as for the Cappadocians, Dionysius, and Maximus, the divine logoi are 
predeterminations (proorismous), foreknowings (prognoseis) and wills (thelemata) meant 
for the creation and perfection of what exists.261  
The proper translation of the Greek thelemata is especially important in the 
philosophical-theological task of our understanding the divine logoi. Thelemata in this 
context should be translated as “divine wills,” not as “acts” of the divine will or 
“products” of the divine will. This is so because the latter two translations would, 
                                                          
259 Io. ev. tr.2.10; CCSL 36.16.  
260 Triads III.2.23. 
261 See Triads III.2.26.  
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according to the Eastern Orthodox tradition, result in us understanding the divine logoi as 
creatures, and not as expressions of the uncreated God as He is accessible to us. In his 
150 Capita, Palamas makes it clear that any attempt to employ such translations would be 
to land oneself in heresy, for “it is not the energy of God that is a creature—certainly 
not!—but rather the effect and product of the energy.”262 Palamas is arguing that the 
divine energeiai and the effects of those energies are not the same from an ontological 
standpoint. If they were, Barlaam and Akindynos would have been right to say as they 
did that the energies of God are mere creatures, thereby dragging down God’s energies to 
the level of what is created. Palamas thinks that such an identification would result in the 
collapsing of the divine volitions (thelemata) and divine participations (metoxai) into 
what is created.263 But this would be absurd, “[f]or if the energy is in the category of 
creatures or if these are uncreated (What madness!) in that they exist before they have 
been created or before creatures (What impiety!), God would not have an energy.”264 
Palamas maintains, however, that God must have an energy and that this energy must be 
uncreated. This is a theological touchstone, as it were, that he shares with many other of 
the Greek Fathers and writers who preceded him in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.265  
                                                          
262 Capita 73. 
263 See Capita 87. 
264 Capita 140.  
265 See, for example, Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 19.49.2-4, which Palamas cites in Capita 72. See also 
Capita 81, where Palamas will quote Maximus: God is comprehensible “from his creatures according to his 
divine energies, namely his eternal will for us, his eternal providence over us and his eternal wisdom 
concerning us, and, to use the words of the divine Maximus, “his infinite power, wisdom and goodness” 
(Unidentified text); and at Capita 88 Palamas cites Maximus’ Capita Theologica 1.48 and 50 as further 
evidence for the divine thelemata being uncreated. Palamas will even cite St. Paul in Capita 82 (Rom 1:20) 
to make his case: Since the creation of the world the invisible realities of God, namely, his eternal power 
and divinity, are perceptible to the eye of the mind in created things. These invisible realities of God (= the 
energies) are perceptible to the eye of the mind in created things, meaning they are not identical to those 
created things themselves. Palamas will add Dionysius the Areopagite to the list of those who hold the 
energies to be uncreated as well. More specifically, he will reference the DN 2.11: “We give the name 
divine distinction to the beneficent processions of the thearchy. For in bestowing abundantly upon all 
beings participation in all good things it is distinguished in its unity and multiplied in its oneness and it 
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According to the Eastern doctrine of divine ideas, God created all things, spiritual 
and corporeal, out of nothing. The act of creation itself was one of God’s will, not his 
essence, for God created freely according to his eternal and unchanging counsel. The 
word “counsel” in this connection implies not only a free or willful act, but a thoughtful 
one—the counsel of the three persons. It is the persons who create in and through their 
energies, not in and through the essence they commonly share. St. John Damascene helps 
to summarize the doctrine well, writing: “God creates by His thought which immediately 
becomes a work”266 .... “God contemplated all things before their existence, formulating 
them in his mind; and each being received its existence at a particular moment, according 
to His eternal thought and will (kata ten theletiken autou axronon ennoian), which is a 
predestination, an image, and a model.”267 Commenting on this text, Vladimir Lossky 
notes that the term “theletiken-ennoian” (volitional-thought) is a “perfect expression of 
the Eastern doctrine of the divine ideas,”268 because it tells us quite exactly what these 
ideas are—and what they are not—in God’s counsel for all created beings. What they are 
not are the eternal reasons of created beings found in and determined by the essence of 
God, which they would be referred to through a form of exemplary causality as in 
Aquinas.269 Rather, Lossky thinks the Greek Fathers were correct in viewing the divine 
ideas as dynamic, thoughtful, and intentional in their existence, and for placing them in 
                                                          
enters a multiplicity inseparable from the One.” Palamas explains that Dionysius holds to the uncreated 
nature of the processions/energies because “he calls them divine and says they are distinctions belonging to 
the whole Godhead.” (Capita 85).  
266 John Damascene, De fide orth., II, 2, PG, XCIV, 865 A. 
267 Ibid, 837 A.  
268 Lossky, 94. 
269 It is worth noting that Lossky here accuses not only Aquinas but also Augustine as holding the 
view that the divine ideas are located in the essence of God (Lossky 95-96). While Aquinas is deserving of 
this accusation (cf. De Divinis nominibus 2.3), I think Augustine is not, as I will further make clear in what 
follows.  
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that which naturally comes with the necessary (non-volitional) essence of God, namely 
the divine energies. He writes: “the ideas are to be identified with the will or wills which 
determine the different modes according to which created beings participate in the 
creative energies.”270 There are therefore as many divine ideas (logoi) or wills 
(thelemata) as there are individual created beings which relate to those beings in various 
ways, depending on the higher or lower capacities they possess to participate in the 
reality of God. It follows that the logoi spoken of by the Eastern Orthodox tradition are 
fundamentally different from, say, the Forms/Ideas of Plato, because they are not 
“species,” i.e., they are not what we would call secondary substances.271  
In his Ambiguum 7, Maximus the Confessor speaks very well for the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition in making such a point of difference clear. For Maximus, every 
human being—and indeed every created thing—has his/her/its own corresponding divine 
idea (logos) in the Word of God (Logos) in terms of which they have been made.272 Then, 
ideally, all created beings enact movement (kinesis) of one kind or another in an attempt 
to conform themselves to their corresponding logoi, “whether by intellect, by reason, by 
sense-perception, by vital motion, or by some habitual fitness...”273 until they reach their 
ultimate perfection in God. That is, until they completely conform themselves to the logoi 
that God has of them, thereby no longer needing any motion, having achieved a stability 
                                                          
270 Lossky, 95. 
271 Aristotle’s famous definition of secondary substance from his Categories is as follows: “But 
people speak, too, of secondary substances, to which, as species, belong what are spoken of as the primary 
substances, and to which, as genera, the species themselves belong. For instance, a particular man belongs 
to the species “man,” and the genus to which the species belongs is “animal.” So it is these things, like 
“man” and “animal,” that are spoken of as secondary substances” (C 5). The problem is, as Sinkewicz 
points out from his commentary on the 150 Capita, that “Without the energies God would have no 
individual subsistence. He would exist only on the level of a universal or secondary substance in Aristotle’s 
terms.” (Sinkewicz, 48). This in turn leads to the theological error of Sabellianism.  
272 Ambiguum 7, 1077C. 
273 Ambiguum 7, 1077C. 
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or rest. When it comes to human beings in particular, Maximus thinks that this goal of 
conformation to the divine ideas is implanted in us by nature (i.e., we cannot help but 
seek it to some extent given our nature), and that at the end of this conformation process 
we become “God, being made God by God [and so] to the inherent goodness of the 
image is added the likeness (cf. Gen 1:26).”274 Or as he will say elsewhere: “our entire 
self will wholly pass over to God as an image to its archetype.”275 Our self as image will 
therefore possess every perfection of our archetypal logos, i.e., every ontological or moral 
good that is appropriate to us as an individual. 
The second point on which scholars have misinterpreted Augustine’s theory of the 
divine ideas concerns how God’s creative eternity, or perhaps better, the immutability of 
the divine ideas is understood. Most scholars believe that the undoubted influence that 
Neoplatonism had on Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas276 led him to conceive the 
rationes of God as static, purely actual and intelligible realities in the manner of the 
Platonic Forms. Jacques Maritain, James Wetzel, Fr. Edmund Hill, Eleonore Stump, and 
Norman Kretzmann provide particularly good representations of this same basic position, 
though sometimes for different reasons, as will be made clear below.  
Speaking for both Aquinas and Augustine, Maritain claims that, for them, God 
knows all created “essences in His uncreated essence which is His sole specifying 
                                                          
274 Ambiguum 7, 1084A. 
275 Ibid, 1088A. 
276 See for example, Confessions 8.2, where we learn that Marius Victorinus translated certain libri 
platonicorum that Augustine read prior to his conversion and, indeed, that were the impetus for his 
conversion. The exact identity of the books Augustine read are unknown, but some scholars think they 
were likely Plotinus’ Enneads 1.6 (On Beauty) and Porphyry’s De Regressu Animae. Cf. Pierre Courcelle, 
Late Latin Writers 173-82. An overview of Augustine’s early knowledge of Neoplatonism around the time 
of the Confessions can be helpfully found in Robert Crouse’s “Paucis mutatis verbis: St. Augustine’s 
Platonism,” in George Lawless and Robert Dodaro (eds.), Augustine and his Critics (London: Routledge, 
2000), especially pages 37-50.  
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object.”277 Maritain concedes that this means that they would have to hold that “God has 
the entire course of time physically present [i.e., in its actual being] to His eternal 
Instant.”278 And elsewhere he will specifically say that they view the entire course of time 
as physically present in the divine ideas—those realities “to which all things and all 
events and the whole succession of time are present at one stroke in their actuality and 
their existentiality, and in which there is absolutely nothing variable and absolutely 
nothing indeterminate.” 279 Immediately we can detect a problem: Does not Maritain’s 
interpretation of Augustine deny the inherent temporality of creation, which changes (and 
hopefully advances towards its perfection) over time? St. Basil provides a good summary 
statement of this worry in his nine homilies on creation known as the Hexaemeron, in 
which he writes that “the proper and natural adornment of the earth is its completion: 
corn waving in the valleys—meadows green with grass and rich with many coloured 
flowers—fertile glades and hill-tops shaded by forests.”280 But in the divine ideas none of 
this was actually produced. Rather, through these ideas, the earth was impregnated with 
the power necessary to bring forth, at the appointed time, these various perfections. For 
Basil, if we were to say that in the divine ideas all of this was actually produced, then the 
changeability that makes up an essential aspect of temporal creation would be illusory.  
Next we come to James Wetzel, who, in the last chapter of his extremely well-
received and often cited book, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, defends the 
uncontroversial claim that humans exist under a temporal mode of being, while God 
exists under an eternal one. Wetzel then goes on to say that, from God’s eternal 
                                                          
277 Maritain, 70; and see 72.  
278 Maritain, 79; from Aquinas, see I Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5.  
279 Maritain, 93.  
280 Hexaemeron, Homily 2.3. 
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perspective, He anticipates “all the saint’s failures of will. From God’s point of view, 
conversion does have closure. Human beings, having limited access through grace to 
God’s way of viewing things, nevertheless have no way of anticipating their own 
lives.”281 We can know ourselves up to an extent in our time-bound condition, but never 
to the extent of anticipating our own lives completely, with all of our failures and 
triumphs of the will present to our memory. Yet God does have a perfect knowledge of 
the lives of the saints, according to Wetzel, and this because of His predestinating will 
already and eternally having bestowed on them the graces necessary for their salvation: 
“To put it baldly, I am claiming that in terms of how grace operates, the saints live out 
their lives as the effect in time of an eternal cause. The effect is necessary in the way that 
events, once they have occurred, are fixed. On this analogy, our lives are set out in 
advance, predestined in God’s eternity.”282 Wetzel thinks it follows that, “Saints are 
empowered in will in so far as they can recollect the ordered self that God has created 
them to be,”283 and are enervated in will insofar as they cannot. The problem with 
Wetzel’s interpretation of Augustine occurs in his claim that the effect is necessary in the 
sense of already happened, occurred, or actual. Augustine does not believe that there is an 
“ordered self” in the sense of a perfect, completed paradigm of a saint’s life that that saint 
can hopefully, partially recollect, and that exists in the mind of God in such a way that He 
cannot be temporally responsive to what that saint wills in time, with or without the help 
of His grace. Saints and sinners alike are temporally bound, as Wetzel himself will point 
out in various places throughout his book, and so it makes little logical sense for him to 
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say that my life narrative, my conversion story, my ultimate eschatological fate, has 
already been decided before it has been decided. Wetzel bases our hope of redemption on 
a fiction, an archetypal self that supposedly exists already “fixed” in the mind of the 
Creator. Plato’s influence on Wetzel’s interpretation of Augustine’s views on 
predestinating grace looms large, but more important, I think, is what conclusion this 
Platonic interpretation of Augustine leads us to accept, namely: a dualistic view of the 
person as two separated personae, one temporal and incomplete, the other eternal and 
complete. Such a dualistic way of thinking may have been familiar to Mani and his 
disciples, but not to the mature Augustine.284  
Fr. Edmund Hill, O.P., one of the best twentieth century translators and 
commentators on Augustine’s Sermons, On the Trinity, and On Christian Teaching, 
thinks the divine ideas are just Plato’s ideas or forms, except for the fact that they are 
placed in the divine mind—in the Word; they are the rational plans of creatures, fully 
actualized, before the work of temporal creation takes place. For Hill, when in the 
beginning heaven and earth were created, they were planted as “hidden seeds” in the 
world as the seminales rationes, where the fully actualized ideas in the Word would then 
develop and shine forth, God willing, in their corresponding time-bound creatures. Hill 
likens this developmental process to the execution of a computer program.285 The 
                                                          
284 As is often pointed out, when Augustine was younger, he remained a “hearer” among the 
theological sect of the Manicheans for around nine years, whose characteristic belief was in the dualism 
between good and evil. Such a dualism, they believed, was present at the microcosmic scale in the human 
person (the human soul being good, the body being evil) and replicated at the macrocosmic scale in the 
existence of a kingdom of light and a kingdom of darkness that make up the reality of the universe.  
285 P. 411, ftn 2; Sermons 94A-147A on the New Testament. Hill offers the same interpretation of the 
divine ideas in his commentary on Book IV of Augustine’s On the Trinity, where in ftn 68 he writes the 
following: “These aeternae rationes are the platonic ideas or forms, located by Plotinus in the first 
emanation Mind or Nous, and by Augustine in the Logos or Word of God.... The aeternae rationes are not 
to be identified with the seminales rationes, which he was talking about in Book III, 13, note 20, and which 
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problem with Hill’s analogy is that it ignores the distinction Augustine makes between 
what is “actual” (actualis) and what is “complete” (completus). Hill takes the divine ideas 
to be fully actualized, like a computer program, when, in fact, Augustine considers the 
divine ideas to only completely contain all possible potentialities for the good a thing 
may have according to its nature, and depending on the free choices it makes or does not 
make, if the creature under consideration is something ontologically more than a rock or 
a horse. The divine plan for a specific rational creature of its kind cannot be modeled 
after a computer program, even one of quantum level complexity, because its plan as 
related to God and the totality of creation cannot be explained by the calculation of 
already actualized inputs that then lead to determined outputs. For Augustine, human and 
angelic behavior is unique in that it is mindful and willful, intelligent and free, capable of 
following divine instruction on what it ought to do, but not constrained to execute that 
instruction in running the natural course of their existence. I submit that rational creatures 
are, so to speak, “co-programmers” with God, to modify Hill’s analogy in a way in which 
Augustine would approve, sharing their potential for doing what is good with the all-
good God. 
Finally, we have both Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann interpreting 
Augustine as holding God’s foreknowledge to be immutable based on the fact that God’s 
nature is immutable. According to them, if a temporal event were “earlier or later than or 
past or future” 286 in relation to God’s knowledge, then He would be present in the 
successiveness of time, which they think would lead to an undermining of His simplicity. 
                                                          
are, as it were, products of the eternal ideas planted as “seeds” in the creation, or the eternal program for 
things, conceived in the Logos, written into the structure of the created universe” (Hill, ftn 68, page 182).  
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With this said, they do think that a relation can obtain between an eternal being like God 
and temporal beings like ourselves, and they describe such a relation in terms of ET-
simultaneity (eternal-temporal simultaneity). ET-simultaneity is essentially a relation of 
co-existence, which means that what is eternal and what is temporal can occur 
simultaneously. However, Stump and Kretzmann further add very importantly that what 
is eternal and what is temporal cannot both be related “within the same mode of 
existence,”287 as they are both irreducibly real modes of existence. To reduce what is 
temporal to what is eternal would render time illusory, and to reduce what is eternal to 
what is temporal would render eternity illusory.288 Following Boethius and the medievals, 
however, Stump and Kretzmann claim it is absurd to deny the reality of either mobile 
time or eternity; and that there is no third alternative mode of existence.289  
Since we must affirm the reality of two modes of existence, it is necessary to 
define ET-simultaneity in terms of two observers with two non-symmetrical 
epistemological perspectives: God’s eternal frame of reference and our temporal frame of 
reference. Stump and Kretzmann define ET-simultaneity as follows (note that x and y 
stand for entities and events): 
For every x and for every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous iff 
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal or vice versa;  
and  
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both 
present – i.e., either x is eternally present and y is observed as temporally present, 
or vice versa;  
and  
                                                          
287 Stump and Kretzmann, 436. 
288 Ibid. 
289 It is important to note that Stump and Kretzmann do not provide an actual argument as to why it 
would be absurd to deny the reality of one or the other modes of existence mentioned. All they do is claim 
that “the medieval adherents of the concept of eternity held that both time and eternity are real and that 
there is no mode of existence besides those two” (Stump and Kretzmann, 436).  
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(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference 
frames, x and y are both present – i.e., either x is observed as eternally present and 
y is temporally present, or vice versa.290  
 
As their description of the relation proves, Stump and Kretzmann believe that they can 
actually speak of the “unique eternal reference frame” as always being simultaneous with 
the “infinitely many temporal reference frames.” This is somewhat unusual insofar as 
they admit that explaining relational simultaneity in non-Newtonian scientific systems is 
problematic.291 Nevertheless, they insist that it is conceptually unproblematic to claim 
that all temporal entities and events are in a relation of co-existence in God’s eternal 
“now,” that they are ET-simultaneous. 
 Stump and Kretzmann then proceed to apply their definition of ET-simultaneity to 
the now dated example of President Nixon’s death, which was a future contingent at the 
time that they wrote their article. Specifically, they look at how an eternal entity with its 
unique frame of reference can relate to this particular future contingent. According to 
them, while it may be true that Nixon’s death will only be realized at the time of his 
actual death (which we now know to be April 22, 1994), we must also say that Nixon’s 
death “is present to an eternal entity”292 in the manner prescribed by their definition of 
ET-simultaneity. Next, however, they immediately make a point of denying a vision of 
Nixon’s death to an eternal entity: “It cannot be that an eternal entity has a vision of 
Nixon’s death before it occurs.”293 Stump and Kretzmann concede that a vision of a 
future contingent event like Nixon’s death is impossible for God, because then an eternal 
event would be prior to a temporal event, and such an earlier-later relation cannot be 
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possible in eternity. With this said, it is also their claim that the sacrificing of God’s 
vision of Nixon’s future death does not take away “the actual occasion of Nixon’s dying 
[being] present to an eternal entity.”294 As a matter of fact, all temporal actions and 
events associated with Nixon from the time of his birth to the time of his death are ET-
simultaneous within God’s eternal frame of reference. Stump and Kretzmann conclude 
that “there is a sense in which it is now [prior to Nixon’s actual death] true to say that 
Nixon at the hour of his death is present to an eternal entity,”295 yet they never explain 
what sense of “true” they are using.296 How can an eternal being, while not having a 
vision of Nixon’s death, still have true knowledge of the hour when Nixon will die? 
Moreover, what is the difference between an eternal entity having a vision of the future 
and having the future present to it? It appears that Sump and Kretzmann use temporal 
operators to explain both notions, yet they only choose to reject the former. Not only that, 
but Augustine actually speaks out vigorously against any such position as complete 
nonsense in City of God 13.11, where he writes that, it is “absurd to say that a man is in 
death before he reaches death (for to what is his course running as he passes through life, 
if already he is in death?), and ... it outrage[s] common usage to speak of a man being at 
once alive and dead, as much as it does so to speak of him as at once asleep and awake.”  
  Another difficulty plagues the misinterpretation that Stump and Kretzmann 
attribute to Augustine, and it concerns the inconsistent way in which they understand 
God’s omniscience itself. The following text calls attention to the inconsistency: “If we 
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296 Stump and Kretzmann say nothing about the various theories of truth: identity, various 
correspondence, coherence and pragmatist theories. Nor do they say anything about the bearers of truth: 
sentences, beliefs, etc. I suspect if pressed, they would opt for an identity theory between the vision or 
intuition of the observer and a fact.  
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are considering an eternal entity that is omniscient, it is true to say that that entity is at 
once aware of Nixon resigning the Presidency and of Nixon on his deathbed (although of 
course an omniscient entity understands that those events occur sequentially and knows 
the sequence and the dating of them); it is true to say also that for such an entity both 
those events are present at once.”297 Given the fact that Stump and Kretzmann are on 
record earlier as having said that an eternal entity is atemporal and separate from the 
succession of time, it is inconsistent for them to now say that, from an eternal entity’s one 
and the same epistemological perspective, temporal events can be simultaneous and yet 
also prior/posterior with respect to that eternal entity.  
 Stump and Kretzmann attempt to meet this charge of inconsistency by claiming 
that there is only “one objective reality that contains two modes of real existence in 
which two different sorts of duration are measured by two irreducibly different sorts of 
measure: time and eternity.”298 But if Stump and Kretzmann say that time and eternity are 
“two irreducibly different sorts of measure,” one wonders how they could have justifiably 
postulated ET-simultaneity as an explanatory entity to begin with. After all, no relation 
can obtain among two relata that are totally unlike each other.299 That is why when 
Stump and Kretzmann claim that an eternal entity infallibly knows the contingent truths 
of Nixon’s resignation from the presidency and death as ET-simultaneous, we must 
question what sense of the word “know” they are using. Only by having two senses of 
“know” can they possibly avoid the absurdity that Nixon’s resignation and his death are 
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299 We are taught as much from Plato, who in the Timaeus repeatedly expounds the idea that only like 
things can be brought into relation with each other. Cf. for example, Timaeus 45a-e. Plato. Complete 
Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, 1997.  
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ET-simultaneous, and so occur at the same time. Even then, however, it is unclear how an 
event could be known as both occurring now in eternity and in the future.  
 Eleonore Stump still defends ET-simultaneity to this day, believing her two-tiered 
(eternal-temporal) ontology can sufficiently explain the interaction between God and 
man. In the God of the Bible and God of the Philosophers (2016), given as the annual 
Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, she argues that the God of classical theism, i.e., 
the immutable, eternal, and absolutely simple God, is the God of the Bible, who is seen to 
interact with humankind in highly personal and collaborative ways as witnessed, for 
instance, in the story of Jonah. While her focus is on Aquinas’s version of classical 
theism, she makes clear that what she says equally applies to Augustine as well.300  
 The main objection Stump attempts to answer is: How can an immutable, eternal, 
and absolutely simple God interact with a person such as Jonah without destroying the 
coherence of maintaining these three divine attributes in the process? In the story of 
Jonah, God rescues Jonah after he says a prayer, but would not this entail that God was 
somehow passively determined by Jonah’s plea, thereby causing Him to be mutable, 
temporal, and complex?301 Stump answers with a resounding, No, offering an analogy 
involving Erwin Abbott’s short story, Flatland, to make her point. In brief, the main plot 
of Flatland revolves around a self-aware two-dimensional square living in a two-
dimensional world. One day this square encounters and begins to converse with a 
similarly self-aware sphere, who inhabits a three-dimensional world. Of course, the 
sphere cannot adequately explain its three-dimensional existence to the square, who is 
                                                          
300 See Stump, 37-38, where she identifies both Augustine and Aquinas as classical theists of the same 
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301 See Stump, 35. 
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puzzled by this new mode of being it can never occupy in its two-dimensional state. 
Stump concludes that: “In the story, the two spatial modes of existence, that of Flatland 
and that of the sphere, are both real; and neither is reducible to the other or to any third 
thing.”302 So too with respect to God’s immutable, eternal, and absolutely simple 
existence and how it can personally relate to our inherently mutable, temporal, and 
complex existence. According to Stump, Aquinas, Augustine, or any classical theist for 
that matter, believes that “reality includes both time and eternity as two distinct modes of 
duration, neither of which is reducible to the other or to any third thing. Nonetheless, on 
their view, it is possible for inhabitants of the differing modes of duration to interact.”303 
And once again, in addition to the previously mentioned analogy, Stump attempts to rely 
on ET-simultaneity to explain such interaction. The problem is she admits that “the 
presentness or simultaneity associated with an eternal God cannot be temporal 
presentness or temporal simultaneity.”304 Here, then, is where she totally denies any kind 
of “real” relation or interaction possible between God and man. God can only be present 
or simultaneous with time-bound man if and only if He is present or simultaneous with 
time-bound man. No amount of analogies or philosophical conceptualization can hide this 
truth. Stump then hedges and says ET-simultaneity is a special kind of simultaneity, in 
which “all of time is encompassed within the eternal present ... just as the whole Flatland 
world can be here for someone in three-dimensional space,”305 but can never bridge the 
original gap she created between God as eternal and man as temporal, because of the 
crippling Platonic assumption that they are two separate and irreducible forms of 
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existence. Her ontology as a whole lacks the middle reality of the divine ideas, which are 
eternal by a different kind of eternity than that of the divine essence, namely that of the 
divine will and knowledge, and which are especially emphasized in the Eastern tradition 
and Augustinian theology.306 Such incorporeal and eternal reasons may be above the 
human mind, as they are unchangeable, but they are really present to us in changeable 
creation. For “unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be 
able to employ them as our measures by which to judge corporeal things.”307 Because of 
their truncated two-tiered ontology, Stump and Kretzmann have to rely on the eternity of 
the divine essence to explain every attribute (immutability, eternity, and simplicity in 
particular) pertaining to God as God and how He relates to creation. This in turn forces 
them to say that every temporal entity and event in creation “is present at once to the 
whole life of eternal God,”308 or what means the same thing, physically present at once to 
the eternity of the divine essence. Whether they admit it or not, Stump and Kretzmann 
have denied the reality of the temporal order in the defense of the immutability, eternity, 
and simplicity of the divine essence.  
 Augustine preferred, no doubt to keep the purely actual essence of God distinct 
from His will and knowledge, to say that the divine essence is existentially distinct (not 
divided) from the divine idea of a creature, with the latter being further distinguishable 
from the creature itself. For “the formula or idea on which a creature is fashioned is there 
in the Word of God before it is realized in the fashioning of the creature” and remains 
                                                          
306 The importance of the divine ideas in Eastern and Augustinian theology for creation and 
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there after it comes to be.309 This idea is life for the creature, i.e., what constitutes its 
creaturely perfection; and this idea is complete because the creature has “nothing in [its] 
natural manner of running [its] course in time which was not made causally in that 
primordial creation.”310 For this primordial creation contains the nature proper to each 
thing according to its kind, and so “whenever a creature in its natural development in due 
course discloses and puts forth perfection, this added something was previously hidden 
within that creature, if not in a visible and tangible corporeal way, at least by a natural 
power.”311 Augustine believes that the goal of this perfection process for creatures is to 
rest in God, not as He is for Himself (essentially), but as He exists for creation in terms of 
His will and knowledge expressed in the divine ideas (relatively).312 We might say that 
the latter realities in God—those that are distinct from the divine essence—contain “fully, 
exhaustively, existentially, all there is of being, of the positive, of good, of the 
ontologically good and of the morally good, in creatures, because it itself causes or makes 
all of this.”313 Nothing more of being is ever added to the divine ideas after their 
establishment. Augustine’s reasoning for this is that God “would not be the perfect 
worker He is, unless His knowledge were so perfect as to receive no addition from His 
finished works.”314  
It follows that through the divine ideas God has a perfect existential and moral 
knowledge of the whole of creation from moment to moment, insofar as it exists as the 
kind of thing it now is and as it ultimately ought to be according to the divine ideas by 
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which it was originally made. As we saw previously, a divine idea constitutes God’s 
rational plan for a particular creature that will help it keep its natural order and realize its 
full, God-given, potential. It is a plan that anticipates every good actuality that that 
creature can attain as related to God and the totality of creation. When it comes to any 
creature, there is no getting to that good before God, no anticipating it, no making it, 
since it has already been done by Him, who has done, is doing, and will do all good 
things in heaven and earth.  
It is important to emphasize, however, that Augustine never says that what was 
made causally in that primordial creation is actual, or already existing. It was made 
“Invisibly, potentially, in their causes, as things that will be in the future are made, yet 
not made in actuality now (Quomodo fiunt futura non facta).315 This is something that 
scholars such as Maritain, Wetzel, Hill, Stump, and Kretzmann assume, perhaps because 
of their apparent penchant for reading Aquinas backwards into Augustine, or for reading 
Plato forwards into Augustine. But if one examines Augustine’s corpus carefully, and 
especially his Commentaries on Genesis, where we find the bulk of his references to the 
divine ideas, Augustine only ever defends the position that the divine ideas contain fully, 
exhaustively, the potential goods for the corresponding creatures which are the bearers of 
these ideas. In his Literal Commentary on Genesis, for instance, Augustine claims that 
the “formulae contained each potentiality” for all creatures, “so that anything would be 
actualized from them that pleased the one who would make them.”316 Augustine will give 
numerous examples of this passim DGnL, including that of a tree and its various 
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perfections: “Let us, then, consider the beauty of any tree in its trunk, branches, leaves, 
and fruit. This tree surely did not spring forth suddenly in this size and form, but rather 
went through a process of growth with which we are familiar.” Specifically, Augustine 
tells us, it is in the seed that “all those parts existed primordially, not in the dimensions of 
bodily mass but as a force and causal power.”317 Saying that it is the potentiality of 
creatures that can be actualized according to the divine ideas ensures that the ordo 
temporum is not rendered illusory, being merely reduced to what is eternally actual and 
immutable. Augustine will make similar comments to this effect in his other two 
commentaries on Genesis, namely, his Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and 
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book.318  
Augustine was a firm believer in the potential aspects of created reality, writing 
elsewhere that all things in creation “have been seminally and primordially created in the 
very fabric, as it were, or texture of the elements; but they require the right occasion 
actually to emerge into being. For the world itself, like mothers heavy with young, is 
heavy with the causes of things coming to birth.”319 But these things are not yet actual, 
possessing no definite number, weight, and measure, i.e., possessing no formed nature 
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(number), no ultimate end to strive towards (weight), and no relations to anything else 
(measure).  
We can say, for example, that no possible perfection of a human being is lacking 
in the corresponding idea for him in the Word, for God possesses perfect knowledge of 
human nature in itself and as it is lived in the concrete members of the species. The idea 
for a particular person contains each “good” potentiality for him, so that he would be 
actualized from his corresponding idea if he so chose to conform himself to it. Augustine 
noticeably picks up on this example in what can only be said to be a side issue of the final 
book of The City of God, i.e., whether or not infants who have died are going to be 
resurrected in the body which they would have had if they were given the chance to 
mature normally. Here, Augustine reinforces the point that the divine idea of any thing 
contains all potential perfections for that thing. He writes of the dead infant in particular 
that it was: 
... wanting the perfect stature of its body; for even the perfect infant lacks the 
perfection of bodily size, being capable of further growth. This perfect stature is, 
in a sense, so possessed by all that they are conceived and born with it—that is, 
they have it potentially, though not yet in actual bulk; just as all the members of 
the body are potentially in the seed, though, even after the child is born, some of 
them, the teeth, for example, may be wanting. In this seminal principle of every 
substance, there seems to be, as it were, the beginning of everything which does 
not yet exist, or rather does not appear, but which in the process of time will come 
into being, or rather into sight. In this, therefore, the child who is to be tall or 
short is already tall or short.”320  
 
One can see that the fundamental assumption of Augustine’s argument is that some thing 
cannot come from nothing and no thing ever could: If there was not some sense in which 
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the infant already possessed the perfection of its bodily size and form of its members 
(potentially), then there would be no rational way to maintain that it could ever, through 
the process of time and its own deficient being, achieve these perfections (actually). 
These perfections would be some ‘things’ that literally originated in ‘nothing,’ but it is 
absurd to say that something can come from nothing.321 Hence the need for there to be all 
of these perfections seminally in the principle of the human substance, i.e., in its 
corresponding divine idea.  
This in turn raises an important question: If in fact all of the perfections of human 
nature and its conative and cognitive powers are contained in the divine ideas, then would 
not this mean that we as human beings are necessarily limited in the number of goods we 
can accomplish? Speaking of the human will in particular, Augustine writes: “Wherefore 
our wills also have just so much power as God willed and foreknew that they should 
have; and therefore whatever power they have, they have it within most certain limits; 
and whatever they are to do, they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge 
is infallible foreknew that they would have the power to do it, and would do it.”322 
According to Augustine, these “most certain limits” imposed on the human will, because 
of God’s perfect knowledge of the human will, are necessary, but not necessary in any 
sense that would be controlling of our freedom: 
For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though 
we be unwilling effects what it can effect—as, for instance, the necessity of 
death—it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly are 
not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, 
we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if 
we will, it is; if we will not, it is not—for we should not will if we were unwilling. 
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322 City of God 5.9. 
123 
 
 
 
But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary 
that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I 
know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the 
freedom of our will.323  
 
Death is not in our power; growing old is not in our power; being born is not in our 
power; and so too for a host of other things natural to human life too many to enumerate. 
These happen to us whether we will them or not. It is Augustine’s claim that our wills are 
not necessary in this sense of “not in our power.” However, they are still necessary in the 
sense that if one wills such and such an action, then of necessity one wills such and such 
an action, whether for good or ill. As a result of our possessing a definite nature, distinct 
from other natures in the mind of God, we are limited in the number of potential goods, 
and therefore evils—which are merely privations of goods—that we can willingly acquire 
or avoid as human beings. This necessary consequence of our partaking in one and same 
human nature, which has a corresponding complete divine idea to go along with it, is not 
necessary in any vicious, freedom-destroying sense. It is only necessary in how things 
actually are for us, because of the reality we inhabit as human beings.  
The Greek Fathers also present a unified philosophical front when it comes to 
saying that God has a perfect knowledge of human nature through the divine ideas, with 
this perfect knowledge only including the potential perfection, or actuality, of man. 
Nyssa, for instance, writes in his On the Making of Man XXIX.1 that, “in the power of 
God’s foreknowledge, all the fullness of human nature had pre-existence (and to this the 
prophetic writing bears witness, which says that God knoweth all things before they be).” 
But he makes clear that the “fullness” he speaking of is potential:  
just as we say that in wheat, or in any other grain, the whole form of the plant is 
potentially included—the leaves, the stalk, the joints, the grain, the beard—and do 
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not say in our account of its nature that any of these things has pre-existence, or 
comes into being before the others, but that the power abiding in the seed is 
manifested in a certain natural order, not by any means that another nature is 
infused into it—in the same way we suppose the human germ to possess the 
potentiality of its nature, sown with it at the first start of its existence, and that it is 
unfolded and manifested by a natural sequence as it proceeds to its perfect 
state...324  
 
He will repeat the same point elsewhere: “the form of the future man is there potentially, 
but is concealed because it is not possible that it should be made visible before the 
necessary sequence of events allows it.”325 Nyssa is arguing that temporal things must 
follow a temporal sequence of development appropriate to their respective natures. It 
follows that a grain of wheat cannot instantly produce its fruit, or pre-exist in its mature 
state where it would bear its fruit. Similarly, the “seed” of a human being cannot instantly 
become an adult, or pre-exist as such; and so on for everything else created and that 
exists in time.326 If it could be otherwise, then things in time could exist as actual before 
they are actual, which would be the very height of philosophical absurdity. The Greek 
Fathers thus understood the metaphysical and logical necessity of keeping creatures 
distinct from their corresponding ideas in the Word. It does not follow, however, that we 
as rational creatures cannot participate in our corresponding ideas. We can, and we 
should, for the more we do so, the more progress we make towards gaining the 
knowledge that God has of us in Him, i.e., the knowledge of how we ought to be in 
relation to God and the totality of creation, which constitutes our ultimate perfection. 
Nazianzen has a similar message to Nyssa when it comes to knowing ourselves in God. 
He will say, when we have ascended to our archetypal selves in the divine ideas, which 
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we now desire but have not yet attained, then we shall know even as we are known (1 Cor 
13:12). We shall know ourselves, in other words, as God knows us as we should be in 
Him; and to know ourselves as God knows us is something He actively wants for the 
whole human race. 327 Those who do not ascend to their archetypal selves, or those who 
fail to attain the likeness of God but still yet retain the image, will not be formed in such a 
way as to attain their ultimate perfection as creatures that are capable of God.328  
Like the Greek Fathers, Augustine will often speak of our conformation to our 
corresponding divine ideas as constituting our ultimate perfection. One instance of this 
that particularly comes to mind can be found in Book XI of The City of God, where he 
will first say of the righteous angels that they know creation: 
... not in itself, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by 
which it was created; and, consequently, they know themselves better in God than 
in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge. For they were created, 
and are different from their creator. In Him, therefore, they have, as it were, a 
noonday knowledge; in themselves, a twilight knowledge.... For there is a great 
difference between knowing a thing in the design in conformity to which it was 
made, and knowing it in itself—e.g., the straightness of lines and correctness of 
                                                          
327 Oration 28.XVII.  
328 Maximus writes in this connection: “[W]hoever abandons his own beginning [i.e., by not 
conforming himself to his corresponding logos in God] and is irrationally swept along toward non-being is 
rightly said to have “slipped down from above,” because he does not move toward his own beginning and 
cause according to which and for which and through which he came to be. He enters a condition of unstable 
gyrations and fearful disorder of soul and body, and though his end remains in place, he brings about his 
own defection by deliberately turning to what is worse. Keeping these things in mind the phrase “to slip 
down” can be understood properly. It means that someone who had the ability to direct the steps of his soul 
unswervingly toward God voluntarily exchanged what is better, his true being, for what is worse, non-
being. (Ambiguum 7.1084D-1085A). Augustine will echo such a statement, claiming that all creatures are 
meant to be formed according to the divine ideas, and in this “conversion and formation the creature in its 
own way imitates the Divine Word, the Son of God, who is eternally united with the Father in the perfect 
likeness and equal essence by which He and the Father are one.” However, Augustine adds that if a 
creature does not imitate its ratione in the Word, if it turns away from its Creator, then it will remain 
“formless and imperfect” (DGnL.I.4.9). Augustine continues this train of thought in the next chapter of 
DGnL, but talks specifically of the formation (or lack thereof) of intellectual creatures. He notes that only 
in God being is the same as living and living is the same as living wisely and happily. When it comes to 
intellectual creatures, being is the same as living, but living is not the same as living wisely and happily. 
Augustine explains that this is because “when it is turned away from changeless Wisdom, its life is full of 
folly and wretchedness and so it is in an unformed state.” (DGnL.I.5.10). See also DGnL.I.9.17. For a more 
down to earth description of this turning away from God and the negative effects that this has on the life of 
human beings, see Augustine’s account of his own experience with this in his Confessions 8.5.  
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figures is known in one way when mentally conceived, in another when described 
on paper; and justice is known in one way in the unchangeable truth, in another in 
the spirit of a just man.329  
 
Augustine believes that, as the spiritual beings we were meant to become, we have some 
access to this angelic, “noonday knowledge” of ourselves; but as we are also material 
beings, and as we often let this latter “aspect” of our being dominate the former, we tend 
to largely possess a “twilight knowledge” of ourselves. As St. Paul famously says, and as 
Augustine loved to quote in this connection, Therefore we are always confident and know 
that as long as we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord. For we live by 
faith, not by sight (2 Cor 5: 6-7). And to quote again from St. Paul: For now we see only 
a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall 
know fully, even as I am fully known (1 Cor 13:12). With this said, Augustine was 
confident that our supreme good lies in this “noonday knowledge” of ourselves, wherein 
we see how we ought to be as creatures of God; and that such a good, “is not far from 
every one of us: for in it we live, and move, and have our being” (Acts 17: 27-28).330  
Equally important, too, is that Augustine views our participation in the divine 
ideas as “pleasing” to God, which calls attention to the fact that God desires all persons to 
conform themselves to him, as he is accessible to them: “God wants to make you like 
him.”331 Yet such good news is immediately counterbalanced by what it implies, namely 
that we are not currently as like God as we should be. While we all are the image of God 
insofar as we possess a rational mind,332 this does not necessarily mean that we are all 
                                                          
329 City of God 11.29. See also DGnL.II.8.18; DGnL.IV.22.39; DGnL.IV.23.40; DGnL.IV.24.41; 
DGnL.IV.25.42; DGnL.IV.26.43; DGnL.IV.28.45; DGnL.IV.30.47; DGnL.IV.34.53; DGnL.IV.35.56. 
330 trin.8.3.5. 
331 Sermon 9.9, 420. 
332 Augustine writes: “When man is said to have been made to the image of God, these words refer to 
the interior man, where reason and intellect reside” (DGnM.I.17.28). For similar statements on the 
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“like” God or exist ‘according to the likeness of God’ after which he originally created us 
(Gn 1:26).333  
When Augustine speaks of man being made according to the likeness of God, I 
would argue that this refers to our development, in co-operation with Him, to conform 
ourselves to His will and knowledge. It has a perfective sense—to make us what God 
knows we ought to be according to His divine rationes for us. It is a form of creation 
distinct from the creation of all things together, after which He rested on the seventh day; 
we might call it continual creation, or the kind of creation of which Christ spoke of when 
he said, My Father is working still (Jn 5:17).334 Augustine will stress that this creation 
demands action on our part. Near the end of DGnM, Augustine will state what it means 
for man to be made in the image and likeness of God, phrasing it in terms of the genders 
of male and female, respectively: “Thus let man be made to the image and likeness of 
God, male and female, that is, intellect and action.”335 While some may object to 
                                                          
mind/reason/intellect of man being made in the image of God, see DGnM.II.7.9; DGnI.16.55; 
DGnL.III.20.30. 
333 Genesis 1:26 as it appears in the Greek Septuagint reads: καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον 
κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν. By contrast, we have the same text from the Vulgate: et ait 
faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. 
334 See DGnL.V.20.40. 
335 DGnM.I.25.43. The Greek East appears to have a similar position to Augustine in identifying the 
image with the intellect/mind/or reason of man and the likeness with the actions required to make us ‘like’ 
God. A classic Orthodox text that bears this out is St. John of Damascus’ On Virtues from the Philokalia, 
vol. 2, pp. 341-342: “As a golden seal to this plain homily, we will add a brief account of the way in which 
what is most precious of all that God has created — the noetic and intelligent creature, man — has been 
made, alone among created beings, in God's image and likeness (cf. Gen. 1: 26). First, every man is said to 
be made in the image of God as regards the dignity of his intellect and soul — as regards, that is to say, the 
quality in man that cannot be scrutinized or observed, is immortal and endowed with free will, and in virtue 
of which he rules, begets and constructs. Second, every man is said to be made in the likeness of God as 
regards his possession of the principle of virtue and as regards his imitation of God through virtuous and 
godlike actions. Such actions consist in having deep sympathy for one's fellow men, in mercy, pity and love 
towards one's fellow servant, and in showing heartfelt concern and compassion. 'Be merciful,' says Christ 
our God, 'as your heavenly Father is also merciful' (cf. Luke 6 : 36). Every man possesses that which is 
according to the image of God, 'for the gifts of God are irrevocable' (cf. Rom. : 29). But only a few — those 
who are virtuous and holy, and have imitated the goodness of God to the limit of human powers — possess 
that which is according to the likeness of God. May we too be found worthy of His sublime compassion, 
having conformed ourselves to Him through good actions and become imitators of all who have ever been 
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Augustine’s identification of the male with intellect (image of God) and female with 
action (likeness of God), one must first remember that this is an allegorical reading of 
Genesis 1:26 on his part. In his subsequent literal interpretation found in DGnL, he will 
clearly state that “she certainly had a mind, and a rational mind, and therefore she also 
was made to the image of God.”336 Second, we must remember that male and female, 
taken in this allegorical spirit, are meant to complement each other in a kind of 
inseparable spiritual union. From this union of image and likeness, male and female, 
intellect and action, Augustine thinks spiritual fruit will be brought forth in the effect of 
holding “the flesh in subjection, as well as other things [that concern] human 
perfection.”337 According to Augustine, it is God that bids us to perfect the image in us 
according to His likeness through the performance of good works, and that He will “give 
us rest after all of these works.”338    
At DGnI.16, Augustine will further explain his literal approach to explaining the 
doctrine of the likeness. Here, he will speak of it in terms of the concept of participation. 
Augustine will ask why the Scriptures say, “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 
Are not all images like that of which they are images? He answers his own question in 
the affirmative, but notes that not every thing that is like something else can be said to be 
its image. For some thing to be called the image of something else it must have its origin 
from this other thing. In addition, we must make another distinction between what is 
‘like’ and ‘likeness’ itself. For example, there is a difference between a chaste person and 
                                                          
faithful servants of Christ. For mercy is His and to Him are due all glory, honour and worship, together 
with His unoriginate Father and His all-holy, blessed and life-creating Spirit, now and always and through 
all the ages. Amen.” (emphasis mine) 
336 DGnL.III.22.34. 
337 DGnM.I.25.43. 
338 Ibid.  
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chastity; a strong person and strength; a wise person and wisdom. The former persons 
being such and such depends on their relation to, or participation in, these latter realities. 
And these latter realities, Augustine thinks, are found “in God,” where there is chastity 
which is not chaste by participation; strength which is not strong by participation; and 
wisdom which is not wise by participation. Augustine concludes that whatever things 
God made that are like Him in these and other respects are like by participation in these 
likenesses themselves.339 He explains these distinctions in relation to Gen 1:26: “the 
addition, ‘to the likeness,’ after it had said, ‘to the image,’ was meant to show that what 
was called the image is not like God in the manner of one participating in some likeness, 
but that this image is itself the likeness, in which all things participate which are said to 
be like. Thus there is in God chastity itself, by participation in which souls are chaste, and 
wisdom, by participation in which souls are wise, and beauty, by participation in which 
all beautiful things are beautiful.”340 It follows that if the Scriptures mentioned only 
‘likeness,’ they would not have sufficiently indicated our origin from Him; and if they 
had mentioned only ‘image,’ they would have sufficiently indicated our origin from Him, 
“but not that it was so like to Him that it was not merely like, but likeness itself.”341 It is 
the likeness itself of God that forms us and brings us into the unity with God which we 
were meant for before the foundation of the world.342  
According to Augustine, God wants to “love us for actually being what he now 
loves us that we might be,” in the complete divine idea he has for each one of us, “and 
                                                          
339 DGnI.16.57. 
340 DGnI.16.58. 
341 Ibid. 
342 DGnI.16.58. See also DGnL.IV.17.29.  
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are not such as he hates because we are (non quales odit quia sumus),”343 in our presently 
incomplete and sinful time-bound condition. Augustine often preached this same lesson, 
that God does not love us as we are, but rather hates us insofar as we are sinful, thereby 
failing to achieve the likeness to Him we can and ought to achieve. This is analogous, he 
thinks, to how sick people hate themselves as they are, insofar as they are ill, and how 
doctors hate their sick patients, insofar as they hate their patients’ illnesses. As the doctor 
of our souls, God has compassion for us, because while He hates us as we are, because 
we are afflicted with many “fevers” of the soul, such as avarice, lust, hatred, 
covetousness, lechery, and so forth, He wants to make us what we are not yet. He wants 
to make us better. He wants to make us like Him. Augustine thinks we see this 
particularly in the example of Christ, who only loved sinners because of the good he 
wished to make in them and for them, not because of the sin he found in them.344 It is up 
to us to let him make us into the kinds of persons we are not yet, into spiritual men and 
women. We can and must help the wellness process along, according to Augustine, by 
making an effort with God, by listening gladly to what he orders, and by gladly doing 
what he orders. And if not gladly, we must force ourselves to “co-operate” with God, so 
that God, as doctor, and we, as patients, may persecute our illnesses together.345  
Nevertheless, this healing of human nature will never make us what God is, no 
matter how healthy we become. God only promised to make us what He is, “after a 
fashion, that is to say, an imitator of God like an image, but not the kind of image that the 
Son is.”346 To give us some understanding of how we can be a kind of image of God but 
                                                          
343 trin.1.10.21; CCSL 50.59. The Latin odit is a form of odio, meaning to hate or to dislike.  
344 Sermon 335I.5, 420 or later? 
345 Sermon 9.10. 
346 Sermon 9.9.  
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not the kind of image that the Son is, Augustine will draw on an example he often uses in 
his Sermons: that of the difference between the emperor, his son, and the coins that bear 
his image. Augustine thinks the emperor’s image is carried differently by a gold 
sovereign than how it is carried by the emperor’s son; these two different images of the 
emperor are not of equal ontological weight. So too, we are God’s coins, but better ones, 
insofar as we are His coins endowed with life and intelligence, and so capable of 
knowing whose image we carry and to whose image we were originally minted.  
Because we were created imago Dei, Augustine will say that it is the nature of the 
human person, and the human mind in particular, that it order itself according to the 
eternal pattern of righteousness present in God for it, which exemplifies how it ought to 
be as related to God and the rest of creation.347 Following Augustine’s previous coin 
analogy, we might say this is how we as God’s coins are restruck in a way which actually 
surpasses our “first issuance,” so to speak. When we let God restrike us in the furnace of 
charity, we quite literally touch the Master Minter himself, for the re-minting effected by 
divine ideas, as expressions of God’s will and knowledge, are himself as He is accessible 
to us.348  
The above minting process renews the image of God in us that was damaged by 
the fall and our own personal sins. Of course, this does not happen instantaneously: “The 
renewal of which we speak is not effected in the single moment of return, like the 
renewal which takes place in baptism in a single moment through the remission of all 
sins—none whatsoever remaining unremitted.”349 Rather, Augustine likens our rise to 
                                                          
347 trin.10.7.5. 
348 See Conf. 12.4, 38, where Augustine will speak of God’s will and knowledge as being no less God 
than the divine essence. They are God, albeit God as He interacts with creation.  
349 trin.14.23.17. 
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contemplating God, or our greater and greater conformation to God’s divine will and 
knowledge, to recovering after a bout of fevers or after some harm has been done to the 
body; our fevers may cease or a dart may be pulled from our body quite quickly, but that 
is different from the convalescing that takes place after which one’s full health returns, 
which must take “effect by gradual process.”350 So too with our defaced and distorted 
image: It is one thing to remove the cause of its weakening, by the forgiveness of sins, 
yet it is quite another thing to go about strengthening it, which takes place by a gradual 
process of grace working on (passive) and with (active) our human nature and its various 
conative and cognitive powers. Augustine views this divinely-directed recovery process 
as a distinct form of grace from the grace of creation, to which he often refers to as re-
creation.351  
To support the view that God continues to be involved with his incomplete 
creation after its first establishment in the divine ideas, Augustine frequently cites Jn 
5:17: My Father is working until now, and I myself am working. It is his claim that after 
the initial act of creation God holds together, and providentially provides for, everything 
that he has made; and that this is a form of creation that will take place in time until the 
final Apotheosis of creation, the “Sabbath of Sabbaths,”352 when everything that has 
remained with God will enjoy eternal rest in God. However, everything else that has not 
                                                          
350 Ibid. 
351 See for example, Sermon 260D.2. Such a distinction between these two different kinds of creation 
can be found in the Eastern tradition as well. See for instance Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium 4.3: “For we 
recognize a twofold creation of our nature, the first that whereby we were made, the second that whereby 
we were made anew. But there would have been no need of the second creation had we not made the first 
unavailing by our disobedience. Accordingly, when the first creation had waxed old and vanished away, it 
was needful that there should be a new creation in Christ.”  
352 Sermon 9.21. 
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will be left to its own self-imposed temporal demise, returning from the nothingness from 
whence it came, and in which it foolishly placed its hope for happiness.353  
Augustine is careful to keep the two forms of creation he has spoken of as distinct 
(creation and re-creation), and the corresponding realities that go along with them 
(immutable and time-bound): “the unchangeable formulae [or ideas] for all creatures in 
the Word of God are one thing... [and] yet another these which carrying on from those he 
is working until now.”354 Augustine will return to this distinction multiple times in The 
Literal Meaning of Genesis. He gives an example of it in action: “I say that in that first 
establishment of things, in which God created all things simultaneously together, man 
was not to be found as he is now, not only as an adult but not even as an infant, not only 
as an infant, but not even as a fetus in his mother’s womb, not only this, but not even as 
the visible seed of a human being.”355 In short, he was to be found as ‘complete’356 in his 
                                                          
353 See The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book IV, 12, 23. Augustine speaks of this Sabbath day in 
Books 12 and 13 of the Confessions, too, noting that on this day temporal creation will participate in the 
eternity of its Creator. Such will be a day without end, a day on which God will be all in all, and creation 
will find final rest in Him (See for example, Conf. 13.24.35-25.38).  
354 The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book V, 12, 28.  
355 Ibid, Book VI, 10. According to Augustine, the unchangeable ideas for creatures reside in the 
eternity of the divine will and knowledge (i.e., in the creative function of the Word of God), not in the 
eternity of the divine essence. They are expressions of the divine will and knowledge itself, and so cannot 
be placed into the category of creaturely existence. Augustine will discuss this at DGnL.IV.3-6 in terms of 
the numbers, weights, and measures that God used in that first establishment of things and after which He 
rested on the seventh day. He argues throughout these chapters that the numbers, measures, and weights of 
things are in God (DGnL.IV.3.7); that these three realities that constitute the complete natures of things are 
not “created beings” on pain of an infinite causal and explanative regress (DGnL.IV.4.10); that they are, 
specifically, in “God the Creator” (DGnL.IV.5.11); and that since creatures were ordered in the primordial 
creation to have their own numbers, measures, and weights, these three realities must not be placed 
“outside” of God, but nor can they can be placed in the essence of God (DGnL.IV.6.12-13). However, only 
later in DGnL will Augustine specifically place these three realities in His will and knowledge, for God not 
only must be said to have originally created all things with knowledge (see, for example, DGnL.V.13.29), 
but also according to His decision as Creator, “whose will constitutes the necessity of things”—their 
numbers, weights, and measures. Augustine will also reiterate here that this determination of the divine will 
for created things in the divine ideas cannot be said to be “in the created world” or, as he said previously, 
“outside” of God (DGnL.VI.15.26).  
356 It is important to recall that Augustine makes a distinction between what is complete and what is 
actual.  See page 105 of this dissertation. To say man is ‘complete’ in his corresponsing divine idea is not 
to say that he is endowed from the beginning of his existence with all possible goodness of will and 
strength of understanding. What it means is that the divine idea for man completely contains all possible 
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corresponding divine idea. But man as he is found now, whether as an adult, visible seed, 
or at whatever stage of development in between, is partly complete, partly incomplete, in 
his own existence.  
Perhaps now we can better understand why Augustine will make statements to the 
effect of: “it is what [God] wills that will of necessity be in the future, and it is those 
things that he has foreknown which will really be in the future;”357 and “He knows 
unchangeably all things which shall be, and all things which He shall do.”358 Taken out of 
context, the previous statements sound like an affirmation of predestination (maybe even 
double-predestination) to the ears of most scholars.359 But by placing them within the 
context of Augustine’s theory of the divine ideas, I believe they only support a reasonable 
divine providence. First, the only things that will of necessity be in the future are those 
                                                          
potentialities for the good he may have according to his rational nature. Because Augustine will make this 
distinction, I find it unfair to attribute to him the “Western” position that man before the fall was in no way 
potential, but perfect in will and understanding. Kallistos Ware will interpret Augustine in this way in his 
Excerpts from the Orthodox Church, Part II Faith and Worship: “According to Augustine, man in Paradise 
was endowed from the start with all possible wisdom and knowledge: his was a realized, and in no sense 
potential, perfection.” But for Augustine, man is only created as complete, not as perfect in the sense of 
already actual, or already at rest. Augustine will even point out that with respect to Adam’s paradisal 
“freedom” that it does not represent the full perfection/deification (or Augustine will prefer “amelioration”) 
of man.  Only the liberty of Christ does—the liberty of the second Adam. This is something I discuss 
extensively in Chapter 9 and hinted at in Chapter 1 as the solution to the problem of theological fatalism.    
357 The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book VI, 17, 28.  
358 City of God 5.9.  
359 Jaroslav Pelikan thinks that Augustine’s mature theology—his “Augustinism” as it has come to be 
known—“had in many ways gone beyond even the Western theological tradition (not to mention the 
Eastern tradition) by positing a doctrine of predestination, including predestination to damnation, and of the 
irresistibility of grace.”359 To support his interpretation, he first cites Augustine’s City of God 5.9, where 
Augustine claims that all human willings are part of the order of causes included in God’s foreknowledge. 
This by itself may not land Augustine in a fatalistic position, Pelikan argues, but his eventual inclusion of 
all human willings as the causal effects of God’s predestinating will does. However, the following text he 
cites from City of God 22.2 does not prove this: “according to that will of his which is as eternal as his 
prescience, certainly he has already done in heaven and on earth all the things that he has willed—not only 
things past and present, but even things still future.” This text is frequently mentioned by scholars trying to 
catch Augustine in a form of predestinationism when, in fact, it serves as a proof text for his innocence of 
such a charge. Firstly, we must note once again how careful Augustine is in specifying that it is the eternity 
of the divine will that is at stake here, not the eternity of the divine essence. That is, we are discussing 
God’s role as creator and not his role as generator of the Son and Spirator of the Holy Spirit. Secondly, 
what Augustine says is perfectly consistent with the Eastern doctrine of the divine ideas and how they 
unchangingly relate to created beings.  
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things that God wills, because the divine ideas are complete, not lacking any “good” 
potentialities for their respective creatures existing in time. Potentialities for evil provide 
no exception, for they are quite literally nothing on Augustine’s account; they are mere 
nihilations or privations that are parasitic upon the existence of the good but not 
constitutive of the good.  
Second, the only things that will really be in the future are those things that God 
has unchangeably foreknown in the divine ideas, because it is based on them that God 
knows the future through their primordially complete causality, effected through the Son 
and in the Holy Spirit, which actualizes creatures at the appropriate times, in accord with 
the divine will and knowledge for those creatures, as well as their free choices, when 
considering the rational creation. Evil actions on the part of rational creatures once again 
provide no exception to the above account, because evil does not exist as a positive 
reality for Augustine. It has no proper mode of being in itself. With this said, in knowing 
all the potential goods of creatures through the divine ideas, God knows all the possible 
evils that could befall them as well, for such evils are nothing else than privations of the 
potential goods present in the divine ideas. In other words, God knows all possible evils 
through the goods of which they are privations. He knows how far they fall short of the 
ideal of what they can be in Him. 
The king Hezekiah and his miraculous recovery from an illness he was suffering 
provides an occasion to witness Augustine’s theory of divine ideas in action. As the story 
goes, Hezekiah was going to die because of natural, secondary causes, but God extended 
his life by fifteen years after hearing his prayers. Augustine claims this is something that 
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God had foreknown he would do before the foundation of the world.360 Since this was 
something God foreknew that he was going to do, it was something that was really going 
to be in the future. But how is this not an instance of divine pre-determination, if God’s 
extending of Hezekiah’s life was decided before he even existed? The answer is found in 
the divine idea for Hezekiah, which causally interacted with the time-bound man himself. 
We might say that, built into the very idea of Hezekiah, there is every kind of perfection 
that was, is, and would be offered to the man himself (even life of body and soul), 
provided that he patterns himself after God’s eternally complete idea of him in the 
appropriate way, at the right time, and in the right circumstances. In Hezekiah’s case, 
God’s eternal will for Hezekiah and Hezekiah’s own temporal will matched up, leading 
to his miraculous recovery recounted in 2 Kings 20:1; 2 Chronicles 32:24; and Isaiah 
38:1. This is an instance of predestination, but one of potentialities, namely the “good” 
potentialities Hezekiah actualized by his free choice, helped along by God’s good will for 
him. The worry remains, however, that this personal activity of God, hearing the prayers 
of a dying man, somehow threatens both divine transcendence and immutability. To 
which I answer it jeopardizes neither: God’s essence remains transcendent, and God’s 
will did not have to change to personally respond to Hezekiah, for God decided before 
the foundation of the world to give (maybe not always in the way people expect, to be 
sure) when people “ask” of Him with a sincere faith (Matthew 7:7). Augustine writes: “It 
gives us firm hope that no one who asks, seeks and knocks leaves the Lord’s presence 
empty-handed.”361 Hezekiah asked, and so he received.  
                                                          
360 The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book VI, 17, 28. 
361 Sermon 105A, date uncertain. 
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God’s will according to the divine ideas is thus genuinely eternal on my view, 
because nothing new happens to God either essentially or accidentally on account of a 
new decision of His will. All of His decisions as to how to perfect his creation have 
already been prejudged on the basis of the everlasting divine ideas. Augustine writes of 
God’s will: “His will is singly, simultaneously, sempiternally all that he wills, not willing 
now and then, on this or that. He does not will now what he nilled before, or nill now 
what he willed before, since that would show a changeable will, and anything changeable 
is not eternal, and ‘our God is eternal.’”362 Unlike human beings, God does not act under 
the aspect of time, sometimes choosing this, sometimes choosing that, “but by the eternal 
and unchanging, stable formulae of his Word, co-eternal with himself, and by a kind of 
brooding [fovebat], if I may so put it, of his equally co-eternal Spirit.”363  
In one of his early works, On the Immortality of the Soul, Augustine uses an 
analogy involving the will of an artist to make the point that something immutable can 
move something mutable without undergoing any change in itself: “there can be a certain 
thing which is not changed when it moves a changeable thing. For when the intention of 
the mover to bring the body which it moves to the end it desires is not changed, while the 
body which is acted upon is changed by this motion from moment to moment, and when 
that intention of accomplishment, which obviously remains unchanged, moves both the 
members of the artificer and the wood or stone which are subject to the artificer, who 
may doubt that what we have said follows as a logical consequence.”364 Nevertheless, 
God’s will is really present in the ordo temporum, because His decisions are actuated at 
                                                          
362 Conf. 12.3.18. 
363 Literal Meaning of Genesis, Book I, 18, 36. 
364 De immortalitate animae 3.4. Trans. by George G. Leckie, St. Aurelius Augustine: Concerning the 
Teacher and On the Immortality of the Soul. D. Appleton-Century Company: New York, 1938.  
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the fitting time, in relation to the appropriate rational and non-rational creatures for their 
perfection. While God’s will or creative Wisdom may abide unchangeably (Wis 7.27), 
this does not mean it is not temporally active in the perfection of creation. Augustine 
writes in his commentary on Psalm 138: “Wisdom stands firm, if we can properly say 
that she stands; the expression connotes immutability, not immobility [dicitur autem 
propter incommutabilitatem, non propter immobilitatem]. Nowhere is she other than she 
is here or there, never is she different from what she is now or was formerly. This is what 
God’s utterance is.”365 And elsewhere, he tells us that, “[w]hile this wisdom is 
unchanging in itself, it does not hold itself aloof from anything that is, even in a changing 
mode of existence, because there is nothing that was not created by it.”366  
A concrete example of this kind of immutable movement can be witnessed in the 
coming of Christ. For Augustine, in the Word of God, “there was timelessly contained 
the time in which that Wisdom was to appear in the flesh.”367 And while it was decided in 
the pre-eternal counsel of Father, Son and Holy Spirit that the Son would manifest 
himself in the flesh of our humanity, only at the “right time” could such an idea be made 
actual in the person of Christ.368 According to Augustine, it would be absurd to negate the 
very real and very temporal aspect of Christ’s existence:  
He contains in himself the deep treasures of wisdom and knowledge and fills 
minds with faith in order to bring them to the eternal contemplation of the 
immutable truth. Imagine if the almighty did not create the man, wherever he was 
formed, from the womb of his mother, but thrust him suddenly before our eyes! 
Imagine if he went through no ages from infancy to youth, if he took no food and 
did not sleep! Would he not confirm the opinion of that error, and would it not be 
believed that he did not in any way assume a true man, and would it not destroy 
what he did out of mercy if he did everything as a miracle? But now a mediator 
                                                          
365 en. Ps. 138.8; CSEL 95/4.135.  
366 trin.3.2.15. 
367 trin., 2.2.9. 
368 Ibid, 4.5.26; see also 7.2.4. 
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has appeared between God and human beings so that, uniting both natures in the 
unity of his person, he may raise up the ordinary to the extraordinary and temper 
the extraordinary to the ordinary.369  
 
Not only that, but for there to be Christ there first had to be Mary. And for there to be 
Mary there first had to be Adam, Noah, Abraham, and then David, from whose royal line 
she descended. Augustine claims that from Adam to Christ’s birth there spanned five 
ages, with his birth marking the beginning of the sixth.370 Christ was not actually 
incarnate in the divine ideas, or “physically present” in God’s eternal instant, as Maritain, 
Wetzel, Hill, Stump, and Kretzmann must hold according to their sometimes Platonic-
sounding ontological interpretations of Augustine, before he was sent. Rather, when the 
fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, made of woman (Gal 4:4). Like all 
temporally existing things, Christ the man required the right moment to “actually emerge 
into being.”371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
369 Ep.137.3.9; CSEL 44.108, the works of St. Augustine: a translation for the 21 century.  
370 Ibid, 4.2.7. 
371 Ibid, 3.2.16. See also 4.2.11, where he notes that all the sacred and mysterious things shown to us 
about Christ before he was sent “were likenesses of him,” but not actually him who was to come at the right 
time. And later at 4.5.30, Augustine claims that, while the angels could represent Christ before his 
incarnation in order to prefigure his future coming, “they could not take him over and just be him.”  
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Chapter 5 
Augustinian and Eastern Arguments for Divine Simplicity 
 
As we have seen throughout the last chapter, most scholars interpret Augustine as 
holding to a simple ontological equivalence between the eternity of the divine will and 
knowledge (as expressed in the rationes) and God’s eternal essence. But once such an 
interpretation is viewed as a satisfactory stopping point within the context of our 
understanding of Augustine’s view of divine and human interaction, no amount of 
philosophical hedging can then bring the eternal God into a meaningful, engaged, and 
personal relationship with temporal humanity. On this interpretation, God always remains 
separated from the drama of salvation history, or even worse, renders the latter illusory, 
as a kind of puppet theatre, in which all temporal events and entities are made physically 
present to His eternal now, as pre-determined and already accomplished facts that cannot 
change or develop according to a will other than God’s alone. The zeal with which we 
have seen philosophers and theologians alike defend this interpretation of God’s wholly 
transcendent and utterly dominating eternity ultimately stems from their desire to uphold 
what has been seen as the overriding theological focus of the Western theological 
tradition since the time of Augustine, namely the absolute simplicity of God; and we have 
seen them defend this interpretation even at the expense of the plurality of God, whether 
that be with respect to himself as three-persons (ad intra), or with respect to the economic 
dispensation of his many gifts for what is created (ad extra).  
This chapter will examine a few of the most important texts from Augustine’s 
corpus that could be used to support their interpretation. All of these texts will be seen as 
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falling into either one of two distinct but related arguments for God’s simplicity, what I 
will call the possession and participation arguments, both of which appear to not allow 
for a real distinction between the eternity of the divine essence and the eternity of the 
divine ideas. I will prove, however, that these arguments only support the idea that no 
real distinctions can be made in the divine essence itself, not precluding any such 
distinctions when it comes to the divine persons’ relations to their shared essence, or to 
each other as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or to creation as they work to perfect it 
according to the rationes. Augustine’s position in this regard will therefore be shown to 
closely mirror the Eastern Orthodox tradition on divine simplicity, which also does not 
allow for real distinctions pertaining to the divine ousia or physis as it is in itself (auth 
kath’ authn), but does in these other three respects.372 In this chapter, I will specifically 
compare Augustine’s view on God’s simplicity with that of St. Gregory of Nyssa, whose 
view on the absolute simplicity and incognoscibility of the divine physis373 will be used 
                                                          
372 The Eastern Orthodox tradition will make a threefold distinction (diakrisis) without division 
(diairesis) between: 1) the divine nature and the three Persons; 2) the three Persons and the divine energies; 
and 3) the divine nature and the divine energies. In the latter two distinctions, the energies are often 
referred to as the divine names, attributes, or whatever accepted term that can be used to designate that 
reality which is around the divine nature (peri thn theian phusin). Gregory Palamas has some particularly 
clear texts illustrating all three of these distinctions without divisions in his 150 Capita. Even better, in 
these texts, he will reference many of the salient authorities on these distinctions within the Greek tradition, 
such as the Cappadocians, Pseudo-Dionysius, Cyril of Alexandria, and John Chrysostom. For example, 
Capita 34-40 discuss the Person-nature distinction. Capita 72-84 refer to the Person-energy distinction, 
especially with respect to the Holy Spirit and His gifts/energies. Finally, there are many Capita that make 
reference to the famous nature-energy (ousia-energia) distinction, such as Capita 65, 68, 74, 78, 82, 95, 
and 100-105. The Greek-East holds these distinctions in God to be real (pragmatike) distinctions, but they 
do not destroy His simplicity, because neither the three Persons nor the many different energies designate 
the nature of God as it is in itself, which is totally one, not made up of parts, and unlimited. As we shall see 
in the next chapter, Augustine does not deny these various distinctions present in the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition. He will argue that there is a difference in how we can or cannot understand these realities when 
we apply them to God, relatively or absolutely.  
373 In his article, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to St. 
Gregory of Nyssa.” StVTQ 21.02, pp. 76-104 (2006), Krivocheine notes that Nyssa preferred to use the 
term physis when talking about the Divinity of God, and that “the contrary could be said of St. Basil. He 
prefers the term “essence” to “nature.”” (Krivocheine, 76, ftn 1). Krivocheine will say later that commonly 
the only major difference between these terms is that “nature” has more of an “ontological connotation,” 
whereas “essence” is used more in “respect to knowledge.” Nevertheless, he thinks that the two terms can 
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to represent that of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. I will prove that, at least with respect 
to their views on divine simplicity, “neither of them adopt a notion of absolute simplicity, 
e.g., as espoused by Thomas Aquinas, in which the persons of the Trinity and the divine 
energies are reduced to and simply identified with the divine essence (ousia) or nature 
(physis).”374 
The first Augustinian argument to be considered, the possession argument, can be 
briefly summarized as follows: Since God is absolute being without any kind of 
composition, qualification, or modification, for Him to be great, just, almighty, and so 
forth for the rest of His attributes is the same as to be. The divine essence is therefore 
“the same as itself” and “is what it has.”375 It must be what it has, for this is the only way 
to ensure that God can never be deprived of the attributes He possesses, or suffer any 
kind of change in those very same attributes. Augustine will make the possession 
argument multiple times in On the Trinity,376 but the following is arguably one of its 
more impactful formulations:  
It is generally accepted to be the case with the human virtues which are to be 
found in the human spirit that although they each mean something different from 
the others, they can in no way be separated from each other, and so men who are 
equal for example in courage are also equal in sagacity and justice and 
moderation. For if you say that they are equal in courage, but one man excels in 
sagacity, it follows that the other’s courage is less sagacious, and thus they are not 
even equal in courage, since the former’s courage is more sagacious; and you will 
find the same with the other virtues if you run through them all—it is not of 
course a question of fortitude of body, but of fortitude or courage of spirit.  
                                                          
be used interchangeably, which is evidenced by what Nyssa says in places such as CE.3.2.34 and 81 
(Krivocheine 82).  
374 This quotation is an addition made by my dissertation director, Fr. John D. Jones, who originally 
pointed out to me the importance in Orthodox theology of God himself (persons, essence, energies) as 
being simple (sc. non-composite) in a way that can allow for real distinctions without bringing about any 
real divisions. The persons, essence and energies are really distinct from each other, but since they are not 
in any way divided from one another, God himself remains simple. 
375 De civ. 8.6, and 11.10.  
376 For more representative examples of the possession argument in Augustine’s On the Trinity, see 
trin. 1.4.26; 5.2.9; 6.2.11; 7.1.1; 7.2.6. 
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How much more then will this not be the case in that unchanging and 
eternal substance which is incomparably more simple than the human spirit? For 
the human spirit it is not of course the same thing to be, and to be courageous or 
sagacious or just or moderate; it can be a human spirit and have none of these 
virtues. But for God it is the same thing to be as to be powerful or just or wise or 
anything else that can be said about his simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity 
to signify his substance [de illa simplici multiplicitate uel multiplici simplicitate 
dixeris quo substantia eius significetur].377  
 
Augustine thus uses the co-entailing unity present among the human virtues to argue that, 
in an analogous but much higher way, there is an even stronger kind of unity present in 
God’s substantia. He takes this to prove that the Father cannot possess any perfections in 
greater measure than the Son (and by extension the Holy Spirit), who is God from God, 
and therefore must be co-equal to the Father in all things.378 If any one of the three 
persons could possess even one divine attribute in greater measure than the other two, 
God would be made complex, or turned into a Trinity of unequal perfections. As a result, 
any one of the three persons must be equal in all things to the three considered together 
and vice versa. He continues:  
Since, therefore, the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone is just 
as great as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit together he is not to be called 
threefold in any sense [triplex]. Bodies, on the contrary, increase by a union of 
themselves.... In God himself, therefore, when the equal Son adheres to the equal 
Father, or the equal Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, God does not thereby 
become greater than each one separately, for there is nothing whereby that 
perfection can increase. But he is perfect whether the Father, or the Son, or the 
Holy Spirit; and God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is perfect, and, 
therefore, he is a Trinity rather than tripartite [et ideo trinitas potius quam triplex]. 
 
Nor since he is a Trinity [trinitas] is he, therefore, tripartite [triplex]; 
otherwise the Father alone or the Son alone would be less than the Father and the 
Son together. Although, to tell the truth, it is difficult to see how one can speak of 
the Father alone or the Son alone, since the Father is with the Son and the Son 
                                                          
377 trin.6.1.6; CCSL 50.234. 
378 Augustine will maintain that all three Persons of the Trinity are equal in all things, except in their 
Personal characteristics (Generator, Generated, Processed) that cause them to be distinct from each other, 
so that we are able to name them Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
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with the Father always and inseparably, not that both are Father or both the Son, 
but because they are always mutually in one another and neither is alone.379  
 
If the Father and the Son and the Spirit were triplex, then they would be divided into 
three parts. As it is, however, they are always and inseparably a trinitas, because they are 
each perfect, whether we consider Father, Son, or Spirit. Augustine admits in this passage 
that it is well-nigh impossible to abstract what can be said of the Father alone from what 
can be said of the Son alone, since Father and Son are always together, possessing all 
perfections to an equal and infinite degree together.  
Augustine clearly thought that the essential unity of God was important to be 
made known not just to his more theologically-philosophically adept readers, but also to 
the community of the faithful in the Church. In Sermon 341.8 (419), he preaches: “In 
God, though, everything that is said about him is one and the same; in God, you see, 
power isn’t one thing and sagacity another, courage one thing and justice another, or 
chastity another. Whichever of these you attribute to God, it isn’t to be understood as one 
thing and another, and none of them, in any case, is attributed to him worthily.” And later 
in that very same Sermon, “in God power is identical with justice (whatever you say in 
him, you are saying the same thing, since in fact you are not saying anything that is 
worthy of him) ... because all the things you say in that field are one and the same, and all 
have the same value.”380 Augustine’s theological teaching and preaching when it comes 
to the simplicity of God’s eternal essence therefore appear to line up, in that they both 
convey the message that we cannot divide the divine essence by saying that it is the 
                                                          
379 trin.6.7.9-8.9; CCSL 50.237-8.  
380 Sermon, 341.10. 
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subject of many different perfections that it participates in to be good, just, wise, etc. 
Rather, Augustine holds the divine essence to have one and the same ontological value.  
Augustine’s possession argument for God’s simplicity thus discusses His 
“essence,” or what is “in Him.” It is an attempt to talk about God as He is in Himself, 
which from the Eastern Orthodox perspective may appear a foolish and impossible 
endeavor,381 but what matters for the moment is that Augustine is not saying that this is 
how God exists for creation. It is also important to keep in mind that Augustine is only 
broaching this topic of the undivided unity of God’s essence to prove the co-equality of 
Father, Son, and Spirit, to prove that the divine persons are a Trinity and not tri-partite. 
Augustine at no point will claim that he knows exactly what the essential Life of God 
consists in, and/or that he can adequately express this Life via thought or speech.382 After 
all, he uses an argument from analogy with the human soul and the unity of its virtues in 
his attempt to understand the substantial unity present in God. Augustine understood that 
                                                          
381 The Eastern Orthodox tradition is well-known for its insistence on the incognoscibility of the 
divine ousia/physis, whether by celestial or super-celestial minds. For an excellent discussion of this, 
especially in St. Gregory of Nyssa, see esp. Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature...,” pp. 76-80. 
Augustine will actually make similar statements about the unknowability of God. See DGnL.IV.6.13, for 
example, where he writes: “But we are mortals and sinners, and our corruptible bodies are a load upon our 
souls, and the earthly habituation presses down the mind that muses upon many things. But even though 
our hearts were absolutely undefiled and our minds completely free from all burdens, even though we were 
already equal to the holy angels, the Essence of God would surely not be known to us as it is in Himself.” 
Both the Eastern Orthodox tradition and Augustine would appear therefore to disagree with the Thomistic 
view that our beatitude in the next life consists in the satisfaction of our desire to know the divine essence, 
which becomes an intelligible species for the blessed to see by the eye of their mind: “There resides in 
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. 
But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural 
desire would remain void. Hence, it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God” 
(ST I, Q. 12, A. 1, ad 1).  
382 Hence why I think any claim that Augustine’s views on the knowability of the divine essence 
should be identified with that of someone such as Eunomius, who held that the divine names had a “divine 
origin and the power to express the essence of things” (Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature..,” 
84), should be avoided. Augustine only mentions that “in God” goodness, justice, wisdom, etc. have the 
same ontological value to illustrate how much greater the unity is in God’s substance than in even the 
highest image of it in the human mind and its various faculties and powers. It is not as if God’s substance is 
broken up into various parts, however unified they may be.  
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no analogy, including this one, is perfect or able to intellectually comprehend the Being 
of God Himself.383  
All of the significant Greek Fathers make this kind of distinction between God for 
Himself (who is absolutely simple and unknowable) and God for creation (who is 
willingly manifold yet without division and knowable), even though it might be said that 
they are less willing than Augustine to speak of the former as they are of the latter.384 
Archbishop Basil (Krivocheine) will in fact say of Nyssa in particular that, while he 
affirms the incognoscibility of the divine nature, this does not prevent him from holding 
to its simplicity. He does this to “defend the orthodox trinitarian doctrine of the 
consubstantiality of the Son with the Father (in his polemics against Eunomius) and of 
the divinity of the Holy Spirit (in his writings against Macedonius).”385 Like Augustine, 
then, Nyssa argues for divine simplicity to safeguard the co-equality of Father, Son, and 
Spirit.  
We can see this in Book I of his Contra Eunomium, where Nyssa will claim that 
the simplicity of the divine nature is evident to all, and that even the dullest of persons 
understands that “simplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of no degrees. In this 
case there is no mixture or conflux of qualities to think of; we comprehend a potency 
without parts and composition.”386 Wisdom, power, goodness, and whatever else may be 
                                                          
383 It is worth mentioning that Nyssa will give a similar analogy involving the human soul and its 
various faculties and powers to understand the simplicity of God’s nature: “If therefore the human mind is 
not damaged in its simplicity by the many names used for it, how could one think that God, because He is 
called wise, just, good, eternal and all the names suitable to Him, should thus be of many parts or that the 
perfection of His nature could be reassembled by participation in them...” (CE.2.503).  
384 For similar statements about the absolute simplicity of God’s unknowable essence in the 
Cappadocians, see for example, Nyssa’s CE.1.38; Gregory Nazianzen’s Orations 30.XX and 31.XIV; and 
Basil’s On the Holy Spirit 18.45. 
385 Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature...,” 80. 
386 Eunom.1.19. 
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suitably predicated of the Holy Trinity, are not external properties in which They 
participate so that They may acquire them, but rather are properties rooted in Their very 
nature. Put briefly, the Trinity must be what It has. Nyssa writes in this connection: 
Nothing defective concerning wisdom or power or any other good thing is found 
in Him for Whom the good is not just something acquired but is by nature 
(phusei) that which He is (katho esti toiouton pephuke). Thus he who claims to 
distinguish in the divine nature such lesser and greater essences, makes the Divine 
... a composite of dissimilar things, and would lead us to believe that the subject is 
one thing and the participated things another, which implies further that by 
participation in them He comes to be in them something which He was not 
before.387  
 
Nyssa offers this “possession” argument for the divine nature’s simplicity in order to 
combat Eunomius’ claim that God the Father is alone truly simple, and therefore 
possesses, to a greater degree than the Son and Holy Spirit, the various Divine 
perfections.  
Nyssa’s version of the possession argument will also take center stage in his letter 
to Ablabius, On ‘Not Three Gods.’ Near the beginning of this work, Nyssa makes a 
distinction between the strict use of the term “nature” and its common use. Using human 
nature as an example, he claims its strict use demands that we see it as indivisible and not 
separated between various human beings.388 But in its common use, we do tend to see 
human nature as separated from one individual to the next, and we do frequently say 
things such as Peter, James, and John are “many men.” Bringing this examination of the 
term nature to bear on the divine nature and the three persons, Gregory concludes that, 
                                                          
387 Ibid. 
388 Gregory will explain this in his Epistula 38.2 as follows: “If now of two or more who are [man] in 
the same way, like Paul and Silas and Timothy an account of the ousia of men is sought, one will not give 
one account of the ousia of Paul, another one of Silas and again another one of Timothy; but by whatever 
terms the ousia of Paul is shown, these same will fit the others as well. And those are homoousioi to each 
other, who are described by the same formula of being.” Translation taken from page 70 of Johannes 
Zachhuber’s, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological 
Significance, (Leiden: Brill, 2000).  
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just because we speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as being three persons, it does not 
follow that the divine nature is actually separated between them, thereby making three 
Gods out of one. Immediately after giving this response, however, Gregory notes that it 
will not be sufficient to quell the common use of the term divine nature. The only way to 
move forward on this issue is to examine the power (dunamis) of the Godhead: 
Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine Nature is not itself 
signified, but some one of its surroundings (ti ton peri)389 is made known.... Since, 
then, as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our 
appellations from the several operations that are known to us.... He surveys all 
things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His 
power of contemplation those things that are not visible, [hence] we suppose that 
Godhead (theotes) is so called from beholding (thea).... Now.... let him consider 
this operation, and judge whether it belongs to one of the persons whom we 
believe in the Holy Trinity, or whether the power extends throughout the Three 
Persons.390  
According to Gregory, the way we can tell whether or not the power extends throughout 
the three persons is by examining whether their energeiai are one. For if their activities 
are one, which they are, then the power which is the source of them must be one. And if 
                                                          
389 The word “peri” in this expression has the sense of “around” the divine nature, but one must often 
be careful in its translation from the Greek, because its meaning is not only dependent on theological 
context, but also the grammatical case of the words associated with it. Krivocheine rightly notes that we 
must make a distinction in Nyssa’s writings “when he uses the words ‘divine nature’ in the accusative and 
when he uses them in the genetive (peri ths theias phusews) (Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine 
Nature...,” 88, ftn 82). Paying attention to the grammatical cases of the words ‘divine nature’ is important, 
because only in the accusative can we translate “peri” by “around” the divine nature, and then and only 
then “it can have a particular theological meaning.” Others in the Orthodox tradition render “peri” in the 
accusative in this way. See for example, Maximus the Confessor, Chapters on Love I.100: “The qualities 
that appertain to His nature/ [better: ‘around His Nature’ (tôn peri auton)], however, are accessible to the 
intellect's longing: I mean the qualities of eternity, infinity, indeterminateness, goodness, wisdom, and the 
power of creating, preserving and judging creature.” Translation modified by Fr. John D. Jones. Of course, 
if these words were in the genetive, they would merely have the meaning “of the divine nature,” not 
thereby connoting any kind of real metaphysical relationship between the energies and the nature 
(Krivocheine, 88, ftn 82). Sometimes translators of Nyssa will render “peri” by “about” or “concerning.” 
An example: “in order that we might have a certain understanding of what is thought piously about Him 
(peri auton nooumenôn)” (CE.2.246). Often translations such as these skirt the danger of not doing enough 
to connote a real relationship of the energies to the essence, or they imply one that is conceptual or logical, 
i.e., one that depends on human thought, such as we find in Aquinas’ “real” distinction between the Persons 
and the essence.  
390 Ad Ablabium, GNO 3/1.43-44; NPNF V.332-3. 
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the power is one, then the hypostatically manifested nature which is the source of that 
power must also be one.  
Nyssa argues that just as there is oneness in the Divine nature, so, too, there is in 
the other names we apply to it: “But since the Divine, single, and unchanging nature, that 
it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it does not admit in its own case the 
signification of multitude; but as it is called one nature, so it is called in the singular by 
all its other names, ‘God,’ ‘Good,’ ‘Holy,’ ‘Savior,’ ‘Just,’ ‘Judge,’ and every other 
Divine name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to operation, 
we shall not dispute the point.”391 Nyssa will not dispute the point whether these Divine 
names refer to physis or energeia in God, because it is the oneness of God from Scripture 
(Dt 6:4) which he ultimately desires to prove. This is a oneness that must be devoid of all 
divisions in the physis of God, but does allow for real distinctions in the energeiai around 
It, and in the hypostaseis that manifest It.392 Elsewhere Nyssa will describe this oneness 
                                                          
391 Ad Ablabius, NPNF 530. 
392 To give an adequate summary of the Eastern Orthodox tradition on these distinctions without 
divisions in God, let alone in Nyssa by himself, would prove to be impossible in this rather short chapter. 
However, some brief comments on Nyssa’s theological approach to them can now be made. Nyssa believes 
that the divine attributes, names, or energies—i.e., goodness, life, beauty, even God (theotes), etc.—do not 
correspond to the divine physis, but rather the divine energeiai which are around it. The names we give 
them cannot denote the nature as it is in itself, because then it would be “multiform and multi-composite, 
manifesting its manifoldness according to the differences designated in the names” (CE.2.302-304). With 
this said, the names do point to realities in God, and this is supported by Scripture, which, for example, 
often speaks of the Only-Begotten as “Door,” “Shepherd,” etc. We predicate these names of God “by way 
of intellection (tou kat’ epinoian tropou),” but they are not “purely a product of our intellection” 
(Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature,” 85). Thus, when it comes to the physis-energeia 
distinction in Nyssa, we may conclude that it is a real distinction (or one existing in God, not just in our 
minds), and that it does not threaten divine simplicity, because it causes no divisions in the divine physis. 
The same kind of reasoning is used by Nyssa to argue that the physis-hypostasis distinction in God causes 
no real divisions in the His nature. A representative text: “By these expressions [i.e., ‘Light 
Unapproachable’ for the Father and ‘True Light’ for the Son], Scripture does not at all harm this simplicity, 
because their community and particularity are not of the essence, for if they were, their convergence would 
demonstrate that the subject is composite. But the essence remains itself, whatever it may be according to 
nature, being what it is” (CE.3.10). And, finally, we have the hypostasis-energeia distinction. According to 
Nyssa, the energies are common to all three of the divine persons, having their source in the Father, 
proceeding through the Son, and being perfected by the Spirit. They are energies of the Persons, and so not 
divided from them, but they are distinct, because they cannot be merely identified with Father, Son, and 
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as not requiring the identification of the subject (the Divine Being) with its various 
“energetic” and “Personal” attributes: 
As for the statement that [God] is a judge, we understand by the word 
“judgement” a specific energy around Him, while by the word “is” we direct our 
mind toward the subject. We are clearly instructed by this not to think that the 
notion (logos) of the being (tou einai) is identical with the energy. Thus, when we 
say that He is generated or ungenerated, we separate our thought in a two-fold 
supposition, understanding by the “is” the subject and implying by “generated” 
and “ungenerated” the attribute of the subject.393 
 
Krivocheine believes this passage should be seen as Nyssa defending his older brother 
Basil from Eunomian theological attack.394 As is well-known, the Eunomians were 
critical of Basil, claiming that he identified energy and essence in the Son.395 Nyssa’s 
response here is simple: God is one subject, but possesses different relational attributes, 
which are distinct but not divided from His Being.  
                                                          
Spirit. Again, Nyssa thinks this is true according to Scripture: “Scripture teaches that faith in the name of 
the Father who vivifies all proceeds ... so that the life-giving grace has its point of departure 
(aphormhtheisan) in Him. As life, it gushes out, as from a source, through the Only-Begotten God, who is 
the true life, and makes perfect those who are made worthy by the energy of the Spirit” (Maced., p.106.3-
8). To summarize, we may say the energies are of the Persons and around the divine nature, distinct but not 
divided from both.  
393 CE.3.5. 
394 See Krivocheine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature...,” 95-96. 
395 CE.2.359. Basil himself will respond to the Eunomians in his famous Letter 234. The Letter begins 
with the Eunomians posing a dilemma in terms of a question: “Do you worship what you know, or what 
you do not know?” Basil answers that to know (to eidenai) has many senses that correspond with the 
various ways God can be said to be, not essentially but energetically, as great, powerful, wise, good, just, 
etc. For Basil, we know God in terms of His energies as they economically come down to us; we cannot 
intellectually comprehend His essence. After this rebuttal, the Eunomians try a different argumentative 
approach, claiming that if God is simple, how can He exist in these multifarious ways? All these things we 
know “about” (peri) Him must be identical to his essence. Basil thinks this is absurd, for can we really say 
that there is the “same mutual force/power (dunamis) in his awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice 
and His creative power, His providence and His foreknowledge, and His bestowal of rewards and 
punishments, His majesty and His providence?” We cannot. The energies are distinct from the essence and 
come down variously to us, performing their salvific functions in specific ways, depending on the 
providential dispensation required. As Basil will say, “the energies are various (energeiai poikilai) and the 
essence simple (ousia áplh). Through this knowledge of the energies, we can know that He exists (hoti 
estin) but not what He is (ti estin). According to Basil, our knowledge of God in these various ways must 
eventually give way to worship: “We know God from His power. We, therefore, believe in Him who is 
known, and we worship Him who is believed in.” St. Basil the Great: Epistle CCXXXIV, translated by 
Rev. Blomfield Jackson (modified by Fr. John D. Jones). 
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The second of the two arguments Augustine gives for God’s simplicity, the 
participation argument, is really a variant of the first one due to its being based on the 
same fundamental understanding of God’s essential unity, but it is couched in language 
that is sufficiently different to mention it here briefly as a distinct argument. We may 
summarize it as follows: God cannot be said to participate in His various attributes 
(mercy, justice, power, greatness etc. etc.), because then He would be inferior to those 
perfections in which he participates. He would need them to be merciful, just, powerful, 
great, and so forth. A representative example of this argument can be found at On the 
Trinity 5.2.11. Here, Augustine illustrates how God’s essential relation with respect to the 
attribute of greatness (or any perfection for that matter) differs from that of something 
that partakes of greatness, such as a great house, a great valley, or a great heart. In each of 
the latter, its being is one thing and its being great another. Because of this fact, 
Augustine thinks true greatness is not had by any of these things. True greatness is that 
by which all of these things are made great. This is a greatness that is reserved for God 
alone, Who...  
is not great with a greatness which he is not himself, as though God were to 
participate in it to be great; otherwise this greatness would be greater than God. 
But there is nothing greater than God. So he is great with a greatness by which he 
is himself this same greatness. And that is why we do not say three greatnesses 
any more than we say three beings; for God it is the same thing to be as to be 
great. For the same reason we do not say three great ones but one great one, 
because God is not great by participating in greatness, but he is great with his 
great self because he is his own greatness. The same must be said about goodness 
and eternity and omnipotence and about absolutely all the predications that can be 
stated of God, because it is all said with reference to himself.396  
                                                          
396 trin.5.2.11. Augustine will allude to this argument in many other places. See for example, 
trin.5.3.12; 6.1.2; 6.1.5; 6.1.7; 6.2.8; 7.1.2; 7.3.10.  
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As in the possession argument, the participation argument for God’s simplicity makes 
clear that we are talking about God “with reference to himself” and not about God with 
reference to something else. In other words, we are talking about God’s essential 
greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence, and so forth. None of what Augustine has 
said would prevent him from making statements about God’s greatness, goodness, 
eternity, and power in relation to creation.  
Augustine’s possession and participation arguments have been heavily criticized 
by most scholars for their being overly concerned with the unity of God’s essence at the 
expense of not paying enough attention to the personal diversity of Father, Son, and 
Spirit, and how they economically manifest their attributes in salvation history for the 
benefit of creation. Accordingly, so the argument goes, Augustine makes God out to be 
an absolutely simple monad with no real internal or external differentiation. What follows 
are some representative examples of this scholarly position in the secondary literature.  
In Being as Communion, John Zizioulas simultaneously lauds the Cappadocians 
for bringing attention back to the notion of person as the ultimate ontological reality in 
the Trinity while at the same time excoriates Augustine for supposedly making the unity 
of the divine essence ontologically primary over and above the three persons. Using his 
own words: “By usurping the ontological character of ousia, the word person/hypostasis 
became capable of signifying God’s being in an ultimate sense. The subsequent 
developments of Trinitarian theology, especially in the West with Augustine and the 
scholastics, have led us to see the term ousia, not hypostasis, as the expression of the 
ultimate character and the causal principle (arche) in God’s being.”397 And he will say 
                                                          
397 Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1985), page 88.  
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elsewhere: “There can be no doubt that Augustine makes otherness secondary to unity in 
God’s being. God is one and relates as three. There is an ontological priority of substance 
over against personal relations in God in Augustine’s Trinitarian theology.”398 Zizioulas, 
however, thinks the Cappadocians were right to prioritize the individual divine persons 
over their shared substance and, specifically, to expound the idea that all things properly 
originate from the person of the Father, not from the divine essence. This is a position 
that has become well-known in Greek Orthodox circles as the monarchia of the Father, 
according to which the first person of the Trinity is said to be the ultimate ontological 
source of all reality, Divine and created.399 The Greek Fathers understood that this should 
not now lead to a hierarchical ranking of the individual divine persons as being more or 
less God than the others a la Arianism. That is why we have Nazianzen, for instance, 
writing that the monarchy to be believed is that of Father, Son and Spirit, for it is a 
monarchy “that is not limited to one person,”400 but rather extends throughout the three, 
because of their unity of essence.  
                                                          
398 Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2006), 33.  
399 The Monarchy of the Father is based on the idea that agency belongs to the person (hypostasis). 
Actions are not actions of the nature (physis/ousia), but of the person that manifests it. There is a classic 
text from John of Damascus’ De Fide Orthodoxa which illustrates this well. In this text, the Damascene 
makes a fourfold distinction between energeia, ennergêtikon, ennergtêma, and ennerrgôn in God: “But 
observe that energy (energeia), capacity for energy (ennergêtikon), the product of energy (ennergtêma), 
and the agent of energy (ennerrgôn) are all different. Energy is the efficient and essential motion of nature 
(physis or ousia). The capacity for energy is the nature from which the energy proceeds. The product of 
energy is that which is effected or caused by the energy. And the agent of energy is the subsistence or 
person (hypostasis) that uses the energy.” (De Fide Orthodoxa, III.15). The Monarchy of the Father thus 
consists in His hypostasis providing the source of being and unity in the Trinity with respect to the Son and 
Holy Spirit. The Father shares His divine nature with the Son and Spirit, thereby becoming Personally 
related to Them and They to Him. Because of this we may also say that, while all three are co-equal and co-
eternal Persons, thereby sharing the same will/energy, in every common action of Theirs that extends from 
Them to creation, such action “has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is 
perfected in the Holy Spirit” (NPNF Ad Ablabius 526; see also 527 and 528). In the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition, then, there is a pride of place given to the person of the Father, who is the source of the essential 
Life of the Trinity and the economic life of created reality, but never in separation from the Son and Holy 
Spirit.  
400 Oration 29.II. 
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In contrast to the more Personal approach of the Greek Fathers is, as we have 
seen, Augustine’s vehement defense of the unity of God’s essence. It has thus become an 
easy critique to make that Augustine subsumes the Persons, along with their divine 
attributes, into the undifferentiated unity of the divine essence. Following from this, 
among other things, would be the undesirable consequence that Father, Son, and Spirit 
are non-relational to each other, as there would not strictly speaking be any “otherness” 
in the Godhead to be relational to, there being only the divine essence.  
Richard Cross interprets the notion of person in Augustine’s Trinitarian grammar 
in this way, viewing it, like the notion of substance, as non-relational.401 It is important to 
note that he cites only the following passage from Augustine as proof of the soundness of 
his interpretation: 
Therefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not as he is Father, 
but as he is, so too the person of the Father is not other than the Father himself. 
For person is said non-relationally (ad se), not in relation to Son and Spirit, just as 
he is called “God,” “great,” “good,” “just” and all other such things. And just as it 
is the same thing for him to be as to be God, great, good, so it is the same thing 
for him to be as to be person. Why therefore do we not call these three together 
“one person,” as “one essence” and “one God,” but say “three persons” even 
though we do not say “three gods” or “three essences,” unless it be because we 
want some one word to serve for this meaning by which we understand the 
Trinity, so that we would not be entirely silent when asked “what three,” when we 
confessed there to be three.402  
Cross apparently takes this “possession/participation argument” for the term person’s 
non-relational status as self-evident in the above passage, for he gives almost no 
philosophical justification for it afterwards, except for a rushed statement to the effect of: 
person is not a relational term, because we do not use it as part of a two-place predicate, 
                                                          
401 cf. ftn. 3, 216. 
402 trin. 7.6.11. 
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as we would in the case of the terms father, master, friend, and so forth.403 Not only is 
this an exceedingly weak (and in my mind irrelevant) explanation as to why the term 
person is non-relational for Augustine, who says nothing here, or anywhere in Book VII 
of On the Trinity for that matter, of the requirements of terms to function as two-place 
predicates, but it also completely ignores the nuanced metaphysical distinction Augustine 
is making between the Father as viewed from the perspective of substance and the Father 
as viewed from the perspective of his intra-trinitarian relations. Augustine is very clear in 
saying that, when considered in himself, what the Father “is” is not the same as what he is 
in relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Since the Father is a person, the same goes for 
when we consider his personhood: from the perspective of substance, the person of the 
Father just is the Father himself as God; but from the perspective of relation, the Father is 
uniquely the begetter of the Son and the spirator of the Spirit, which are two other distinct 
persons to which the Father is related. To be fair to Cross, Augustine does focus most of 
his comments in the above passage on that which is non-relational in God, namely the 
divine substance; but the language of relation is sufficiently present here (if read in 
context), and elsewhere explicitly in Book VII, that Cross really has no philosophical 
justification for his claim that person, when said of God’s Trinitarian being, is merely a 
non-relational term. What is perhaps most odd to the reader is that after making this 
argument, Cross will say that “Augustine certainly does not deny that the persons are 
distinct by relations or that “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit” are relational words.”404 How, 
though, can the Father, Son, and Spirit be relational words if they denote three distinct 
                                                          
403 See Cross, 218.  
404 Cross, 230. 
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persons? If indeed person is a non-relational word according to Cross, then how can the 
divine persons be truly relational?  
 Catherine Mowry LaCugna shares Cross’ criticism of Augustine as over-focusing 
on God in himself, and so destroying any possibility of there being a truly relational God, 
whether with respect to himself or to creation. For LaCugna, “Augustine inaugurated an 
entirely new approach. His starting point was not the creedal and biblical sense of the 
monarchy of the Father, but the divine essence shared equally by the three persons.”405 
While she admits that Augustine discusses the economic missions of the three persons in 
salvation history at the beginning of On the Trinity, in Books I-IV, she still claims that 
Augustine prioritizes the unity of the Trinity over the divine economy, and that this 
where his Trinitarian theology properly begins.406 To support her interpretation of 
Augustine, LaCugna only uses the same primary text quoted by Cross from Book VII 
mentioned above. She writes of this text: “Earlier in the treatise [i.e., in Book V] 
Augustine had cited Father, Son, and Spirit as relative terms, but in this passage he denies 
the relative character of a divine person and equates person with substance. The person of 
the Father is the same as the being of the Father. The person of the Father is thus 
absolute, without relation to Son and Spirit.”407 We can see that LaCugna falls into the 
same interpretative morass of confusion as Cross when it comes to Augustine’s 
metaphysical understanding of the trinitarian term ‘person,’ because she also fails to take 
into account the distinction Augustine is trying to make in this passage between the 
                                                          
405 God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), page 10.  
406 See LaCugna, 99. 
407 LaCugna, 89. 
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person of the Father considered in himself and the person of the Father considered with 
respect to Son and Holy Spirit.  
It warrants mentioning that such was a distinction that was also made by the 
Cappadocians. Nyssa particularly resembles Augustine in this connection, writing that 
there is a difference with respect to what the Father is as regards the relation he has to the 
Son and “as regards the definition of his nature.”408 He continues to argue that the same 
distinction must be applied to the Son: “But what he is, in his own nature, who exists 
apart from generation, and what he is, who is believed to have been generated, we do not 
learn from the signification of ‘having been generated,’ and ‘not having been generated.’ 
For when we say ‘this person was generated’ (or ‘was not generated’), we are impressed 
with a twofold thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative part of 
the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the subject by the words ‘was 
generated’ or ‘was not generated’—as it is one thing to think of that which is, and another 
to think of what we contemplate in that which is.”409 Nyssa may speak in terms of 
thinking of “that which is” and “in that which is,” but he is driving at the same distinction 
as Augustine. He does so in order to prevent the supposition that God’s physis is the same 
as God’s energeia. It follows that when we say that the Father is ungenerate and the Son 
generate, we must always keep in mind their double reality in terms of being and action; 
the former consisting in their reality as subjects (as “Deity” or “Divine”), the latter 
consisting in the apprehension of that which uniquely belongs to them as subjects (as “not 
having been generated” and “having been generated,” respectively).  
                                                          
408 Eunom.3.4. 
409 Eunom.7.5. 
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David Bradshaw (2004), however, is one of many writing from an eastern 
orthodox perspective who thinks that, while the East has this distinction between God’s 
being and activity, Augustine identifies the two in order to preserve divine simplicity, and 
that this position can ultimately be traced back to Aristotle, who says in Metaphysics XII 
that the substance of the Prime Mover just is actuality.410 Bradshaw is correct in finding 
this position to an extent in Boethius and then St. Thomas. In De Hebdomadibus, 
Boethius writes: “in Him [God] esse and agere are the same.... But for us esse and agere 
are not the same, for we are not simple.” Aquinas for his part says of God’s being and 
activity: “suum agere est suum esse.”411 But then, without citing any specific texts from 
Augustine’s corpus throughout his entire ten-chapter book that would support his 
interpretation, abruptly concludes that Augustine shares this same “Latin” understanding 
of divine simplicity. According to Bradshaw, “the Augustinian conception of divine 
simplicity entails that God is identical to His own will.... Nor will it do to say that God is 
identical with His will only in the sense of His capacity to will, not his will as actually 
realized. Divine simplicity rules out such distinctions.”412 I am more than willing to 
concede that there is some evidence that Boethius and Aquinas may have identified 
God’s being and will,413 but Augustine never argues for such an identification, which can 
be seen from what I have already shown. Bradshaw (2008) does not abandon this view of 
Augustine, writing: “Among the identities that Augustine infers from divine simplicity is 
                                                          
410 Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom. Cambridge University 
Press (2004). See pages 290-295. The quotation from Aristotle he is relying on is from Meta.1072b20: 
“And since that which is moved and mover is intermediate, there is a mover which moves without being 
moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.”  
411 ST 1.4.1; see also SCG II.9.4. 
412 Bradshaw (2004), 247. 
413 In addition to the text quoted before, see for example, ST. I.19.5 and De Potentia III.15, where he 
writes that “although will and nature are identically the same in God, they differ conceptually (ratione), 
insofar as they express respect to creatures in different ways.” 
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that God is identical with his own will. By this he must mean God’s expressed and 
determinate will, and not merely the will as a faculty as such, for to take the identity as 
applying only to the will as a faculty would introduce a distinction in God that would 
compromise his unity.”414 The only distinction Bradshaw thinks Augustine can possibly 
make between God’s will as faculty and as expressed and determinate, if he desires to 
keep God simple, would not be real but notional.415 What may seem ironic to readers of 
Bradshaw’s work, however, is the fact that he is perfectly willing to allow the Greek East 
to make the same fundamental distinction between God’s being and activity in terms of 
their ousia-energeia distinction, detailing its history from the time of Aristotle to its 
maturation in the Byzantine era with St. Gregory Palamas in pain-staking detail, but then 
denies the same kind of move as philosophically and theologically untenable with respect 
to Augustine.  
There are also scholars like Colin Gunton who believe that the demand of divine 
simplicity has exacted upon Augustine’s Trinitarian theology the lack of a real distinction 
between the essence of God and how that essence is expressed in the distinct persons of 
Father, Son, and Spirit. In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Gunton writes in this 
connection: 
It is difficult for [Augustine] to understand the meaning of the Greek hypostasis. 
One reason is that he can make nothing of the distinction so central to 
Cappadocian ontology between ousia and hypostasis: “I do not know what 
distinction they wish to make” (trin.V.10). Certainly, it is unfair to say that he 
gets nothing of the point at all, for he goes on to say that, in view of the difficulty 
of translating the Greek terms into Latin, he prefers to say, with his Latin 
                                                          
414 Bradshaw (2008), 241. Bradshaw only cites here Conf. 8.6 and 11.10 to support his interpretation, 
but in both cases he fails to recognize that Augustine is speaking about God’s essential being (ad intra), not 
God’s relational being (ad intra or ad extra). There is a difference between these, as we know, but 
Bradshaw completely paints over it in his eagerness to find a continuity between Boethius and Aquinas and 
Augustine.  
415 See Bradshaw (2008), 249. 
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tradition, unam essentiam or substantiam and tres personas. Augustine at least 
realizes that different concepts are required if we are to express the distinction 
between the way in which God is one and the way in which he is three. It 
becomes clear, however, that the adoption of the correct Latin equivalents does 
not enable him to get the point, for, in a famous statement, he admits that he does 
not really see why the term should be used. ‘Dictum est tamen tres personae non 
ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur’ (trin.V.10, cf. trin.VII.7): “this formula was 
decided upon, in order that we might be able to give some answer when we were 
asked, what are the three”) ... Moreover, Augustine reveals that he is unaware of 
what is going on when he makes it appear to be merely a matter of linguistic 
usage (forte secundum linguae suae consuetudinem, trin.VII.11).416  
Gunton explains that the reason why Augustine cannot grasp the point of the Greeks’ 
ousia-hypostasis distinction is because he grounds his Trinitarian thought in the 
intellectual tradition of Neoplatonism and, specifically, in its conception of God as “the 
Absolute One.” It is the latter conception of God that imbibes to Augustine’s conception 
of the Trinity an abstract notion of personhood and intellectualism that removes the 
Trinity from its proper liturgical, practical, and salvific context.417 Gunton’s “Trinity in 
Modern Theology” makes the same kind of critique, adding the specific charge of 
modalism against Augustine’s Trinitarian theology: 
[Augustine] stressed the unitary being of God at the expense of the plurality, and 
effectively generated a modalism in which the real being of God underlies rather 
than consists in the three persons. As a result, Augustine’s theology cuts off “the 
inner and eternal Trinity from the economic and revealed. It is as if much that is 
of interest to writers about the Trinity in later Augustinian theology could be said 
almost without reference to the divine economy of creation and salvation made 
real in the Son and the Spirit.418  
                                                          
416 The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), pp. 39-40. 
417 Ibid, 42-43. Gunton is not alone in this critique of Augustine’s philosophical connection to 
Neoplatonism, and the problems that this connection has for his theology. See also Karl Rahner, The 
Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns & Oates, 1970); Robert W. Jenson, the Triune Identity: God 
According to the Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982); Vladimir A. Lossky, The Mystical Theology 
of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clark, 1957); Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New 
Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1991). 
418 Trinity in Modern Theology, 940-941. 
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Gunton’s critique here, like all of the others we have seen above, is based on what I 
believe has been a faulty interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of divine simplicity—an 
interpretation in which God’s simplicity and relationality through various essential (ad 
intra) and economic (ad extra) activities have been viewed as mutually exclusive 
realities; or perhaps even worse, as one and the same reality with no real differentiation. I 
will remedy this misinterpretation in the next chapter, where I will show Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology to be the via media between the theological extremes of Arianism 
and Sabellianism; the former being extreme in its claim that there is an unequal plurality 
in God, thereby destroying His unity; and the latter being extreme in its claim that there is 
no plurality in God, thereby destroying the individuality of the three persons. In 
successfully navigating his conception of God in between the shoals of these two 
heretical options, Augustine will be seen to dock his theological ship, as it were, in the 
safe harbor of the orthodox faith.  
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Chapter 6  
Augustine’s Conception of God: One in Essence, Three by Relation 
 
While we have seen that the common scholarly line to take is that Augustine 
holds to a modalistic conception of God, he actually defends neither the ontological 
primacy of the unity of the divine essence nor that of the diversity of the three persons. 
Rather, Augustine prefers what I would call a “both...and” approach to the Trinity, 
affirming simultaneously the unity of the Trinity and the Trinity in that unity. He tells us 
that such a preference was ingrained in him by scripture, which is full of passages that 
proclaim not only the oneness within God, but also distinctness within God: the 
“testimonies of the divine scriptures ... present our faith with the unity and equality of the 
three.”419 For Augustine, if we were to say that God only has existence as some monadic 
and undifferentiated thing, the realities of Father, Son, and Spirit would be lost. Yet on 
the other hand, if we were to say that Father, Son, and Spirit only have existence as three 
independent individuals, the reality of their unity would be lost. Taking scripture to be 
authoritative on this issue, Augustine thinks that God’s three-in-oneness must be piously 
believed, even if one cannot understand it.420 As mentioned in the very first chapter of 
this dissertation, however, Augustine was not a theologian satisfied with believing for the 
sake of itself; he desired to understand his faith, and this desire clearly extended to his 
faith in the Trinity, which he believed the One God is. Just how he did, and of equal 
importance, did not, understand the tri-unity of God in terms of the philosophical 
categories of essence and relation, is the subject of this chapter.  
                                                          
419 trin.1.3.14, emphasis mine. 
420 See trin.7.3.8. 
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Since Books V-VII of On the Trinity (ca. 413-416) are most relevant to 
Augustine’s own understanding of God as one according to essence and three according 
to relation, they will receive the lion’s share of my treatment. However, to set the stage, I 
think it important to briefly begin in Book I with Augustine’s initial statement of the 
Catholic faith in the Trinity, because it encapsulates very well the overall Trinitarianism 
that he will painstakingly defend throughout the rest of the work, one which, as we shall 
see, has a threefold emphasis on: (1) the unity of the divine substance; (2) the plurality 
and co-equality of the three divine persons (ad intra); and (3) the distinct functions of 
Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation (ad extra). Using 
Augustine’s own words:  
(1) The purpose of all the Catholic commentators I have been able to read on the 
divine books of both testaments, who have written before me on the Trinity which 
God is [de trinitate quae Deus est], has been to teach that according to the 
Scriptures Father and Son and Holy Spirit make known a divine unity in the 
inseparable equality of one substance [unius substantiae inseparabili aequalitate 
divinem insinuent unitatem]; and therefore there are not three gods but one God; 
(2) although indeed the Father has begotten the Son, and therefore he who is the 
Son is not the Father [et ideo filius non sit qui pater est]; and the Holy Spirit is 
neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, 
himself co-equal to the Father and the Son, and belonging to the unity of the 
Trinity [ad Trinitatis pertinens unitatem]. 
(3) It was not however this same three (their teaching continues) that was born of 
the Virgin Mary, crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate, rose again on the third 
day and ascended into heaven, but the Son alone. Nor was it this same three that 
came down upon Jesus in the form of a dove at his baptism, or came down on the 
day of Pentecost after the Lord’s ascension, with a roaring sound from heaven as 
though a violent gust were rushing down, and in divided tongues as of fire, but the 
Holy Spirit alone. Nor was it this same three that spoke from heaven, You are my 
Son, either at his baptism by John [Mark 1:1], or on the mountain when the three 
disciples were with him [Matt 17:5], nor when the resounding voice was heard, I 
have both glorified it [my name] and will glorify it again [John 12:28], but it was 
the Father’s voice alone addressing the Son; although just as Father and Son and 
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Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably [inseparabiliter operum]. 
This is also my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith.421  
The above passage can be seen as a kind of executive summary of the whole On the 
Trinity, minus the philosophical explanations of actually how God is one substance, how 
God is three persons, and how God actively manifests himself in his distinct persons to 
creation. In what follows, I will attempt to briefly go over Augustine’s understanding of 
the “how” of each of these three points pertaining to the Catholic faith in the Trinity, so 
that we may not only once and for all dispel the frequent misinterpretation of Augustine’s 
conception of God as an undifferentiated monad, but also highlight the relational aspects 
of God (both ad intra and ad extra) to better see how our human reality can harmoniously 
co-exist with God as He is accessible to us.  
To that end, we begin with the prologue of Book V, where Augustine’s 
description of God initially possesses a clear apophatic tenor. Here Augustine notes that 
not even men with the intellectual and spiritual aptitude of St. Paul are capable of 
“grasping [God] as he is”; he can only be seen like a puzzling reflection in a mirror (1 
Cor 13: 12). The best we can do, according to Augustine, is understand God negatively, 
“if we can and as far as we can, to be good without quality, great without quantity, 
creative without need or necessity, presiding without position, holding all things together 
without possession, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without 
any change in himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing.”422 We have 
to understand God, in other words, as being beyond Aristotle’s nine categories of 
accidental being (quantitatis, qualitatis, locus, temporis, situs, habitus, facere, pati, and 
                                                          
421 trin.1.4.7; CCSL 50.34-6.  
422 trin.5.2.  
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relatiuum).423 The first category of being, “essentia” or “substantia,” is soon after applied 
to God by Augustine, but not in the rationalistic way done by the Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition as a kind of limiting notion meant to imply that something is the 
subject of accidental properties. We have already seen that this way of understanding 
substance is rejected by Augustine in his possession and participation arguments for 
God’s simplicity.  
Nevertheless, Augustine felt free to use the word substantia to speak about God, 
even while divorcing this word from its original philosophical context.424 An example of 
this can be found in his Commentary on the Psalms: “We speak of man or animal, the 
earth, the sky, the sun, the moon, stone, the sea, the air: all these things are substances, 
simply in virtue of the fact that they exist. Their natures are called substances. God too is 
a certain sort of substance [quaedam substantia], for anything that is not a substance is 
not anything at all. A substance is something that is [Substantia ergo aliquid esse est].”425 
Augustine’s most extended discussion of the notion of substance with respect to God, 
however, comes in Books V and VII of On the Trinity, where one comes across the 
expression “substantia uel essentia” or one of its grammatical variants when Augustine 
discusses how one should speak about the Trinitarian God, thus indicating that he takes 
                                                          
423 The various predicables of Aristotle are most famously mentioned at Categories 1b25-2a4 and 
Topics I, 9, 103b20-24. Richard Cross (2007) has attempted to show that Augustine was aware of and 
purposefully rejected the use of categorical language when talking about God in De Trinitate. (Quid tres? 
On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to Understand in De Trinitate V and VII, Harvard Theological 
Review 100.2: 215-32). Importantly, though, Augustine does not avoid the use of such language when 
talking about created things. See for example, trin.5.5.6. Nor does he completely throw out this 
philosophical apparatus when he analogously applies certain parts of it to our understanding of God’s 
reality.  
424 Lewis Ayres believes that Augustine’s “brief glosses” with regard to the meaning of substantia 
give enough evidence to prove that he was somewhat aware of a distinction like that between Aristotelian 
primary and secondary substance (See Ayres 200, Augustine and the Trinity). 
425 en. Ps. 68.5; CCSL 39.905.  
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the words substantia and essentia to possess roughly equivalent meanings.426 The 
difficulty, of course, is that the correlative terms in Greek for substantia and essentia, i.e., 
hypostasis and ousia, are not viewed by the Eastern Orthodox tradition to be equivalent 
in their meaning. From the Cappadocians to John of Damascus and the later Byzantine 
theological tradition that followed with St. Gregory Palamas, these words took on very 
specific and distinct meanings from each other.427  
In any event, Augustine will make clear in Book V that he prefers essentia: 
“There is at least no doubt that God is substance (substantia), or perhaps a better word 
would be being (essentia); at any rate what the Greeks call ousia. Just as we get the word 
                                                          
426 See for example, trin.5.1.3; 5.2.10; and 7.3.7. Scholars have picked up on this equivalence as well. 
See Kyle Claunch, who says that “Augustine uses the term substance (Latin: substantia) with the Greek 
ousia, usually translated by essence” (Claunch, 789). See van Geest: “It is also evident from the fact that 
Augustine emphasizes God’s being as essentia, with substantia as synonym in De Trinitate, that his 
epistemological reflections were pervaded by hope. He continually stressed that it was impossible to 
express this essentia in words.” (165). See also Lewis Ayres, who notes that Augustine uses the Latin terms 
substantia, essentia, and natura synonymously (Ayres 82, Augustine and the Trinity). As evidence of this 
threefold terminological equivalence, Ayres cites vera rel.7.13.  
427 As we have seen in the case of Nyssa, there is a real distinction without division made between 
ousia/physis and hypostasis in God. Ousia/physis are terms used to designate the unknowable and simple 
essence/nature of God, whereas hypostasis is a rather broad term meaning “something with subsistence,” or 
“something that is” (Greek: to on/Latin: id quod est). When applied to the Trinity that God is, the term 
hypostasis has three referents: the persons of Father, Son, and Spirit; these are the primary realities in God 
according to the Eastern Orthodox tradition. John of Damascus will say, for instance, “the agent of energy 
is the subsistence or person (hypostasis) that uses the energy.” (De Fide Orthodoxa, III.15). Neither the 
ousia/physis nor the energeia have an independent existence from the hypostasis. There is no such thing as 
a free-floating essence/nature or energy in God—the essence/nature is hypostatically manifested in the 
Persons, and the energy is (or energies are) common to all Three. There is certainly nothing in the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition akin to the Thomistic understanding of God as ipsum esse subsistens (See for example, 
Quaestio Disputatae De Potentia Dei q. 7, a. 2, ad. 1 and ST 1, q. 4, a. 2), for this appears to do away with 
any kind of real distinction between being and essence in God. By contrast, the relations that ousia/physis 
and energeia have to the three hypostaseis in God will be referred to by St. Gregory Palamas as being 
substantial, real, and enhypostatic. In Capita 122, Palamas writes in this connection: “Not solely the Only-
Begotten of God but also the Holy Spirit is called energy and power by the saints, just as they possess the 
same powers and energies in exactly the same way as the Father, since according to the great Dionysius 
God is called power, “in that he possesses beforehand in himself, and transcends, every power” (DN 8.2; 
PG 3:899D). And so the Holy Spirit possesses each of these two as understood or expressed together with 
him whenever the enhypostatic (enhypostaton) reality is called an energy or power, just as Basil, who is 
great in every way, says, “The Holy Spirit is a sanctifying power which is substantial (enousios), real 
(enuparktos) and enhypostatic (enhypostatos)” (CE 5; PG 29:713B). Of course, in quoting Basil, Palamas 
does not want us to view the Holy Spirit as enhypostatic in the sense that the energies are enhypostatic: the 
Holy Spirit is one of the Trinitarian hypostases, whereas none of the energies are hypostases. 
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“wisdom” from “wise,” and “knowledge” from “know,” so we have the word “being” 
(esse) from “be” (essentia). And who can more be than he that said to his servant, I am 
who I am, and, Tell the sons of Israel, He who is sent me to you (Ex. 3:14).”428  
The first reason for his stated terminological preference comes from the Greeks 
having another word (i.e., hypostasis) which, he thinks, they do not adequately 
distinguish from the word ousia: 
I give the name essence to what the Greeks call ousia, but which we more 
generally designate as substance. They indeed also call it hypostasis, but I do not 
know what different meaning they wish to give to ousia and hypostasis. Certain of 
our writers, who discuss these questions in the Greek language are wont to say 
mian ousian, treis hypostaseis which in Latin means one essence, and three 
substances ... But because the usage of our language has already decided that the 
same thing is to be understood when we say essence, as when we say substance, 
we do not venture to use the formula one essence and three substances, but rather 
one essence or substance and three persons. Such is the way in which it is 
expressed by many Latin commentators, whose opinion carries great weight and 
who have discussed this subject, since they were unable to find a more suitable 
terminology for putting into words that which they understood without words.429  
The Greeks say mia ousia, treis hypostaseis when speaking about the Trinitarian God, but 
the typical Latin translation of hypostasis by substantia results in the ambiguous 
expression: una essentia uel substantia, tres substantiae.430 Augustine’s point is that the 
Greeks are using two words that seem to be etymologically the same (sub- and hypo- 
both mean “under” and -stance and -stasis both mean “stand”), thus making their 
theological expression uninformative. This is why Augustine will prefer to use the Latin 
persona and not substantia (Greek: hypostasis) when discussing the internal 
differentiation of God’s being into Father, Son, and Spirit.431 But as noted in the above 
                                                          
428 trin.5.1.3.  
429 trin.5.8.9-9.10; CCSL 50.216-217. 
430 trin.5.2.10. 
431 It is well-known by now that Augustine first used the term ‘person’ in a technical, theological 
sense in De Agone Christiano (ca. 397). The Christian Combat, trans. by Robert P. Russell O.S.A. Taken 
168 
 
 
 
passage, Augustine thinks this is merely a better way in the Latin language to express 
God’s unity and difference, His Oneness and Threeness. He is using a different term in a 
different language from that of his Greek contemporaries, but he is attempting to use it to 
refer to the same realities of Father, Son, and Spirit.  
In Book VII, Augustine writes further about this difference between East and 
West when it comes to their respective Trinitarian vocabularies. He notes that “our Greek 
colleagues talk about one being, three substances, while we Latins talk of one being or 
substance, three persons (tres personae)... [I]n our language, that is Latin, being and 
substance do not usually mean anything different.”432 Because of the possible ambiguity 
that can result from the Greeks’ preferred way of speaking, Augustine conventionally 
adopts persona here as a more appropriate term than hypostasis when paired with 
substantia or essentia. With this said, persona as a term also has drawbacks to its use. 
Augustine will repeatedly say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct and 
unconfused persons (Latin: personae/Greek: prosopa) from the divine essence. But as 
Basil of Ancyra and Basil the Great point out, the word person (prosopon) in its original 
etymological sense of “theatrical mask” was heretically used by the Sabellians in 
describing the three divine persons as being “masks” of a numerically identical, monadic 
God. Augustine, however, is clearly not so literal in his rendering of the term persona, 
and he even notes that the only reason why we use the word person (persona)—or any 
other word to talk about the divine essentia for that matter—is to be able to say 
something about the divine mystery, “so that we are not simply reduced to silence.”433 
                                                          
from The Fathers of the Church, Volume 2. See for example, Chapters 14 and 16, where he decries those 
who would deny the existence of the three divine persons, and their eternity and equality, respectively.  
432 trin.7.3.7. 
433 trin.7.3.11. 
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We have also seen this to be the case for the Cappadocians and, specifically, Gregory of 
Nyssa with respect to the divine physis. In On Not Three Gods, Nyssa shows that we 
really have no idea what the word physis means when referred to God. That is why Nyssa 
gives up tyring to account for the unity of the Three via the divine physis, but rather 
attempts to do so by examing the power (dunamis) of God.434 For Augustine, it is merely 
a matter of convention what word we choose in this connection, whether the Latin 
persona or the Greek prosopon/hypostasis. In response to the question “Three what?,” we 
must say something, even if whatever we do say will always fall utterly short of 
adequately describing the threefold being of the one God.  
The second and related reason for Augustine’s preference of essentia over 
substantia also appears in Book VII and has to do with the undesirable, simplicity-
denying connotations brought on by the latter’s standard linguistic-philosophical use. 
Augustine will famously say that the difference between substantia and essentia lies in 
their derivation from different verbs—the former from subsistere and the latter from esse: 
[subsistence] is rightly applied to things which provide subjects for those things 
that are said to be in a subject, as the color or form of a body.... But if God 
subsists, so that he may be properly called a substance, then there is something in 
Him as it were in a subject, and he is no longer simple.... But it is wrong to assert 
that God subsists and is the subject of his own goodness, and that goodness is not 
a substance, or rather not an essence, that God himself is not his own goodness, 
that it inheres in him as in its subject. It is, therefore, obvious that God is 
improperly called a substance [abusive substantiam vocare]. The more usual 
[nomine usitatiore] name is essence, which he is truly and properly called, so that 
perhaps God alone should be called essence [ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur 
essential, quod uere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat 
essentam]. For he alone truly is, because he is unchangeable. And, therefore, he 
revealed his name to Moses when he said: I am who am: and He that is, has sent 
me to you (Ex. 3:14).435  
 
                                                          
434 See pages 140-141 of this dissertation for Nyssa’s actual argument for this.   
435 trin.7.5.10; CCSL 50.260-1.  
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Because of its inherent meaning of providing “subjects for those things that are said to be 
in a subject,” which is antithetical to the understanding of God’s essential being as 
absolutely simple, proven by the possession and participation arguments, the word 
substance is the worse choice when compared with essence to use of God Himself. For 
Augustine, anything that is fittingly said of God with respect to Himself (secundum 
substantiam) must be identical to His unified being, otherwise God would be complex. 
Like Augustine, I will follow his preferred convention of using essentia to discuss the 
divine being, though in certain contexts (discussing the Nicene Creed, for example) and 
in my commentary on certain Books of On the Trinity (especially Books V and VI), I will 
use the more commonly adopted substantia as he does. Augustine lets us know why he 
will switch back and forth between essentia and substantia to discuss the “being” of God 
in Book V: It is because “many Latin authors, whose authority carries weight,” have used 
substantia “when treating of these matters, being able to find no more suitable way of 
expressing in words what they understood without words.”436  
Augustine’s reluctance to speak of God in terms of the philosophical category of 
substance can also be witnessed in Book IV of the Confessions, where he describes God 
as “marvelously simple and unchangeable” (mirabiliter simplicem atque 
incommutabilem).”437 He uses the marvelous simplicity of God to argue against those 
who would try to claim that God is a subject of accidental predication, for this would 
imply that God is composite, possessing his attributes as if they were external to His 
                                                          
436 trin.5.2.10. After doing a quick Latin word search of Books V-VII from PL 42, it is clear that 
Augustine follows the terminological convention of these “Latin authors.” In Books V and VI, Augustine 
will use substantia around 4 times more often as essentia. However, in Book VII, he will use essentia over 
twice as much as substantia.  
437 Conf. 4.16.28. 
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being. However, as we have seen Augustine argue time and time again, God does not 
possess his power, greatness, beauty, etc. as if they were qualities of his divine substance, 
as if they were tacked on to His being. Rather, for God, to be is to be powerful, great, 
beautiful, etc.438 
If Augustine does not understand God’s essential existence as a substance with 
accidents, then how does he? The answer he gives to this question is: idipsum esse, being 
itself, which is not restricted by the spatial and/or temporal considerations of human 
categorical speech, thought, and existence.439 It follows that God’s uncreated and 
unchanging being cannot be understood along the lines of created and changing being, 
which can be explanatively captured by Aristotle’s ten categories of being. But then how 
can we understand at all the idipsum esse that is God? Put bluntly, we cannot. Such is an 
inadequate name we give for the nameless God himself-in-himself. Augustine tells us 
that his naming of God as idipsum esse comes from his Latin version of Psalm 122:3, 
which reads as follows: “Ierusalem quae aedificatur ut ciuitas, cuius participation eius in 
idipsum,” ‘The Jerusalem that is being built as a city, it is a sharing in the selfsame, the 
identical.’440 Like Augustine, I will use the dual expression “selfsame, the identical” to 
translate the idipsum esse which God is. In his exposition of this Psalm, Augustine’s 
questioning attitude reinforces the apophatic nature of this dual expression: “What is 
                                                          
438 From discussing Augustine’s so-called “participation” and “possession” arguments for God’s 
simplicity in the previous chapter of this dissertation, I take this to mean no more and no less than God does 
not participate in or possess His power, greatness, beauty, etc. as if there were separate realities from 
Himself.  He is all of them, expressed personally as Father, Son, and Spirit. Put another way: God is not a 
substance in the Aristotelian sense of the term, according to which He would possess His attribues or 
perfections as accidents.       
439 For more on Augustine’s naming of God as idipsum esse, see trin.5.2.3; Commentary on the 
Psalms 134.4; Sermo 7.7; and De mor.ecc.1.14.24; BA 1.172, where he says “therefore we must love God, 
... of whom I will say nothing else than that he is being itself”—Deum ergo diligere debemus, ... quod nihil 
aliud dicam esse, nisi idipsum esse). 
440 See trin.3.1.8. 
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idipsum? What can I say other than idipsum? ... What is idipsum? That which always is in 
the same way, which is not now one thing, now another. What therefore is idipsum, 
unless that which is? What is that which is? That which is eternal. For that which is 
always one thing and then another is not, because it does not abide.”441 Jean-Luc Marion 
concludes that, for Augustine, the idipsum esse that God is, “remains radically and 
definitively apophatic; it does not provide any essence, does not reach any definition, but 
only expresses its own inability to speak of God.”442 The idipsum remains beyond the 
horizon of created being and any form of rational and non-rational forms of 
apprehension.  
It remains beyond the horizon of created being because it is radically unlike 
created being: the idipsum is simple, while creation is complex; the idipsum is eternal, 
while creation is temporal; the idipsum is unchangeable, while creation is changeable; 
etc. However, it is fair to say that, out of the many differences that could be listed here 
between the idipsum that God is and created being, arguably all of them ultimately stem 
from our understanding of the unity actually enjoyed by the divine essence—a unity 
which everything that is created lacks just because of the fact that it was created. As we 
have seen in Augustine’s possession and participation arguments for God’s simplicity, 
while God cannot be said to possess or participate in perfections external to his being, 
anything created, insofar as it is created, must do so, for its being is always different from 
its being good, great, just, and so forth. While it is true that created things have a 
providentially ordained unity in the divine ideas, which they can potentially reach in God, 
such a unity cannot compare to or be co-equal with that of the Father, Son, and Spirit.  
                                                          
441 en. Ps. 121.5; CSEL 95/3.90-1.  
442 Idipsum: The Name of God according to Augustine, 180.  
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According to Augustine, the Trinity’s unity of being leads to at least two 
corollaries. First, all of God’s attributes should be expressed in the singular, not as three 
separate affirmations: “whatever is said with reference to self about each of them is to be 
taken as adding up in all three to a singular and not to a plural.”443 So, for example, while 
the Father is great, the Son is great, and the Holy Spirit is great, they do not possess three 
separate “greatnesses” but one greatness, which belongs to them all. The same holds, 
mutatis mutandis, for the rest of the divine attributes. Second, like the Cappadocian 
Fathers, Augustine believes that because the Father, Son, and Spirit share the same 
essence, they have the same will, or energy, to use the Greek term.444 One of his later 
statements concerning this comes from Sermon 398.3 (425): “Father and Son have one 
will, because they have one nature. I mean it is quite impossible for the will of the Son to 
differ in the least degree from the will of the Father. God and God, both one God; 
almighty and almighty, both one almighty.” There are many other places in Augustine’s 
corpus where one can find mention of this ‘same essence-same will principle’ as it 
pertains to the Trinity.445  
The unity of substance that Augustine argues for with respect to the three Persons 
is not original to his theology, but finds its roots in the Councils of Nicaea (325 AD) and 
Constantinople (381 AD), both of which had previously said that the Son was homo-
ousios, of the same substance or nature, as the Father. Both of these councils also 
endorsed a theology that was fundamentally and unequivocally anti-Arian. This is made 
                                                          
443 trin.5.2.9.  
444 See Basil’s Contra Eunomium III.4, On the Holy Spirit 19 and 37; Gregory of Nyssa, Contra 
Eunomium I.394-97, On the Holy Spirit (GNO III.I, 92-93), On the Holy Trinity (GNO III.I, 10-12), On Not 
Three Gods passim, On the Lord’s Prayer 3 (GNO VII.2, 41). 
445 See for example, Epistula 11.2 (CCSL 31.26-27); trin.1.2.7; trin. 2.2.9; trin.4.5.30; Sermo 215.8; 
Sermo 126.10; Sermo 213.7; Contra serm. Arian.4; and Enchir. 38.  
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evident from the Nicaean creed itself, which categorically rejects any kind of theology 
that maintains Father and Son to possess different and unequal substances. We see this to 
an even greater extent in St. Athanasius’ amended version of the creed of Caesarea that 
would provide the theological inspiration for the Nicaean creed.446  
Augustine will also rely on Scripture to argue for the unity of Father and Son and, 
specifically, Jn 10:30 (I and the Father are one): “What does it mean, “we are one”? We 
are of one and the same nature. What does it mean, “we are one”? We are of one and the 
same substance.”447 The Arians, however, challenged the consubstantiality of the Son 
with the Father according to their interpretation of John 17:3 (Now this is eternal life: 
that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent) to prove 
that the Father is the only true God; and their interpretation of 1 Tim 6:16, which states 
that the Father is alone God and alone immortal. For Arius and his followers, to say that 
                                                          
446 Athanasius’ amended version of the creed of Caesarea is as follows. The translation is taken from 
H. M. Gwatkin, The Arian Controversy. Longmans, Green, and Co.: London, 1914: “We believe in one 
God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things, both visible and invisible; And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the 
Son of God, begotten of the Father, as only-begotten—that is, from the essence (ousia) of the Father—God 
from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, being of one essence 
(homoousion) with the Father, by whom all things were made, both things in heaven and things on earth: 
who for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh, was made man, suffered, and rose 
again on the third day, ascended into heaven, cometh to judge quick and dead. And in the Holy Spirit. But 
those who say that ‘there was once when he was not,’ and ‘before he was begotten he was not,’ and ‘he was 
made of things that were not,’ or maintain that the Son of God is of a different essence (hypostasis or 
ousia), or created or subject to moral change or alteration—these doth the Catholic and Apostolic Church 
anathematize.” This creed uses the term ousia at three key points. First, it is used to describe the Son as 
being of the ousia of the Father (to emphasize the correlativity of the terms Father and Son). Second, it is 
then immediately used to conclude that the Father and Son are of the same nature or substance, i.e., 
homoousios (to emphasize their inseparability). Third, it is finally used to categorically reject the idea that 
the Son is of another hypostasis or ousia than the Father (to emphasize the error of the Arians, who thought 
the Son was of a different substance than the Father). We may summarize by saying that all three uses of 
ousia language in this creed are meant to connote the ontological closeness that properly exists between the 
Father and the Son. This creed also has a clear polemical purpose: To utterly condemn the Arian heresy. In 
chapter two of his book, Gwatkin writes of how Athanasius and the other bishops at the council of Nicaea 
accepted the Caesarean creed of Eusebius, which heretically viewed the Son as a secondary God caused by 
the will of the Father (Gwatkin, 26), for the express purpose of proposing amendments to it that would 
destroy Arianism once and for all (Gwatkin 29).  
447 Sermon 139.1, 417.  
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the Son is consubstantial with the Father would thus be to say that He is co-equal and co-
eternal with the Father, which would lead to the existence of two ultimate principles in 
reality—an absurdity according to their approach to scripture. They further thought that 
the ontological prioritization of the Father over the Son could be seen in the terminology 
used to describe them as persons, namely begotten and unbegotten. They assumed that 
these terms referred to the divine substance, and so they were led to the conclusion that 
the only-begotten Son necessarily differs in substance (qua ousia) from the unbegotten 
Father. Arius writes of his own theological position in his Thalia (or “the banquet,” ca. 
323): 
The one without beginning established the Son as the beginning of all creatures.... 
He [the Son] possesses nothing proper (hidios) to God, in the real sense of 
propriety, for he is not equal to God, nor yet is he of the same substance 
(homoousios).... There exists a Trinity in unequal glories, for their subsistencies 
(hypostases) are not mixed with each other.... The Father is other than the Son in 
substance (kat’ ousian) because he is without beginning.... By God’s will the Son 
is such as he is, by God’s will he is as great as he is, from [the time] when, since 
the very moment when he took his subsistence from God; Mighty God as he is, he 
sings the praises of the Higher one with only partial adequacy. To put it briefly, 
God is inexpressible to the Son.... For it is impossible to search out the mysteries 
of the Father, who exists in himself.... What scheme of thought, then, could admit 
the idea that he who has his being from the Father (ton ek patros onta) should 
know by comprehension the one who gave him birth.448  
Having been heavily influenced by Nicaea and Constantinople,449 Augustine’s conception 
of the divine unity was therefore careful to avoid the unequal plurality of natures or 
essences present among the divine persons in Arian theology.  
                                                          
448 Translation by Williams, Arius 101ff.  
449 While I cannot do a sufficient examination of the extent of the influence of Nicaea and 
Constantinople on Augustine here, Ayres proves its significance for Augustine in both of his full length 
studies on this topic. See his Nicaea and its Legacy and Augustine on the Trinity.  
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Augustine was also unwilling to veer too far off in the opposite extreme 
theological direction, commonly referred to as Sabellianism, or the position which treats 
Father, Son, and Spirit as three names of one numerically identical reality or person. He 
makes clear that the sameness of substance he is arguing for the three persons should not 
be seen as destroying their individuality:  
we must maintain a faith which is unshakeable, so that we call the Father God, the 
Son God and the Holy Spirit God. Also, there are not three Gods, but that the 
Trinity is one God, not with different natures, but of the same substance [neque 
diuersas naturas, sed eiusdem substantiae]. Nor is the Father sometimes the Son 
and another time the Holy Spirit, but the Father is always the Father, the Son 
always the Son and the Holy Spirit always the Holy Spirit [sed pater semper pater 
et filius semper filius et spiritus sanctus semper spiritus sanctus].450  
 
Lewis Ayres believes this passage from On the Faith and the Creed, and especially the 
language of eiusdem substantiae, is a clear reference to the Nicaean term homoousios, 
and is a prime example of Augustine’s indebtedness to this Ecumenical Council.451 Not 
only that, but the statement that the Father is always Father, the Son always Son, and the 
Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit is a clear rejection of the Sabellian view that God is a kind 
of three-faced Janus, switching “faces” whenever the economic need should arise, with 
these faces not possessing any independent subsistence of their own. To use the technical 
vocabulary of relations, Sabellianism views each relation in the Godhead as mutual 
(mutua) and symmetrical (aequiparantiae). In his The Classical Theory of Relations, 
Constantine Cavarnos defines this kind of relation very well as one “such that, when it 
holds from the referent to the relatum, a relation of the same nature or denomination 
holds from the relatum to the referent.”452 Hence there is not, properly speaking, two or 
                                                          
450 De fide et symbolo 9.20; CSEL 41.26.  
451 Ayres 81, Augustine and the Trinity. Similar texts may be found at c. Adim.I; Io. ev. tr. 36, 37, and 
39; and c. Max.12.  
452 Cavarnos, 81. 
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more distinct terms related to each other in a mutual, symmetrical relation, but rather one 
and the same nature or denomination is related back to itself. It follows that saying that 
all of the relations in the Godhead are mutual and symmetrical, as the Sabellians do, 
makes God out to be one in such a way that the same God is the Father, the same God is 
the Son, and the same God is the Holy Spirit.453  
For Augustine, however, the one God always subsists as Father, Son, and Spirit 
simultaneously. Once again, this is a view of Augustine that is fully borne out by 
Scripture, and so must be believed with the sincerest of faith, even if it cannot be fully 
understood:  
In very truth, because the Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Father, and 
the Holy Spirit who is also called the gift of God (Acts 8: 20; Jn 4: 10) is neither 
the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three. That is why it is said in the plural 
I and the Father are one (Jn 10: 30). He did not say “is one,” which the Sabellians 
say, but “are one.”454  
 
Any theological view that rejects God’s Threeness, such as Sabellianism, must therefore 
be rejected as heretical. 
 So far, what we have seen is that Augustine does not opt for either a strictly 
pluralistic or monistic view of God. And so we might well ask: What, exactly, is his view 
of God? The short answer to this question is that Augustine opts for a relational view of 
the Trinity which God is, in which the causal relations of Father and Son and Spirit 
determine their differences from each other, while their shared essence maintains their 
                                                          
453 See Sermo 156.6, 419.  
454 trin.5.2.10. In addition to his doctrinal proclamations against Sabellius and his followers in On the 
Trinity, Augustine was known to preach against them as well. See for example, Sermo 229G.3, 416-417: 
“Whoever has seen me has also seen the Father.... Notice, by the way, that it’s not for nothing it says has 
also seen the Father. He didn’t say, “Whoever has seen me has seen the Father,” or he would be giving an 
opening to the Sabellians, who are also called Patripassians [i.e., Father-suffered-ites], who say the Father 
is the same as the Son.... Father, therefore, and Son are two. Two what? If you ask me that—Father and Son 
are two.”  
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unity with each other. Since we have already examined in sufficient detail Augustine’s 
views on how God is one in essence, we shall now take a look at his overall doctrine of 
relation and how it applies to God. At the outset of such a discussion, I believe it 
important to mention that Augustine will only use the adverb “relative” and its cognate 
words eighty-one times in his entire corpus, and seventy-eight of them come from Books 
V-VII of On the Trinity.455 From this material consideration alone, these three Books will 
be my primary theological and philosophical resource for explicating Augustine’s 
understanding of any and all relations.  
Augustine’s main opponents in these three Books are the Arians, against whom he 
argues for the substantial unity of the Son and Holy Spirit with the Father, while 
simultaneously arguing for their real distinction from each other. Early on in Book V, 
Augustine will outline his basic approach to walking this fine line between substantial 
unity and real distinction in God. Perhaps to the surprise of his theological opponents 
Augustine agrees with the Arians that, because of God’s absolute simplicity and 
immutability, nothing can be said of Him according to accident. Indeed, whether we are 
discussing accidentia inseparabilia or accidentia separabilia, these cannot be predicated 
of God.456 While we do frequently use accident words to describe God, such as good, 
great, powerful, etc., these words do not point to realities superadded onto the divine 
substance. Hearkening back once again to the possession and participation arguments, we 
can say that when we claim that God is good, we really mean that God is his own 
goodness; when we claim that God is great, we really mean God is His own greatness; 
                                                          
455 The other three references can be found at trin.15.3.5; civ.11.10; and ep. 170.6. 
456 trin.5.4.5; CCSL 50.209. 
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and when we claim that God is powerful, we really mean that God is His own power. 
That is, God does not possess or participate in these realities as if they were external to 
His own being, but rather they are distinct from but undivided from the divine substance.   
Where Augustine notes his disagreement with the Arians is in their conclusion 
that everything said of God must refer to his substance. For Augustine, some of the things 
said of God are “said with reference to something else (ad alterum),”457 or according to 
relation. A case in point are the relationship words used to designate the first and second 
persons of the Trinity, ‘Father’ and ‘Son.’ He writes of these two relationship words: 
the terms [Father and Son] are not said according to substance [secundum 
substantiam], because each of them is not said with reference to himself [ad se], 
but both of these are used reciprocally, each with reference to the other [ad 
alterutrum]. Nor are they used according to accident [secundum accidens], 
because that which is called Father and that which is called Son is eternal and 
unchangeable in them. Consequently, although it is different to be the Father and 
to be the Son, still there is no undivided substance, because this is not said 
according to substance, but according to relation [secundum relatiuum]. And this 
relation is not an accident, because it is unchangeable.458  
We might say therefore that the terms ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ signify realities that lie in 
between that which is accidental and that which is substantial, or that they signify the 
mutual relationships between the first and second persons of the Trinity.459 These are 
relationships that are mutually exclusive (the Son can no more be his own Father as the 
Father can be his own Son), and so not predicable of their shared divine substance; and 
                                                          
457 trin. 5.1.6. 
458 trin.5.5.6; CCSL 50.210-211. A similar text can be found at trin.5.8.9; CCSL 50.215: “Thus, let us 
above all hold to this: whatever is said in reference to itself concerning that divine and exalted sublimity is 
said according to substance [substantialiter]; but what is said in reference to something [ad aliquid] is not 
said according to substance but relation [non substantialiter, sed relative]. The power of the ‘of one 
substance’ in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is so great that everything which is said concerning 
individuals with reference to themselves is understood as adding up not to a plural number but to the 
singular.  
459 Analogous comments can be made about the third person of the Trinity and the term ‘Holy Spirit.’ 
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these are relationships that are non-accidental, because they are eternal and 
unchangeable.460  
The ingenuity of what Augustine has done here rests in his re-purposing of the 
philosophical category of relation, which when applied to God is no longer accidental, in 
order to free up the requisite ontological space for the three persons to exist as distinct 
individuals within the divine substance. While Augustine’s changing of the accidental 
ontological status of relation with respect to God may be seen by some as signaling a 
radical break from philosophical tradition and, specifically, the Aristotelian tradition, he 
actually borrowed quite a lot from the latter to construct his own theory of relation. 
Following Aristotle, Augustine conceived of a relation in the broadest sense as a 
characteristic with the peculiarity that the being which possesses it possesses it of, 
towards, or for another distinct being.461 Or as Augustine will say, “the terms of any 
predication of relationship must have reference to each other.”462 The two beings/terms in 
question are often given the technical names of referent and relatum, respectively, though 
Augustine never refers to them as such. For example, in the relation Simmias is “taller 
than” Socrates, Simmias is the referent and Socrates is the relatum. The relation “taller 
                                                          
460 Arguing for the simplicity of the divine essence and the real existence of the persons based on 
mutual relationships of origination distinguishes Augustine’s Trinitarian theology from that of Aquinas, 
with which it is often mistakenly identified. While Aquinas frequently cites Augustine as an authority of 
the Catholic faith in the Summa Theologica—more so in fact than any other religious authority—he notes 
his disagreement with Augustine on this important point: “Some [including Augustine], then, considering 
that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we 
may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is 
begotten.... This opinion, however, cannot stand” (ST, I, Q. 40, A. 2, co., emphasis mine). Given Aquinas’ 
view that the divine persons signify in God relations as subsisting in the divine essence, capable of only 
being distinguished in our thought, his disagreement with Augustine should come as no surprise. For 
representative texts from the Summa Theologica that illustrate Aquinas’ difference from Augustine 
concerning the relation of the divine persons to the essence cf. ST, I, Q. 28, A. 2, co.; ST, I, Q. 28, A. 3, ad. 
1; ST, I, Q. 29, A. 4, co.; ST, I, Q. 30, A. 1, co.; ST, I, Q. 30, A. 4, co.; ST, I, Q. 31, A. 1, co.; ST, I, Q. 31, 
A. 2, co.; ST, I, Q. 39, A. 1, s.c.; ST, I, Q. 39, A. 1, co.; ST, I, Q. 39, A. 6, co.; ST, I, Q. 40, A. 1, co..   
461 See for example, Cat. VII.6a37-38; Cat. VII.8b1-2; Top.VI.146b38-40 and VI.142a28-30.  
462 trin.7.1.2.  
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than” is a characteristic possessed by Simmias, but only in relation to Socrates, for 
considered by himself Simmias is not “taller than” anyone (Socrates or whomever 
else).463 The existence of this relation depends on its inherence in the referent, but the 
essence of this relation is to hold from the referent to the relatum.464  
Evidence of Augustine’s indebtedness to Aristotle in his general understanding of 
how relations exist and what they essentially are can be traced back to Book IV of the 
Confessions, where Augustine tells the reader that when he was around twenty, he read 
and completely understood a Latin translation of the Ten Categories of Aristotle. 
According to Fr. Paul Henry, there is no doubt that such reading material from The 
Philosopher influenced Augustine’s own view of relations: Augustine borrows his 
understanding of relations from “the Book of Categories but also from the Nichomachean 
Ethics. From Aristotle he takes the analysis of reciprocal and mutual relations, such as 
friend to friend, and father to son, and greatly improves upon it.”465 We can see the truth 
of this for ourselves especially in Book VII of On the Trinity, in which Augustine will not 
only describe relations and their terms in almost the exact way as Aristotle does in the 
first four chapters of the Categories, but even use many of the same examples.466  
Near the beginning of Book VII, Augustine will make the important distinction 
between what is said with reference to self and what is said with reference to another. He 
                                                          
463 See Phaedo 102 ff. 
464 See Top.VI.146b38-40.  
465 Henry, Paul S.J. Saint Augustine on Personality: The Saint Augustine Lecture 1959, Villanova 
University. The Macmillan Company: New York, 1960. P. 11  
466 For more on Augustine’s acquaintance with Aristotle’s Categories, see for example, Roland J. 
Teske, S. J., “Augustine’s Use of ‘Substantia’ in Speaking about God,” The Modern Schoolman 62 (1985), 
pp. 147-163; William E. Mann, “Immutability and Predication: What Aristotle Taught Philo and 
Augustine,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22 (1987), pp. 21-39; George Rudebusch, 
“Aristotelian Predication, Augustine, and the Trinity,” Thomist 53 (1989), pp. 587-597; and Adrian Pabst, 
“The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological Metaphysics,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007), pp. 553-578.  
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writes: “when you say master, you point not to being but to relationship, which refers to 
slave; but when you say man, or anything similar that has reference to self and not to 
another, then you point to a being.”467 Augustine believed all such creaturely relations to 
be dependent for their existence on the terms of those relations. For example, if there 
were no men, there could be no master-slave relationship, because there would not be a 
man to be a master and a man to be a slave. So too when we are discussing men, horses, 
and sums of money: the latter are said with reference to self and signify beings; but the 
terms “master,” “slave,” “draft-animal,” and “security” are said with reference to another 
and signify specific relationships. These would have no relational existence, so to speak, 
if it were not for their corresponding substance terms. All such relations are, to use the 
technical vocabulary of relations once again, mutual (mutua) and asymmetrical 
(disquiparantiae). This kind of relation can be defined as holding between two or more 
beings if and only if “when it holds from the referent to the relatum, a relation of a 
different nature or denomination holds from the relatum to the referent.”468 In other 
words, it is a two-way relation amongst different natures or denominations.  
Bringing this examination of relations to bear on God, Augustine infers that if the 
Father was not something with reference to himself, then he could not be talked about in 
relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit. Any relation for Augustine necessarily depends on 
the existence and nature of its terms, or as he famously says, “every being which is 
spoken of relatively is something apart from that relation [aliquid excepto relatiuo].”469 
This Aristotelian insight, when applied to the intra-trinitarian relationships within God, 
                                                          
467 trin.7.1.2.  
468 Cavarnos, 90. 
469 trin.7.1.2; CCSL 50.247-8. 
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shows that Augustine took seriously the distinct individuality of the three divine persons, 
each of which is necessary for there to be the triune God, and each of which equally 
manifest the unified divine essence. Moreover, since the three persons are “something 
apart” from or not reducible to their their relations to each other, Augustine must be said 
to have held that the intra-trinitarian relations are “real” relations, having an objective 
basis in reality, separate from the considerations of any finite intellect. After all, if the 
persons are real, objectively and ontologically, then the relations that obtain between 
them must be such as well. In this regard, Augustine will very clearly say that the 
Father’s being qua Father has reference not to himself, but rather to his only begotten 
Son; and that the Son’s being qua Son has reference not to himself, but rather to his un-
begotten Father:  
The Father is Life, not by a ‘being born’; the Son is Life by a ‘being born’ ... the 
Father, in that he is, is from no one; but in that he is the Father, he is on account 
of the Son [Pater quod est, a nullo est; quod autem Pater est, propter Filium est]. 
But the Son, both in that he is the Son, is on account of the Father, and in that he 
is, is from the Father [Filius vero et quod Filius est, propter Patrem est; et quod 
est, a Patre est] ... Therefore, the Father remains life, the Son also remains life; 
the Father, life in himself, not from the Son, the Son, life in himself, but from the 
Father.470  
  
Not only does this have to do with what is said, but with what ‘is.’ The Father ‘is’ only 
Father if he has a Son; and the Son ‘is’ only Son if he has a Father. In other words, 
Augustine believes that in order for there to be either one of these two divine persons 
both of them must really, ontologically exist. What this shows is that the diversity of 
person present in the Trinity actually enhances Its unity, or indeed is the very cause of 
that unity. He clarifies this point with the example of the inseparable nature of the 
relation between human fathers and their sons, while noting its obvious limitations:  
                                                          
470 Io. ev. tr. 19.13; CCSL 36.196-7. 
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For example, a man and another man, if the one should be a father, the other a 
son. That he is a man is in respect to himself; that he is a father is in respect to the 
son.... For the name father has been said in respect to something [pater enim 
nomen est dictum ad aliquid], and son in respect to something: but these are two 
men. But in truth, God the Father is Father in respect to something [At vero Pater 
Deus ad aliquid est Pater], that is to the Son; and God the Son is Son in respect to 
something, that is, to the Father. But as those are two men, not so are these two 
Gods.471  
  
When considering the Holy Spirit, we can say that Father, Son, and Spirit are not three 
Gods precisely because they are Father, Son, and Spirit, i.e., because they are what they 
are as persons in relation to each other; because they exist ad aliquid. But unlike human 
fathers and sons, they are perfect persons, whose relationships to each other are eternal 
and unchanging. For Augustine, this makes their relationships to each other actually 
perfecting of their essential unity and not accidental properties of an association of two or 
more separate beings. Augustine therefore preserves the unity of the Trinity by arguing 
for its Personal diversity, and preserves its Personal diversity by arguing for Its unity, 
each of which necessarily, ontologically implies the other.  
 As Rowan Williams says, “What should be particularly noted is that Augustine, 
so far from separating the divine substance from the life of the divine persons, defines 
that substance in such a way that God cannot be other than relational, trinitarian.”472 
Augustine certainly never views the divine substance as a kind of separate principle of 
unity within God, or as a separate causal source of the three Persons.473 According to 
Augustine, the Trinity is nothing more and nothing less than the one God and vice versa:  
                                                          
471 Io. ev. tr. 39.4; CCSL 36.346. 
472 Williams, 180.  
473 In not attributing the unity of the Trinity to a separate divine essence, but the essence as lived in 
the dynamic inter-relation of the three persons, I think Augustine’s comment here should, at the very least, 
be seen as compatible with the idea of the monarchy of the Father that is prevalent in the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition.  According to the East, it is the person of the Father that is entirely the source of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit, not the divine ousia.  
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... nor do we, therefore, call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence 
and one God, as though three somethings subsist from one matter which 
[tamquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant], whatever it is, is unfolded in 
these three. For there is nothing else of this essence besides the Trinity [non enim 
aliquid aliud eius essentiae est praeter istam trinitatem] ... [In material things] 
one man is not as much as three men together; and two men are something more 
than one man ... but in God it is not so; for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
together is not a greater essence than the Father alone.474  
  
One of the difficulties in our understanding of the Trinity, then, comes from the fact that 
within God (ad intra) “one is as much as three are together, and two are not more than 
one, and in themselves they are infinite. So they are each in each and all in each, and each 
in all and all in all, and all are one.”475 The kind of part-whole logic that humans are 
inclined to engage in to understand other people and the material world around them 
simply will not work when it comes to the Trinity, which cannot be understood in such a 
piecemeal way. Elsewhere Augustine similarly writes: 
... the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are the Trinity, but they are only one 
God; not that the divinity, which they have in common, is a sort of fourth person, 
but that the Godhead is ineffably and inseparably a Trinity... You know that in the 
Catholic faith it is true and from belief that the Father and the Son and the Holy 
Spirit are one God, while remaining a Trinity ... the Trinity is of one substance 
and [the] essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself [ut ipsa essentia non aliud 
sit quam ipsa trinitas].476  
 
I submit that the last two primary texts from Augustine show his commitment to the 
belief that the essence of the Trinity is not an extra fourth reality in God. We have seen 
him express this belief in various statements: “there is nothing else of this essence besides 
the Trinity,” “not that the divinity which they have in common is a sort of fourth person,” 
and “the essence is nothing else than the Trinity itself.” I take these statements to mean 
that the divine essence does not have an independent existence by itself and for itself. 
                                                          
474 trin.7.6.11; CCSL 50.264-5. 
475 trin.6.10.12. 
476 Epistle 120, 3.13, 3.17.  
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Rather, It exists in the realities of Father, Son, and Spirit. In the Greek East, we see the 
same belief expressed with the technical, theological term “enhypostatic” as it is applied 
to the essence and energies of the three Persons.477  
With this said, Augustine does not collapse the three divine persons or their intra-
trinitarian relationships into the absolute unity of the divine essence, nor does he do so 
with their relations toward creation. He always keeps distinct what is said of God by way 
of essence and what is said of God by way of relationship, because when it comes to “the 
things each of the three in this triad is called that are proper or peculiar to himself, such 
things are never said with reference to self but only with reference to each other or to 
creation, and therefore it is clear that they are said by way of relationship and not by way 
of substance.”478 Augustine gives an example of each of these three realities pertaining to 
God: “That he is, is said of God with reference to himself; that he is Father is said with 
reference to Son, and that he is Lord is said with reference to the creation that serves 
him.”479 In other words, what is said of substance in God, what is said of relationship in 
God, and what is said of relationship outside of God are not the same. They are not the 
same because they denote different and distinct realities pertaining to God.  
When it comes to the three persons in particular, Augustine wants to ensure that 
they really exist as irreducible realities within the irreducible essence. To indicate the real 
existence of the persons—or their subsistentia personarum—he will make an often 
                                                          
477 St. Gregory Palamas will define the term “enhypostatic” at The Triads III.i.9 when speaking of 
how the deifying gift of the Holy Spirit can be said to be “enhypostatic.” He writes: “It is “enhypostatic,” 
not because it possesses a hypostasis of its own, but because the Spirit “sends it out into the hypostasis of 
another,” in which it is indeed contemplated. It is then properly called “enhypostatic,” in that it is not 
contemplated by itself, nor in an essence, but in a hypostasis.” For more on the use of the term 
“enhypostatic” in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, see ftn 422 of this dissertation.  
478 trin.5.3.12. 
479 trin.7.3.9. 
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overlooked distinction between the Father and Son being alium and alius. The former can 
be translated as “another person,” the latter as “another thing or nature.” Such a 
translation is vindicated by Augustine’s own discussion of the term alium at On the Soul 
and its Origin 2.9,480 where he writes: “sed quia eum genuit de se ipso, non aliud genuit 
quam id quod est ipse. Excepto enim quod hominem assumpsit et uerbum caro factum est, 
alius est quidem uerbum dei filius, sed non est aliud; hoc est alia persona est, sed non 
diuersa natura.” The distinction between alium and alius will also appear quite 
frequently in Augustine’s later works.481 Though perhaps at De civitate Dei 11(ca. 418) 
we receive one of its clearest expressions in the service of making known the real 
existence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit: 
But the Holy Spirit is another person [alium] than the Father and the Son, for he is 
neither the Father nor the Son. But I say, ‘another person’ [alium] and not 
‘another thing’ [alius], because he, like them, is simple, and, like them, he is the 
immutable and co-eternal Good.... For we do not say that the nature of the Good 
is simple because it is in the Father only, or in the Son only, or in the Holy Spirit 
only. Nor, as the heretics who follow Sabellius have supposed, is it a Trinity in 
name only without the real existence of the persons [subsistentia personarum].482  
                                                          
480 CSEL 60.343. 
481 See for example, Io. ev. tr. 36.9; 37.6; and 45. See also Sermo 140.2.  
482 civ.11.10; CCSL 47.330. Here one must be warned not to equate Augustine’s understanding of the 
real existence of the divine persons with that of Aquinas. To see the contrast between Augustine and 
Aquinas on this issue more sharply, the notion of relatio subsistens (subsisting relation) must be given a bit 
of explanation. Aquinas first discusses this notion against the background of a larger question concerning 
whether ‘person’ in God refers to the divine essence, or whether it refers to the ‘relatio’—the unique being 
of the divine person. As is well-known, Aquinas famously says that in God relations cannot be accidental, 
and so they must subsist just like the divine essence itself. We must also keep in mind that the term 
‘person’ is only used appropriately with respect to God for Aquinas if it refers to that which most 
fundamentally distinguishes one person from the others, which he believes is found in the only thing 
intrinsic to each of the persons—the divine essence. Aquinas writes in this regard: “a divine person 
signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of a substance, and such a relation is 
a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature” (ST.I.q.29.a.4.resp.). For Aquinas, ‘person’ can refer to 
relation directly, but only as it refers to that relation as it is expressed in the existing hypostasis of Father, 
Son, or Spirit. This allows him to say that ‘person’ can refer to essence, provided that we keep in mind that 
this is so because essence and hypostasis are identical in God. Aquinas will say that the relationships of 
origin in God are real (ST.I.q.28.a.4.resp.), but we might question “how real?,” considering his doctrine of 
subsisting relation, which appears to leave us with a quadruple equivalence wherein ‘person’ = ‘relation’ = 
‘hypostasis’ = ‘essence.’ Examining Aquinas’ notion of subsistent relations in the detail it demands for a 
full account would take us too far afield from our current objective. As a result, I will end my inquiry into 
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Even this view of holding to the real existence of the three persons has not escaped the ire 
of scholars. In his article, “The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian,”483 Timothy Bartel 
claims that any kind of relative Trinitarianism that holds to the real and distinct existence 
of the three persons must pay the logical price of abandoning Leibniz’s Law (hereafter 
LL), or as it is often referred to as, the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Because 
of this Bartel claims that relative Trinitarianism does not pass logical muster and is a 
“dead end.”484  
LL is summed up by Bartel as follows: “For any x and any y and any property P, 
if x=y then x has P if and only if y has P.”485 Since relative Trinitarianism states that the 
Father and Son are consubstantial, or sharing in the same nature or substance, it follows 
that for it to dovetail with LL it must hold that the Father and the Son have all the same 
properties. The problem, however, is that according to both Eastern and Western 
orthodoxy the Father possesses a certain internal property as Father that is unique to Him 
(ingenerate), not shared by the Son or the Holy Spirit; the Son possesses a certain internal 
property that is unique to Him (generate), not shared by the Father or the Holy Spirit; and 
the Holy Spirit possesses a certain internal property that is unique to Him (processed), not 
shared by the Father or the Son. These internal properties have their corresponding 
economic manifestations (pillar of cloud, the Incarnation, tongues of fire, and so on), 
which are made known throughout salvation history to the creation to bring it into 
                                                          
this notion here. But it is worth mentioning that I am not the only one to take this view of Aquinas. See 
Richard Cross, “Two Models of the Trinity,” 285-286.  
483 “The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian” by Timothy Bartel from Religious Studies, Vol. 24 (1988), 
pp. 129-155.  
484 Bartel, 133. 
485 Bartel, 134. 
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communion with God. These properties are unique to each of the individual persons and 
are therefore incommunicable to the others. They are not, in other words, numerically 
identical with each other. Bartel specifically takes a closer look at the Son and what he 
calls His “incarnational properties.” According to Bartel, if we follow the dictates of LL 
it will validate any inference of the form:  
“God the Son has incarnational property P; 
God the Father lacks P; 
Therefore, God the Son is not God the Father.” 
Bartel thinks that it must therefore follow from this conclusion “that God the Son and 
God the Father are different deities.”486  
In my mind this sort of logic chopping engaged in by Bartel, which is meant to 
delegitimize relative Trinitarianism, consists of a series of wasted swings. I would argue 
that LL only applies to the common deity of Father, Son, and Spirit for at least two 
reasons. First, if the scope of application of LL extended beyond the common deity of the 
Three to their unique properties as persons, then we would be led headlong into 
Sabellianism, or some other erroneous form of theological modalism. Second, the fact 
that the Son has certain incarnational properties that the Father does not implies no lack 
of deity in the Father or greater deity in the Son. For these properties do not concern the 
common deity of Father and Son, but rather in this case the Son’s unique economic 
relation to creation in the unified person of Christ. LL completely paints over the 
distinction that really exists between God’s internal properties (such as greatness, 
goodness, mercifulness, etc.) that are univocally, equally, and identically predicated of 
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Father, Son, and Spirit, and those properties, whether internal or external, that are 
uniquely predicated of each of the Persons. With the aforementioned distinction, we can 
say without contradiction that God the Son, God the Father, and God the Holy Spirit are 
one and the same deity, but, very importantly, distinct persons with distinct economic 
functions.  
With the charge that the relative Trinitarianism that Augustine is proposing flies 
in the face of basic logic being sufficiently rebuffed, we must now consider the particular 
person of the Holy Spirit, who Augustine views as both another person and the relation 
binding the Father and Son together. Here we necessarily have to take a brief theological 
and philosophical detour into Augustine’s often misunderstood doctrine of the filioque. 
According to Augustine, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as well as from the Son 
(the doctrine of ‘double procession’): “Nor, by the way, can we say that the Holy Spirit 
does not proceed from the Son as well; it is not without point that the same Spirit is called 
[by the scriptures] the Spirit of the Father and the Son.”487 Eastern theologians have 
always preferred, of course, the statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father 
through the Son, though there are notable exceptions even in the Eastern orthodox 
tradition on this point.488 Augustine’s pneumatology, however, is far more nuanced than a 
one-sentence expression can convey. While the Father and Son are one single principle 
when it comes to the proceeding of the Holy Spirit,489 there is an important qualification 
                                                          
487 trin.4.5.29. See for example, Mt 10: 20 and Gal 4: 6.  
488 At the end of his On the Holy Spirit, for example, Basil concludes with the somewhat controversial 
doxology: “to the Father, with (meta) the Son together with (sun) the Holy Spirit.” (Spir.3). He does not 
end with the more commonly-accepted-in-Greek-Orthodox circles statement: “to the Father through (dia) 
the Son in (en) the Holy Spirit.” 
489 He makes this clear, for example, at trin.5.3.15. 
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that must be taken into account that brings Augustine’s position closer to that of the East. 
490 This qualification can be found in Book XV of On the Trinity: 
only he from whom the Son was begotten and from whom the Spirit principally 
[principaliter] proceeds, is God the Father. I have added principally therefore 
because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But the Father also 
gave this to him, not as though he already existed and did not yet have it [non iam 
exsistenti et nondum habenti], but whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word, 
he gave in begetting him [sed quidquid unigenito verbo dedit gignendo dedit]. He 
so begot him, therefore, that the common gift should also proceed from him, and 
that the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both.491 
  
He adds to this argument a litter later on in Book XV: 
And he who can understand in that which the Son says: as the Father has life in 
himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself (John 5:26), that the 
Father did not give life to the Son already existing without life, but so begot him 
apart from time that the life which the Father gave to the Son in begetting is co-
eternal with the life of the Father who gave [sed ita eum sine tempore genuisse ut 
uita quam pater filio gignendo dedit coaeterna sit uitae patris qui dedit]; let him 
understand that, just as the Father has in himself that the Holy Spirit should 
proceed from the Father, it is so to be understood that his proceeding also from 
the Son comes to the Son from the Father [de patre habet utique ut et de illo 
procedat spiritus sanctus].492  
 
For Augustine, then, the ultimate causal source of the Holy Spirit is still the Father, 
because “the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son is traced back, on both 
counts, to him of whom the Son is born.”493 While both of the above passages from Book 
XV appear to be discussing the internal relations that the Spirit has to the Father 
(principally) and the Son, it could be argued that they leave open the possibility for the 
doctrine of double procession to apply to both what is said of God ad intra and what is 
                                                          
490 For more on Augustine’s pneumatology in Book XV, see Basil Studer’s “Zur Pneumatologie des 
Augustinus von Hippo (De Trinitate 15.17.27-27.50),” in Mysterium Caritatis: Studien zur Exegese und zur 
Trinitätslehre in der Alten Kirche, Studia Anselmiana 127 (Rome: Pontifico Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1999), 
311-27.  
491 trin.15.17.29; CCSL 50.503. 
492 trin.15.26.47; CCSL 50.528.  
493 Ibid, 4.5.29. 
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said of God ad extra. This in turn would seem to collapse the latter distinction in God, 
also known as the theology/economy distinction.  
Those in the Eastern Orthodox tradition have been perennially bothered by this 
result, because they believe that such an ad intra/ad extra distinction in God must be 
maintained to accurately discuss the origin of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity and His 
activities outside of the Trinity. It should be noted that the Trinitarian controversies of the 
4th C., such as Arianism, were sparked in large part because of a failure to do this, 
because of a failure to make a clear distinction between God as Father (ingenerate), Son 
(generate), and Spirit (processed) on the one hand, and God the Trinity as economically 
manifested in salvation history on the other hand. Rather, the Eastern Orthodox tradition 
holds to the idea that only the Father proceeds the Holy Spirit (internally), but Father and 
the Son can both be said to send the Holy Spirit (economically), e.g., at Pentacost, 
Christ’s baptism, and the transferring of the Spirit to the twelve apostles on the evening 
of his resurrection.494 The Father’s sole procession of the Spirit within the Trinity can be 
defended by examining not only Scripture, such as Jn 15: 26, but also the creed produced 
by the Council of Constantinople in 381.  
This Council says regarding the Spirit: “and in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver 
of life, who proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is 
worshipped and glorified, who has spoken through the prophets.” Note that it does not 
speak of the Spirit in its economic function as paraclete or helper. While this creedal 
statement concerning the Spirit clearly implies His Divinity, along with and equal to the 
                                                          
494 See An Agreed Statement, III, Theological. 
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Father and Son, it does not “specify the manner of the Spirit’s origin, or to elaborate on 
the Spirit’s particular relationships to the Father and the Son.”495  
One could argue that the greatest difference between East and West on the 
filioque revolves around how to understand this original creedal language of procession, 
and the way key Greek/Latin terms have been used to discuss the Spirit’s origin from the 
Father and Its being sent forth into the world. The Greeks, to properly maintain the 
theology/economy distinction, will use the Johannine language of ekporeuetai to say the 
Spirit “proceeds” from the Father within the Trinity. The members of the North American 
Orthodox-Catholic consultation explain that, at the Council of 381, this Gospel text (Jn 
15: 26) was slightly altered from “to pneuma ... ho para tou Patros ekporeuetai” to: “to 
pneuma to hagion ... to ek tou Patros ekporeuomenon.” This was done so that they could 
“emphasize that the “coming forth” of the Spirit begins “within” the Father’s own 
hypostatic role as source of the divine Being, and so is best spoken of as a movement out 
of (ek) him.”496 Hence we can say that for the Greeks the term ekporeuetai has a technical 
and theological meaning that refers to the intra-trinitarian relationship between Father 
and Spirit. They will use other words such as proienai to say that the Spirit goes forward 
into the world, to refer to the Spirit’s economic mission. By contrast, the Latins use the 
words procedere and the related processio to discuss the origin of the Holy Spirit from 
the Father and from the Son. The problem is that both of these terms possess the general 
meaning of “movement forwards,” but neither of them connote the idea of this movement 
coming forth from a definite source or starting-point. Because of the generality of these 
                                                          
495 An Agreed Statement, II.¶.2. The filioque thus cannot be said to have been a part of the original 
Creed of 381. It was in fact added some time later at the Council of Toledo in 589, then gaining subsequent 
theological traction in the West over the centuries that followed.  
496 An Agreed Statement, III, Terminology.  
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Latin terms, they can be used to refer to “the Son’s generation as well as the breathing-
forth of the Spirit and his mission in time,”497 which in turn muddies or downright 
conflates the theology (God ad intra) and economy (God ad extra) distinction. 
Whether or not Augustine is guilty of this in his use of these Latin terms is 
something I will not discuss here. What is important to note I think is that, through all of 
the East and West debate over the filioque, there is, in both traditions, the commitment to 
viewing Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three co-equal persons. Whatever origin of the 
Spirit we might theologically prefer, both Augustine and the East view the Spirit as God 
from God, and along with the Son  “light from light, and true God from true God.” 
Augustine will explain that the Holy Spirit is a joint gift of the Father and the Son, or the 
act of mutual love that eternally spirates from the Father to the Son and from the Son to 
the Father. Since their mutual love for each other is perfect, it must be a person on equal 
status with the Father and the Son. If the Holy Spirit was somehow less of a person than 
the other two, then the relation between Father and Son would be imperfect, or perhaps 
better, their mutual love for each other would be imperfect; which is absurd. Since “love 
itself is nothing but a kind of life which couples together or seeks to couple some two 
entities, the lover and the loved,”498 God’s perfect love—the Holy Spirit—must be 
conceived as “some sort of ineffable communion [ineffabilis est quaedam ... 
communio]”499 between the Father and Son, but at the same time as a person co-equal to 
the two realities he joins. The only way this is possible is if the Holy Spirit is given in 
such a way that he gives himself as God to Father and Son as he is being given from 
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498 trin.8.13.9.  
499 trin.5.11.12; CCSL 50.219. 
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Father to Son and from Son to Father. For anything less would break up the perfect unity 
of the perfect persons: 
Nor because they give and he is given is he, therefore, less than they, for he is so 
given as the Gift of God that he also gives himself as God [Ita enim datur sicut 
dei donum ut etiam se ipsum det sicut deus]. For it is impossible to say of him that 
he is not a master of his own power, of whom it was said: the Spirit breathes 
where he will [John 3.8] ... there is no subordination of the Gift and no 
domination of the givers, but the concord between the Gift and the givers 
[concordia dati et dantium].500  
 
However, Augustine’s view that the Holy Spirit is the “common love (caritatem) by 
which the Father and the Son love each other”501 has been heavily criticized in the East, 
for it appears to depersonalize the Holy Spirit by reducing the third person of the Trinity 
to the mere loving relation between Father and Son. According to Boris Bobrinskoy, both 
Augustine and his theological mentor, Ambrose, viewed the Holy Spirit as the bond of 
love between Father and Son, thereby making the Holy Spirit less of a Person than the 
other two. On their pneumatology, “the Spirit is viewed essentially as the Gift of the new 
life flowing from the Father to the Son,” not as a fully-fledged Person.502 Kallistos Ware 
also thinks that once one calls the Holy Spirit the ‘bond of love’ between Father and Son, 
He becomes depersonalized.503 Suffice it to say that Augustine’s doctrine of the filioque 
has not received much positive attention in Eastern scholarly circles. Much of the 
criticism it has received, I submit, can be explained by examining not only the Latin term 
processio, but also the common historical perception of the category of relation. But as 
we shall see, this in turn can be attributed to a more fundamental (and misguided) 
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501 trin. 15.17.27. 
502 Bobrinskoy, Boris. Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and 
Patristic Tradition. Trans. by Anthony P. Gythiel. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press: New York, 1999. P. 274. 
503 See Ware, Kallistos. “The human person as an icon of the Trinity.” Sobornost, Vol. 8, No. 2 
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materialistic tendency of the human mind to understand the entirety of reality in bodily 
terms. First, however, let us briefly consider relations.  
At least as far back as Aristotle, relation was viewed as the weakest of all types of 
beings, and least capable of independent existence.504 Aristotle explains this by the fact 
that relations presuppose other types of more perfect beings to exist. For example, 
relations presuppose substances to make up their terms, and quantity and quality to make 
up the nature of those terms.505 Aquinas will later make similar comments on the weak 
ontological status of relations, such as his famous statement: “Relatio praedicamentalis 
est accidens minimae entitatis.”506 It should come as no surprise, then, that Orthodox 
theologians would think that Augustine’s view of the Holy Spirit as the bond of love 
between Father and Son depersonalizes the third person of the Trinity.  
I have already shown, however, that in the context of the Trinity Augustine does 
not understand relation as one of the accidental philosophical categories of being talked 
about by Aristotle; the intra-trinitarian relations are expressions of God himself. Speaking 
of the Spirit in particular, Augustine writes: “But this communion is consubstantial and 
co-eternal ... and this again is a substance, because God is a substance, and God is love 
(1Jn 4:16).”507 And at De civitate Dei 11.24 Augustine will explicitly say that the Holy 
Spirit is the “sanctitas” of both Father and Son, not as qualitas, but as substantia and 
persona in trinitate. Elsewhere, Augustine tells us why there is still great reluctance 
among some to accept this view of the Spirit as substantial communio: It is because the 
unity between two material bodies does not appear to be a fully-fledged reality when 
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506 Elementa, Vol. I, sect. 190; see also Cursus Philos., qu. XVII, art. II, IV. 
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compared to the other two realities it joins. After all, if those two realities are separated, 
then that unity does not exist anymore, but they go on existing.508 For Augustine, this 
view of the matter is one which is distorted by a mind that is weighed down by 
materialistic thinking. As he has argued on countless other occasions, since the Holy 
Spirit is God, and since the Holy Spirit is love, it follows that the love that binds the 
Father and the Son together necessarily is substance.509  
To conclude this chapter on God’s essential unity and relational diversity, I think 
it appropriate to end with Augustine’s own summary of what he believes he has 
accomplished in Books V-VII concerning substantial and relative predication found at the 
beginning of Book VIII: 
Those things which are predicated relatively the one to the other—as Father and 
Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit—are predicated specially in the Trinity 
as belonging severally to each person, for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son 
the Trinity, nor the gift the Trinity: But that whenever each is singly spoken of in 
respect to themselves, then they are not spoken of as three in the plural number, 
but one, the Trinity itself, as the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit 
God; the Father good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and the Father 
omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit omnipotent: yet neither three 
Gods, nor three goods, nor three omnipotents, but one God, good, omnipotent, the 
Trinity itself, and whatever else said of them, not relatively with respect to each 
other, but individually in respect to themselves.510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
508 See De fide et symbolo 9.20. 
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Chapter 7 
The Common and the Particular: God’s Oneness of Essence and Threeness of 
Person according to the Cappadocians 
 
 
 
It has been discussed that the Cappadocian Fathers understood the person of the 
Father as the ultimate ontological notion in the Trinity, and as the person that is the 
source of unity for the entire Trinity.511 But there is also an equally important emphasis in 
their doctrinal works on the oneness of the Trinity being a function of the unity of all 
three Persons, in their mutual and mutually exclusive causal relations to each other. 
While there is certainly truth in saying that the Cappadocian Fathers held to the logical 
priority of the Father, in that He is the origin (arche) and cause (aitia) of the Son and 
Spirit, they never thought this led to the Father having a genetic or metaphysical priority 
over the other two. This point has been well-discussed in the secondary literature, 
particularly by Albert Meesters and Joshua McNall.512 My goal in this chapter is not to 
critically evaluate the work of scholars on these topics, but rather to briefly sketch how 
the Greek-speaking-East and the Augustinian-West agree that the unity of the Trinity is a 
function of the shared divine essence, hypostatically manifested in Father, Son, and 
                                                          
511 This interpretation of the Father’s role within the Trinity is common in Eastern Orthodox circles. 
See Zizioulas’ work entitled Personhood, p.40, where he discusses how the Cappadocians saw the unity of 
God being found in the person of the Father alone, not in the divine essence. See also Kallistos Ware, who 
has said that: “According to the Greek Fathers of the fourth century, whom the Orthodox Church follows to 
this day, the Father is the sole source and ground of unity in the Godhead.” (The Orthodox Way, rev. edn 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995, p. 32)). John Meyendorff makes the same point about 
the Father’s primacy in terms His unity-giving role in the Trinity, albeit less starkly than the other two. 
Quoting John of Damascus, Meyendorff writes: “If the Father does not exist, then neither does the Son and 
the Spirit; and if the Father does not have something, then neither has the Son or the Spirit. Furthermore, 
because of the Father, that is, because of the fact that the Father is, the Son and the Spirit are.” (Byzantine 
Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), 
p. 183. Meyendorff is quoting from De fide Orthodoxa, 1.8)). 
512 See Meesters’ “The Cappadocians and their Trinitarian Conceptions of God,” page 409. See 
McNall, A Free Corrector: Colin Gunton and the Legacy of Augustine. Augsburg Fortress Publishers 
(2015), page 278.  
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Spirit, in their causal relations to each other. This will be no small achievement. As will 
be shown in the next two chapters concerning Augustine’s essence-will distinction and its 
practical implications for the problem of theological fatalism, it is a philosophically 
necessary first step to not only allow for: 1) multiple and distinct ‘realities’513 to exist in 
God along with the essence, but also for 2) the true freedom of man to exist under the 
influence of God’s non-essential help. The second point meaning, of course, not that 
God’s help is unnecessary for our salvation, but that the grace granted to man comes from 
a reality in God not identical to His essence, i.e., from His will and knowledge. I submit 
that only by consistently making such a distinction between God’s unity of essence and 
the relativity of the persons can any theology, East or West, take the requisite 
philosophical steps to make sense of the former divine reality and the latter human 
reality. This is something the Cappadocian Fathers, namely Basil the Great (ca. 330-379), 
Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 331-395), and Gregory Nazianzen (ca. 329-390), understood all 
too well. 
One difficulty in attempting to illustrate this commitment of the Cappadocians to 
such a distinction, however, is the fact that none of them had a treatise specifically 
devoted to considering the Trinity as Augustine did in his De Trinitate.514 Even if the 
general point could be argued otherwise, certainly none of them wrote a treatise on the 
Trinity of the sustained breadth and depth of Augustine. This makes it so that we must 
                                                          
513 I am using the term ‘realities’ to broadly refer to the tria onta in God: ousia, energeia, and the 
three Trinitarian hypostaseis. In doing this I follow Gregory Palamas, who in his 150 Capita will also refer 
to these three by using ta onta. See for example, Capita 75: “There are three realities (triôn ontôn) in God, 
namely, substance (ousias), energy (energeias), and a Trinity of divine hypostases (theiôn hupostaseôn).” 
Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. Trans. by Robert E. Sinkewicz, C.S.B. 
Studies and texts (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies), 83: Ontario, Canada (1988).           
514 See “The Cappadocians and their Trinitarian Conceptions of God” by Albert Meesters from NZSTh 
(2012); 54 (4): 396-413, p. 400.  
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reconstruct their Trinitarian conceptions of God in a somewhat piecemeal fashion from 
their various doctrinal works, which I will briefly attempt to do in this chapter, but with 
special emphasis on the essence (common)-person (particular) distinction that is so 
central to each of their conceptions of God. Much like Augustine, the Cappadocians will 
situate their conceptions between those of the Arians/Neo-Arians and Sabellius.515 The 
former they accomplish by emphasizing the divine unity, or sameness of essence, of the 
three persons. The latter they accomplish by emphasizing the divine plurality of Father as 
Generator, Son as Generated, and Spirit as Processed.  
We begin with Basil’s theology of the Trinity, which finds mature form in his 
three-book Contra Eunomium (finished ca. 363 or 364), but which can also be helpfully 
pieced together from his Epistles. The core of Basil’s teaching on the Trinity rests in his 
twofold emphasis on the unity and distinction in God. He warns us of the dangers of 
emphasizing either one of these two realities in God, writing: “Harsh rises the cries of the 
combatants encountering one another in dispute; already all the Church is almost full of 
the inarticulate screams, the unintelligible noises, rising from the ceaseless agitations that 
divert the right rule of the doctrine of true religion, now in the direction of excess, now in 
that of defect. On the one hand are they who confound the persons and are carried away 
into Judaism; on the other hand are they that, through the opposition of natures, pass into 
heathenism.”516 The former, the “Judaizers,” are those who excessively defend the unity 
of God. These are the Sabellians, who do not acknowledge the subsistent representation 
                                                          
515 Whereas the Arians held that there was some likeness between Father and Son, the Neo-Arians, led 
by Aetius and Eunomius, were more extreme in their belief that there was no likeness (anomoios) between 
the Father and the Son. 
516 CE, 30.77. 
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of the persons.517 The latter, the heathens, pass into defect on the “golden mean” scale of 
how to represent God as Trinity, because of their division of the divine unity. These are 
the Arians/Neo-Arians, who portray the three persons as having different natures from 
each other, with the Father’s being the greatest, or that one which can be identified as 
truly God.  
Contrary to the Sabellians and the Arians/Neo-Arians, Basil believes the orthodox 
faith to rest in the idea that Father, Son, and Spirit are one in essence, but distinct in their 
particular properties or characteristics. He writes: “According to this [i.e., the Father and 
Son sharing one and the same nature or substance], divinity (theotes) is one. That is to 
say, it is according to the rationale (logos) of the substance (ousia) that the unity is 
thought, but, as in number (arithmos), the difference of each rests in the particular 
properties and in the particular characteristics (tais idiotesi tais xarakterixousais).” 518 
Contra Eunomium 2.28 further reveals the distinction between ousia and idiomata or 
idiotetes:  
Particularities (idiotetes), being added onto the substance (ousia) like marks or 
forms, distinguish what is common by means of individual characteristics (tois 
idiazousi xaraktersi), but they do not cut the identity in nature (homophues) of the 
substance. For instance, deity (theotes) is common, fatherhood and sonship are 
individualities (idiomata); from the intertwining of each, the common and 
particular, there comes to us a grasp (katalepsis) of the truth, so that on the 
mention of the unbegotten light we understand the Father, and on that of begotten 
                                                          
517 I say “who did not acknowledge the subsistent representation of the persons” because even 
Sabellius spoke of persons (prosōpa) in the Godhead, but these persons did not possess true subsistence—
an independent and particular existence of their own. Basil comments on Sabellius’ inadequate use of the 
term person in Ep. 210 as follows: “For it is not sufficient to enumerate the difference of the persons 
(diaphoras prosōpōn), but it is necessary to confess that each person exists in a true subsistence (hekaston 
prosōpon en hupostasei alēthinē huparkon). For not even Sabellius rejected this non-subsistent 
representation of the persons (anupostaton tōn prosōpōn anaplasmon), saying that the same God, though 
one in substance, is transformed on every occasion according to necessary circumstances, and is spoken 
now as Father, and now as Son, and now as Holy Spirit.” (Ep.210, 5.34-41). The word prosōpa can only be 
used to refer to Father, Son, and Spirit if the phrase “existing in true subsistences” or something to that 
effect is paired with it, otherwise such use of the word prosōpa would be an affirmation of the error of 
Sabellius’ theological modalism.  
518 CE, 1.19.  
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light we get the notion (ennoian) of the Son ... for this is the character of 
individualities, to reveal in the identity (tautoteti) of substance the otherness 
(heteroteta).  
 
The added language of the common and the particular when applied to God seen here can 
also be found in his Epistles. It is on clear display, for instance, in Epistle 236, 6.1-22, 
where he defines the distinction between ousia and hypostasis as that between the 
common and the particular: 
Ousia and hypostasis have the distinction that the common has with reference to 
the particular (to koinon pros to kath hekaston); for example, just as “an animal” 
(zoon) has with reference to “a particular human” (deina anthropon). For this 
reason we confess one substance for the Godhead, so as not to hand down 
variously the notion of being; but we confess that the hypostasis is particular, in 
order that our conception of Father and Son and Holy Spirit may be unconfused 
and plain. For unless we think of the characteristics that are sharply defined in the 
case of each, as for example fatherhood and sonship and holiness, but from the 
general notion of being confess God, it is impossible to hand down a sound 
definition of faith. Therefore, we must add what is particular to what is common 
and thus confess the faith; the Godhead is something common, the paternity 
something particular, and combining these we should say: “I believe in God the 
Father.” And again in the confession of the Son we should do likewise—combine 
the particular with the common and say: “I believe in God the Son.” Similarly too 
in the case of the Holy Spirit, we should frame on the same principle our utterance 
of the reference to him and say: “I believe also in the divine Holy Spirit,” so that 
throughout the whole, both unity is preserved in the confession of the one 
Godhead, and that which is peculiar to the persons is confessed in the distinction 
made in the characteristics attributed to each.  
 
The most important point we may glean from the above primary texts from Basil is that 
any accurate conception of the Trinity which God is will be made up of two elements, 
distinct but not divided from each other, namely the common divine essence and the 
particular characteristics of the persons. While Basil and the other Greek Fathers are 
unanimous in their opinion that the first of these elements cannot be known in any way, 
shape or form by humans or the bodiless powers, the latter can be, to the extent that it 
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can, through the economic and energetic manifestations of the persons in the divine 
missions.  
How one may conceive of God in this way is famously discussed by Basil in 
Epistle 234 (sent in 376 to his friend Amphilochius), which was written in response to the 
Eunomians’ objection that since the divine essence is unknowable, if one worships it, one 
worships what one does not know. Part and parcel of this objection is the underlying 
Eunomian polemic that if God is truly simple, then all of the perfections we attribute to 
Him must be names of His substance. To which Basil responds: 
We say that we know the greatness of God, His power, His wisdom, His 
goodness, His providence over us, and the justness of His judgment, but not His 
very essence (ousia).... But God, he says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him 
you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. The absurdities involved in this 
sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated, 
are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His 
awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His 
providence and His foreknowledge, His bestowal of rewards and punishments, 
His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any of these, do we declare his 
essence? ... The energeiai are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we 
know our God from His energeiai, but do not undertake to approach near to His 
essence. His energeiai come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our 
reach.519  
 
Basil’s point here is twofold. First, we can be said to know (to eidenai) God in many 
different ways according to his justice, creative power, etc. Second, by knowing God in 
these many different ways, according to these activities (energeiai), we can form some 
idea or concept of God (ennoia). Indeed, “the concept of God (ennoia) is gathered by us 
from the many attributes which we have enumerated.... We say that from his activities 
(energeiai) we know our God, but his substance itself we do not profess to approach.”520 
                                                          
519 Epistle 234; PG 32 872C-873B; NPNF 8, 274. 
520 Ibid. Augustine has less patience in his response to a similar objection: “if you want to argue with 
me and score off me by saying to me, “Which God do you worship? What sort of God do you worship? 
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It follows that while we cannot know the unity of God from the unknowable and 
unapproachable ousia, we can from the energeiai that come down to us. 
The difference between essence and energeia in God that Basil is calling our 
attention to in order to counter the Eunomians is consistent with his overall philosophical 
distinction between knowledge of what a thing is (ti esti) and how it is (hopos esti) 
mentioned at Contra Eunomium 1.15.521 To explain this distinction, he gives the 
following example: When we say that one man is the son of another man that does not 
tell us what he is, but only from whom he came to be. We can speak of both what a man 
is and how he is relative to another person, e.g., through the relation of sonship, but these 
are not the same. So, too, Basil thinks when we speak of God the Father: we can talk 
about what the Father is, even if we do not comprehend His being as God, and how the 
Father exists as unbegotten, not coming from either of the other two divine persons.  
According to Lewis Ayres, Basil’s account of identity and difference in the 
Trinity reveals his indebtedness to many philosophical groups, including Aristotelianism, 
Stoicism, Platonism, and Neoplatonism.522 As partial proof of his claim, Ayres does a 
quick summary of how similar Basil’s talk of the distinction between ousia and idiomata 
or idiotetes mirrors that of the early Stoics belief in there being a difference between a 
universal and non-differentiated substrate, what they called “hupokeimenon” or “ousia,” 
as the pre-requisite for concrete existence, and its individuating particular qualities, what 
they called “idiotetes” or “poiotetes.” Ayres argues that it is likely that Basil was further 
                                                          
Show me what you worship,” I will answer. “Even if there is something I can show you, you aren’t 
somebody I can show it to” (Sermon 261.2, 418). 
521 PG 29, 545B. 
522 Ayres 199. See also page 62 of Philip Kariatlis’ “St. Basil’s Contribution to the Trinitarian 
Doctrine” from Phronema, Vol. XXV, 2010, pp. 57-83, where it is noted how Basil clearly drew upon his 
own Greek paideia to refute the heresies of his day and formulate his Trinitarian doctrine.  
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influenced in his idea of relations as being individuating characteristics by Aristotle 
through Porphyry.523 Porphyry famously wrote of Socrates being individuated by his 
color, rationality, and his relationship to his father.524 At Contra Eunomium 2.4, Basil 
echoes this by writing that Paul is Paul because he is a Jew from Tarsus, because he is a 
student of Gamaliel, and because he is a Pharisee who observes the Jewish law. These 
characteristics give us some idea of who Paul was as a concrete individual; they give us a 
concept of Paul. But what they do not give us is a knowledge of Paul’s nature as a human 
being. Whether we are speaking of God’s divine nature or Paul’s human nature, there is 
no way of knowing these natures in the abstract, in themselves.525  
Basil will also use the distinction between absolute and relative names to discuss 
the unity and diversity of God, respectively. At Contra Eunomium 2.9, Basil claims that 
absolute names refer to an essence (such as ‘man’), whereas relative names refer to 
relationship (such as ‘son’ and ‘the generated one’). The latter thus refer to idiomata. 
Ayres views Basil’s use of terminology in this instance as more proof that he specifically 
used Neoplatonic and Aristotelian ideas concerning essential and relative terms, within 
Stoic parameters, to elucidate a coherent doctrine of God’s unity of essence yet diversity 
of persons.526  
We turn now to Gregory of Nyssa, who in many ways philosophically refined and 
developed his older brother Basil’s theological ideas. Indeed, especially after Basil’s 
death, Nyssa would often become an apologist for his ideas against those who would 
                                                          
523 See Ayres page 201. 
524 Isagoge, CAG 4.1.2. 
525 Basil makes it a general rule that “knowledge of the divine nature is impossible just as knowledge 
of any nature in itself is impossible” (Ayres 282). 
526 See Ayres 202. 
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threaten the Orthodox faith, even in some cases speaking for him.527 Nowhere is Nyssa’s 
willingness to step into his brother’s theological shoes more importantly found, at least 
for the purposes of this dissertation, than in his discussion of the common/particular 
distinction in God that we briefly covered above in Basil.  
Nyssa’s philosophical elaboration of his brother’s distinction can be situated 
within another discussion of his pertaining to two types of terms: the first are those that 
are predicated of many different subjects and indicate a “common nature” (koinon 
phusis).528 For example, the term “Man” is predicated of Paul, Peter and Barnabas. The 
second are those that have a more limited scope, referring not to things common (koinon) 
but to things particular (idion, idiazon, idiomata).529 As we shall see, it is with this 
terminological distinction in hand that Nyssa can argue, without grammatical, logical, or 
metaphysical contradiction, that God is one in nature but three in person. While certain 
scholars such as Jaroslav Pelikan have objected that since the Cappadocians make this 
distinction, they must hold that the divine nature is some “kind of Platonic universal,” 
which is borne out by Nyssa’s three men sharing one human nature example,530 I find this 
objection to lack its sting. Nyssa ultimately views the divine nature as being 
hypostatically manifested in the Father, Son, and Spirit, and not having an independent 
existence of its own apart from them. Hence Nyssa would never, as Pelikan argues, view 
the divine nature as some kind of abstract universal over and above the three Persons.  
                                                          
527 See McNall 278 for more on this. 
528 Epistle 38, LNPNF, Second Series, Vol. VIII, 137.  
529 Ibid, 137. 
530 See Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1971), Vol. I of The Christian Tradition, 221ff.  
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Nyssa’s Ad Graecos provides a particularly good introduction to how the essence 
(common)-person (particular) distinction can be properly conceived to exist in God. He 
begins this work by making clear that the term God cannot be used to refer to Person, but 
rather the one essence of the Holy Trinity:  
If the term God were indicative of the Person, then out of necessity when we 
speak of the three Persons we would be saying three Gods, but if the term God 
signifies the essence, when we confess the one essence of the Holy Trinity we 
rightly teach as doctrine that there is one God since the term God refers to one 
essence. Therefore it follows that God is one both according to essence and 
terminology, not three.531  
 
As an example of how this works, terminologically and metaphysically, Nyssa once again 
will talk of three men sharing in one and the same human nature: “since in the case of 
Peter, Paul and Barnabas we do not declare there to be three essences since they are of 
one essence, how much more so in the case of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit will we not 
declare this properly? For if the essence is not to be divided into three according to the 
persons, it is obvious that neither should God be, because the term God does not indicate 
Person, but rather the essence.”532 He continues on this same point: 
As everyone agrees, Peter, Paul and Barnabas are called one Man as far as 
humanity is concerned. Consequently, in itself, that is to say insofar as Man is 
concerned, there cannot be many of them. To say many “mans” is a misuse of 
language and is not said in a proper sense.533  
 
On the other hand, Nyssa believes that it is not improper to say that three or more things 
share the same essence, but that they are distinguished by their individual subsistencies. 
For “something is distinguished from something else either by essence or by subsistence 
                                                          
531 All passages from Nyssa’s Ad Graecos are translated by Daniel F. Stramara Jr. and are taken from 
his article “Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Graecos “How it is that we say there are Three Persons in the Divinity 
but do not say there are Three Gods” (To the Greeks: Concerning the Commonality of Concepts). The 
Greek Orthodox Theological Review Vol. 41, No. 4 (1996), p. 381. 
532 Stramara, 383. 
533 Stramara, 385-386.  
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or by both essence and subsistence, and thus Man is distinguished from horse by essence, 
whereas Paul is distinguished from Peter by subsistence, and in addition the specific 
human subsistence [e.g. Paul] is distinguished by both essence and subsistence from the 
specific subsistence of the horse [e.g., Bucephalus].”534 
 Examining the second kind of distinction drawn between individual human 
subsistencies, Nyssa believes that it is accurate to say that Paul and Peter are different 
persons because of the unique differences that constitute their subsistencies, e.g., 
“baldness, height, fatherhood, sonship or anything else of this sort.”535 Nyssa will caution 
that the common essence of Peter and Paul, i.e., humanity, and the concrete manifestation 
of that essence in each of their unique persons is not the same, nor should ever be viewed 
as the same. This is so, he tells us, because “if anyone speaks about the individual, i.e., 
the subsistence, he immediately directs the mind of the listener to look for someone 
curly-haired, grey-eyed, a son, a father, et cetera. Whereas the term ‘species’ (that is to 
say essence) directs the listener to an understanding, namely: a rational animal, mortal, 
capable of understanding and knowledge; an irrational animal, mortal, capable of 
neighing and the like.”536  
 Nyssa concludes that, if we are willing to admit that such a distinction between 
species and subsistence is rightly made with respect to Man and those that participate in 
that essence, respectively, then such a distinction will apply even more so in the case of 
God and the three Persons. It follows that with respect to the eternal and divine essence, 
we are not able to say “such and such a God,” which would refer to each of the 
                                                          
534 Stramara, 388.  
535 Stramara, 389. 
536 Stramara, 389.  
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hypostases; nor can we say, when referring to the three persons, “God and God and God,” 
which would indicate the eternal and divine essence. Such (mis)references would 
constitute category mistakes of the highest order. That is why Nyssa thinks that we must 
profess one God, according to the unknowable and unapproachable divine essence, but 
who is ‘contemplated’537 in the three Persons—Father, Son and Spirit.  
 According to Nyssa, while we cannot know the divine essence, we can know the 
mode of existence (tropos huparxis) unique to each of the three persons. These three 
modes of existence (i.e., ingenerate, generate, processed) are known through the causal 
relations that the three persons have to each other, and that are revealed to creation in the 
missions. In his own Contra Eunomium, Nyssa will explain the tri-unity of God with a 
similar example to one we have seen him use before: “things that are identical on the 
score of being will not all agree equally in definition on the score of personality. For 
instance, Peter, James, and John are the same viewed as beings, each was a man; but in 
the characteristics of their respective personalities, they were not alike.”538 At Contra 
Eunomium1.22, he then applies this distinction to the Trinity, which he regards as  
... consummately perfect and incomprehensibly excellent yet as containing clear 
distinctions within itself which reside in the peculiarities of each of the persons: 
as possessing invariableness by virtue of its common attribute of uncreatedness, 
but differentiated by the unique character of each person. This peculiarity 
contemplated in each sharply and clearly divides one from the other: the Father, 
for instance, is uncreate and ungenerate as well: He was never generated any more 
than he was created. While this uncreatedness is common to Him and the Son, and 
                                                          
537 When Nyssa speaks of ‘contemplating’ God in the three persons, he means a form of knowing 
called ‘epinoia’ or ‘conceptualization.’ Nyssa refers to this as “the way we find out things we do not know, 
using what is connected and consequent upon our first idea of a subject to discover what lies beyond.” 
(Eun.2.182). Once we form an initial idea about something, we add new ideas to that initial idea until we 
reach the conclusion of our research. This adding of new ideas for the sake of discovering what lies beyond 
just is epinoia. Because epinoia plays a consequent function in our understanding of something, it is proper 
to say that its epistemological object, when applied to God, is the energies and not the essence. For the 
energies are consequent, or come after, the divine essence in terms of ontological ordering.  
538 CE 1.19. 
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the Spirit, He is ungenerate as well as the Father. This is peculiar and 
uncommunicable, being not seen in the other two persons. The Son in his 
uncreatedness touches the Father and the Spirit, but as the Son and the Only-
begotten He has a character which is not that of the Almighty or the Holy Spirit. 
The Holy Spirit by the uncreatedness of His nature has contact with the Son and 
Father, but is distinguished from them by His own tokens. His most peculiar 
characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the 
Father and the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate, nor as Only-
begotten: this it is that constitutes His chief peculiarity. 
Nyssa is telling us that each of the persons of the Trinity is unchanging because each is 
uncreated. They are all the same, identified, unified, or whatever we wish to call it 
because of their uncreatedness. What allows for real intra-personal diversity is the 
peculiarity proper to each person and which, therefore, is incommunicable to any of the 
others: the Father is ungenerate, the Son generate, and the Holy Spirit is neither 
ungenerate nor generate. According to Nyssa, these peculiarities have their basis in the 
causal relations that obtain between the three persons, and that within the common and 
uncreated divine nature, “as our faith teaches, there is a cause, and there is a subsistence 
produced, but without separation, from the cause.”539 The former obviously being the 
Father, the latter being the Son. Nyssa will stress that this difference in cause is the only 
difference we can point to between Father and Son: “In our view, the native dignity of 
God consists in godhead (theotes) itself, wisdom, power, goodness, judgment, justice, 
strength, mercy, truth, creativeness, domination, invisibility, everlastingness, and every 
other quality named in the inspired writings to magnify his glory; and we affirm that 
everyone of them is properly and inalienably found in the Son, recognizing difference 
only in respect of unoriginateness.”540 Unoriginateness, or having no cause of existence, 
                                                          
539 CE 1.26.  
540 CE 1.33. Note that Nyssa speaks here of the unity of the Son with Father in terms of the theotes 
itself, i.e., the energeiai, not the divine physis. As already discussed, Nyssa and his fellow Cappadocians 
held to the incognoscibility of the divine nature by the human or angelic intellect and to Its imparticibility 
211 
 
 
 
is peculiar to the Father alone; whereas the Son alone has the peculiarity of being directly 
caused by the Father. But in the ‘native dignity of the Godhead itself,’ Father and Son are 
one in wisdom, power, goodness, judgement, etc. They are, in other words, one in energy 
but two by their causal relations to each other.  
Other works of Nyssa serve to highlight the causal differences present amongst 
the persons in the Trinity as well. He writes, for instance, in To Ablabius: 
While confessing that the nature is undifferentiated, we do not deny a distinction 
in causality, by which alone we seize the distinction of the one from the other: 
that is, by believing that one is the cause and the other is from the cause. We also 
consider another distinction with regard to that which is from the cause. There is 
the one which depends on the first, and there is that one which is through that 
which depends on the first.541  
 
The one that is “the cause” is the Father; the other “from the cause” is the Son; and the 
one that is “through that which depends on the first” is the Spirit. Because of these causal 
distinctions, Nyssa is thus able to say without contradiction that, while God’s nature is 
                                                          
on the part of the entirety of creation. But this presents a problem: Because of the epistemological and 
metaphysical impossibility of encountering the divine nature, how can we say the Trinity is one God and 
not three Gods? Nyssa attempts to prove the unity of the persons and their shared nature from the oneness 
of their energy—that reality which is present around the divine nature and which is common to all three 
Persons. See, for example, Ad Ablabius NPNF 525, where Nyssa writes of the Godhead (theotes) that it 
refers to an energeia and “is so called from thea, or beholding, and that He who is our theaths or beholder, 
by customary use and by the instruction of Scriptures, is called theos, or God.” According to Nyssa, this 
energy extends throughout all three persons of the Trinity. To deny this is to go against Scripture which 
“attributes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (Ibid, NPNF 525). Nyssa will cite here 
Ps. Ixxxiv.9, Mt.ix.4, and Acts v.3. Not only does Scripture support the unity of the Godhead (and so the 
oneness of the Persons and their shared nature), but also the special character of Trinitarian operation: “but 
every operation which extends from God to the Creation, and is named according to our variable 
conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy 
Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided with regard to the number of 
those who fulfill it, because the action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but 
whatever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His providence for us, or to the government and 
constitution of the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three” (Ibid, NPNF 526-527). While we can 
say Father, Son, and Spirit are three persons, Their operation with respect to creation is one, because Their 
power and will which is the source of that operation is one. We can legitimately hold therefore that the life 
They give to creation is one life (not three lives), the judgment They pass on creation is one judgment (not 
three judgements), and so on. But neither, then, “can we call those who exercise this Divine and 
superintending power and operation towards ourselves and all creation, conjointly and inseparably, by their 
mutual action, three Gods.” (Ibid, NPNF 527).  
541 Ad Ablabius, GNO, III/1, 55.24–56.6. 
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one and the same, we can indicate in Him a difference in manner of existence (tên kata to 
pôs einai diaphoran endeiknumetha).542 Nyssa attempts to concretize the point with an 
example that involves asking a husbandman about a particular tree and, specifically, 
whether it had been planted or had grown of itself. If he were to answer either that the 
tree had been planted or had not been planted, Nyssa rhetorically asks, would that tell us 
anything about the nature of that tree? No, it would “leave the question of its nature 
obscure and unexplained,”543 but it would tell us how that tree exists. Applying this 
insight to the Godhead, Nyssa writes: “when we learn that he [the Father] is unbegotten, 
we are taught how he exists (hopos ... einai), and how it is fit that we should conceive 
Him as existing, but what He is we do not hear in that phrase.”544 Nyssa wants to make 
clear that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each have their own personal property or mode 
of origination: the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Spirit proceeds 
only from the Father. Each of these personal properties tells us what relation that person 
has to the others as origin or caused,545 but the essence of God is in no way known from 
them.  
These personal properties also serve to reveal the inseparable relations present 
between the members of the Trinity. According to Nyssa, when it comes to the property 
ungenerate, it not only establishes the Father as being from no one, but also that “the 
word Father introduces with itself the notion of the Only-begotten, as a relative bound to 
it.”546 Nyssa will say as clearly as can be that “the Son must always be thought of with 
                                                          
542 Ad Ablabius, NPNF 530. 
543 Cf. Ad Ablabium III.I, 56-57; NPNF Vol. 5, 336. 
544 Ad Ablabius, GNO 3/1.57; NPNF V.336.  
545 “Greek and Latin pro-Nicenes [articulate] the principle that we know the persons only by their 
relationships of origin” (Ayres 300).  
546 CE 1.38. 
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the Father (for the title of father cannot be justified unless there is a son to make it 
true).”547 A little later on at Contra Eunomium1.39, in response to the Eunomian charge 
that the Son at one point did not exist, he further writes: “how can the Son ever be non-
existent, when he cannot be thought of at all by himself apart from the Father, but is 
always implied silently in the name Father.” The very meaning of the name Father “is not 
understood with reference to itself alone, but also by its special signification indicates the 
relation to the Son. For the term ‘Father’ would have no meaning apart by itself, if ‘Son’ 
were not connoted by the utterance of the word ‘Father.’”548 For Nyssa, it is not only that 
the name Father would have no meaning if used by itself, but also that the very being of 
the Father qua Father would have no existence by itself, since “without the Son the 
Father has neither existence nor name, any more than the powerful without power, or the 
wise without wisdom. For Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.”549 Nyssa’s 
point in all of these quotations is simple: there would be no Generator without the 
Generated; no Generated without the Generator.  
All such statements of the Father’s relativity to the Son and the Son’s relativity to 
the Father (and the Spirit’s relativity to the Father and the Son) form the philosophical 
and theological bedrock of the major distinction found in Nyssa’s theory of relative 
predication as a whole, which he believes is so basic and so straightforward that even 
children who have just begun their grammatical education grasp it without difficulty, but 
is no less important because of that fact: that is, the distinction between absolute and 
relative terms. In the following passage, Nyssa explains very well what he takes to be the 
                                                          
547 CE 1.38. 
548 CE 2.2. 
549 CE 2.4. 
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orthodox position on names which can be predicated of God absolutely or relatively, and 
those which can be predicated sometimes absolutely and sometimes relatively, depending 
on how they are used by the speaker: 
God is called Father and King and other names innumerable in Scripture. Of these 
names one part can be pronounced absolutely, i.e., simply as they are, and no 
more: viz., imperishable, everlasting, immortal, and so on. Each of these, without 
our bringing in another thought, contains in itself a complete thought about the 
Deity. Others express only relative usefulness; thus, Helper, Champion, Rescuer, 
and other words of that meaning; if you remove thence the idea of one in need of 
the help, all the force expressed by the word is gone. Some, on the other hand, as 
we have said, are both absolute and are also amongst the words of relation; God, 
for instance, and good, and many other such. In these the thought does not 
continue always within the absolute. The universal God often becomes the 
property of him who calls upon him; as the saints teach us, when they make that 
independent being their own. The Lord God is Holy; so far there is no relation; 
but when one adds the Lord Our God, and so appropriates the meaning in a 
relation towards oneself, then one causes the word to be no longer thought of 
absolutely. Again; Abba, Father is the cry of the Spirit; it is an utterance free from 
any partial reference. But we are bidden to call the Father in heaven, Our Father; 
this is the relative use of the word.550  
Nyssa views terms such as imperishable, everlasting, and immortal as absolute, then, 
because of their completeness, or because of their capability of being used by a speaker 
without having to reference some other thing. Whereas terms such as Helper, Champion, 
and Rescuer are relative, because they are used with reference to something else—those 
helped, those championed, and those rescued. Different still are terms that are both 
absolute and relative, depending on their use. Terms such as God and good could be used 
in either manner: God is universal, but also called upon by the saints; God is good, but 
also called our supreme good. In both cases, the absolute God, the absolute good, can be 
brought into a relation with us because of what we choose to do.  
                                                          
550 CE 1.38. For similar passages in Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium discussing this absolute/relative 
distinction, see CE 2.11; CE 3.7; and CE 10.1. 
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In Nyssa’s theology of the Trinity, there is thus a clear place for both what is 
absolute and what is relative with respect to God; the former being the divine nature, the 
latter being the divine persons causal relations to each other and their providential 
dispensations towards us. This in turn allows Nyssa to walk the theological middle road 
that lies between that of Sabellianism and Arianism. He writes in this connection: 
Having heard of Father and Son from the Truth, we are taught in those two 
subjects the oneness of their nature; their natural relation to each other expressed 
by those names indicates that nature; and so do our Lord’s own words. For when 
He said, ‘I and My Father are one,’ He conveys by that confession of a Father 
exactly the truth that He Himself is not a first cause, at the same time that He 
asserts by His union with the Father their common nature; so that these words of 
His secure our faith from the taint of heretical error on either side: for Sabellius 
has no ground for his confusion of the individuality of each person, when the 
Only-begotten has so distinctly marked Himself off from the Father in those 
words, ‘I and My Father;’ and Arius finds no confirmation of his doctrine of the 
strangeness of either nature to the other, since this oneness of both cannot admit 
distinction in nature.551  
Like his older brother Basil, then, Nyssa locates the unity of the Trinity in the divine 
nature, hypostatically manifested in Father, Son, and Spirit. He views the differences of 
the three persons to be a function of their causal properties (i.e., ingenerate, generate, 
processed), each of which is incommunicable but also implicative of the other two. In 
addition, following Basil, we have seen that Nyssa holds that God’s inherent relationality 
finds expression economically in His various providential dispensations towards us, 
which not only serve to economically reveal the Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct 
persons, but also the oneness of their greatness, power, wisdom, goodness, providence, 
justness of judgment, and anything else that is befitting of God.  
                                                          
551 Contra Eunomium 1.34. 
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The last of the Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, best explains his 
theology of the Trinity in his Theological Orations (ca. 380).552 Like Basil and Nyssa, 
Gregory places a clear emphasis on unity and distinction in God. Ayres in fact writes that 
“one of the most distinctive characteristics of Nazianzen’s Trinitarian theology is the 
manner of his emphasis on the harmony of unity and diversity in the Godhead. For 
Gregory, the generative nature of God eternally produces the triunity as the perfection of 
divine existence. ”553  
This is not an idea that Gregory reasons to, or argues for, but rather takes as a 
given of his theological point of view: 
Monotheism, with its single governing principle, is what we value—not 
monotheism defined as the sovereignty of a single person (after all, self-
discordant unity can become a plurality) but the single rule produced by equality 
of nature (phuseos homotimia), harmony of will, identity of action (tautotes 
kineseos), and the convergence towards their source (pros to en ton ex autou 
sunneusis) of what springs from unity ... though there is numerical distinction, 
there is no division in the being. For this reason, a one eternally changes to two 
and stops at three—meaning the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In a serene 
and non-temporal, incorporeal way, the Father is parent of the “off-spring” and 
originator of the “emanation” ... [but] we ought never to introduce the notion of 
involuntary generation.554  
And elsewhere he similarly writes: 
A perfect Trinity consisting of three perfect (Triada teleian ek teleion trion), we 
must abandon the concept of a monad for the sake of plenitude (dia to plousion), 
and go beyond a dyad (for God is beyond the duality of matter and form which 
constitutes material things), and we must define God as a Trinity for the sake of 
completeness (dia to teleion).555  
                                                          
552 The five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen were preached at Constantinople between the 
years of 379-381. They are orations 27-31. These orations earned him the honorific title, The Theologian, 
which he shares with only one two others, Saint John the Evangelist and St. Symeon the New Theologian 
(11th C.). These orations are directed primarily against the Neo-Arians (led by Aetius of Antioch and 
Eunomius of Cyzicus) and the Arians, who respectively believed that the Son’s nature was radically unlike 
(anomoios) the Father’s and that the Son’s nature was like (homoios) the Father’s.  
553 Ayres, 244-245. 
554 Orat.29.2. 
555 Orat.23.8. 
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In Oration 42, Gregory conceives of this perfect one-in-three and three-in-one relation 
amongst the divine persons as a kind of cleaving together, not as a kind of coalescence in 
which the unique characteristics of the divine persons is lost: “The three have one 
nature—God. The principle of unity (enosis) is the Father, from whom the other two are 
brought forward and to whom they are brought back, not so as to coalesce 
(sunaleiphesthai), but so as to cleave together (echesthai).”556  
With the principle of unity in the Trinity being provided by the person of the 
Father, we now need to ask: What provides the difference of the persons? Much of 
Gregory’s positive view on how the Three are distinguished from each other in the 
Trinity is found in his critique of the Eunomians and, specifically, their view that the 
names of Father/Unbegotten and Son/Begotten denote different realities of different 
ontological ranks. Since Gregory’s position closely resembles that of Basil and Nyssa 
(and not to mention Augustine), I will keep the following examination of this Trinitarian 
topic in his thought brief.  
Nazianzen’s response to the Eunomians centers on the fact that they are 
fallaciously moving from the use of a conditioned or relative term to an unconditioned or 
absolute use of that term: “What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you 
mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you 
mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same? For example, 
Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of 
man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the 
essence.”557 So too when it comes to Unbegotten and Begotten: Nazianzen believes these 
                                                          
556 Orat.42.15. 
557 Oration 29.X. 
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are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes, characteristics, or 
particularities of the divine essence, which is eternally and immutably the self-same. 
These terms must therefore point to a difference external to the essence; they point to a 
difference with respect to Cause.558 Depending on the use of Unbegotten and Begotten, 
they can denote either the same reality (with respect to essence) or different realities 
(with respect to Cause); but never the same reality in any way that would destroy the 
unique and individual existence of the divine persons, nor different realities in any way 
that would divide the divine essence.  
For Nazianzen, when using the term Father/Unbegotten with respect to Cause, it 
neither names an essence nor an action. Rather, it is the name of “the Relation in which 
the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father. For as with us these names make 
known a genuine and intimate relation, so, in the case before us too, they denote an 
identity of nature between Him that is begotten and Him that begets.”559 Nazianzen 
makes clear, however, that we should not conceive this distinction as one of pure reason, 
or as a construct of the human mind, with no basis in the reality of God. It is a real 
distinction because “He is identical with the Father in essence; and not only for this 
reason, but also because He is of Him.”560 In other words, it is a real distinction because 
He is related to Him.  
The fact that the relation of sonship is unique to the Son alone, i.e., is 
incommunicable to the Father, implies no deficiency in the Father. Likewise, the fact that 
the relation of fatherhood is unique to the Father alone implies no deficiency in the Son. 
                                                          
558 See Oration 29.III, where he says “in respect of Cause They (i.e., the Son and Holy Spirit) are not 
unoriginate.”  
559 Oration 29.XVI. 
560 Oration 30.XX. 
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In Oration 31.IX, Nazianzen will further engage in a brief discussion of why the Spirit is 
not another son of the Father, and so not a brother to the Son. He discusses this because it 
is the Eunomians belief that there must be something lacking in the person of the Spirit, 
otherwise He would be another Son. Nazianzen replies that there is nothing lacking in the 
Spirit, or to any other of the persons for that matter, because God possesses no 
deficiency. Rather, the difference of the persons, or what he believes is the same thing, 
their mutual relations to each other, “has caused the difference of their names,” while 
simultaneously implying no deficiency of substance in any one of them. It is the “very 
fact of being Unbegotten or Begotten, or Proceeding [that] has given the name of Father 
to the First, of the Son to the Second, and of the Third, of whom we are speaking, of the 
Holy Ghost that the distinction of the three persons may be preserved in the one nature 
and dignity of the Godhead.” For Nazianzen, it is these properties that make them really 
three persons, and it is their shared Godhead that makes them one essence, which 
successfully avoids their unity being conceived in Sabellian terms, or their causal 
distinctions from each other leading to the Eunomian division of the Godhead into 
separate and unequal persons. 
Summing up the overall Cappadocian view on the Trinity would take far more 
than a short chapter such as this to do it justice. However, I believe that at the very least I 
have shown that they have a combined commitment to a view of the Trinity that is 
strikingly similar to that of Augustine. More specifically, both Augustine and the Greek 
Fathers held to a theology of God possessing a dual emphasis on unity and diversity, the 
common and the particular: the unity of God being provided by the common divine 
essence, manifested in the intra-trinitarian life of the three Persons (especially in the 
220 
 
 
 
person of the Father for the Greeks); and the diversity of God being provided by the 
particular causal relations of Father to Son, Son to Father, and Spirit to Father and Son.  
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Chapter 8 
The Augustinian Distinction between God’s Essence and God’s Will 
 
 In the previous two chapters, we have considered the distinction found in both 
Augustine and his Cappadocian contemporaries between the divine essence and the 
divine Persons. We have also seen in chapters 5 and 7 of this dissertation that the Greek-
East (for example, in the work of Gregory of Nyssa) makes a further distinction between 
the physis/ousia and energeia of God. Those in the East hold that it is through the latter 
reality which is “around” the divine nature/essence that we come to know, draw near to, 
or experience God the Trinity.  
At this point, however, we might well ask: Why make such a fuss over these 
abstract and abstruse topics in theology? What advantage can doing this possibly have for 
solving the practical problem of predestination, and for positively understanding man’s 
true freedom as a creature of God? The beginning of the answer to this complex question 
rests in the need for there to be real relations in God. We have seen that the alternative 
which denies this is a complete non-starter: If there were no internally distinct and real 
relations among Father, Son and Spirit, and if God was only conceived of as an abstract 
and undifferentiated essence, then His reality would lack any personal subsistence. There 
would only be the completely necessary, unchanging, and eternal divine essence into 
which the three persons, their causal relations to each other, and their attributes are 
coalesced. It is thus unclear how God’s essence could interact with creation in any co-
operative, meaningful, and personal way.  
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In this regard, we can say that the divine essence, considered by itself, is 
philosophically irrelevant to solving the problem that is the topic of this dissertation. For 
an answer we must look instead to the relative reality of God, which is made up of two 
distinct sides: the first consisting of the intra-trinitarian relations of unbegotten, begotten, 
and procession (ad intra); and the second consisting of the numerous economic relations 
that the three persons have towards creatures in heaven and on earth through their divine 
energies (ad extra). It does not take an erudite theological wisdom to conclude that the 
former relations are also, considered by themselves, philosophically irrelevant to the 
problem at hand, since they only obtain because of the internal activities of Father, Son, 
and Spirit as they are considered with respect to each other, apart from creation. In short, 
these intra-trinitarian activities/relations belong to the ‘realm’ of theology. The problem 
of predestination, however, belongs in the ‘realm’ of the divine economy, in which God 
as Trinity does not exist apart from creation, but actively, through His will and 
knowledge, attempts to continually perfect it and bring it into communion with Him.  
As we have already seen in chapter 4, for Augustine and the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition, the locus of the economic relations that obtain between God and the time-bound 
creature are found in the eternal divine will and knowledge, i.e., in the divine ideas. 
Nevertheless, there is still great reluctance on the part of scholars working today to accept 
the idea that Augustine mirrors the Eastern Orthodox tradition in this regard and, 
specifically, that Augustine’s theology was nuanced enough to even have a distinction 
between God’s essential and economic life. In this chapter, I venture to dispel this 
stereotype even more forcefully by examining examples from Augustine’s corpus of two 
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more ways in which he makes a distinction between God’s essence and/or intra-trinitarian 
relations (ad intra) and His will and knowledge (ad extra).  
 Before discussing these two ways and some texts from Augustine’s corpus which 
illustrate them, I think it is important to briefly note the difference in terminology used by 
Augustine and the Greek East. As we shall see shortly, Augustine prefers to say we can 
make an essence-will distinction in the reality of God, whereas it is traditional of the East 
to say we can make an essence-energy distinction.561 I submit that nothing is really lost in 
going from the Latin to the Greek or vice versa, however, because the East views the 
energy of God to be identical to His will. Gregory Palamas, for instance, states that “the 
energy which bestows substance, life and wisdom and which in general creates and 
conserves created beings is identical with the divine volitions.”562 And elsewhere he will 
rhetorically ask: “what is the will of God, if not an energy of the divine nature?”563 St. 
John of Damascus will also identify the divine energies with the divine will, writing: “His 
creative and preserving and providing power is simply his good-will.”564 Augustine’s 
Cappadocian contemporaries further show agreement on this important point. Basil the 
Great, for instance, says that the creation of the world was a result of God’s deliberate 
                                                          
561 While it is traditional for the Greek-East to speak in these terms, there are notable exceptions. In 
his article, “St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creation,” Georges Florovsky shows that there is in St. Athanasius’ 
writings, especially in his Discourses against the Arians, mention of a distinction between the divine 
nature/essence and will, or theologia and oikonomia. Athanasius made this distinction “to discriminate 
strictly between the inner Being of God and His creative and “providential” manifestation ad extra, in the 
creaturely world” (Florovsky, 51). The inner essential being of God is totally independent of creation and 
totally necessary (i.e., in the sense that God simply exists as He is, not choosing to be this or that). On the 
other hand, His creative and providential manifestation in the creaturely world is a result of the free divine 
will.  
562 Capita 87. In saying that the divine energy is “identical” with the divine volitions, Palamas is not 
arguing for the coalescence of the various energies with the volitions of God. This would lead to numerous 
theological paradoxes that Palamas is aware of and careful to avoid. See for example, Capita 100-103. 
What Palamas means is that the will is an energy of the divine nature.  
563 The Triads III.iii.7. 
564 De Fide Orthodoxa, Book II, Ch. 29.  
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choice (aproairetos) or will; and that it did not take place through a necessary activity “as 
the flame is the cause of the brightness.”565 Gregory of Nyssa agrees with his older 
brother Basil, claiming God’s creative activity to be one of His will (thelesis or boulesis), 
not His essence.566 Krivocheine notes in fact that when Nyssa speaks in a trinitarian 
context, he will use the term “energy” in the singular to call attention to the fact that the 
energy mentioned is that of the three Persons—the life-giving power that comes from the 
Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit. This life-giving 
power just is the divine good will: “[the energies of the Three are] a certain unique 
movement and communication of the [divine] good will, performed from the Father 
through the Son toward the Holy Spirit.”567 We can make this identification of the divine 
will with the energy, because “it is manifest that there is no difference between will and 
energy in the divine nature.”568 These texts should suffice in proving that when Augustine 
will speak of an essence-will distinction in God, as I will show below, he is not speaking 
in opposition to the Greeks, who believe that the orthodox faith demands that there be an 
essence-energy distinction in God. Rather, they are referring to the same realities in God, 
even if they are using a slightly different theological vocabulary.  
In addition to his previously discussed distinction between the eternity of the 
divine essence and the eternity of the divine ideas, there are two other major ways 
Augustine’s essence-will distinction will manifest itself in his corpus. The first of these is 
found in the distinction Augustine makes between God’s essential activities of generation 
and procession and His creative activity as producer of heaven and earth. In order to 
                                                          
565 Hexaemeron 1.7; PG 29 17B-C; NPNF 8, 56. 
566 See On the Soul and Resurrection PG 46 121B, 124B; NPNF 5, 457-458.  
567 Tres dii. 
568 CE.2.228. 
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distinguish these activities in God, Augustine had to make a corresponding distinction 
between God’s essence and will, respectively. The alternative, which only takes into 
consideration God as He is for Himself (idipsum esse), as I have shown repeatedly, would 
be theologically and philosophically absurd: For God as He is for Himself just is His 
essence, completely necessary, completely actual, completely simple, and so cannot be 
directly and ontologically responsible for what is contingent, partly actual and partly 
potential, and complex, i.e., all that is created. In theological theory and practice, 
Augustine could not be more opposed to such a one-sided and truncated idea of God. 
Evidence of this can be found in both his early and later works, both pastoral and 
doctrinal, in which we can clearly witness Augustine assign distinct roles to the divine 
essence and to the divine will as two realities that properly pertain to God as God.  
For the sake of brevity, I will limit my consideration of primary texts to those that 
can be classed as doctrinal,569 starting with a text from Book XII of the Confessions, 
which highlights the impassible divide between God as idipsum esse and creation: 
And whence could it derive even that sort of being but from you, “the source of 
all beings” of any sort? Yet they are all unlike you to the degree of their distance 
from you—a distance not in space, since you are not at this or that point, in this 
way or that way, but yourself-in-yourself, yourself-in-yourself, yourself-in-
yourself, “holy, holy, holy,” Lord, the God all-powerful [Rev. 4.8] [itaque tu, 
domine, qui non es alias aliud et alias aliter, sed idipsum et idipsum et idipsum, 
sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, dominus deus omnipotens]. At the origin, which you 
are, you made something of nothing in your wisdom, which is generated from 
your essence [in principio, quod est de te, in sapientia tua, quae nata est de 
substantia tua, fecisti aliquid et de nihilo]. Yet heaven and earth were made, not 
generated from you. Had they been generated from you, they would have been the 
equal of your Only-Begotten Son, and therefore equal to you; but it cannot rightly 
be said that anything is your equal that was not generated from you. Nor was there 
                                                          
569 For those who are interested in what Augustine has to say pastorally on the distinction between 
generation and creation, and how this demands that there be a corresponding distinction between God’s 
essence and will, see the following representative texts: Sermo 214.2 and 214.5, 391; Sermo 118.1, 418; 
Sermo 119.2, probably after 409; and Sermo 214.2. 
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anything apart from you, God, triune Unity and united Trinity, that you could 
have used in creation.570 
 
While God is the source of all created realities, what is created nonetheless remains 
radically unlike the divine source from whence it came. Indeed, any sort of created reality 
remains always distant from God, not in terms of His place, quality, quantity, etc., as He 
is not bound by the categories of space-time, but in terms of who he is “himself-in-
himself.”  
To maintain this ontological distance of creature from Creator, Augustine believes 
we must recognize the distinction between generation and creation: While God the Father 
generates his Wisdom (the Son of God) from his essence, he creates heaven and earth ex 
nihilo in his Wisdom, with such creation coming about exclusively through the causation 
of the divine will. At Confessions 12.4.38, he writes in this connection:  
When, our God everlasting, they hear or read the biblical account, they realize 
that you stand far above past and present time in your changeless continuity, yet 
everything temporally conditioned you have made. Your will, which is yourself, 
made everything, not from some new purpose or change of a prior one. You made 
it not from your own substance, in your all-forming likeness. You made it rather 
from nothing, which is unlike you in lacking all form. Yet it became like you 
when you gave it form, turning it back toward you in all its gradated potentials, 
assigned to each by its degree of being, so that ‘all you made is good.’ 
 
Augustine begins this passage with an apparent antinomy, i.e., God is wholly immutable 
and yet He has made all that is temporal and changeable, the resolution of which can only 
be accomplished by relying on a different reality in God that is distinct from the divine 
essence. This different reality ‘in’ God is His will, which is Himself. Augustine’s claim 
that the divine will is “God” invites comparison with the Eastern Orthodox view that the 
divine energy is no less “God” than the divine essence, in that it is a reality that properly 
                                                          
570 Conf.12.2.7; CCSL 27.219.  
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pertains to God as God.  The divine energy is distinct but not divided from the divine 
essence. However, unlike the utterly transcendent divine essence, the divine energy is 
immanent in creation and capable of being participated in by what is created.  
In addition, Augustine’s idea that the divine will is responsible for creation,571 
while at the same time distinguishing this creative activity from the Generation of the Son 
according to the divine essence, finds its roots in the Christian East with St. Athanasius, 
who was perhaps the first to extensively argue for the distinction of these activities in 
God. He did so especially to combat the Arian idea that the Son’s Generation was an act 
of the “will and deliberation”572 (boulhsei kai thelhsei) of the Father. Indeed, Georges 
Florovsky notes that Athanasius’ “whole refutation of Arianism depended ultimately 
upon this basic distinction between “essence” and “will,” which alone could establish 
clearly the real difference in kind between “Generation” and “Creation.”573 But it also 
would a fortiori lead to the condemnation of any theological position, such as the Logos-
theology of the Apologists and Origenism, that failed to distinguish between the 
“categories of the Divine “Being” and those of Divine “Revelation” ad extra, in the 
world.”574 As Florovsky makes clear, Athanasius’ interest in this distinction was not just 
polemical in character. Even before the Arian controversy broke out, Athanasius was 
                                                          
571 Rowan Williams will write of Confessions 12.6-13 that, “Augustine and his readers can only 
conclude that creation is caused by God’s will alone; and what that will establishes as the logical 
precondition of everything else is that the world will be capable of change.” Williams, Augustine on 
Creation, 68.  
572 Discourse III.59. 
573 Florovsky, 53. Athanasius thus believed that there was a difference in kind between the activities 
of generation and creation, because of the difference in the realities in God that are respectively responsible 
for them: “generation is not subject to will (boulhsei),” as the Arians thought, but rather is a “property of 
the substance (ousias)” (Florovsky, 55). For more examples of this distinction in Athanasius’ Discourses, 
see I.19, I.20, II.24 and 29, I.36, II. 57, III.60, 61, and 62. 
574 Florovsky, 42. Florovsky will note that both of these schools of theological thought were utilized 
in one way or another by the Arians, who thereby perpetuated this error into the 4th C. For more on this, see 
Florovsky 42-46.  
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“wrestling with the problem of Creation,” which he saw as inextricably related to the 
foundation of Christian faith: “the redemptive Incarnation of the Divine Word,”575 with 
such redemption taking place with the understanding that there is a radical divide or 
“hiatus” between God’s Being and the contingent being of what is created. But to make 
good theological sense of this divide required the distinction between “Generation” and 
“Creation,” and their respective sources in the essence and will of God. Athanasius may 
have been one of the first in the Eastern Orthodox tradition to make these distinctions 
without divisions in God, but he certainly was not the last. St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. 
John of Damascus, St. Gregory Palamas, and St. Mark of Ephesus would all follow in the 
footsteps of Athanasius in this regard.576  
On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, Book I.4, provides another excellent 
example of Augustine speaking of God’s essence as responsible for generating the Son 
and spirating the Spirit, whereas God’s will is responsible for creating everything out of 
nothing. Here, Augustine notes that everything that God made was very good, “but they 
are not good in the same way as God is good, because he is the one who made, while they 
were what was made. Nor did he beget them from himself, to be what he is himself, but 
                                                          
575 Florovsky, 49. 
576 I am indebted to the research of Florovsky, who will give representative examples of this 
distinction without division in God in all of the major works of these Saints on pages 60-61 of his article, 
“St. Athanasius’ Concept of Creation.” Perhaps the most striking example out of all of the ones given 
comes from St. John of Damascus’ De Fide Orthodoxa, and which I will therefore repeat here: “For we 
hold that it is from Him, that is, from the Father’s nature, that the Son is generated. And unless we grant 
that the Son co-existed from the beginning with the Father, by Whom He was begotten, we introduce 
change into the Father’s subsistence, because, not being the Father, He subsequently became the Father. 
For the creation, even though it originated later, is nevertheless not derived from the essence of God, but is 
brought into existence out of nothing by His will and power, and change does not touch God’s nature. For 
generation means that the begetter produces out of his essence offspring similar in essence. But creation 
and making mean that the creator and maker produces from that which is external, and not of his own 
essence, a creation which is of an absolutely dissimilar nature” (I.8; PG 94, 812-813). The Generation of 
the Son from the Father is therefore an effect of nature (ths phusikhs gonimothtos), whereas creation is an 
act of will (thelhsews ergon). See Florovsky 61.  
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he made them out of nothing, so that they would not be equal either to him by whom they 
were made, or to his Son through whom they were made; and that is as it should be.” 
Augustine realizes, however, that since creation is not begotten, he will have to answer 
the question, ‘How does it come to be?’ What power of production is responsible for its 
existence? Augustine answers that, “It is God’s will, you see, that is the cause of heaven 
and earth.”577 As a matter of fact, in the Miscellany of 83 Questions, Augustine claims 
that whenever God’s causality in relation to creation is mentioned, it is his willing that is 
meant. He thinks this point must be emphasized, otherwise some may get the false 
impression that somehow creation is generated from God’s essence as the Son is 
generated or as the Spirit is spirated, thereby raising creation onto an equal ontological 
footing with the divine essence and the three persons in which it is manifested. This in 
turn would destroy the Creator-creature distinction—the distinction on which all of our 
wisdom rests: “the whole discipline of wisdom, which is for the purpose of instructing 
human beings, consists in distinguishing the Creator from the creation and in 
worshipping the one as Master and acknowledging the other as subject.”578  
Augustine’s desire to safeguard the Creator-creature distinction by denying 
creation’s participation in the essence of God can also be seen in his other Commentaries 
on Genesis. At the beginning of his Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, for 
instance, Augustine reiterates in summary form the central tenets of the Catholic faith:  
that God the almighty Father made and established the whole creation through his 
only-begotten Son, that is, through his wisdom and power consubstantial and co-
eternal with himself, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, who is also consubstantial and 
co-eternal. So Catholic teaching bids us believe that this Trinity is called one God, 
and that he made and created all things that are, insofar as they are, to the effect 
that all creatures, whether intellectual or corporeal, or what more briefly 
                                                          
577 Ibid. 
578 Miscellany of 83 Questions, LXXXI. 
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according to the words of the divine scriptures can be called invisible or visible, 
are not born of God, [non de Deo nata] but made by God out of nothing, and that 
there is nothing among them which belongs to the Trinity except what the Trinity 
created—this nature was created.579 For this reason it is not lawful to say or 
believe that the whole creation is consubstantial or co-eternal with God.580  
 
Augustine cannot be any clearer that all created things are made and established by God 
the Trinity, as a unitary act of Father, Son, and Spirit, but that they are not born of God, 
i.e., they are not God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God. Rather, they 
are made and established by God the Trinity from nothing, and so they cannot be said to 
be consubstantial or co-eternal with Him. Here, admittedly, Augustine is not explicit in 
saying that it is the divine will which makes every created thing out of nothing, but it is 
implicitly understood that this is the case. After all, if the divine essence is not 
ontologically responsible for creation, then something else in the Trinity must be. This 
other reality in the Trinity is the divine will, as I have suggested above. We can therefore 
say for Augustine that it is not the Trinity in its essential Life that brings creatures into 
existence out of nothing and continues to create them even up until now (Jn 5:17), but 
rather the common will of Father, Son, and Spirit, which is life for them. It would at least 
be a logical conclusion for Augustine to draw, because the intra-trinitarian Life of the 
divine persons (i.e., the Father in His essence begetting the Son and the Father in His 
essence spirating the Holy Spirit) does not “belong” to created things, nor thus can it be 
said to cause them.  
We have already seen that Augustine thinks it would be absurd to say that God 
created without knowledge, willy-nilly making this or that, with no purposeful number, 
                                                          
579 The “nature” referred to here is the human nature of Christ. In the form of man, Christ is a 
creature, created by the Trinity; but out of everything else created, he “belongs to the Trinity,” because of 
his hypostatic union with the Son.  
580 Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, 2. 
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weight, or measure.581 It follows that His creative will was simultaneously directed by 
His knowledge of what is fitting for each thing as the kind of thing that it is, both with 
respect to its proper nature and as it should be in Him. For there is “no shape, no 
structure, no union of parts, no substance whatsoever which can have weight, number, 
measure unless it is through that Word, and by that creator Word to whom it was said: 
You have ordered all things by measure, number and weight [Wisd. 11.21].”582 God thus 
creates willfully, but also knowingly, according to certain measures, numbers, and 
weights. Augustine thinks these two activities in God are distinct from each other, not 
only from the authority of Scripture (1 Cor 1:24: Christ the power and wisdom of God), 
but also from certain philosophical-theological presuppositions to which he is deeply 
committed.583 The idea that the common will of the Trinity is responsible for creation, as 
well as how the divine will must be distinct without division from the divine knowledge, 
is implicit in the above passage from the Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis. But 
these points can be reasoned to quite naturally when read within the broader context of 
Augustine’s theology of the relation of the Trinity to creation as a whole, which is 
                                                          
581 See pages 95-96 of this dissertation.  
582 Io. ev. tr. 1.13; CCSL 36.8. 
583 Of these philosophical-theological presuppositions I highlight two in particular. First, Augustine’s 
claim in Chapter 19 of On the Predestination of the Saints that God’s foreknowledge and predestinating 
will cannot be confused. There must be a real distinction (in re ipsa) between them, otherwise God would 
be responsible for everything that He foreknows, including all future sins of rational creatures. In the East, 
Palamas will later make the similar point that if we identify or coalesce God’s will with God’s 
foreknowledge, then we will be left with an absurd theological dilemma: “either God will not know all 
things beforehand for he does not will everything that happens, or he wills also evil things because he has 
foreknowledge of all things” (Capita 100). Second, in DGnL.V.13-15, Augustine will repeatedly make the 
point that God knew all things in Wisdom before they were made. Augustine will say that this knowledge is 
in God and is life for creatures, and that all creatures “before they were made were in the knowledge of 
God their Creator” (DGnL.V.15.33). Hence Augustine thought that God’s knowledge of creatures was 
distinct from, or “before,” God’s making of them. Yet these two actions of God were clearly not divided 
from each other, for, to use the words of Augustine: “Who would be so insane as to say that God had made 
things that He did not know?” (DGnL.V.13.29).  
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perhaps manifested most clearly in his concept of the divine ideas previously discussed in 
chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 Books II-IV of On the Trinity provide us with an opportunity to witness yet 
another way in which Augustine makes a clear distinction between God’s inner essential 
Life—the Life that He lives for himself alone—and God’s economic life—the life that 
He lives for creation and its perfection. Generally speaking, these three Books are 
concerned with communicating his theology of mission, or with how we should 
understand the theophanies of the Old and New Testaments.584 According to Augustine, 
the divine missions temporally reveal (but do not constitute) in some kind of visible, 
spiritual, and/or intellectual way the eternal processions of the Trinity, i.e., the begetting 
of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the 
Son. While God in himself always remains beyond the dramatic unfolding of salvation 
history for Augustine, the divine missions serve the crucial function of revealing to us the 
real distinctions amongst the three persons in the Trinity; they are what make the mystery 
of the eternal Triune God knowable, as far as is possible, for believers. Contrary therefore 
to the “economic theologians,” such as Justin Martyr and Tertullian, Augustine never 
holds that the sendings of the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be identified with the 
transcendent mystery of God in himself. While showing the theophanies not to be a direct 
manifestation of the divine essence may be an obvious point of orthodoxy in the East, and 
one I think that is equally present in the Augustinian-West, there has been much 
reluctance to accept this interpretation of the Augustinian view. Possibly the two best 
                                                          
584 In Book II, he sets himself the task of deciding which of the divine persons visibly appeared in the 
Old Testament. In Book III, he is concerned with determining whether angels were ever employed in the 
service of creating theophanies. In Book IV, he examines how the New Testament theophanies may be said 
to differ from those of the Old Testament.  
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scholarly examples of this resistant attitude are found in the works of the twentieth-
century theologians Karl Barth and Karl Rahner, whose “essentialist” interpretation of 
Augustine’s theology of mission has remained prevalent up to the present day.  
In his Church Dogmatics, Barth is quite straightforward in how he interprets the 
entire Western tradition’s, including Augustine’s, view of God’s self-revelation to 
humankind: “What is God as God, the divine individuality and characteristics, the 
essentia or ‘essence’ of God, is something which we shall encounter either at the place 
where God deals with us as Lord and Saviour, or not at all.”585 According to Barth, we 
can nonetheless encounter God in the world, but there is no real plurality with respect to 
His operations, for “God’s essence and His operation are not twain but one. God’s 
operation or effect is His essence in its relation to the reality distinct from Him, whether 
about to be or already created.”586 Barth only admits a notional (unreal/logical) 
distinction between God’s essence as such and His operations, not one at the level of His 
Being.  
 Karl Rahner, on the other hand, argues that Western Trinitarianism is a 
fundamentally flawed endeavor, because of the separation it entails between the 
economic and immanent trinities. More specifically, he identifies four problematic 
aspects in the Western doctrine of the Trinity:  
1) The removal of the Trinity from the practical life of faith into the realm of 
theological speculation. Rahner will (in)famously say in this connection: 
“Christians are, in their practical life, almost mere ‘monotheists’ ... [and] should 
the doctrine of the Trinity have to be dropped as false, the major part of religious 
                                                          
585 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: Edinburgh, 1936ff., vol. 2/1, p. 261.  
586 P. 426. 
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literature could well remain virtually unchanged.”587 I find this claim to be both 
sweeping and inaccurate. In the Western Church, we call to mind and worship the 
Trinity in every divine service: We make the Sign of the Cross in the name of the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the priest will pray at the end of the Eucharistic 
Prayer, ‘Through Him, and with Him and in Him, O God, almighty Father, in the 
unity of the Holy Spirit, all glory and honor is yours, for ever and ever’; we often 
sing hymns of praise throughout the Mass to all three persons of the Trinity; etc. 
The point in bringing up these few examples (among many) is to prove that, even 
with respect to the major part of religious literature that most affects the “practical 
life” of Western Christians, i.e., that part which pertains to the liturgical life of the 
Church, Rahner’s claim about the unimportance of the doctrine of the Trinity 
rings false. Eastern Christian worship services and spiritual life are also 
thoroughly grounded in and expressive of the presence of the Trinity.  
2) The emphasis it places on the unity of the divine essence over and above the 
diversity of the three divine persons. God is both one in essence and three by 
relation, but it is typical of Western theologians to “begin” with de Deo uno, 
thereby giving the impression “as if everything which matters for us in God has 
already been said in the treatise On the One God.”588 Rahner will say that, while 
Aquinas was the first to explicitly separate the oneness of God from His 
triuneness, he only did so because of Augustine’s influence. The Greek Fathers, 
by contrast, “begin” with the diversity of the three persons and then move on to 
                                                          
587 Rahner, 10-11. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel, with an introduction, index and 
glossary by Catherine Mowry LaCugna, Crossroad Herder Book (New York: Crossroad, 1997). 
588 Rahner, 17.  
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consider the unity of God’s essence.589 Rahner’s second charge is easy to answer, 
however, as Augustine neither literally (Books I-IV deal with the divine missions 
of the three persons) nor logically (Books V-VII deal with the tri-unity of the 
Godhead and how we should speak of it) begins with a narrow focus exclusively 
on the oneness of the divine essence.  
3) The claim that all of the actions of the three persons ad extra, in the economy 
of salvation, are indivisible. It is commonplace to express this doctrine in the 
following Latin phrase: opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. Rahner thinks 
Augustine is guilty of this charge due to the closeness of the relationship 
Augustine posits between the temporal missions (ad extra) and the eternal 
processions (ad intra), so close a relationship in fact that he identifies the two.590 
As my brief survey of key texts from Books II-IV below will show, however, 
Augustine is innocent of this charge as well.  
4) The utter disregard of hints as to the Trinitarian being of God, except from the 
New Testament.591 Anyone familiar with Augustine’s corpus knows this is 
patently untrue. Augustine is perfectly willing in Books II-IV of On the Trinity, 
for instance, to discuss which of the three divine persons appeared to Old 
Testament figures in various theophanic experiences. 
Rahner believes that Augustine is primarily to blame for the above four theological 
failings, though he never quotes or cites specific passages from Augustine’s corpus to 
                                                          
589 Rahner, 16-17. 
590 See for example, Rahner, 11 and 29. 
591 Rahner 20-21. 
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support his criticisms.592 In response to Augustine’s theology, Rahner argues for what in 
my mind can only be the complete antithesis of what he takes to be the Western 
theological option, holding that “the economic trinity is the immanent trinity” and vice 
versa.593 It follows from this axiomatic identification of the immanent and economic 
trinities that the Trinity which God is reveals itself to humanity exactly as it is in 
Godself.594 Augustine’s position is more nuanced than Rahner portrays it, however, 
incorporating the idea that there is a distinction (not a division) between the divine 
missions (ad extra), which reveal the personal properties of begetting, begotten, and 
procession, and the three Persons as they are related to each other and their shared 
essence (ad intra).  
 What we have encountered in the work of Barth and Rahner are the two main 
ways scholars have and still do interpret Augustine’s theology of mission: either 1) it 
collapses the inner (ad intra) and outer (ad extra) sides of the Trinity into each other, or 
2) it separates these two sides of God, thereby removing God as He is for Himself 
(essentially) from God as He is for us (economically). Rather than blindly agree with 
either Barth or Rahner, however, we must do our due theological diligence and examine 
what Augustine actually has to say with respect to God’s relation to creation, and how He 
makes Himself known to it throughout salvation history. Before examining what he has 
to say in Books II-IV of On the Trinity with respect to these issues, I want to give a brief 
explanation why I will engage in a somewhat out-of-order approach of considering Book 
                                                          
592 For more on this failure to cite specific texts from Augustine in Rahner, see Drayton C. Benner’s 
“Augustine and Karl Rahner on the Relationship between the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology, Vol. 9, no. 1 (January 2007), pp. 24-38.  
593 Rahner, 22.  
594 Rahner 34-35. 
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III first, and then Books II and IV. My reason for starting with Book III is that it, more 
than the other two, tells the reader what reality in God is ontologically responsible for all 
of the theophanies of the Old and New Testaments—i.e., the divine will—whereas Books 
II and IV are more about giving specific examples of theophanies from Scripture. Since 
my dissertation as a whole is more concerned with proving that Augustine believed 
God’s reality included more than just an abstract and undifferentiated essence, and how 
this helps to solve the problem of predestination, my approach to considering these three 
central Books in On the Trinity, which will attempt to emphasize this other reality distinct 
from the divine essence, should make good philosophical and theological sense.  
 Augustine mentions the divine will as a distinct reality in God early in Book III, 
noting that it and it alone is the cause of everything in creation, ordering every created 
thing for the good: “The power of God’s will, after all, extended to producing through 
created spiritual agents sensible and perceptible effects in the material creation. Is there 
indeed any place where the Wisdom of almighty God does not achieve what she will, 
Wisdom who deploys her strength from one end of the universe to the other, ordering all 
things for the good (Wis 8:1).”595 Even more explicit in its emphasis on the divine will 
having a proper role to play in God is the following text from On the Trinity 3.1.9:  
From that lofty throne, set apart in holiness, the divine will spreads itself through 
all things in marvelous patterns of created movement, first spiritual then 
corporeal; and it uses all things to carry out the unchanging judgement of the 
divine decree, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal things, whether they be 
non-rational or rational spirits, whether they be good by his grace, or bad by their 
own will.... And so the whole of creation is governed by its creator, from whom 
and by whom and in whom (Rom 11: 36) it was founded and established. And 
thus God’s will is the first and highest cause of all physical species and motions. 
For nothing happens visibly and in a manner perceptible to the senses which does 
not issue either as a command or as a permission from the inmost invisible and 
intelligible court of the supreme emperor, according to his unfathomable justice of 
                                                          
595 trin.3.1.6  
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rewards and punishments, favors and retributions, in what we may call this vast 
and all-embracing republic of the whole creation.596 
 
The first point Augustine makes is that the divine will is immanent in creation, because it 
is responsible for the creating, sustaining, and re-creating of all spiritual and corporeal 
things according to God’s salvific purposes, or what Augustine calls here the 
“unchanging judgment of the divine decree.” The second point he makes is that the whole 
of creation is governed by its “Creator,” or God as related to the creation, namely the 
divine will, which is the first cause of all visible things and movements in the creation. 
As Augustine will say later, the first and supreme cause of all things created, “like the 
rising and setting of heavenly bodies, the births and deaths of animals, the countless 
variety of seeds and growths, clouds and fogs, snow and rain, thunder and lightning, 
thunderbolts and hail, wind and fire, cold and heat, and so forth” ... and rarer things that 
happen in nature, “such as eclipses and comets, monstrous births, earthquakes and the 
like” is the “will of God.”597 One should also note how careful Augustine is to say that 
we live and move and have our being in our “Creator.” However, the “supreme emperor,” 
who is God himself, sitting in his lofty throne, separated from us in holiness, remains 
utterly transcendent of what he has created, imparticipable and unknowable.  
 Augustine makes a distinction between God in Himself and God in His creative 
function, or between God’s essence and will, respectively, because of the theological 
need to preserve both the integrity of the divine reality ad intra and ad extra—the former 
being expressed essentially in the intra-trinitarian divine processions, the latter being 
expressed willfully and knowingly in the creation and the divine missions. To give a false 
                                                          
596 CCSL 50.135-6. 
597 trin.3.3.19.  
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dilemma to the effect of “either God reveals Himself exactly as He is in Godself, or He 
reveals nothing of Himself,” as we saw Barth and Rahner argue, is not something 
Augustine is logically willing to accept. Rather, Augustine understands the will of God to 
be “God,” albeit God as He makes Himself available to us and, indeed, to the entirety of 
spiritual and corporeal creation. Augustine will repeat the same basic point in different 
ways and many more times in Books II and IV as he continues to elaborate his theology 
of mission. 
 In Book II, for example, when he is discussing the theophanies of the Old 
Testament, Augustine will give a preliminary definition of what it means for something 
to count as a divine mission, which he phrases in terms of the distinction between what is 
visible and what is invisible: 
Since then it was a work of the Father and the Son that the Son should appear in 
the flesh, the one who so appeared in the flesh is appropriately said to have been 
sent, and the one who did not to have done the sending. Thus events which are put 
on outwardly in the sight of our bodily eyes are aptly called missa because they 
stem from the inner designs of our spiritual nature. Furthermore, that form of the 
man who was taken on is the person or guise of the Son only, and not of the 
Father too. So it is that the invisible Father, together with the jointly invisible Son, 
is said to have sent this Son by making him visible. If the Son has been made 
visible in such a way that he ceased to be invisible with the Father, that is if the 
substance of the invisible Word, undergoing change and transition, had been 
turned into the visible creature, then we would have had to think of the Son 
simply as sent by the Father, and not also as sending with the Father. As it is, the 
form of servant was so taken on that the form of God remained immutable, and 
thus it is plain that what was seen in the Son was the work of Father and Son who 
remain unseen; that is that the Son was sent to be visible by the invisible Father 
together with the invisible Son.598  
 
Using the Incarnation as a case in point, Augustine tentatively defines a divine mission as 
an event which is put on outwardly, capable of being seen by our bodily eyes, yet 
                                                          
598 trin.2.2.9. 
240 
 
 
 
ultimately having its efficacy on the hidden, spiritual part of our human nature.599 When 
it comes to the Incarnation, we can properly say that the coming of Christ was one of the 
missions of the second person of the Trinity, both because of His material visibility in the 
form of man and because of the internal spiritual help granted to us because of that 
mission, namely the potential to have a right relation to God, to be adopted sons and 
daughters of the Most High. Augustine is careful to say, however, that it is the invisible 
Father and the invisible Son who sent the second person of the Trinity by making Him 
visible in the humanity of Christ. The maintaining of the invisibility of the Son is 
important, for if it was not, and if the Son’s invisible substance as God was somehow 
changed into that of a visible creature, He would no longer be a joint sender of Himself 
with the Father. Rather, He would simply be sent, transformed from God into a creature, 
thereby ceasing to possess the power to redeem the whole of fallen humanity through the 
spiritual renewal we required.600 Thankfully, Augustine tells us, this is not the case: the 
Son was visibly sent in such a way that His invisible substance as God remained 
unchanged. 
 Augustine believes that the same kind of visible/invisible distinction can be made 
with respect to the sending of the Holy Spirit: 
He was visibly displayed in a created guise which was made in time, either when 
he descended on our Lord himself in bodily guise as a dove (Mt 3:16), or when 
ten days after his ascension there came suddenly from heaven on the day of 
Pentacost a sound as of a violent gust bearing down, and there appeared to them 
divided tongues as of fire, which also settled upon each one of them (Acts 2:2). 
This action, visibly expressed and presented to mortal eyes, is called the sending 
of the Holy Spirit. Its object was not that his very substance might be seen, since 
he himself remains invisible and unchanging like the Father and the Son; but that 
                                                          
599 I say “tentatively” because it is only in Book IV that Augustine will give his definitive definition of 
a divine mission. 
600 See 2 Corinthians 4:16: Therefore we do not lose heart. Though outwardly we are wasting away, 
yet inwardly we are being renewed [by God] day by day. 
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outward sights might in this way stir the minds of men, and draw them on from 
the public manifestations of his coming in time to the still and hidden presence of 
his eternity sublime.601  
 
And a bit later on: 
 
The Spirit did not make the dove blessed, or the violent gust, or the fire; he did 
not join them to himself and his person to be held in everlasting union. Nor on the 
other hand is the Spirit of a mutable and changing nature, so that instead of these 
manifestations being wrought out of created things, he should turn or change 
himself into this and that, as water turns to ice. But these phenomena appeared, as 
and when they were required to, creation serving the creator (Wis 16:24), and 
being changed and transmuted at the bidding of him who abides unchanging in 
himself.602  
 
Augustine will actually speak of the Spirit’s proprium, or that which he distinctively is, in 
the economy of salvation, as the will of God in his De Genesi adversus Manicheos 1.5.8 
and 1.7.12.603 Moreover, in his Gn. Litt. 1.5.11, Augustine refers to the Spirit as the love 
and benevolence of God, and then strongly implies that these are to be conceived as the 
good will of God: “Certainly the Spirit of God was stirring above this creation. For all 
that He had begun and had yet to form and perfect lay subject to the good will of the 
Creator, so that, when God would say in His Word, Let there be light, the creature would 
be established, according to its capacity, in the good will and benevolence of God.”604  
So far, we have seen Augustine make similar comments about the sendings of the 
Son and Spirit, and how both persons can be properly understood as visible and invisible 
to what is created. We might now well ask: What about the Father? According to 
Augustine, the Father cannot properly be said to be sent, but that does not prevent Him 
                                                          
601 trin.2.2.10. 
602 Ibid. 
603 The same equation is made at Gn. Litt. Imp. 16-18. 
604 The Latin for this passage is as follows: superferebatur utique spiritus dei, quia subiacebat scilicet 
bonae uoluntati creatoris quidquid illud erat quod formandum perficiendumque inchoauerat, ut dicente deo 
in uerbo suo: fiat lux, in bona uoluntate, hoc est bono placito eius pro modo sui generis maneret, quod 
factum est. CSEL 28.10. Augustine will make similar comments about the Spirit’s economic function at 
Gn. Litt. 1.7.13 and 2.6.14.  
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from appearing to His creation when the times and circumstances require: “why should 
we not take it to be the Father who appeared to Abraham and Moses, and indeed to 
anyone he liked in any way he liked, by means of some changeable and visible creature 
under his control, while in himself and in his own changeless substance he remained 
invisible?”605 We are made aware of the Father’s presence to His creation many times in 
scripture. For example, during the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt, scripture tells 
us: But God went before them by day in a pillar of cloud and showed them the way, and 
by night in a pillar of fire; and the pillar of cloud did not fail by day, nor the pillar of fire 
by night before the people (Ex 13:21). Augustine thinks it would be nonsensical for 
anyone to believe that these manifestations of God the Father to the Jews revealed His 
very substance. Rather, he thinks they were actuated when needed by material creation 
serving the Creator.606 Scripture also speaks of the Father visibly manifesting His person 
to creation in other noticeable ways:  
Sinai mountain was smoking all over, because God had come down upon it in fire, 
and smoke was rising from it like the smoke from a furnace, and the whole people 
was utterly bewildered; and there were trumpet blasts going on very loudly. 
Moses would speak, and God would answer him with a voice (Ex 19:18). And a 
little further on, after the law had been given in the Ten Commandments, it says, 
And all the people could see the voices and the flares and the trumpet blasts and 
the mountain smoking (Ex 20:18). And a little further on still, The whole people 
was standing far off, but Moses went into the mist where God was; and the Lord 
said to Moses etc. (Ex 20:21). What is there to be said here, except that surely no 
one is crazy enough to say that smoke, fire, clouds, mist and so forth are the very 
substance of the Word and Wisdom of God which is Christ, or of the Holy Spirit? 
As for God the Father, not even the Arians ever dared to say such a thing. So all 
these occurrences consisted of created things serving the creator and impressing 
themselves on the senses of men as the divine arrangements required.607 
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Here, as before with the Son and the Holy Spirit, Augustine argues that a real distinction 
must be made with respect to the Father’s invisible and unchanging substance and how 
He visibly chooses to manifest Himself to what is other than Himself, i.e., spiritual and 
corporeal creation. The alternative which holds that the substance of God the Father or 
God the Son or God the Holy Spirit is beholden to economic or cosmological motifs is to 
Augustine a clear instance of theological stupidity, one avoided even by the Arians, at 
least with respect to the Father. How Augustine philosophically argues for this distinction 
in Book II to avoid this theological pitfall has been somewhat implicit in one important 
respect, namely in terms of its not specifically mentioning the role of the divine will in 
the effecting of the theophanies touched upon above. With this said, the Incarnation of 
the Son, the dove, gust of wind, and tongues of fire of the Holy Spirit, and the smoke, 
voice, fire, and mist of the Father are explicitly revealed to be expressions of the divine 
will in Book III, as I have previously noted.  
 My goal in examining these primary texts from On the Trinity concerning the 
revelation of the Son, Spirit, and Father to humankind has been to prove that Augustine 
holds the theophanies in the Old and New Testaments to truly reveal God, not as He is as 
idipsum esse, but as He is for us. I submit that Augustine understands the theophanies as 
revealing God’s will and knowledge (rationes), which will become further evident in our 
examination below of two of his Sermons that have to do with the Transfiguration. As I 
have said earlier in this dissertation (chapter 4), these rationes are eternal and 
unchanging. They are truly said to be with God as Creator. They are life for their 
corresponding creatures in the Word. They are not to be identified with creatures. The 
Greek-East also holds that the theophanies are not just created effects, or products of the 
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divine will and knowledge. They are the volitional-thought (theletiken-ennoian) of 
God.608  
 There is great reluctance, however, to accept this Eastern-friendly interpretation 
of Augustine I am suggesting when it comes to the theophanies. In his article, 
“Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An Eastern Orthodox 
Perspective,” Bogdan G. Bucur will limit his consideration of theophanies in Augustine 
to a study of passages from the De Trinitate, especially Books I-IV, much as I have done 
up to this point. Bucur begins by distinguishing three kinds of theophanies (trin.3.10.19): 
1. Those involving angels in performing their divine function as messengers.  
2. Those involving angels bringing about a change in pre-existing matter to fulfill a 
divine purpose.  
3. Those involving a material representation made for a specific occasion, with such 
a representation passing away after it has fulfilled its divine purpose.  
Bucur states that Augustine believes that the messages of 1) were those of a “real, created 
angelic being,”609 but that God still remains the ultimate source of such a theophanic 
experience: “The power of the will of God reaches through the spiritual creature, even to 
the visible and sensible effects.”610 Bucur then immediately denies that God’s will is 
really present in such a theophanic experience, because of the fact that God’s will is only 
present insofar as the angel speaks ex persona Dei.611 That is, the effect of this angelic 
speaking has only so much of God’s will in it as the angel is speaking out of the person of 
                                                          
608 For a discussion of the term theletiken-ennoian, see page 100 of this dissertation.  
609 Bogdan G. Bucur. “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An Eastern 
Orthodox Perspective,” SVThQ 52:1 (2008), 67-93. P. 70. 
610 trin. 3.1.6. 
611 trin.3.10.20. 
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God. Theophanies of the second variety consist of matter being changed, re-ordered, 
and/or formed by an angel. In this case it is not the angel but the matter that is used by 
God to accomplish some salvific function.612 In doing so, Bucur thinks this matter will 
“come to signify something about God and God’s will.”613 Once again, however, the 
implication is that such a theophany cannot put us in touch with the reality of God. For 
this matter is created and thus can only signify, but not actually connect us to, the 
uncreated divine reality. The final kind of theophany consists of God bringing bodies out 
of nothing in order to accomplish certain salvific ends, such as we find in Lk 3:22; Acts 
2:3; Ex 3:2; Ex 13:21; Ex 19:16; etc. For Bucur, Augustine viewed these bodies as being 
“brought into existence by the will of God,”614 citing trin.3.4.9: “the will of God is the 
first and highest cause of all the forms and movements of corporeal beings.”  
  After describing these three kinds of theophanies as nothing more than created 
representations of God, Bucur will note the polemical backdrop against which Augustine 
formulated his own views on the theophanies in De Trinitate. More specifically, the 4th C. 
Trinitarian controversies between the Modalists, Homoians, and supporters of the faith of 
Nicaea.615 The latter group attempted to fight back against the Homoian idea that the Son 
is inherently visible, and thus changeable, meaning He is less God than the inherently 
invisible Father. Pro-Nicenes before Augustine would respond by making a distinction 
between the invisible nature of the Son, which does not come down to us, and His visibly 
manifesting Himself in the “species” produced by the divine will.616 According to Bucur, 
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613 Bucur, 71. 
614 Bucur, 71. 
615 Bucur, 74. 
616 Bucur, 75. 
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this is a distinction that carries over into Augustine’s own theological treatment of 
theophanies in Books I-IV of De Trinitate, but he attempts to reconcile the existence of 
the visible and invisible in a new way from that of his pro-Nicene predecessors, i.e., “by 
severing the ontological link between the two, so that the species is no longer ‘owned’ by 
the subject of the natura.”617 Bucur thinks this is especially evident of theophanies in 
which an angel speaks for God. The angel is created and God speaks His words through 
it, thereby making His will known. There is therefore no presence of God Himself in such 
an angelic theophany. Rather, there is only “God’s ‘impersonation’ by an angel.”618 I 
would agree with Bucur that the visible “stuff” of a theophany (i.e., the ‘species’) is not 
part or parcel of God the Son or God the Father’s invisible natura. Their invisible and 
shared nature, for Eastern or Western theology at the time of Augustine, does not “own” 
the species.  
Whether ‘impersonated’ by an angel, or signified by ‘pre-existing’ or ‘created out 
of nothing’ matter, God’s substance does not appear, but this does not prevent His will 
and knowledge from being made known, and clearly, in these Old and New Testament 
theophanies. These theophanies are not owned by His natura, but they are by His will 
and knowledge. I would argue that, if anything, this helps to reinforce the idea that 
Augustine held to a strict distinction between God’s substance (that does not appear to 
creation) and God’s will and knowledge (that are made known at key times throughout 
salvation history).  
                                                          
617 Bucur, 76. 
618 Bucur, 77. 
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Bucur continues that Augustine’s theology of theophanies “also marks a break 
with the transformative character of theophanies,”619 of which the Lord’s Baptism and the 
Taboric Light of the Transfiguration deserve special note. According to the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, these are events in salvation history where the divine presence of God 
is made known to humans, not through some created intermediary, but directly through 
the uncreated energies.620 It follows that these theophanies engender real changes of 
salvific importance in those who experience them. A representative example of the 
Eastern doctrine of the transformative character of theophanies can be found in 
Dionysius’ Divine Names 1.4, where it is written:  
“Then [in the next life] ... when we have attained a Christform lot ... we shall 
“always be with the Lord” (I Thess.4: 13). In altogether pure contemplations, we 
shall be filled with His visible theophany, which shall shine round about us in 
most brilliant splendors, as were the disciples in that most divine 
Transfiguration.”621  
 
This text from Dionysius’ Divine Names is clear that what the disciples experienced 
during the Transfiguration was the uncreated light of Christ’s divinity, His visible 
theophany, and that those who have attained a Christform lot will also experience this in 
the next life. According to Fr. John D. Jones, in any theophany the “divine hiddenness 
                                                          
619 Bucur, 80. 
620 In this way the Greek Christian tradition continues the OT rabbinical idea that the Shekinah of 
God, i.e., “the majestic presence or manifestation of God which has descended to “dwell” among men,” is 
the divine presence itself. Rabbis used the word Shekinah to avoid the common, but in their mind 
inappropriate, anthropomorphizing connotations inherent in the word God, who is above every human 
name and expression. Some such as Maimonides interpret the Shekinah of God to be a created light which 
is an intermediary between God and man, but this is a minority position. The Biblical passages from which 
the word Shekinah is derived, such as Ex. 24:16 (the glory of the Lord abode upon Mount Sinai), are 
typically taken to indicate the dynamic and real presence of the divine. The Shekinah does not dwell among 
all men, but rather only those Israelites who were of “pure and therefore aristocratic lineage and who were 
wise, brave, wealthy, and tall.” A pure heart manifested in good deeds (e.g., studying the Law, prayer, 
hospitality) makes one worthy of the Shekinah, whereas sin (e.g., idolatry, lechery, the shedding of blood) 
causes it to depart. See Kaufmann Kohler and Ludwig Blau, “SHEKINA (lit. “the dwelling”),” from the 
unedited full text of the 1906 Jewish Encyclopedia.  
621 DN 1.4, 592 B-C.  
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(kpuphioths)” is not revealed—nothing created, angel or man, can experience this ‘we 
know not what.’ What can be experienced, however, is a divine name, power, or energy 
of the divine. These realities bring us back to God and make us like Him, to the extent 
possible, “according to a divine image/icon and similitude/likeness (kata thein eikona kai 
homoiwsin).”622 The actual meaning of the term ‘theophany,’ Dionysius tells us, dovetails 
with this role that the divine names, power, or energies play in perfecting us: It refers to 
“that vision, which manifesting the divine similitude depicted in it as giving form to 
unformed realities, raises up those who have such visions to what is divine.”  
A theophany therefore grants us access to “divine things themselves” (twn theiwn 
autwn),623 through which we become deified. St. Gregory Palamas will insist that this text 
from the DN illustrates that there must a continuity between what the disciples 
experienced in this life during the Transfiguration and what the blessed will enjoy in the 
next. He will claim that “we can never experience or see God through the natural powers 
of our intellectual or perceptive capacities.”624 Nor can we experience or see God through 
the mediation of any created entity.625 As a result, if we are truly said to experience the 
uncreated and divine presence, our sensory and intellectual faculties must be transformed 
by God’s grace; they must be enhanced beyond their natural capacities. We must receive 
eyes we “did not possess before,”626 or as he will say elsewhere, “eyes transformed by the 
power of the Holy Spirit.”627 Palamas will speak of this transformation/enhancement 
                                                          
622 Fr. John D. Jones. “Filled with the Visible Theophany of the Lord: Reading Dionysius East and 
West.” Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, Vol. 53 (2012) Nos. 1-2, pp. 13-41. Pp. 18-19.  
623 CH 4.3, 180C. 
624 Triads, I.3.35.39. 
625 Triads, III.1.11; III.2.18-19. See also Jones 27. 
626 Triads III.3.22. 
627 Sermon on the Transfiguration I, quoted from Jones 29.  
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occurring not only in the next life,628 but also in certain rare theophanic experiences such 
as the Transfiguration, Paul’s rapture in the ‘third heaven,’ and the protomartyr Stephen 
seeing the heavens open just before he died.629  
Unlike Bucur, Jones does not pass judgment on whether or not Augustine has a 
transformative theology of theophanies.630 But we must ask: Is Bucur’s interpretation of 
Augustine in this respect an accurate one? Two quick points must be made before I offer 
my answer to this question. First, regardless of the transformative power (or lack thereof) 
of theophanies, both my comments and Bucur’s on trin.I-IV have shown that there must 
be a distinction without division between the nature and will in God. Bucur himself will 
say the theophanies are created effects of the divine will, not the divine natura. Second, 
when it particularly comes to the theophany atop Mount Tabor, the Transfiguration, 
Bucur does not cite any primary texts from Augustine’s corpus to draw the conclusion 
that this event does not provide human beings with the chance for a real encounter with 
the uncreated will and knowledge of God. Rather, he will rely on the authority of Michel 
Barnes. Using the words of Barnes, Bucur concludes that for Augustine “what appeared 
in events such as the theophany atop Mt Tabor was created matter being used as an 
instrument of communication by the Trinity,” and that “while an encounter with such an 
instrument ... was an occasion for faith in God,”631 that is all this event could provide. 
Bucur then writes that “it could not, obviously, have any transformative power.”632  
                                                          
628 See for example, Triads I.3.37, where he quotes Maximus in this connection. 
629 Jones, 30.  
630 Jones will show that St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas do not allow for the Transfiguration to 
reveal the uncreated divinity of the Son, because of their rather peculiar epistemological stances, which bar 
us from seeing anything more than the humanity of Christ in this life. See Jones pp. 19-25 
631 Both of these quotations come from Barnes, Michel René. “The Visible Christ and the Invisible 
Trinity: Mt 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400.” Modern Theology 19:3. P. 349. 
632 Bucur, 81.  
250 
 
 
 
 I would argue that the interpretation that Bucur and Barnes give of Augustine on 
theophanic experience at the very least fails to recognize primary texts that could be used 
to support a more “Eastern” reading of his theology in this regard. As two representative 
examples, I will discuss Sermons XXVIII and XXIX, both of which are sermons 
Augustine gave on the Transfiguration. In Sermon XVIII, Augustine says that Christ 
shone like the sun. He was “the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the 
world.”633 Seeing this glorious light, Peter suggested that they all stay on top of Mt 
Tabor, free from the trials and tribulations of the world. Peter then offered to set up three 
tents—one for Jesus, one for Moses, and one for Elijah. Suddenly, a bright cloud 
appeared, overshadowing them. From it, a voice spoke, telling Peter that while he saw 
three persons, there was really One: The Word, Christ, the Word of God present in the 
Law, and the Word of God present in the Prophets. The voice also said that “This is my 
beloved Son.” Augustine is careful to point out, then, that the voice did not say these are 
my beloved sons, including Moses and Elijah, but only Christ. For Augustine, in the 
Transfiguration, what the apostles experienced in their earthly bodies was Christ himself, 
the only begotten Son of God the Father: “Here is the Lord, here the Law and the 
Prophets; but the Lord as Lord; the Law in Moses, Prophecy in Elijah; only they as 
servants and as ministers. They as vessels; He as the fountain: Moses and the Prophets 
spoke, and wrote; but when they poured out, they were filled from him.”634 What they 
experienced was Christ as Lord, the source of all creation, the Word of God the Father. 
They saw Christ in his divine, uncreated glory: “And in this glory is fulfilled what He 
hath promised to them that love him, He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and 
                                                          
633 Sermon 28.2. 
634 Sermon 28.4. 
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I will love him (John 14:21). And as if it were said, What will you give him, seeing you 
will love him? And I will manifest Myself unto him. Great gift! Great promise! God does 
not reserve for you as a reward any thing of his own, but Himself.”635 I do not think any 
passage in the entire Sermon is more forceful in showing Augustine’s commitment to the 
belief that Christ Himself is visibly manifest to all those who love him. Christ does not 
reveal himself through some symbol of divinity or created intermediary, but rather, 
Augustine tells us, he reveals himself in his true divinity. Sermon XXIX echoes what has 
already been said, and makes clear that Christ visibly appeared to the apostles “in his own 
Person.”636 It is worth noting that at no point in this Sermon does Augustine feel the need 
to refer to some created intermediary or visible symbol to play the role of middle-man, so 
to speak, between the disciples and Christ. 
 I should mention that similar views on the real presence of Christ as Lord in the 
Transfiguration are expressed by Augustine in De Genesi ad Litteram and his 
Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.637 Whatever interpretation of these texts one 
prefers, there is no denying that Augustine held that the divine nature, by itself, simply 
could not account for, either theologically or ontologically, the divine missions as he has 
                                                          
635 Sermon 28.5. 
636 Sermon 29.1. 
637 For example, at DGnL.12.26.54, Augustine says that the apostles had an intellectual vision of God 
himself, in which they were taken up from any kind of material symbolization of the divine and were 
carried away to a region “of intellectual or intelligible realities where the clear truth [was] seen without any 
likeness of the body, where it is not obscured by any clouds of false opinions.” Moreover, Fr. Roland Teske 
will comment that “the apostles also attained such a vision of God. In his commentary on the Sermon on 
the Mount, Augustine explains each of the Beatitudes, including, “Blessed are the pure of heart, for they 
shall see God.” Augustine says that the pure of heart will be given the ability to see God, like a clear eye to 
perceive eternal realities. But then he adds, “These things can be fully attained even in this life, as we 
believe the apostles fully attained them.” Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, I, iv, 12, cited in 
Teske, “St. Augustine and the Vision of God,” 153. 
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defined them. We have already examined his tentative definition of them in Book II, but 
he gives their definitive definition in Book IV: 
So the Word of God is sent by him whose Word he is; sent by him he is born of. 
The begetter sends, what is begotten sent. And he is precisely sent to anyone 
when he is known and perceived by him, as far as he can be perceived and known 
according to the capacity of a rational soul either making progress toward God or 
already made perfect in God. So the Son of God is not said to be sent in the very 
fact that he is born of the Father, but either in the fact that the Word made flesh 
showed himself to this world; about this fact he says, I went forth from the Father 
and came into this world (Jn 16:28). Or else he is sent in the fact that he is 
perceived in time by someone’s mind, as it says, Send her to be with me and labor 
with me (Wis 9:10). That he is born means that he is from eternity to eternity—he 
is the brightness of eternal light (Wis 7:26). But that he is sent means that he is 
known by somebody in time.638  
 
While Augustine singles out the Word of God to define what constitutes the essence of 
His mission, His “being sent,” what Augustine says applies to any of the divine missa. 
One of the divine persons can be said to be sent when and only when that person is 
“known and perceived by [someone], as far as He can be perceived and known according 
to the capacity of a rational soul either making progress toward God or already made 
perfect in God.” Augustine’s definition thus makes it clear that a divine mission only 
                                                          
638 trin.4.5.28. Of course, a key question with respect to Augustine’s definitive definition of a divine 
mission is: what, exactly, does Augustine mean in saying that to be sent is to be ‘known by somebody in 
time?’ Does  this ‘knowing’ consist solely of a mental operation which can be accomplished through one’s 
own cognitive powers, or does it consist in the animation and transformation of such mental operation 
through the power/grace/love of the Holy Spirit? Augustine will clearly opt for the latter. In his 
Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, for example, Augustine will speak of how we are said to “see” 
God. He interprets the Beatitude, Blessed are the pure of heart for they shall see God, as identical to the 
operation of the Holy Spirit working through and with those who are pure of heart. Speaking of all of the 
Beatitudes, Augustine writes: “It seems to me, therefore, that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirt, of 
which Isaias speaks (Is 11:2), coincides with these [sc. Beatitudes]” (I.4.11). Specifically, he will go on to 
say of this Beatitude that it coincides with the Holy Spirit’s gift of understanding (Ibid). This gift of 
understanding, given by the Holy Spirit, allows the pure of heart to “see” eternal realities. It grants man the 
power to “see” God (I.4.12). A little later on, Augustine will claim that this gift of mental sight just is the 
love of God “diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Rom 5:3-5) (I.5.13). For 
similar comments by Augustine on this Beatitude, see Sermon 53 on Matt. 3:5-8. When therefore 
Augustine speaks of some persons as ‘knowing’ God the Son, whether in his allusions to the Book of 
Wisdom or in his Sermons on the Transfiguration, I would argue that he believes this to consist in the co-
operation of time-bound man willing or desiring to know God and the Holy Spirit granting this mental sight 
through His power/grace/love.  
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qualifies as such if it has a concrete and real effect on the believer, meaning that a divine 
mission is inherently relational to what is other than God (ad extra). After all, God has no 
need of the divine missions. Their existence is only required because there is creation, 
and because that creation is in need of its proper perfection or in need of maintaining its 
proper perfection in God. Augustine concludes that when the Son is said to be sent, this 
cannot be understood in terms of His being begotten by the Father, which is a relation 
that in itself has nothing to do with creation. Rather, His being sent can be understood in 
two ways: either in terms of His appearing to the world in the form of man in the 
Incarnation, or in terms of His being known and perceived by someone in time. Focusing 
on the latter understanding of mission more so than the former, Augustine then writes 
about the Son and the Holy Spirit: “As being born [sc. generated] means for the Son 
being from the Father, so being sent means for the Son being known to be from the 
Father. And as being the gift of God means for the Holy Spirit proceeding from the 
Father, so being sent means for the Holy Spirit his being known to proceed from the 
Father.”639 Here again Augustine does not let us forget that the Son and the Spirit can 
only be said to be properly sent if mention is made of who or what they are being sent to, 
i.e., spiritual and corporeal creation.  
 Augustine will also reiterate in Book IV that none of the missions of the divine 
persons constitute or reveal the divine essence. To use Bucur’s turn of phrase, they are 
not ‘owned’ by the natura: “If you go on to ask me how the incarnation itself was done, I 
say that the very Word of God was made flesh, that is, was made man, without however 
being turned or changed into that which he was made; that he was of course so made that 
                                                          
639 trin.4.5.29. 
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you would have there not only the Word of God and the flesh of man but also the rational 
soul of man as well; and that this whole can be called God because it is God and man 
because it is man.” And speaking about the Father and the Holy Spirit, Augustine thinks 
“surely no one wishes to say that whatever creature it is that produced the Father’s voice 
is the Father, or that whatever creature it is that manifested the Holy Spirit in the form of 
a dove or in fiery tongues is the Holy Spirit.”640 Whether Augustine views these or the 
other missa of Father, Son, and Spirit as transformative of those who experienced them 
may still be an open question to Eastern and Western theologians alike, or at least one 
that needs further examination before a definite decree is made. Or perhaps in the minds 
of others it is an open and shut case. Either way, East or West, we can agree with 
Augustine that the divine missa are not expressions of the essential Life of the Trinity, 
but rather expressions of the uncreated divine will and knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
640 trin.4.5.31. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion: Our Liberty in the ‘totus Christus’ 
 
In previous chapters, we have seen Augustine use an essence-will distinction in 
God to distinguish between the eternity of the divine essence and the eternity of the 
divine ideas (chapter 4), between the generation of the Son/spiration of the Spirit and the 
act of creation, and between the internal processions and the divine missa, the latter of 
which include the theophanies (chapter 8). Evidence of this distinction in the works of 
Augustine notwithstanding, scholars still have reservations when it comes to the 
theology-philosophy of Augustine. Some still consider Augustine as leaning more 
towards holding the divine essence as providing the unity to the Trinity than the three 
divine persons themselves (chapter 5), even though I have shown reason to doubt this 
over-simplification of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology (chapter 6). The Cappadocian 
tradition, by contrast, emphasizes the unity of the Trinity as coming from the Persons, 
and especially the Person of the Father (chapter 7). Regardless of these and other 
differences, the Western-Augustinian and Eastern-Patristic traditions held that there must 
be real distinctions in God to account for how God necessarily exists for Himself (ad 
intra) and how He freely exists for creation (ad extra).  
In this concluding chapter, I will examine the latter way God exists in terms of the 
Incarnation of the Word and Its extension or prolongation in the Church, understood by 
Augustine as the ‘totus Christus’ or ‘whole Christ.’ I will do this because Augustine 
believes the Incarnation represents the most radical act of God to freely exist for His 
creation, especially for human creation, to effect its redemption and to ensure its liberty 
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(libertas) from the thralldom of sin. Indeed, nowhere else do we see the Augustinian 
distinction between God’s essence and God’s will applied with greater theological need 
than with respect to the doctrine of election by grace as it pertains to Christ, Who is the 
only natural Son of God essentially, but Who willingly emptied Himself, taking the form 
of a slave (Phil 2:6-8).  
I have already alluded to the importance of properly understanding the human 
person and its liberty in the context of self-sacrificial service to God (chapters 2 and 3). 
But in this chapter, I delve into the deeper relational meaning of Augustine’s notion of 
human liberty as total obedience to the providential will of God, exemplified in the 
highest way by Christ, the Mediator between God and man, the Head of the Church. 
More specifically, I make good on my promise in chapter 1 to find the solution to the 
problem of predestination in Augustinian thought, or the problem of divine election in the 
Letters of St. Paul, in the person of Christ. I will accomplish this through the exegesis of 
key earlier and later texts in the Augustinian corpus that illustrate his Christocentic 
anthropology. Given the Augustinian distinction between God’s essence and God’s will, 
we are now able to fully appreciate how genuine human freedom, or liberty, is not the 
freedom to choose this or that, nor is it the freedom to sin. Rather, our liberty is to will as 
Christ wills, i.e., to always and unfailingly obey the will of the Father. The theological 
strategy that Augustine employs in the texts I will examine to argue for his idea of human 
liberty is rooted in Scripture (especially the Letters of St. Paul), but he will pair this with 
appropriate philosophical explanations of the inherent relationality of human beings to 
God’s will and knowledge (rationes) and one’s neighbor in the ecclesial Body of Christ. 
Much of this dissertation was an attempt to prove via textual analysis and argument that 
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Augustine has an essence-will distinction akin to the one we find in the Greek-East. We 
are finally able to see the philosophical “pay off,” as it were, of this in specific texts from 
Augustine that concern what constiutues a free human response to the will of God: 
Christian liberty pertains to the non-essential (ad extra) ‘reality’ of God, i.e., His will or 
energy. In addition, we are able to see this unencumbered from philosophical-theological 
objections which would attribute to Augustine an essentialist model of God,641 or a 
separation between the temporal human will and eternal divine will,642 any one of which 
(if true) would make such an examination a complete non-starter.         
While we have seen that most scholars, following in the learned footsteps of 
Cicero, consider Augustinian “liberty” as negating the possibility of human responsibility 
in the realm of moral-political action, I will now be able to argue that this is a result of 
their misunderstanding Augustine’s fundamentally Christocentric anthropology and its 
emphasis on the real relation between the human will of Christ and His members to the 
divine will. Christian liberty lives and moves and has its being in the Church. It is a 
liberty that belongs to man “not merely as man, but as a member of Christ. Such a liberty 
is designed to bring about, within the deepest recesses of each member of Christ, a union 
between God and man that calls Christ to mind.”643 It is a liberty that is defined by the 
expression of God’s will in the human will, through the obedience of the latter to the 
                                                          
641 One ought to particularly recall the objection Romanides makes to Augustine on pages 17-19 in 
chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
642 We saw this with Stump, Kretzmann, Hill, Wetzel, and others throughout chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
643 The Theology of the Mystical Body, Mersch, 91. 
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former. Even in His most difficult time on earth, this is something Christ the man did to 
effect the redemption of all: yet not my will, but yours be done (Luke 22:42).644 
Over the course of this dissertation, I have shown that Augustine was not 
oblivious to the difficulties attendant on the notion of Christian liberty. These difficulties 
arise in its distinctions between God’s grace and free will: “the discussion about free will 
and God’s grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained, 
God’s grace is apparently denied; whilst when God’s grace is asserted, free will is 
supposed to be done away with.”645 Moreover, we know that Augustine will sum up the 
mystery of divine and human interaction by relying on St. Paul: there is question not of 
him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy (Rom 9:16). If, however, 
there is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, then how can we say that any 
human being contributes anything meaningful to their own salvation? These are 
variations on the same problem with which this dissertation began: the problem of divine 
election by grace found in the Letters of St. Paul and, by extension, the mature theology 
of sin and grace of Augustine. One will recall that this was the problem that caused 
Augustine to write in Book II of the Retractions: “I labored indeed on behalf of the free 
choice of the human will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point 
where the apostle is perceived to have said with the most evident truth, For who makes 
you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? Now, if you have received 
it, why do you glory as if you received it not? (1 Cor 4:7).”  
                                                          
644 The idea that Christ’s perfect liberty was a function of His perfect obedience to the will of the 
Father can be found in the synoptic Gospels, but especially in the Gospel of John: See Jn 4:19, 34; 5:30, 36; 
6:38ff.; 10:17; 14:31; 15: 10.  
645 On the Grace of Christ, 52. 
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 The answer to this problem, which we have seen Augustine hint at in his earlier 
and later works, in his preaching and teaching career, is arguably the greatest lesson we 
can learn from the entirety of Scripture: “The whole aspect and, if I may so speak, the 
entire countenance of the Holy Scriptures is seen, in a mystery very deep and salutary, to 
admonish all who carefully look upon it, that he who takes pride should take pride in the 
Lord.”(1 Cor 1:31).646 Christ is the center of all theological reflection, and indeed the 
whole of Christian teaching can be understood, to the extent that it is possible, in the 
person of Christ. 647 Augustine writes elsewhere that, “All this [sc. Scripture] proclaims 
Christ, the head that has ascended into heaven and the body that toils on earth to the end 
of time.”648 Paul for his part will sum up his entire preaching career as having been a 
witness to Christ, for I judged not myself to know anything among you but Jesus Christ, 
and Him crucified (1 Cor 2:2). I intend to conclude this dissertation on the liberty of 
human beings with the co-operation of divine grace by judging their interaction in the 
way Paul and Augustine prescribe, i.e., according to Jesus Christ, and particularly Him 
crucified. However, I am aware that to “say about the Mediator as much as would be 
worthy of Him would occupy too much space, and indeed no man could say these things 
in a befitting manner.”649 That is why I will limit my comments about the Mediator 
primarily to a discussion of His liberty consisting of His human obedience to the will of 
                                                          
646 Enchir.25.98. 
647 The importance of Christ in understanding the whole of Christian teaching is made apparent in 
Paul’s Letters. See for example, Acts 9:3; 22:4; 26:13ff; Phil 3:12; Col 3:11; Gal 3:28; Eph 1:10. Paul and 
Augustine will identify Christ as the center towards which all Christian doctrine converges, including 
Paul’s doctrine of election by grace. The famous quotation from Romans 8:29, for example, bears this out: 
For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that 
He would be the firstborn among many brethren. For more on the centrality of Christ in Paul and 
Augustine, see Emile Mersch’s The Whole Christ, pp. 80-150 and his Theology of the Mystical Body, pp. 
47-74.  
648 Contra Faustum manichaeum XXII, 94.  
649 Enchir.10.33. 
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the Father. In doing this I follow the theological strategy of the Jesuit priest and 
renowned systematic theologian Emile Mersch, who thinks that “we must focus attention 
on Christ’s humanity,” because all of the divine commands that are meant to sanctify the 
human race, that are designed to make it an “organism of grace,” if obeyed, are present in 
the “decree that willed the humanity of Christ, or rather are basically realized in the very 
way that humanity exists.”650 Since Christ contains all human perfections within Himself, 
because of His total obedience to the will of the Father, Augustine thinks it follows that 
“[t]here is no more eminent instance, I say, of predestination than the Mediator Himself. 
If any believer wishes thoroughly to understand this doctrine, let him consider Him, and 
in Him he will find himself also.”651 Augustine does not make explicit reference to the 
Gospel of John here, but he must have had it in mind: If any man will do the will of Him, 
he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether I speak of Myself (Jn 
7:17). A proper understanding of divine predestination, grace, and human liberty can only 
be found in the person of Christ. It cannot be found in abstract thought or abstruse 
theological concepts. It will escape the grasp, however learned, of those who do not wish 
to live as Christ lived, to will as Christ willed, and love as Christ loved. 
We will now examine some early and later works of Augustine in which this 
Christocentric anthropology is made known. One of the early and more “philosophical” 
works of Augustine where we find this emphasis on the importance of Christ is On the 
                                                          
650 Mersch, 202. These ‘divine commands’ or the ‘decree that willed the humanity of Christ’ are 
expressions of God’s will and knowledge. They are the divine ideas. One of the best commentators on St. 
Paul, Ferdinand Prat, S. J., will say that from baptism “special relations with each of the three divine 
Persons are derived: a relation of sonship with the Father; a relation of consecration to the Holy Spirit; a 
relation of mystical identity with Jesus Christ.” It is this last relation of mystical identity with Christ that 
“explains everything,” including the how we ought to conceive of the liberty of man as a creature of God 
(F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, II, 320).  
651 On the Gift of Perseverance, 67. 
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Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life.652 Augustine’s overall goal in writing it is to 
defend the harmony of the Old and New Testaments contra the Manichaeans, but I am 
more interested in the first Book of this work, which contains a description of how 
Christians ought to live. Especially of interest is Augustine’s idea of the true unity of 
human nature being found in the rational soul as related to God.  
Augustine will begin by discussing the question, ‘What is man?,’ from a rational 
perspective. It is clear that he views beginning with authority as superior, however, 
because “when we learn anything, authority precedes reason.”653 Why? Because our 
“fallen” minds are confounded by intellectual error due to sin and evil. Nevertheless, in 
order to appease the weakness of the Manichaeans, “who think, and speak, and act 
contrary to right order and insist that, first of all, a reason be given for everything,” he 
states that he will submit to their demands and “employ a method of discussion which [he 
considers] faulty.”654 According to this rational perspective, Augustine says man is a 
union of body and soul. Man cannot be either the body or soul by itself. “For although 
they are two things, soul and body, and neither could be called man were the other not 
present (for the body would not be man if there were no soul, nor would the soul be man 
were there no body animated by it).”655 With this said, there is a pre-eminence that we 
                                                          
652 The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Volume 56. The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of 
Life, Trans. by Donald Gallagher and Idella Gallagher. Written in 388 and revised in 390 
653 mor.2.3. 
654 mor.2.3. 
655 mor.4.6. Augustine’s basic view of man being composed of three elements, i.e., spirit, soul, and 
body, does not change over the course of his writings. Nor does his view that to these three elements must 
be added a fourth: the spirit of Christ, obedience to the Laws of God, or however one wants to put the right 
relation between man and God that Augustine takes to be necessary for the former’s perfection. See for 
example, de.fide.et.symb.10.23, where Augustine speaks of the “death” of man in terms of falling away 
from God (Eccl. 10:14) and the “life” of man in terms of serving the law of God (Rom 7:25), or obeying the 
spirit of God (1 Cor 2:14). It is important to note that Augustine will not always use the terms soul (anima) 
and spirit (spiritus) in a consistent manner. But he does generally and for the most part take “soul” to mean 
the principle of life of all rational and irrational creatures, whereas “spirit” has a dual sense: Sometimes he 
uses it according to Scripture, whereas other times he will use it according to what we might call its more 
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must acknowledge in the soul, because how we live a good life primarily pertains to the 
soul. Good morals or virtues are “acts of the soul.”656 Augustine thus identifies who we 
are as persons primarily with the soul, because that is what he takes to be the epicenter of 
our ethical action. He will make similar points about the will and mind, or, to use the 
expression of the Apostle, the inner man.657  
It should come as no surprise that Augustine thinks that we really cannot 
understand Christian life solely through an anthropocentric lens, by examining the soul 
and body unity that is man and how he is moral/virtuous. Augustine therefore quickly 
shifts from the rational perspective to one based in authority and, specifically, the 
authority of scripture. The foundation of this new perspective is that God exists and He is 
                                                          
philosophical meaning. In the first sense, spirit “represents the highest faculty of the human soul which 
raises man above the lower animals.” In the second sense, it has the Stoical meaning of the “imaginative 
power or sense-memory, common to both man and beast.” (Robert P. Russell, ftn 14, p. 325). Etienne 
Gilson has also mentioned this difference in vocabulary when it comes to the soul and spirit in Augustine in 
his seminal work, L’introduction à l’étude de S. Augustin (3rd ed., Paris 1949), pp. 56-57.  
656 mor.5.8. 
657 Augustine will interchange the terms ‘soul,’ ‘will,’ ‘mind,’ and ‘inner man’ when appropriate. See 
On the Grace of Christ 49, in which he seems to use all of these terms in an equivalent manner to discuss 
the place in man where God effects His grace. When it comes to the human will, Augustine often speaks of 
it in terms of being the “root” of good or bad action. This is in accord with Scripture, for the Lord says, a 
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit (Matt 7:18); and the 
Apostle says that greed is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10), indicating that he views love to be the root of 
all right action (On the Grace of Christ, 19). Augustine supposes that, if these two trees, one good and one 
evil, “represent two human beings, one good and one bad, what else is the good man except one with a 
good will, that is, a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one with a bad will, that is, a 
tree with a bad root? The fruits which spring from such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts, 
which proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one” (Ibid). These two different 
trees, these two different human beings, these two different wills are formed in two different ways. The 
good “tree” that bears good “fruit” is formed through the assistance of grace, “for God Himself co-operates 
(cooperatur) in the production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by the 
agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7)” (On the Grace of 
Christ, 20). By contrast, the bad “tree” that brings forth bad “fruit” is deformed by its insistence to rely on 
its own inadequate power, thereby separating itself from Him who is the source of all goodness and life. 
Augustine will just as readily speak of a person as consisting in what his mind thinks: “What a person 
thinks as a person; that, you see, is where the person properly is, in his thoughts.” (Sermon 217.2, 418). It 
should come as no surprise that this is yet another theological insight he takes from St. Paul, who would 
often make a distinction between the inner (spiritual/mental) and outer (fleshly/bodily) man, and claim that 
true personhood consists of this inner man, which, God willing, is renewed from day to day (2 Cor 4:16). 
According to Augustine, the inner man (homo interior) consists in the highest and best part of the soul, 
namely the mind (mens). See trin.12.1-4.  
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the supreme good for man. When we strive after Him, we live good lives. When we reach 
Him, we are happy. Augustine has no truck for objections such as God does not exist: 
“As for those who may deny that God exists, I cannot concern myself with arguments to 
persuade them, for I am not even sure that we ought to enter into discussion with them at 
all.”658 Moreover, the work that he is engaging in right now is meant for those who want 
to know the way of life of the Catholic Church, and so these are persons who do not deny 
God’s existence or claim that He is indifferent to how we act. Quite the contrary: these 
are persons who firmly believe that God guides the life of man through Divine 
Providence which,  
although man had fallen away from its laws and on account of his greed for 
mortal things had deservedly begotten a mortal offspring, did not altogether 
abandon him.... We shall never be able to understand how great, how admirable, 
and how worthy of God this providence is, nor finally, how true all that we are 
seeking for, that is, unless we begin with things human and familiar to us and, 
through faith in the true religion and the keeping of the commandments, proceed 
without forsaking the path that He has prepared for us by the appointment of the 
patriarchs, the bond of the law, the predictions of the prophets, the mystery of the 
Incarnation, the testimony of the apostles, the blood of the martyrs, and the 
conversion of the Gentiles...659  
 
After telling us that we must begin with all of these “things” to achieve an understanding 
of Divine Providence, Augustine focuses his attention on Christ. What does Christ say is 
the ultimate Good for us? What does He say with respect to how we attain this Good? 
The answer to both questions can be found in following the command: Thou shalt love 
the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. 
(Matt 22:37). Augustine thinks that from these words of Christ we know “what we must 
love and how much we must love.... In God is to be found all that is best for us. God is 
                                                          
658 mor.6.10.   
659 mor.7.11-12.  
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our supreme good. We must not stop at anything below Him, nor seek anything beyond, 
for the first is fraught with danger and the second does not exist.”660 When we love God, 
we are united to Him. This unity, Augustine tells us, should be conceived in a spiritual or 
mental way. “We strive after Him by loving Him; we reach Him, not by becoming 
altogether what He is, but by coming close to Him, touching Him in a wonderfully 
spiritual way, and being illuminated and pervaded utterly by His truth and holiness (At 
eum sequimur diligendo, consequimur vero, non cum hoc omnino efficimur quod est ipse, 
sed ei proximi, eumque mirifico et intelligibili modo contingentes, ejusque veritate et 
sanctitate penitus illustrati atque comprehensi). Following St. Paul, Augustine thinks that 
our unity with God through the via amoris cannot be frustrated: I am sure that neither 
death, nor life, nor angels, nor virtue, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, 
nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God, which 
is in Christ Jesus our Lord (Rom 8:38-39).661 We love God through our “soul (animum) 
and mind (mentum).” In loving God, our mind becomes “like God” (Deo similis), to the 
extent that this is possible, “when it humbly submits itself to Him for enlightenment.” 
Indeed, Augustine thinks that the mind achieves its greatest likeness to God “by the 
submission which produces likeness,” but it acquires an unlikeness to God when this 
desire “turns the mind from obedience to the laws of God, by making it desire to be its 
own master, as He is.”662 It is precisely when the human mind humbly submits to God, 
when it recognizes it is not sufficient of its own cognitive and conative resources to be its 
own master, that it enjoys liberty. Augustine will add that the “more fervently and 
                                                          
660 mor.8.13. 
661 Augustine believes we can find the same basic message in the Old Testament in the words of the 
Prophet: It is good for me to adhere to God (Ps. 72.28). 
662 mor.12.20. 
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earnestly the mind does this, the happier and more exalted it will be, and when ruled by 
God alone, will enjoy perfect liberty” (Quod quanto fecerit instantius ac studiosius, tanto 
erit beatior atque sublimior, et illo solo dominante liberrimus). Augustine mentions once 
again that this love of God, which constitutes our liberty, takes place “in Christ Jesus our 
Lord” (in Christo Jesu Domino nostro).663  
Augustine understands our liberty to take place in Him, because Christ is the 
virtue of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). Christ also called Himself the truth 
(John 14:6). To love virtue, wisdom, and truth is therefore to live the ideal Christian 
life—the life of Christ. Augustine recommends to the Christians reading De Moribus 
Ecclesiae Catholicae to love with their whole heart, whole soul, and whole mind 
the virtue which is inviolate and invincible, the wisdom which never gives way to 
folly, and the truth which is not altered but remains ever the same. It is by this that 
we come to see the Father Himself, for it has been said: No one comes to the 
Father but through me (Jn 14:6). It is to this we adhere by sanctification 
(sanctificationem) for, when sanctified (sanctificati), we are inflamed with that 
full and perfect love which prevents us from turning away from Him (qua sola 
efficitur ut a Deo non avertamur) and causes us to be conformed (conformemur) 
to Him rather than to the world. He has predestined us, as the Apostle says, to be 
conformed to the image of His Son (Rom 8:29) (Praedestinavit enim, ut ait idem 
Apostolus, conformes nos fieri imaginis Filii ejus).664  
  
Augustine will characterize this full and perfect love qua sola efficitur ut a Deo non 
avertamur, which causes us to be conformemur to Him, in terms of the four cardinal 
virtues, namely, temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence. It follows that: “temperance 
is love preserving itself whole and unblemished for God, fortitude is love enduring all 
things willingly for the sake of God, justice is love serving God alone and, therefore, 
ruling well those things subject to man, and prudence is love discriminating rightly 
                                                          
663 mor.12.21. 
664 mor.13.22. 
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between those things which aid it in reaching God and those things which might hinder 
it.”665 We might call this Augustinian virtue ethics, the entire goal of which is to attain 
the supreme Good for man, which is God.  
Augustine makes clear that this love of God includes love of oneself and 
neighbor. Indeed, it is impossible that love of God can exclude the other two. This is 
because a man only loves himself in the right way if he attains his supreme Good, and 
this is God. We must love our neighbor also, for Christ commands us to love thy neighbor 
as thyself. (Matt 22:39).666 Augustine then reasons that, if you love yourself in the right 
way when you love God more than yourself, then “what you do on your own behalf, you 
must do also for your neighbor, so that he, too, may love God with perfect love.”667 To 
love our neighbor is thus to lead him to the same Good we are pursuing. According to 
                                                          
665 mor.15.25. Throughout mor. Augustine will give more detailed descriptions of these virtues as they 
pertain to Christian life. In what follows I include a brief summary of the essential aspects of these virtues 
according to Augustine. We begin with temperance, which is meant to prevent our passions from 
overtaking us, thereby causing us to desire things other than God. Augustine will say this virtue is exercised 
by stripping off the old man and putting on the new (Col 3:9-10). That is, strip off Adam, the sinful man, 
and put on Christ, the righteous man (mor.19.35). While temperance consists in not desiring worldly things 
in an improper manner, the function of fortitude is to give them up. The hardest thing to “give up” in this 
life, or what is our “heaviest yoke” is undoubtedly the trials and tribulations that affect our bodies. As 
examples of Christian fortitude, Augustine will cite Job (Job 1:2) and the woman who gave over to the 
tyrannical executioner every one of seven sons instead of blaspheming God, and who then eventually 
underwent the same torture and death (2 Mach 7:1-42) (mor.23.42-43). The essence of justice consists in 
serving the Creator and not the creature (Rom 1:25). It consists in not only listening to but taking to heart 
the words of Christ: No man can serve two masters (Matt 6:24). Accordingly, Augustine thinks that each of 
us must “serve with gladness the Lord whom he loves ... and with respect to all other things, that he govern 
those which are subject to him and endeavor to subject the rest.” (mor.24.44). Finally, the function of 
prudence is to judge what ought to be desired and what ought to be avoided. Augustine accords prudence a 
special place of honor among the virtues already discussed, because without prudence no other temperate, 
patient, or just acts can be “accomplished.” Augustine thus understands prudence to be at work in all of the 
other virtues, insofar as its job is to “keep constant watch so that we are not led astray by the imperceptible 
working of an evil influence” (mor.24.45), which would cause us to be intemperate, impatient, or unjust. It 
is temperate, patient, just, and prudent love of God that constitutes “human perfection.” (mor.25.46). 
Elsewhere Augustine will say this human perfection is illustrated in the actions of Christ, but especially His 
Cross, in which every one of these virtues shines forth to their greatest extent capable for a human being. 
See for example, symb.3.9.  
666 Augustine will make the point elsewhere that, if we do not follow this command of Christ, if we do 
not “embrace the multitude and society of men wherein fraternal charity is operative,” then our faith will 
bear “less fruit.” (de.fide.et.symb.9.21). 
667 mor.26.49. 
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Augustine, this is what is meant by the saying of Scripture, Bear one another’s burdens, 
and in this way will you fulfill the law of Christ (Gal 6:2).668 In one of the most creative 
analogies he ever uses, Augustine will compare the bearing of one another’s burdens with 
how deer swim across a channel: 
When deer swim across a channel to an island in search of pasture they line 
themselves up in such a way that the weight of their heads carried in the antlers is 
borne by one another thus: the one behind, by extending its neck, places its head 
on the one in front. Moreover, because there must be one deer which is at the head 
of the others and thus has no one in front of itself to lay its head on, they are said 
to take the lead by turns, so that the one in front, wearied by the weight of its 
head, retires to the end of the line, and the one whose head it was supporting 
while traveling in the lead takes its place. In this way, bearing one another’s 
burdens, they traverse the channel until they come to solid ground.669  
 
In an effort to find continuity between the Old and New Testaments, Augustine will state 
that perhaps this behavior of deer is what Solomon had in mind when he said: Let the 
deer of friendship and the foal of your affections converse with you (Prov 5:19). 
Augustine thinks that the reason why we must bear the burdens of others is because of 
Christ and, specifically, the “thought of how much the Lord has endured for us.” Just as 
Christ did not deem it satisfactory to only look after Himself, but took away the burden of 
our sins, so, too, we should imitate Him in “willingly bear[ing] one another’s burdens.”670 
 Book I of On Christian Instruction (396-397)671 will similarly place Christ at the 
center of Christian morality. Near the beginning of this work, we get a discussion of the 
famous use/enjoyment (uti/frui) distinction. There are some things which should be 
                                                          
668 83 Questions, 71.1. 
669 83 Questions, 71.1.  
670 71.3. 
671 On Christian Instruction trans. by John J. Gavigan. This work has received high praise. See for 
example, what the 17th C. Benedictine editors of De Doctrina Christiana say: “a work in conformity with 
the dignity of the subject, wrought with scholarly care and surely not unworthy of a place at the front of the 
Bible alone with the Prefaces of St. Jerome.” See page 8 of The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, 
Volume 2. 
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enjoyed, some things which should be used, and others which are to be enjoyed and used. 
Speaking of the first two kinds of things, Augustine writes: “Those which are to be 
enjoyed make us happy. Those which are to be used help us as we strive for happiness.” 
The inversion of this distinction among things cannot but lead to unhappiness, for if we 
strive “to enjoy the things which we are supposed to use, we find our progress impeded 
and even now and then turned aside.”672 Augustine is here thinking of our enjoyment of 
“lesser goods,”673 which we ought to use as stepping stones to reach our highest good. 
Augustine will identify our highest good not with God as He essentially is, but with the 
three Persons, as they are accessible to us: “The proper object of our enjoyment, 
therefore, is the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Same who are the Trinity, one supreme 
Being, accessible to all who enjoy Him.”674 How, though, are we able to enjoy God the 
Trinity? Augustine answers that the mind must be cleansed. We may consider this 
cleansing to be a “sort of traveling or sailing to our own country,” because it is not a 
“moving from place to place, but by a holy desire and lofty morals.”675 No cleansing of 
the mind such as this would be possible, however, without the Incarnation of Christ, in 
which the second Person of the blessed Trinity deigned “to share even such great 
weakness as ours and show us the way to live according to human nature, since we 
ourselves are human.”676 Augustine will refer to Christ in the form of his humanity as the 
only Way (Jn 1:10) by which we can travel back to God, but also as our final destination, 
                                                          
672 I.3.3. 
673 Augustine gives variations on this general advice to Christians passim De Doctrina Christiana: We 
should not be conformed to this world by enjoying the creature instead of the Creator (I.12.12); We must 
“die to this world.” (I.20.19); the entire temporal dispensation is something that we ought to use, “but not 
with any permanent affection and pleasure” (I.35.39); etc.  
674 I.5.5. 
675 I.10.10. 
676 I.11.11. 
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insofar as He is the Word. Or as he will say: “Therefore, although He Himself is our 
native land, He made Himself also the Way to that native land.”677 Elsewhere he adds 
that this humble action on the part of Christ was free, i.e., willed by Him: “what more 
generous or more merciful thing could He do, who was willing to abase Himself for us as 
the Way by which we might return to Him.”678  
  Augustine therefore believes and understands Christ, the God-man, to constitute 
the full meaning of what Christian life should be. When it comes to the Incarnation in 
particular, Augustine notes that there is a curative symmetry between Christ as our 
medicus and medicine and we as Christians:  
Just as medical care is the road to bodily health, so this Care has received sinners 
to heal them and make them strong again. And as physicians bind up wounds in 
an orderly and skillful manner, so that even a certain beauty may join the 
usefulness of the bandage, so the medicine of Wisdom, by assuming humanity, 
accommodated Himself to our wounds, healing some by opposite remedies and 
others by like remedies. A Physician, in treating an injury to the body, applies 
certain opposites, as cold to hot, wet to dry; in other cases he applies like 
remedies, as a round bandage to a circular wound or an oblong bandage to an 
oblong wound, not using the same bandage for every limb, but adapting like to 
like. Likewise, the Wisdom of God, in healing humanity, has employed Himself 
to cure it, since He is both the physician and the medicine.679  
 
Not only in the Incarnation, but also in His Resurrection from the dead and His 
Ascension into heaven Christ “shows us forcibly how willingly He who had the power to 
take it up again laid down His life for us.”680 Augustine will say that it is for the express 
purpose of building up His Church here and now that Christ has willingly done all of 
these things for our salvation. To the extent possible, we must imitate Christ in these 
                                                          
677 I.11.11. 
678 I.17.16. 
679 I.14.13. See also 11.12 of The Christian Combat and 4.8 of the Faith and the Creed for this idea 
that the Incarnation was a healing event for fallen humanity.  
680 I.15.14. 
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ways “without complaint” and “even with joy,”681 because the Church is the body of 
Christ (Eph 1:23). It is His spouse (Eph 5: 23ff). As such, Christ as Head recapitulates 
those in His body, though they do not have the same functions or gifts (Rom 12:4), “by 
the bond of unity and charity—its health, so to speak.”682 Augustine does not shy away 
from saying that this consolidation process of the Church by Christ and His members 
often consists of disciplinary action, or the cleansing of the mind of His members through 
various trials and tribulations. But these are to act as medicine for them, so that when the 
body of the Church is joined to Christ as Head,683 His spouse the Church will not have 
spot or wrinkle or any such thing (Matt 16:19).  
 That Augustine talks specifically of cleansing the mind is significant, for it is in 
the mind that we are created in God’s image. The nobility of man comes from the fact 
that he is created to the image and likeness of God (Gen 1: 27), “not insofar as he is 
housed in a mortal body, but in that he is superior to brute beasts because of the gift of a 
rational soul.”684 Hence Augustine will conclude that “man is most excellent at that time 
when his whole life tends toward the unchangeable Life and clings to Him with all its 
affection. However, if He loves himself for his own sake, he does not refer himself to 
God, but, since he has turned to himself, he is not turned toward something 
unchangeable.”685 Because he is not turned toward something unchangeable, he therefore 
                                                          
681 I.15.14. 
682 I.16.15. 
683 Augustine will add one more theological layer to this picture of the Church as totus Christus—or 
Christ as Head and Christ as members. As Christ is the Head of the Body that is the Church, we may 
similarly call the Father the Head of Christ. According to Augustine, the Father “does not have His origin 
from the Son, the latter has His origin in the Father; the former is the principle of the Son, for which reason 
He is also called the head of Christ (1 Cor 11:3); but Christ, too, is called the principle (Jn 8:25), but not of 
the Father; the latter [the Son] is called the Image of the former (Col. 1:5).” (de.fide.et.symb.9.18). It 
follows that Christ is the Head of the Church and the Head of Christ is God.  
684 I.22.20. 
685 I.22.21. 
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loves a lesser good. Later in his theological career, Augustine will discuss in exacting 
detail how the whole mental and willful life of man must be referred to God in his 
psychological analogies for the Trinity.686 For Christian life, then, the doctrine of the 
imago Dei was of great importance. How do we restore the image of God in us? How do 
we attain to the likeness of God? We do so through the rule of love: “Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself,” but God “with thy whole heart, and with they whole soul, and with 
thy whole mind.” We have all of our thoughts, all of our willings, and all of our life from 
Him. We are made in the image of God and according to His likeness, so Augustine 
thought we ought to direct all of these to Him. God is the only reality (for lack of a better 
word) that should be “loved for His own sake.”687  
 But without Christ the doctrine of the imago Dei would be meaningless and 
ineffectual. It would be incapable of being realized in Christian life within the unity of 
the Church. We need Christ to be our Road and Reward, Way and Destination. Since 
Christ “wished not only to show Himself as the reward of those who have arrived at Him, 
but also, to those who were only coming to the beginning of their journey, to show 
                                                          
686 These psychological analogies are described most famously in Books VIII-XV of On the Trinity, 
but reference to them can be found elsewhere. See for example, Conf.13.3.12; Gn.litt.imp.16.61. Generally 
speaking, they are meant to show that just as there is a threefold unity in man, who is one substance in a 
threefold aspect, in the various faculties and actions of the soul, so, too, God, in a much higher way, 
possesses a unity in essence, but also a threefold aspect by way of the mutual relations of the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. The best and highest analogy can be found in Book XIV: “Therefore this trinity of the 
mind is the image of God not because of the fact that the mind remembers itself and understands itself and 
loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love him by whom it was made. When it 
does so, it becomes wise. But if it fails to do this, even while remembering itself and understanding and 
loving itself, it is foolish. And so let the mind remember its God towards whose image it was made, and let 
it understand and love him. Or to say the same thing more briefly, let it worship God, who is not made, by 
whom because itself was made, it is capable of and can be partaker of him; wherefore it is written, Behold 
the worship of God, that is wisdom (Job 28:28) (trin.14.12.15; CCSL 50A.442-43). Augustine concludes 
that a person is most fully in the image of God when he possesses the following activities: meminisse Dei, 
intellegere Deum, dilligere Deum. Augustine is careful to use active verbs here to reinforce the idea that we 
are most like the Trinity when we are actively remembering God, actively understanding God, and actively 
loving God.  
687 I.27.28.  
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Himself as the way, He willed to assume human flesh. So there is also this verse: The 
Lord created me in the beginning of His ways (Prov 8:22), so that those who wished to 
come might begin from Him.”688 The balance Augustine strikes between understanding 
Christ in these two senses, in the form of His humanity and in the form of His divinity, to 
speak of the function of grace to bring us together on the road to salvation in order to 
sanctify us, is mirrored in the Letters of St. Paul. But as Mersch notes, Paul does not give 
us an exact formula to understand the relation between Christ as our Road and Reward, 
Way and Destination. Rather, it is sometimes the case that “Christ’s humanity scarcely 
appears in this work of union; it is God who gathers men together and draws them to 
Himself, with some intervention on the part of Christ’s humanity that is not clearly 
defined.689 At other times the humanity of Christ appears as the great means employed by 
God to save men.690 This latter case seems to be more frequent.”691  
According to Mersch, we see the same doctrine being supported in the Eastern 
Church, especially in the work of Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril thought that the Christ’s 
humanity could give life to the entire human race because it was united to the Word. It is 
not because of what it is in itself that allowed Christ’s humanity to enliven the human 
race he joined to Himself in the Incarnation. Rather, it is because of what it is in the 
Word—the Light and Life of men.692 These insights about the two-natured Christ from 
Paul and the Doctors of the Early Church, East and West, became crystallized into dogma 
at the Council of Chalcedon (451): 
                                                          
688 I.34.38. 
689 Cf. Rom 3:24-27; 5:1-11; 6:23; 13:25ff.; Gal 4:4-7; Eph 1:3-14; Col 1:13-20. 
690 See Rom 5:11-21; 6:1-11; 1 Cor 1:30ff.; 6:15-20; 2 Cor 5:14-21; 8:9; Gal 2:19ff.; 3:26-29; Eph 
1:18-22; 2:4-10; 13-22; 3:1-10; 4:3-16; Phil 3:14, 17, 21; Col 1:26ff.; 2:2-19; 3:1-4.  
691 Mersch, 200. 
692 See In Ioan., I, 9. 
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Following in the footsteps of the holy Fathers, we all with one accord teach belief 
in one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. We declare that He is perfect in 
divinity and perfect in humanity, that He is true God and true man, composed of 
rational soul and body, that He is consubstantial with the Father in divine nature 
and consubstantial with us in human nature, “in all things like as we are, without 
sin” (Heb 4:15); that before all ages He was born of the Father according to His 
divine nature, and in these latter days was born of the Virgin Mary, Mother of 
God, for our sake and for our salvation, according to His human nature; that one 
and the same Christ, the only-begotten Son our Lord, must be acknowledged as 
existing in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, undividedly, inseparably, 
with no suppression of the distinction between the natures on account of the 
union, but rather with the individuality of each nature safeguarded and coming 
together in one person and subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but 
one and the same Son and only-begotten God the Word, Jesus Christ the Lord.693 
  
Christ has two perfect natures, human and divine, each of which exists unconfusedly, 
unchangeably, undividedly, and inseperably from the other. They are united in the Person 
of the Word, not in the natures themselves, and so there is nothing contradictory in their 
union with each other. Each of the natures of Christ, “though in union with the other, 
performs actions proper to itself: the Word does that which belongs to the Word, and the 
flesh does that which belongs to the flesh.”694 Because of the unity of His human nature 
with His divine nature, Christ in the form of His humanity exists according to a 
perfection (perfectio), or to use a word more often employed by Augustine, an 
amelioration (melioratio),695 that even the best of fallen humanity do not. Christ was 
unable to die, unable to sin, unable to abandon the good. Mersch is clear that this 
melioratio of Christ’s human nature, which made it unable to do these things, is primarily 
the result of the divine action of the Word.696 If this divine action were to be suspended or 
                                                          
693 Denz., 148, quoted from the Theology of the Mystical Body, p. 202. 
694 Mersch, 203. 
695 83 Questions, PL, 40, 85.  
696 Throughout The Theology of the Mystical Body, Mersch will refer to the perfection of Christ in the 
form of His humanity as an ‘entity of union.’ What we witness in the Incarnation is a union of two natures 
that is unique and without comparison. The same must therefore be said when it comes to the perfection of 
Christ. “As the union is a union, so the perfection is an “entity of union,” and we cannot say anything more 
adequate or basic about it.” Augustine takes the perfection of Christ’s humanity, or indeed the perfection of 
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withdrawn from the assumed humanity, then so would its perfection. Others such as 
Msgr. Fulton Sheen will refer to this unity of Christ’s human nature with His divine 
nature as a form of instrumental causality.697 
To understand how this dependence relation between the assumed humanity and 
the Word functions, Mersch offers up a comparison. Consider the illumination of the air 
by the sun. The light is a “property of the air.” It is “intrinsic to the air.” However, the air 
is only illuminated when it is in “contact with the sun,” or when it is “penetrated by the 
sun.” Suspend or withdraw the light shed by the sun and there is no illumination of the 
air. According to Mersch, this proves that “the illumination in the air is a sort of 
diminished continuation and participation of the sun’s illumination; it is, so to say, the 
brilliance of the sun as realized and expressed by the air in its own way.”698 The 
brilliance of the sun belongs to the air, but only because the sun unceasingly causes it, 
because the sun communicates its brilliance to the air. Augustine will also use light and 
                                                          
anything that is created, to be a function of its internal coherence or unity, which is given to it by God 
(DGnI.10.32). Mersch continues that the perfection of Christ in particular has no meaning or possibility 
“except in expressing in one nature the union with the other nature and in formally causing the first nature 
to be a united nature.” Thus, while the Word may be the primary cause of Christ’s human nature to be 
united with His divine nature, the unity between Christ as man and Christ as God can only be real if they 
are both related to each other, if they are united in one Person. Mersch claims that, either we can think of 
this entity of union “in thinking of the union, in believing in the Incarnation, and in envisaging the two 
natures, or else what we have in mind is not it at all.” (Mersch, 215). We may refer to this perfection, or 
entity of union, as “divinization, grace, fullness of grace,” or whatever other way Christian tradition refers 
to it (Mersch, 221).  
697 Sheen writes that Christ’s “human nature is as entire and intact as any human nature; He is as 
perfectly human as any of us, being man in the truest sense of the term.” (28-29). He is such because He is 
an instrument of His divine Personality, because He is the perfect expression of God in the form of 
humanity. Sheen views this instrumental relationship between Christ as man and Christ as God not as “an 
instrument separate from His Person, as a pencil is separate from my hand, but united as my hand is united 
to my brain.” (29). To support his claim, Sheen cites the classic Latin axiom: Actiones sunt suppositorum. 
Actions belong to the person, not to the nature. Applying this axiom to Christ, we must conclude that every 
action of His human nature belongs to His Person. Since His Person is the Word, the second Person of the 
blessed Trinity, it follows that “each and every action of His human nature had an infinite value because 
done by the Person of God” (31). Augustine does appear to place the unity and perfection of Christ’s 
human nature in the Person of the Word, for “anything that is said of the man Christ has reference to the 
unity of the person of the Only-begotten” (Enchir.15.56). See also Enchir.10.35. 
698 Mersch, 367. 
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air to discuss the unity and distinctness of the two natures, God and man, that occurs in 
the Incarnation. In Epistle 137, Augustine observes that “there are some who request an 
explanation of how God is joined to man so as to become the single person of Christ, as if 
they themselves could explain something that happens every day, namely how the soul is 
joined to the body so as to form the single person of a man.” He continues later on:  
For as the soul makes use of the body in a single person to form a man, so God 
makes use of man in a single person to form Christ. In the former person there is a 
mingling of soul and body; in the latter person there is a mingling of God and 
man; but the hearer must abstract from the property of material substance by 
which two liquids are usually so mingled that neither retains its special character, 
although among such substances light mingled with air remains unchanged. 
Therefore, the person of man is a mingling of soul and body, but the person of 
Christ is a mingling of God and man, for, when the Word of God is joined to a 
soul which has a body, it takes on both the soul and the body at once. The one 
process happens daily in order to beget men; the other happened once to set men 
free. 
 
Augustine concludes that we must understand the union of a soul and body to form man, 
and the union of the divine Logos with a soul and body to form Christ, along the lines of 
how light is mingled with air, not as we would two liquids that are mingled together in 
such a way that neither one retains its unique character. Light illuminates the air, so that 
it, too, shines like the light; but at no point in this illumination process does air stop being 
air or light stop being light.699 So, too, when Christ wills the divine will. His will remains 
His own and God’s will remains His own; and they each remain wholly their own and 
wholly each other because of their relation to each other. 
                                                          
699 Such an idea is mirrored in the Thomistic belief that the intellect in act is the intelligible in act 
(intellectus in actu perfectio est intellectum in actu) (ST I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3). What this means is that the act 
of the intellect is the actual intelligible thing that is known, and the actual intelligible thing that is known is 
the act of the intellect. This results in there being no gap between the knower and the known. For example, 
when I come to know the Augustinian view of the unity of the two natures of Christ, my intellect, formally 
speaking, assimilates that knowledge and becomes what it knows. But my intellect remains my intellect and 
this aspect of Augustine’s Christology remains this aspect of Augustine’s Christology; they each remain 
distinct, but also become one. 
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 Lest we get any idea that this made Christ the man’s contribution insignificant or 
irrelevant to the Word’s taking on of human nature in order to perfect it, we must add that 
“the divine action has to be received in the human nature, and quid-quid recipitur, 
recipitur ad modum recipientis.”700 That is, the divine action of the Word must be 
received according to the capacity of Christ’s human nature. It follows that with respect 
to His human nature the unifying process cannot be merely passive, external, or material. 
Nor can it be one devoid of consent. Quite the contrary: “the human nature [of Christ] 
had to be intensely active in receiving it, even though this activity itself was received. 
The reception had to be accomplished in the deepest center, the very root of the nature, 
and hence had to be brought about in a suitable way, that is, through an act of immanent 
spontaneity; to lay hold of the human nature as it is, the reception had to take place in that 
nature’s inner source of activity, which is liberty.”701 Liberty is the essential core of 
human nature, and so the divine action of the Word had to be in consonance with it in 
taking on the nature. Christ the man had to consent to be one Person with the Word. If 
there were no such consent, then the union would be “violent” and would not be “human 
in its term.”702 In The Theology of the Mystical Body, Mersch will attempt to clarify this 
free unity of man with God in the person of Christ in terms of “filiality.” For the human 
nature of Christ to be the human nature of the Son, the perfection bestowed upon it, due 
to its union with the Son, had to have been “designed to fit it to be the Son’s humanity, to 
equip it to act in a way that is becoming of the Son while yet acting in accordance with its 
own nature; how could such perfection be other than ‘filial?’”703  
                                                          
700 Mersch, 207. 
701 Mersch, 210. 
702 Mersch, 210. 
703 Mersch 362. 
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 Just as the grace of union is “filial” or fitting to Christ’s human nature, and so 
cannot destroy the inner core of that nature, i.e., its liberty, so, too, must be the grace of 
headship. Christ as Head of the Church enjoys true liberty in His carrying out of the role 
of mediating our sanctification through the power of the Holy Spirit. But if this is so, 
Mersch adds, Christ must “influence the lives of Christians by a grace that is essentially 
‘filial.’”704 The grace that Christ imparts to Christians exists because of His action, which 
is an amelioration for us. The perfection it effects in us is “the simple prolongation in 
Christ’s members of the personal union with God and the Son that is fully realized in the 
head and that affects the members according to the measure of their union with the 
head.”705 Thus, the more united someone is with Christ, the more perfect they are, and so 
the more free they are; the less united someone is with Christ, the less perfect they are, 
and so the less free they are. On the eve of His death, Christ prays to the Father that we 
might enjoy this active, internal, spiritual, and freeing unity: That they may be one, as we 
also are.... That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee; that they also 
may be one in us.... That they may be one, as we also are one: I in them and Though in 
Me; that they may be made perfect in one. (Jn 17: 11, 21ff.)  
 According to Augustine, the grace that Christians possess is a derivation of the 
grace of headship conferred on Christ through His unity with the Son. Our predestination 
and adoption as sons of the Most-High, therefore, must be seen in continuity with 
Christ’s eternal relation of sonship to the Father: “God calls many to be His sons, in order 
to make them members of His only-begotten, predestined Son.”706 Mersch believes that 
                                                          
704 Mersch, 366. 
705 Mersch, 371. 
706 De.praed.sanct.30, 31; see also De dono.persev. 24. 
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what Augustine teaches better than any other theologian is the “living, interior, and, as 
we should say today, psychological unity that brings Christians and Christ together in a 
single organism, a single man, a single Christ.”707 It is this “interior” emphasis of 
Augustine that allows him to argue that we and Christ constitute a single man.  
The Sermons and Commentaries of Augustine bear this out rather well, as Mersch 
points out. The following indented passage, as well as the footnotes, are from pages 350-
351 of his Theology of the Mystical Body:  
Since we are He708 and He is we,709 and since we belong to Christ710 and are 
Christ,711 we must have His Father as our Father712 through the action of the same 
Spirit713 who has brought about the birth of the Son in our midst. For the 
incarnation of the Word who is the Son continues on in the mystical body through 
the Spirit. ‘The Word incarnate is called the nuptials, for in the man who is 
assumed the Church is joined to God.714 ... In this man, the Church also is 
assumed by the Word.’715 
 
The multiple pleas for oneness that Christ makes in his sacerdotal prayer are answered in 
the mystical body through the grace of the Holy Spirit. The apostles, disciples, and the 
faithful are capable of being one body, one Church, one life, one mind, one will, but they 
cannot accomplish this on their own. They need a unifying principle which will make 
them come together in unity under the Headship of Christ. And they received just such a 
unifying principle on the day of Pentacost. Through the grace of the Holy Spirit, they 
                                                          
707 Mersch, 350. 
708 St. Augustine represents Jesus Christ as saying: “I sanctify them in Myself, because they too are I”; 
In Ioan., CVIII (PL XXXV, 1916), where the thought is repeated three times. 
709 “And we are He”; Sermo 133, 8 (PL XXXVIII, 742).  
710 “We pertain to Christ”; Sermo 144 (PL XXXVIII, 790). “We ought not to say that we are strangers 
to Christ, whose members we are, and we ought not to regard ourselves as a different person”; In Ps. 54 
(PL, XXXVI, 629). 
711 In Ps. 26 (PL, XXXVI, 200); In Ioan., XXI (PL, XXXV, 1568). 
712 In Ioan., LXXV (PL, XXXV, 1829). 
713 Sermo 71, 28 (PL, XXXVIII, 461). 
714 Quaestionum Evangeliorum, Lib. I, 31 (PL XXXV, 1329). 
715 In Ps. 4 (PL, XXXVI, 77). 
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became the founding members of the Church, with Christ as its Head, the Holy Spirit as 
its soul, and they as its body. Augustine likens this to what the soul is to the body of man: 
“What the soul is to the body of man, that the Holy Ghost is to the body of Christ, which 
is the Church.”716 While the Head of the Church now sits at the right hand of the Father 
in heaven, and the individual members of the Mystical Body come into being and pass 
away, “the Church remains one because that which gives it its abiding personality is the 
Pentacostal Spirit.”717 The individuality of the members of the Church is not lost because 
they share in It. Christ makes this clear in the words he spoke the night before He died: I 
will not leave you orphans: I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world seeth Me 
no more. But you see Me: because I live and you shall live.718 In that day you shall know 
                                                          
716 PL 38, col. 1231. 
717 Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen, The Mystical Body of Christ. Sheed and Ward: New York, 1935. P. 121. To 
explain the unity between Christ and Christians, Sheen will rely on a discussion of the early Church and 
various theological insights from St. Thomas and St. Augustine. In his characteristic fashion, Sheen will aid 
his explanation of this theological mystery with helpful analogies to make it more concrete. One in 
particular stands out and is re-used throughout his book, namely, the analogy of life: “The condition of the 
early Church can be represented better by the analogy of life. They [i.e., the apostles, disciples, and the 
faithful] were like the elements in a chemical laboratory, capable of being part of a body, and yet not a 
body, because lacking a soul. We know up to one hundred percent the chemicals which enter into the 
constitution of a human body, and yet with all our superior knowledge of chemistry, we cannot make a 
body in our laboratories. Why? Because we lack the power to give a unifying principle or a soul to those 
chemicals which will make them mutually coalesce into that new emergent which we call life. (107-108).  
718 In his Commentaries on the Gospel of John, Tractate 75, Augustine will describe this unity of us in 
Christ and Christ in us as a kind of sonship through adoption by grace, as the relation between the bride and 
the bridegroom (Mt 9:15), and even in terms of the Lord’s own words: “I am the vine, you are the 
branches.” Regardless of how one wishes to conceive of it, this unity gives us life eternal, makes us who 
we truly are, and allows us to be wholly free. Commenting on the Lord’s words, “Because I live you shall 
live also,” Augustine thinks that this points to the need for redemption from original sin that has, whether 
for good or ill, been seen as the cornerstone of his theological anthropology. Just as in Adam we can say 
that all men have died, so, too, in Christ we can say all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:21-22). The Lord’s 
words also, however, point to the need for our co-operation in the process of redemption, one that continues 
up till today in the action of the Church. More specifically, Augustine thinks that we must choose to die to 
ourselves. Die to the old man, and put on the new, who is possessed by the Spirit (Rom 13: 14; Col. 3:12-
13): “Because we did not live, we are dead; because He lived, we shall live also. We were dead to Him 
when we lived to ourselves; but, because He died on our behalf, He lives both for Himself and for us.” 
(75.3). Augustine is very clear that our complete redemption is not yet at hand—the image of God in us has 
not been fully restored. We still walk by faith and not by sight. We still do not “know” how Christ is in His 
Father, and us in Christ, and Christ in us. We will only know this unity as it is meant to be known on the 
day on which we shall live, “for then shall be completed that very state which is already in the present 
begun by Him, that He should be in us, and we in Him.” (75.4). Msgr. Fulton Sheen describes this dying to 
ourselves in a Christocentric way: “The redemption of Christ’s Mystical Body can become complete only 
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that I am in My Father, and you in Me, and I in you. (Jn 14: 18-20). Christ did not say I 
am My Father, you are Me, and I am you. He keeps distinct all of the parts of the 
Mystical Body by saying I am in My Father, and you in Me and I in you.  
We and Christ constitute a single man, because we are all possessed by the same 
Pentacostal Spirit, but we and Christ are different, because we all possess different 
functions in the single man that constitutes the ‘whole Christ’: “That one man is assumed, 
whose head is Christ ... he is the one assumed. He is not outside us; we are in His 
members.... Let us abide in Him and be assumed; let us abide in Him and be the elect.”719 
Here we have Augustine explicitly making a connection between the doctrine of the 
mystical body and the doctrine of election. If we abide in Christ, if we become one of His 
members, if we are assumed by Him, then we are elect. If we do not abide in Christ, if we 
do not become one of His members, if we are not assumed by Him, then we are not elect. 
The words of Jesus come to mind: I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes 
to the Father except through me (Jn 14:6). To be elect, or what means the same thing, to 
come to the Father, we must be sons of God in Christ through the grace of the Holy 
Spirit. With this said, our sonship is different from that of Christ. We may be called sons 
of God, “but He is God’s Son in a different sense.... He is the only Son, we are many. He 
is one, we are one in Him. He is born, we are adopted. He is the Son by nature, begotten 
from eternity; we are made sons by grace in time.”720 While there is a difference, there is 
                                                          
as we, through the influence of his grace, reproduce His own life in ours.... Christianity reveals that we are 
called in some way to prolong His Life, Death, and Resurrection in our lives, because of our solidarity with 
Him.” (298-299). We know what to do then, but how can we successfully accomplish this re-living of 
Christ’s Life, Death, and Resurrection? In a word: obedience. We must exercise humble obedience to what 
the Father in heaven wills for us, namely, to restore the image and likeness of God in us. To achieve this 
lofty goal, one that Christ did in the form of his humanity, we too must be willing to be “obedient unto 
death, even to death of the Cross.” (Phil 2:8). 
719 In Ps. 64, 7. 
720 In Ps. 88, 7. 
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also a close-knit unity, for our sonship by grace and His Sonship by nature become one in 
Christ. It is in Him, “redeemed as we are by His blood and washed clean by Him, [that] 
we are sons and are the Son; for though we are many, we are one in Him.”721 We are 
“members of the only-begotten Son of God.”722  
Because of how strong our unity is with Christ, Augustine will tell us that for God 
to love the Son completely, He must love His adopted sons along with Christ. God cannot 
love the Son and not love us.723 In a similar way, if we are to love God the Father and 
God the Son with all of our heart, soul, and mind, then we must love the other members 
of the Body of Christ that make up the totus Christus. Love of God and love of neighbor 
cannot be separated from each other: 
For God’s sons are the body of God’s only-begotten Son; and since He is the head 
and we are the members, the Son of God is one. Therefore he who loves the sons 
of God, loves the Son of God; and he who loves the Son of God loves the Father. 
Nor can anyone love the Father unless he loves the Son; and whoever loves the 
Son, loves also the sons of God. Which sons of God? The members of the Son of 
God.724  
 
Augustine will insist that when we love our brothers and sisters, who are members of the 
Body of Christ, we must love Christ Himself, who is the Head of that Body; and when we 
love Christ, we love the Son of God, for Christ is the Word; and so when we love the Son 
of God, we cannot help but love the Father, whose Word He is. Love does not admit of 
divisions: 
Choose the object of your love; the rest will follow. Perhaps you say: I love God 
alone, God the Father. You are wrong; if you really love, you do not love the 
Father alone; no, if you love the Father, you also love the Son. Very well, you 
may reply, I love the Father and I love the Son. But I love only God the Father 
and God the Son, our Lord Jesus Christ who ascended into heaven and sits at the 
                                                          
721 In Ps. 123. 
722 In Ioan., CX, CXI. 
723 Ibid. 
724 In epist. ad Parthos, X; PL XXXV, 2055.  
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right hand of the Father, the Word by whom all things were made, the Word who 
became flesh and dwelt among us; I love no one else. You err; for if you love 
Him, the head, you also love the members; and if you do not love the members, 
you do not love the head either. Let no one bring in a distinction between love and 
love, for love is of this nature: as it is a joining together in one, it makes one and, 
as it were, fuses together everything embraced by it. Take some gold, melt the 
whole mass, and a single ingot comes forth.725 
 
It is when our love of God and neighbor is total, complete, and undivided that we can 
properly say we are of one spirit with Christ. For this kind of love joins us together and 
makes us one with Him and each other in such a way that there is one mystical person, 
the whole Christ. Since we are one person with Christ, we share in His predestination: 
For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of 
His Son, so that He would be the firstborn among many brethren (Rom 8:29). 
 Yet not all are one person with Christ, and so they do not share in His 
predestination. To become conformed to His image, so that we are one person with Him, 
we must fight. More specifically, we must fight the desires of the flesh. Hence Augustine 
will characterize Christian life as a combat.726 In the Christian Combat (397), Augustine 
will say that anything that we do to combat the desires of the flesh, or concupiscence 
(cupiditas), is an imitation of Christ.  
 Near the beginning of this work, Augustine will contrast the mediation to life 
provided by Christ and the mediation to death provided by the devil. By a good life of 
virtue, humility, and godliness we become one with Christ. We become ‘like’ Him. On 
the other hand, “so by a bad life of wickedness, pride, and ungodliness do we become 
ourselves one with the devil. That is to say, we become like the devil and, just as our 
                                                          
725 Ibid. 
726 This was a common idea in early Christian writing, which can be traced back mainly to the 
language found in St. Paul’s second letter to Timothy. See for example, 2 Tim 4:7.  
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body is subject to us, so we are made subject to him.”727 To avoid this subjection to the 
devil, or perhaps better, slavery, we must fight against the desires of the flesh that would 
lead us away from God. Augustine will cite the Apostle as saying in this connection: I so 
fight as not beating the air; but I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest 
perhaps after preaching to others, I myself should be found rejected (Eph 2:2). The 
chastisement of the body the Apostle speaks of is merely an imitation of Christ. Hence 
why he recommends us to imitate him as he is an imitator of Christ: Be imitators of me as 
I am of Christ (Phil 3:20).  
Augustine anticipates that some will now ask how we are to keep our flesh in 
check, and whether or not this is a free choice of the will: 
Lest anyone pose the very question of how we are to bring our body into 
subjection, I reply that it is easy to understand and do, provided we are already 
living in subjection to God by a good will and unfeigned charity; for every 
creature, willingly or unwillingly (velit nolit), has been made subject to its one 
God and Lord. This is a reminder to serve our Lord God with an undivided will 
(tota voluntate). The just man serves Him in a spirit of freedom (liberaliter), but 
the unjust man serves him like a shackled slave (compeditus servit). Yet, all are 
subject to divine Providence. Some conform with filial obedience and cooperate 
with (faciunt cum) Providence in the performance of good, while the rest are cast 
into chains, like slaves, being dealt with according to their merits.728  
 
Augustine believes Christ in the form of his humanity to be the best example of a person 
who kept the flesh in check, who lived in subjection to God with a good will and 
unfeigned charity, who served God with an undivided will and a spirit of liberty, and who 
conformed himself to God with filial obedience. All of this is made clear in the sacred 
                                                          
727 2.2. 
728 DaC 7.7. The full Latin text for this passage can be found in PL 40 and is reproduced here: Sed ne 
quis forte hoc ipsum quaerat, quomodo fiat ut corpus nostrum servituti subjiciamus; facile intelligi et fieri 
potest, si prius nos ipsos subjiciamus Deo, bona voluntate et sincera charitate. Nam omnis creatura, velit 
nolit, uni Deo et Domino suo subjecta est. Sed hoc admonemur, ut tota voluntate serviamus Domino Deo 
nostro. Quoniam justus liberaliter servit, injustus autem compeditus servit. Omnes tamen divinae 
providentiae serviunt: sed alii obediunt tanquam filii, et faciunt cum ea quod bonum est; alii vero ligantur 
tanquam servi, et fit de illis quod justum est. 
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Scriptures, which “testify concerning His Son who, in the words of the Apostle,” was 
born of to Him according to the flesh of the offspring of David (Rom 1:3).729 Any 
suggestion that the Son did not assume our human nature must be condemned. For 
Augustine, “He assumed a complete human nature, joining Himself to man’s intellectual 
nature through the soul, and, through the soul, uniting Himself to the body.”730 Because 
he assumed a complete human nature, Christ also had to combat the flesh. 
 Yet Christ totally and completely obeyed the will of the Father, and He did so 
with a decisive spontaneity, evidenced in the command He gives us to follow: Let your 
speech be, “yes, yes;” “no, no.” (Matt 5: 37). The Apostle speaks of this also: There was 
not in Him now “yes” and now “no,” but only “yes” was in Him (2 Cor 1:19).731 The 
decisiveness of Christ’s human will is a result of being the Father’s Word: “What is the 
Father’s doctrine, if not the Father’s word? Therefore Christ Himself is the Father’s 
doctrine, if He is the Father’s Word. But the Word cannot be the Word of no one, but has 
                                                          
729 10.11. 
730 18.20. Augustine held that the human nature assumed by the Word for His earthly mission had a 
human intellect and human will. To say otherwise is the same as saying “He was not a man.” (19.21). There 
is ample evidence that Augustine maintained this view throughout his earlier and later theological career. 
For example, in de.fide.et.symbolo (393), Augustine tells us that the Son took upon Himself a “complete 
human nature, namely, body, soul, and spirit ... [and that] we should be on our guard against any notion that 
any particular component of our nature had no share in the assumed nature and its unrelated to our 
salvation.” (4.8). In the Enchiridion (ca. 421), Augustine will claim that it is wrong to say “that any part 
was lacking in that human nature He put on, except that it was a human nature altogether free from any 
bond of sin.” (10.34).  
731 One of the better philosophical-theological explanations of why Christ’s will is so decisive is given 
by Emile Mersch, who believes its decisiveness is due to its “totality.” According to Mersch, when Christ is 
willed, “He is willed in his entirety, by a decree that is one even in its term, because in Christ it forms the 
unity of this term.” Everything that exists thus has its proper place and right order in the decree that willed 
Christ. Because Christ was willed by a total and unified will—the will of the three persons—He is totality 
and unity. It follows that “those who are Christ’s members are willed by the prolongation of Him and 
insertion into Him,” into the unity that He is. This is a unity grounded in love, not only in the love that God 
has for mankind, but also the love that we have for God and neighbor. Indeed, the “will that wills Christ, 
who is totality, may be conceived as a total will which includes all the special decrees that affect each man 
and cause each man to save himself.” (Mersch, 278). It is this totality of will, its unity, its undividedness, its 
total goodness, that lead to the decisive spontaneity of Christ to always say “yes” to good and “no” to evil. 
When we will the will of Christ, we, too, are able to let our “yes” mean “yes” and our “no” mean “no.”  
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to be the Word of someone, and the doctrine that He announced is Himself and not just 
His, because He is the Word of the Father. What is so much yours as you? And what is so 
little yours as you yourself, if what you are belongs to another?”732 We may now want to 
ask: Can this filial obedience of Christ, testified to in the sacred Scriptures, instantly 
willing to do the will of the Father, allow for His free co-operation with the Father?  
Could He have ever said ‘no’ to the Father, or would such an ability to say ‘no’ even 
matter to His liberty?733 What about in our case as Christians? Can our total and complete 
obedience to the divine will allow for our free cooperation? Augustine will answer as we 
saw him answer in his Sermons and works sent to the semi-Pelagians: “Man would not be 
                                                          
732 In Ioan. 29. 
733 In relation to these questions concerning Christ’s inability to sin, inability to die, and inability to 
abandon the good, we can ask another: If Christ only ever in fact said ‘yes’ to the will of the Father, then 
what would Augustine make of the temptations of Christ after His baptism detailed in Mk 1:12, 13; Mt 4: 
1-11; and Lk 4: 1-13? Were they not really temptations because Christ could not have succumbed to them?  
Perhaps the pericope in the Gospel of Matthew, according to which Jesus asks the Father three times to be 
delivered from the cup of His passion (Mt 26: 39, 42, 44), gives us the best means to reflect on these kinds 
of questions in Augustine and come up with a plausible answer. For Augustine, in the Garden of 
Gethsemane, Jesus could in a sense be said to have “wished for something other than what the Father 
willed” (Contra Maximinum 2.20; PL 42). But elsewhere in his Commentaries on the Psalms he will go on 
to explain what exactly this means and how this does not jeopardize the sinless liberty of Christ, but rather 
illustrates the weakness of the members of His ecclesial Body: “How did our Lord marry two wills so that 
they became one in the humanity he bore? In his body, the Church, there would be some people who, after 
wanting to do their own will, would later follow the will of God. The Lord prefigured these people in 
himself. He wanted to show that though they are weak, they still belong to him, and so he represented them 
in advance in his own person. He sweated blood from his whole body, as a sign that the blood of martyrs 
would gush from his body, the Church.... He revealed the human will that was in him, but if he had 
continued to insist on that will, he would have seemed to display perversity of heart. If you recognize that 
he has had compassion on you, and is setting you free in himself, imitate the next prayer he made: Yet not 
what I will, but what you will be done, Father (Mt 26:39). (En.in Ps.93.19; CCSL 39.1319). It is important 
to add, however, that Christ is the Head of this Body, and so Augustine will continue that: “[Jesus] took on 
sadness this way as he took on flesh. He was sorrowful, as the Evangelist says. If he was not sorrowful 
when the Evangelist says, 'My soul is sorrowful, etc.,' then too when he says, 'Jesus slept,' he did not sleep; 
or when he says, 'he ate,' he did not eat; and therefore nothing sensible will remain, so that it could even be 
said that his body was not real. Whatever is written about him, therefore, is true and happened. Therefore 
he was also sorrowful, but he assumed true sorrow willingly, as he assumed true flesh” (Ibid).  Augustine 
would thus unequivocally defend all of the natural ‘aspects’ of Christ’s humanity (e.g., His hunger, faith, 
desire to make persons righteous, fear of death, etc.), and they are no less ‘real’ for Him because He did not 
insist upon them and thereby go against the will of the Father. For an excellent comparison of Augustine 
with other patristic writers on how to specifically interpret Jesus’ actions in Gethsemane, see “Ancient and 
High-Medieval Interpretations of Jesus in Gethsemane: Some Reflections on Tradition and Continuity in 
Christian Thought,” by Kevin Madigan. The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (1995), pp. 157-
173.  
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perfect if he were to obey God’s commandments out of necessity, and not by his free 
will. This is a very simple matter, as far as I can see.”734  
 As in De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine will state that the spiritual environment 
in which we exercise our freedom is the Church, made up of the Head and the Body. The 
unity holding the Church together is twofold, in that the Body of the Church is one in 
nature, and the Spirit of both Head and Body is the one Spirit of Christ. Augustine writes 
in this connection: 
For, though the Body of the Church is one in nature, anyone can discern what a 
great difference there is between the Head and the other members. If that Man is 
the Head of the Church, by whose assumption ‘the Word was made flesh and 
dwelt among us,’ the other members are all the saints by whom the Church is 
made perfect and entire. Now, the soul gives life to and quickens our whole body, 
but, in the region of the head, the soul perceives sensations of life, sight, sound, 
smell, taste, and touch, but in the other members, only the sensation of touch. And 
on this account, in carrying out their functions (operandum), all the members are 
subject to the head. But, the head occupies a higher position in order to take 
counsel (consulendum), since, to a certain extent, it plays the role of the soul 
itself, which takes counsel (consulit) for the body; for all the senses are to be 
found in the head.735  
 
Here, then, we receive another psychological analogy for understanding the unity present 
in the Church. The soul in relation to the head perceives the sensations of life, sight, 
sound, smell, taste, and touch, whereas the soul in relation to the other parts of the body 
only perceives the sensation of touch. Since all the senses are to be found in the head, it 
occupies a higher position than the body and takes counsel for it. So too in the Church as 
totus Christus: All goods for Christians can be found in Christ, the Mediator between 
                                                          
734 10.11. Not only does our freedom come from our wills, but also from God’s omnipotence itself. In 
chapter 2 of this dissertation, we saw Augustine argue for the omnipotence of God in a way that requires 
the nature of our wills as free to be respected. The argument he gave centered on the fact that ‘God cannot 
contradict his own will.’ And since God created the will of man to be free, it follows that He cannot now 
override that freedom through His grace. In short, grace cannot contradict nature. The same basic argument 
is repeated elsewhere in Augustine’s corpus. See for example, Enchir.24.95 and Symb., 1.2.    
735 20.22. 
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God and man. All the cognitive and conative resources needed for right-living are in 
Christ, who not only “enjoys the benefit of Wisdom Itself, by which all men are made 
wise, but also is the very personification of Wisdom.”736 We as Christians do not possess 
these goods by ourselves as if they were our private possessions. We possess them in 
common with each other, together with Christ.737 Christ is the Wisdom and Power of God 
(1 Cor 1:24), but He is also our wisdom and power as acting members of the Church, 
carrying out our different functions (operandum).  Because Augustine views the wisdom 
and power of Christ to be uniquely ours as members and uniquely His as Head, any 
implication that the Body of Christ just passively reflects His wisdom and power a la 
Protestantism must be avoided.738  
 Augustine will systematize many of the insights we have gleaned about Christ and 
Christian liberty in his On Faith, Hope, and Charity or Enchiridion (ca. 421).739 It is clear 
                                                          
736 20.22. 
737 For a similar discussion of the unity of the Body of Christ in Augustine, see pages 56-57 of this 
dissertation.  
738 As is well-known, Protestants hold that the justification of Christians is a kind of “juridical 
imputation” and “legal fiction.” That is, when God looks upon the members of the Church, He sees 
“nothing in them but the justice of Christ” (Mersch, 158), and He regards this justice as if it were their own. 
Luther will preach this message of Christian passivity in the face of the justice of Christ in many of his 
sermons. See for example, Sermo de duplici iustitia, 1519, in Werke (Weimar, 1884), II, 146: “By faith in 
Christ the justice of Christ becomes our justice, and all that is His and He himself becomes ours.... He who 
believes in Christ, cleaves to Christ and is one with Christ, having the same justice as He.” See also In 
epistolam ad Galatas commentarius, 1535 (ibid, XL, I, 197): “Therefore we are not said to be formally 
holy, as a wall is said to be white because of its inherent whiteness. Inherent holiness is not enough. Hence 
Christ is our whole sanctity.” And finally, see Tischreden, 2933 (Weimar, 1914), III, 96: “We wish to 
remain in the justice that is in the category of relation and not of quality, that God may regard us as pious 
and righteous; we cannot regard ourselves as such.” Enarratio psalmi Ll, in D. Martin Luthers Werke 
(Weimar, 1914) XL, 2, p. 324. Luther will not assign a meaningful role to Christians in the working out of 
their own salvation, because he thinks they are, in the deepest recesses of their souls, sinners who can do 
nothing to alter their situation. Following Luther and Calvin, Protestants take original sin to have 
completely corrupted human nature. Or as Luther says, “natural things [including human beings] are 
wholly corrupt in the sight of God.” Enarratio psalmi Ll, in D. Martin Luthers Werke (Weimar, 1914) XL, 
2, p. 324. 
739 Translated by Bernard M. Peebles, who writes of this work: “it is his only systematic treatment of 
the Church’s doctrine as a whole, and, coming late in his career as a bishop, shows that fulness of 
understanding and precision of analysis which his long years of pastoral care and active combat against 
heresies had produced in him. It is no wonder, then, that the Enchiridion has been drawn upon heavily as a 
synthesis of Augustinian teaching from the days of Peter Lombard (if not before) to our own times” (359-
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from his Retractions that Augustine had a high opinion of this late work: “In this, in my 
opinion, I have adequately covered how God is to be worshipped, a worship which 
Divine Scripture defines as man’s true wisdom.”740 Augustine calls for no emendations or 
additions to be made to it. Though originally meant to be a short handbook on the faith 
and the creed, the Enchiridion became quite long and contains Augustine’s definitive 
definition of Christian liberty. Chapters 8-14 of the Enchiridion discuss the liberty of man 
in terms of obedience to the divine will (which Augustine thinks is how God ought to be 
worshipped and man’s true wisdom), an obedience necessary to enter the Kingdom of 
Heaven, to be a member of the totus Christus.  
 At the beginning of Chapter 8, Augustine ventures “to learn what are the causes 
of good and evil, so much of them, at least, as is required for the path which leads us to 
the kingdom where there will be life without death, truth without error, happiness without 
sorrow.”741 In other words, he aims to discuss the causes of good and evil as they pertain 
to rational, free action. We learn that the cause of all good things is the goodness of God, 
whereas the cause of evil things can be traced to the “desertion from the unchangeable 
good on the part of the will of the changeable good (boni mutabilis voluntatem), first in 
the case of the angels and then in that of man.”742 It is from the voluntas of men and 
angels that comes all the evil of the rational nature, which includes “ignorance of duty,” 
“lust after harmful things,” “error,” “pain,” “fear,” and “unwholesome delectation.”743 
                                                          
360). In The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Volume 27, Robert P. Russell O.S.A. agrees with 
Peebles and notes that “Augustine’s most complete and systematic handling of the subject of faith and the 
Creed is to be found in his Enchiridion, or Handbook, On Faith, Hope, and Charity” (312). There is a 
continuity in his views in De fide et symbolo (393) and the Enchiridion (ca. 421), though these works are 
separated by almost thirty years (Russell, 313).  
740 Retractions II.89. 
741 8.23. 
742 8.23. 
743 8.24. 
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Augustine will later describe the sin of angelic and human creation as it not doing what 
God willed, “but what it willed.”744 However, in the case of man in particular, he was 
also punished by the death of the body. We this in the Book of Genesis in the fall of 
Adam and Eve. God gave Adam fair warning of this punishment should he disobey His 
command (Gn 2:17 and 3:19). God also endowed Adam with “free will (libero arbitrio).” 
Yet He put Adam “under obedience and pain of death,” placing him in this paradisal 
state, “as if giving him a foreshadowing of life to come.”745 According to Augustine, 
“God would have been willing to maintain even the first man in that state of salvation in 
which he had been placed and, at a fitting time, after the generation of children, to lead 
him, without intervention of death, to a better state, where not only would he have been 
unable to sin but even to have the wish of sin.”746 Of course, Adam did not obey the 
command of God, and so he did not rise to a better life. Oh unhappy fall! Augustine 
thinks that this desertion of God by Adam represents the nature of man misusing its 
power to reject and disobey the “command of its Creator (praeceptum sui Creatoris), 
which it might have easily heeded, which had profaned the image (imaginem) of the 
Creator that was within it by insolently turning away from His light.”747 How was this 
rejection, disobedience, profaning, and insolent turning away on the part of man 
accomplished? Augustine answers that it was through a misuse of his libero arbitrio. 
In Chapter 9, Augustine will continue to discuss the misuse of human free will, as 
well as its proper use in terms of the person of Christ. When man misuses his free will, 
                                                          
744 26.100. 
745 8.25. 
746 “Quapropter etiam primum hominem Deus in ea salute in qua conditus erat, custodire voluisset, 
eumque opportuno tempore post genitos filios sine interpositione mortis ad meliora perducere, ubi jam non 
solum peccatum non committere, sed nec voluntatem posset habere peccandi” (28.104).  
747 8.27. 
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this results in a kind of death (perdidit) for himself and it. Or as Augustine will say: “nam 
libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se perdidit et ipsum.”748 He compares this kind of 
death with a man who freely chooses to commit suicide. If a man kills himself, he must 
have been alive to do so. But now that he is no longer alive, he cannot restore himself 
back to life. So, too, when it comes to a man who has sinned through an evil use of his 
libero arbitrio: “sin is victorious and his free will is lost (victore peccato amissum est 
liberum arbitriu).”749 When Augustine says free will is “lost” (amissum), he does not 
mean “totally destroyed,” “incapable of being repaired,” or “gone forever.” He clarifies 
immediately by saying “lost” in the sense being “enslaved” to sin. Augustine will quote 
St. Peter in this connection: for by whatever a man is overcome, of this also he is the 
slave (2 Pt 2:19). It follows that if man is overcome by sin, he is the slave of sin.  
Augustine reasons that, since what St. Peter says is  
... surely true, what liberty, I ask, can a slave have except when it pleases him to 
sin. For that service is liberty which freely does the will of the master. 
Accordingly, he is free to sin who is the servant of sin. Wherefore, no one is free 
to do right who has not been freed from sin and begins to be the servant of justice. 
And such is true liberty because he has the joy of right-doing, and at the same 
time dutiful servitude because he obeys the precept. But, for the man sold into the 
bondage of sin, where will that freedom of right-doing come from unless he be 
redeemed by Him who said: If the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed? 
(Jn 8:36).750  
 
                                                          
748 9.30. 
749 9.30. 
750 9.30: quae cum vera sit, qualis, quaeso, potest servi addicti esse libertas, nisi quando eum peccare 
delectat? Liberaliter enim servit, qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit. Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber 
est, qui peccati servus est. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi a peccato liberatus esse justitiae 
coeperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti 
obedientiam. Sed ad bene faciendum ista libertas unde erit homini addicto et vendito, nisi redimat cujus 
illa vox est, “Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis?  
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We have already witnessed Augustine say that being pleased to sin, or misusing free will, 
leads to an unwholesome delectation. True liberty cannot consist in this disordered desire. 
It is servitude to the wrong master, and so results in a loss of our free will.  
There are five components to the Augustinian definition of true liberty given in 
the above passage. Augustine is quite clear that 1) that service is liberty qui sui domini 
voluntatem libenter facit. It is a service that requires us to 2) esse justitiae coeperit 
servus. It involves 3) recti facti laetitiam, but at the same time 4) pia servitus propter 
praecepti obedientiam.751 Finally, true liberty for man is only possible because of 5) the 
redemptive activity of the Son. It this last component that Augustine emphasizes above 
the others, for if the Son’s redemptive activity does not join itself to the free will of man, 
he is not able to do what is right.752 As Christ says, I am the vine; you are the branches. If 
you remain in me and I in you, you will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do 
nothing (Jn 15:5). Augustine thinks that the importance of (5) can also be found in the 
writings of St. Paul. For example, Eph 2:8-10, where Paul mentions the importance of 
Christ for understanding how we are able to perform good works: For his workmanship 
we are created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God has made ready beforehand 
that we may walk in them (Ipsius enim sumus figmentum creati in Christo Jesu in 
operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus). Augustine takes this to 
mean that we will only be “truly free” (vere liberi) when God “forms and creates (format 
et creat) us, not as men (homines)—for that He has already done—but to be good men 
                                                          
751 The joining of (3) and (4) together are important, because mere obedience to the law is not 
sufficient for salvation. According to Augustine, we must take joy in or love following God’s 
commandment, for although it “appears sometimes to be kept by those who do not love Him, but only fear 
Him; yet where there is no love, no good work is imputed, nor is there any good work, rightly so called; 
because whatsoever is not of faith is sin (Rom 14: 23), and faith worketh by love (Gal 5:6).” (On The Grace 
of Christ, 27).  
752 9.30. 
292 
 
 
 
(boni homines), which He now accomplishes by His grace.” The re-formation and re-
creation of men into good men, or this ‘amelioration’ (melioratio) of human beings, takes 
places “in Christ Jesus” (in Christo Jesu), where we shall become a “new creature” (nova 
creatura).753 Augustine does not mean a “new creature” in the sense of fundamentally 
changing our human nature into some other superior nature, angelic or otherwise, but 
rather according to the words of the Apostle: Create a clean heart in me, O God (2 Cor 
5:17; Ps 51:10).754  
We encounter a similar position in the Old Testament. In the Book of Proverbs, it 
is written: The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways (Prov. 8:22).755 Augustine 
interprets the phrase ‘in the beginning of his ways’ as meaning the Head of the Church, 
Christ, “in His assumed human nature.”756 It is Christ in the form of His humanity that we 
have an example of a “pattern of life,” or a “sure path by which we may come to God.”757 
Christ’s pattern of life, which is the path by which we may come to God requires the 
virtue of humility, one which pre-eminently shines forth in the temporal mission of 
Christ. The Word “deigned to exemplify in His own Person that humility which is the 
path over which we have to travel on our return [to God]; for he did not think it robbery 
to be equal to God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (Phil.2: 6-7).”758 In 
                                                          
753 9.31. St. Paul will say that this is a kind of second creation (cf. Gal 6:14; Eph 2:8ff.; Rom 8:18-23 
and 12:2), one which is as gratuitous as our creation from nothing, but even more glorious (cf. 2 Cor 4:6 
and 5:17ff.). See also Mersch, 273.  
754 Augustine views the heart to be the “true temple of God” in us. (de.fide.et.symb.7.14). Undergoing 
an amelioration of the heart, no matter how great it may be, does not constitute a change in nature. Even 
Christ, who was perfectly man, did not stop being a man because of the perfection of His humanity. 
Christ’s human nature was not somehow changed into His divine nature. Instead, the perfection He 
received made Him ‘man’ in the fullest sense of the term.  
755 The Vulgate substitutes “possessed” (possedit) for “created” (creavit). 
756 de.fide.et.symb.4.6. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid. 
293 
 
 
 
line with the main theme of the Book of Proverbs and the entire Old Testament, i.e., 
attaining wisdom by humbly obeying the will of God,759 Augustine will cite the next 
verse of Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (Phil.2: 8): He Humbled himself, becoming 
obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. Both the Old and the New Testaments 
teach us that wisdom requires humility, humility requires obedience, and obedience leads 
to death, but also life everlasting.  
As in his earlier doctrinal works outlining the correct Christian faith, Augustine 
will note that, “if a man has attained the age of reason, he cannot believe (credere), hope 
(sperare), or love (diligere) unless he wills (nisi velit), nor attain to the prize of God’s 
heavenly call (Phil 3:14) unless he runs voluntarily (nisi voluntate cucurrerit).”760 How, 
though, can we reconcile this affirmation of the importance of the will with the claim that 
there is question not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God showing mercy 
(Rom 9:16)? Augustine answers that this just points to the need for both the will of man 
and God showing mercy, though the latter takes primacy over the former: “The will of 
man alone is not enough, if the mercy of God be not also present—then neither is the 
mercy of God alone enough, if the will of man be not also present.”761 The dynamic 
relation between the mercy of God and the will of man Augustine mentions here remains 
perfectly consistent with his doctrinal teachings on sin and grace (chapter 2 of this 
                                                          
759 Augustine will also characterize the obedience mentioned in the Old Testament in terms of fear of 
the Lord and goes so far as to say that this obedience constitutes the real existence of any person. Augustine 
approvingly quotes the Book of Ecclesiastes in this regard: Fear God, and keep His commandments: for 
this is every man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every despised person, whether it be 
good, or whether it be evil (Eccl 12, 13:14). Augustine writes of this quotation, “What truer, terser, more 
salutary enouncement could be made? Fear God, he says, and keep his commandments: for this is every 
man. For whosoever has real existence, is this, is a keeper of God’s commandments, and he who is not this, 
is nothing.” (City of God 20.3). See also 83 Questions, 71.1.  
760 9.32. 
761 9.32. 
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dissertation) and his preaching on human freedom (chapter 3 of this dissertation). We 
must freely co-operate with God’s grace—or ‘consent’ to it—for it to be effectual in our 
lives. Augustine believes that God’s offer to give grace, which is an offer he extends to 
the whole of humanity, does not have a positive effect on an individual until it has been 
given. But for it to be given, it must be received; and for it to be truly received, it must be 
willingly accepted. I have previously shown that Augustine’s conception of this co-
operation between the gift-giver (God) and gift-receiver (man) is philosophically-
theologically the same as the Eastern Orthodox tradition’s notion of sunergia.762  
The will of man alone fails to accomplish (non implet) the good,763 but since 
God’s mercy alone accomplishes all good whatsoever, His will remains primary. When it 
comes to our good works, we ought to “ascribe all to God, who both makes the good will 
of man ready to be helped (adjuvandam) and helps (adjuvat) it when it has been made 
ready.”764 But it must be emphasized again that it is only with his ‘consent’ that God 
‘makes the good will of man ready to be helped and helps it when it has been made 
ready’ in Christ Jesus, whose workmanship we men are, and in whose good works, 
understood broadly in terms of His life, death, and resurrection, we must walk 
(ambulemus) to be made good men (boni homines). Our calling as Christians therefore is 
to be like Christ, to in a sense re-live His life, death, and resurrection. 
We can only fulfill this calling with the help of God, and “this is by the grace of 
God through Jesus Christ our Lord (haec est gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum 
                                                          
762 See footnote 72 of this dissertation, where I show the results of my lexical study comparing the 
meaning  of cooperatio in Augustine with sunergia in the Cappadocians.  There I find that the meaning of 
these two terms and their respective philosophical-theological uses to which they are purposed are, for all 
practical purposes, identical.   
763 Recall Augustine makes the same distinction between ‘not consenting to bad desires’ and 
‘accomplishing the good.’ See chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
764 9.32. 
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nostrum).”765 It is by this grace that we become like Christ. It is how we become sons of 
God (Rom 8:14). As we saw in chapter 1 of this dissertation, Augustine thinks it is in the 
person of Christ that “we have the grace of God shown forth in a manner altogether 
sublime and clear. What had the human nature in the man of Christ deserved that it 
should be taken up, in a fashion without parallel, into the unity of the person of the only 
of God? What good will, whose firm and good intention, what good works had gone 
before to make that man worthy to become one person with God?”766 The answer to both 
questions is none whatsoever. Grace does not depend on merits. Even for the Son of man 
grace retains its gratuitous or freely-given quality, and it is this grace “which enabled the 
man Christ to be free from the possibility of sin (per quam factum est ut homo Christus 
nullum habere posset peccatum).”767 Augustine will insist that it is the person of Christ 
that fully reveals the reality of the freely-given grace of God as it relates to human nature, 
“for he took up (assumptus) humanity in such a way that it was transformed for the better 
(melius), and it was filled out (formaretur) by him in a manner ... [that is] inexpressibly 
excellent (ineffabiliter excellentius).”768 We can see this in the plan by which Christ was 
born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary: 
                                                          
765 10.33. 
766 11.36. 
767 11.36. 
768 83 Questions, 73.2. Augustine is careful to say that this assumption of humanity by the Son is 
according to “habit” (habitus), but in a very particular sense of this term, so as not to imply any changes in 
the actual natures of man or God. He defines the sense of habit he is using as that “the very things added [to 
other things] are changed in order to produce a habit and are in some way shaped by the things for which 
they produce the habit.” Augustine gives clothing as an example. When it is laid out or thrown on the 
ground, it does not have the form which it has when it is pulled over the head, arms, torso, legs, and other 
members of the body. But when it is put on, “it receives a shape which it did not have while off, although 
the members themselves, with the clothes on or off, remain in the same state.” (83 Questions, 73.1). For 
Augustine, the Son was “clothed with a humanity” by somehow “uniting” (uniens) and “adapting” 
(conformans) it to His divinity (83 Questions, 73.2). In other words, the Son assumed humanity in such a 
way as to “fill it out,” “better it,” “complete it,” but not in such a way as to make it in something that it is 
not—whether that be some superior intellectual nature or God Himself. God and man are one Person in 
Christ, Who is perfectly God and perfectly man.  
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Since, then, a thing may be born of something, yet in such a way as not to be its 
son, and, again, since not everyone who is called son is born of him whose son he 
is said to be, surely the plan by which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit, but not 
as son, and of the Virgin, yet as son, manifests to us the grace of God. For it was 
by this grace that a man, without any antecedent merits, in the very inception of 
his existence, was so united in one person to God the Word that the very same 
person was the Son of God who was Son of man, and the very same person was 
Son of man who was Son of God. Thus, in the taking on of the human nature, the 
grace itself somehow became so natural to the man as to admit no possibility of 
sin.769  
 
Augustine thinks that the distinction between Christ being born of the Holy Spirit, but not 
as son (non sicut filius), and Christ being born of the Virgin Mary, but as son (sicut 
filius), is crucial in understanding how grace makes any man, including Christ in the form 
of his humanity, better in the sense of not being able to sin.  
Christ was a special case, however, because in the very beginning of his existence 
(in ipso exordio naturae suae quo esse coepit) His human nature was so united to His 
divine nature that they became one in the second Person of the blessed Trinity. As a 
result, we as Christians may say that Christ is the Son of God and the Son of man, but He 
is one and the same Person. The unity in Christ between His two natures in His singular 
Person is accomplished by grace (the “grace of union” as it is often called). It is a grace 
that became so natural (naturalis) to Christ in the form of his humanity that He could not 
sin.770  
Though Augustine does not discuss it here, I believe what he has said about Christ 
being born of the Holy Spirit, from the beginning of His existence, fits rather nicely with 
                                                          
769 Cum itaque de aliquo nascatur aliquid etiam non eo modo ut sit filius, nec rursus omnis qui dicitur 
filius, de illo sit natus cujus dicitur filius; profecto modus iste quo natus est Christus de Spiritu sancto non 
sicut filius, et de Maria virgine sicut filius, insinuat nobis gratiam Dei, qua homo nullis praecedentibus 
meritis, in ipso exordio naturae suae quo esse coepit, Verbo Deo copularetur in tantam personae unitatem, 
ut idem ipse esset filius Dei qui filius hominis, et filius hominis qui filius Dei: ac sic in naturae humanae 
susceptione fieret quodam modo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis, quae nullum peccatum posset admittere. 
770 Augustine will speak of this inability to sin of Christ elsewhere. See for example, 13.41.    
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the idea found in his Commentaries on the Gospel of John that Christ was always twice-
born. He was born of the Spirit, but not as son, and born of the Virgin Mary, but as son. 
Because of always being twice-born and, specifically, because of His unity of Person 
provided by the Word through grace, Christ the man could not sin. He could not but do 
the will of the Father,771 to which He was obedient even unto death on a cross.  
 All men are born of the flesh, but not all are born of the Holy Spirit. In the 
Gospel of John, this was the lesson that Christ attempted to teach Nicodemus, who went 
one night to visit the Lord to learn about salvation. Christ says to him, “Amen, Amen I 
say to thee, unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.” Nicodemus 
was puzzled by these words of the Lord. He did not understand how someone could be 
twice-born. “How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his 
mother’s womb, and be born again?” In response, Christ points out that there is more to 
being human, more to being free in will, than what can be found in the reality of the 
flesh: “Amen, Amen I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy 
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; 
and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit. Wonder not that I say to thee, you must be 
born again. The Spirit breatheth where He will; and thou hearest His voice, but thou 
knowest not whence He cometh, and wither He goeth; so is everyone that is born of the 
Spirit” (Jn 3: 5ff). The Spirit breathes where He wills, and so is everyone that is born of 
the Spirit. However, those who live according to the flesh may be physically alive, but 
they are spiritually, mentally, and willfully dead. As St. Paul says, the widow who lives 
for pleasure is dead even while she lives (1 Tim 5:6). Even those such as Nicodemus, 
                                                          
771 Recall that the will of the Father and the Son (and the Spirit) is inseparable. See for example, 
12.38. 
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who are by all accounts naturally good men, cannot be said to be alive unless they are 
born again of the Spirit.  
In the relevant portions of his Tractates on the Gospel of John (Tractate 11), 
Augustine will describe Nicodemus as one of those who believed in Christ’s name, 
because they saw the signs and miracles which He performed. Nicodemus calls Him 
Rabbi, Master. He says Christ is a teacher that has come from God. But Christ did not 
“trust” Himself to Nicodemus. For Augustine, only “to them who have been born again 
does Jesus trust Himself.” Those such as Nicodemus, who are not born again, are 
“catechumens,” in that they “believe in the name of Christ.” They may even bear the 
cross of Christ on their forehead, not being ashamed of His crucifixion. However, they do 
not understand the divinity of Christ, and the Spirit of unity that He imparts to all of those 
who are born again. Augustine writes: “Let us ask him [sc. Nicodemus], ‘Do you eat the 
flesh of the Son of man, and drink the blood of the Son of man?’ He knows not what to 
say, because Jesus has not trusted Himself to him.”772 Those who are born again not only 
believe, but also understand that Christ is God the Son, the Word made flesh. They 
understand the statement, which I might add imposes a limitation on their wills, except a 
man eat my flesh, and drink my blood, he shall not have life in him (Jn 6:54). Augustine 
thinks the way in which we are first incorporated into the life of Christ, so that we may 
eat His flesh and drink His blood, is through the waters of baptism. Indeed, “by His 
baptism He brings over them that believe; all their sins, the enemies as it were that pursue 
them, being slain, as all the Egyptians perished in that sea.”773 
                                                          
772 11.3. 
773 11.4.  
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 When the Lord speaks about the necessity of being born again, Nicodemus fails 
to understand that the Spirit is speaking to him. He still thinks in terms of the flesh. More 
specifically, “he thinks of his own flesh, because as yet he thinks not of Christ’s flesh.”774 
We might say that Nicodemus failed to have the Pauline revelation that we are all one 
body in Christ, and so when Christ said, except a man eat my flesh, and drink my blood, 
he shall not have life in Him, he could not profit from it.775 As is the case with most of 
fallen humanity, Nicodemus only understood those who are born once, according to their 
own mortal flesh.776 
Perhaps this focus on being born of the Spirit is why Augustine will follow his 
discussion of Christ’s inability to sin with a disclaimer on the importance of the life-
giving waters of baptism for all Christians, whether young or old:  
He, by the likeness of sinful flesh in which He was crucified, showed that, 
whereas no sin was in Him, still in some sense He died to sin, in dying to the flesh 
in which was the likeness of sin; and that, while He Himself had never lived the 
old life of sin, He made His resurrection the symbol of our new life, quickened 
out of the old life of sin in which we had been destined to die. Such is the 
meaning of the great sacrament of baptism which is solemnized among us: that 
those who attain to this grace die to sin (moriantur peccato), just as we say He 
died to sin, in that He died to the flesh (quia mortuus est carni), that is, to the 
likeness of sin (peccati similitudini); and that they live through being reborn at the 
font, whatever may be the age of the body, just as He lived rising again from the 
tomb (et vivant a lavacro renascendo, sicut ipse a sepulcro resurgendo, quamlibet 
corporis aetatem gerant).777  
 
                                                          
774 11.5. 
775 Nicodemus was not alone in his lack of understanding. We are told that some others who followed 
Jesus said among themselves, “This is a hard saying; who can hear it?,” and they followed him no more.  
776 Augustine writes of Nicodemus that he “knew but one birth, that from Adam and Eve; that which 
is from God and the Church he knew not yet: he knew only those parents that bring forth to death, knew not 
yet the parents that bring forth to life; he knew but the parents that bring forth successors, knew not yet the 
ever-living parents that bring forth those that shall abide. Whilst there are two births, then, he understood 
only one. One is of the earth, the other of heaven; one of the flesh, the other of the Spirit; one of mortality, 
the other of eternity; one of male and female, the other of God and the Church.” (11.6). 
777 13.41-42.  
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Christ had no need for rebirth in the Spirit, for He was always born of the Spirit.778 We 
see this especially in the Gospel of Matthew 3:14-15, when Jesus comes to John to be 
baptized. John recognizes Jesus’ holiness, saying, I need to be baptized by you, and do 
you come to me? Jesus replies: Let it be so now, for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all 
righteousness. Jesus saw His life, death, and resurrection as fulfilling all righteousness. 
We might ask: fulfilling all righteousness for whom? Not for Himself, of course, because 
He had no sin for which He had to repent or confess. Rather, the fulfillment of 
righteousness He speaks of is for all human beings which are His workmanship, and in 
whose good works we must walk in order to be righteous men like Him.779 Christ is able 
to transmit His righteousness to us, or fulfill all righteousness, because He constitutes a 
single person with us—a persona mystica. He is the Head of this person, we are the 
Body. What the Head possesses (righteousness), so, too, do the members, but only 
through the Head.  
Augustine will stress that Christ underwent His baptism and death, “not through a 
pitiable necessity (non miseranda necessitate), but rather through the mercy of His will 
(sed miserante potius voluntate susceptum est), that One might take away the sin of the 
world.”780 In other words, His submission to be baptized and die for our sins were free 
and merciful acts, not coerced and necessitated acts. Christ’s entire life from his birth to 
his death was freely chosen by Him for our salvation: “At the opportune moment, when 
He willed, when He knew, then He was born; for He was not born without willing to be 
                                                          
778 14.48. 
779 The righteousness of Christ becomes ours when and only when we have faith in Him. Augustine 
will quote Paul in this connection: That I may be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness which is 
of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith (Phil 
3:9). See On the Grace of Christ, 14. 
780 14.49. 
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born.... God was born when He willed it, and when He willed it He died. He was born as 
He willed to be born, of a virgin; He died as He willed to die, on the Cross. Whatever He 
willed, that He did.”781 Near the end of Chapter 14, Augustine concludes that Christ’s 
entire life should serve as a model for Christians here and now, this side of heaven. 
Augustine asks: “What, then, was wrought upon the cross of Christ, in His burial, in His 
resurrection on the third day, in His ascension into heaven, in His sitting at the right hand 
of the Father was so wrought as to serve as a model for the life which the Christian here 
leads, and in reality, not simply as a mystical showing-forth in words (ita gestum est, ut 
his rebus non mystice tantum dictis, sed etiam gestis configuraretur vita christiana quae 
hic geritur).”782 Following St. Paul, Augustine will consider each of these aspects of 
Christ’s life as requiring Christians to follow suit, or perhaps better, to walk in these good 
works themselves. His crucifixion requires a crucifixion of our flesh with its passions and 
desires (Gal 5:24). His burial requires us to be buried with Christ by means of baptism 
into death (Rom 6:4). His resurrection requires that, just as Christ has arisen from the 
dead through the glory of the Father, so also we walk in newness of life (Rom 6:4). His 
ascension and sitting at the right hand of the Father requires us to seek the things that are 
above, where Christ is seated at the right hand of God (Col 3:1). 
                                                          
781 Symb.3.8. 
782 14.53. Christ fulfills a triple role in His divine mission, that of Teacher, King, and Priest. He 
teaches, governs, and sanctifies all creation. According to Msgr. Fulton Sheen, Christ continues this 
threefold divine mission today in the Church, or “the totus Christus (the Whole Christ), as St. Augustine 
calls it, [which continues] the Incarnation by prolonging the ... actions of the historical Christ.” (66). The 
actions of those in the Church, beginning with the Apostles and Mary, but continuing now almost twenty 
centuries till today, are in a sense the actions of Christ. If the actions of the historical Christ were attributed 
to His divine Person, and if the Church and Christ are one (though, of course, we must make the distinction 
between Christ as Head and us as Body), then the actions of those in the Church must in a sense be referred 
to the second Person of the blessed Trinity. They are the extension of the life of Christ. As Sheen writes, 
“The Church ... is that in which Bethlehem revives in every baptism and the Cenacle in every Mass, the 
instruction of the doctors of the Temple in every definition, the pardon of Peter in every absolution, and the 
Crucifixion in every persecution.” (75).  
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Augustine believes that it is only by living the life of Christ that we can attain 
everlasting life for ourselves. Does this fact necessarily impose limits on the lives we can 
profitably lead to work out our own salvation? Does this fact necessarily require sacrifice 
and even death783 on our part? Augustine would answer yes to both questions, but this is 
not a pitiable kind of necessity, or one in which the nature of the will as free is destroyed. 
Rather, it is a limitation on the nature of the will that will lead to its full realization, along 
with the entire nature of the human being of which it is a power. It is a limitation that 
makes us better, freer, and more alive. Msgr. Fulton Sheen will draw on Augustine to 
make this point in a particularly forceful manner, noting that it is in the Church that this 
renewal of human nature and its powers takes place. According to Sheen, one of the 
characteristics of the Church, understood as totus Christus, is its undeniable freedom, i.e., 
the freedom of its Head and its members. Some may view the authority of the Church, 
passed down from Christ to the Apostles, and from the Apostles to Bishops, as a 
restriction on their freedom to do what they want. Others may even see this Apostolic 
authority as a form of enslavement. But for Sheen this is a mistake on their part. Liberty 
does not mean the ability to disregard law, to do what one wants, or to reject all authority. 
Instead, “obedience to law is the condition of all freedom.”784 Sheen gives the following 
examples to this effect: 
Aviators are free to fly only on condition that in the construction of their machine 
they respect the law of gravity; we are free to use words only on condition that we 
accept the standard meaning of those words and the authority of the dictionary; 
we are free to drive automobiles on the street only on condition that we obey the 
traffic laws; an artist is free to draw a triangle only on condition that he respects 
its intrinsic nature and draw it with three sides.... Every traveler who follows a 
road submits to a restriction of his freedom. The road limits his freedom, for if it 
                                                          
783 The death Augustine speaks of may include martyrdom, but it can generally be understood as death 
to sin.  
784 Sheen, 205. 
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were not for it, the whole forest primeval would be his road; but in submitting to 
the limitation of a road he finds he is more free to travel.785  
 
The same reasoning is applicable, Sheen thinks, when it comes to the laws of the Church. 
These laws are no doubt limitations placed upon us, but they are placed upon us by 
Christ, through the Apostles and their episcopal successors. As the Head of the Mystical 
Body786 that is the Church, Christ only commands Christians to obey laws that are meant 
for their perfection. He commands Christians to walk in His good works, to travel back to 
God the Father through Himself, for He is the only Way by which we can come to the 
Father. We may conclude “that the more we obey the laws which make for our 
perfection, the more free we become; and the more we disobey those immanent laws 
which make for our development the more enslaved we become.”787 Sheen will use an 
example to explain. Suppose I thought freedom to be exception from the laws of health. 
In that spirit of false liberty, what if I thought eating as much as I wanted to and drinking 
as much as I wanted to, whenever I wanted to, was freedom? What would happen to my 
life? I would become unhealthy, weak, and less able to enjoy my life. We might say this 
is an example from the “physical” order of how freedom cannot be equated with license, 
but Sheen thinks that we can observe similar truths in the “intellectual” order and, 
ultimately, in the laws and life of Christ himself: 
The more I submit myself to the truths of geography, the more free I am to travel; 
the more I bow down to the necessities of mathematics, the more free I am to 
know the stars and the secrets of the universe; and, on the contrary, the more I 
reject the truths of history, the more I become enslaved to ignorance.... [W]e have 
been called to be the children of God, partakers of His divine knowledge. It 
follows then that the more I submit myself to the laws of Christ and His Church, 
which is the Kingdom of God on earth, the more my perfection grows and the 
                                                          
785 Sheen, 205.  
786 Fr. Emile Mersch S. J. defines the mystical body as “the assemblage of those who live or ought to 
live in Christ.” (Mersch, 51).  
787 Sheen, 206. 
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more my freedom increases.... [W]hen I bow down my will to the law of Calvary, 
I do not surrender my liberty any more than an acorn loses its nature when it dies 
to itself to be reborn in the oak; when I obey the truth of the teaching authority of 
the Church I no more relinquish my freedom than I relinquish my freedom of 
writing when I submit to the laws of grammar. When I obey the commands of the 
Mystical Body of Christ, I am obeying that which makes me perfect not only in 
my body, because it subjects it to reason, not only in my mind, because it subjects 
it to the higher knowledge of faith, but perfect in my being, body and soul, 
because it leads me to perfect union with Him who is God.788  
 
The Truth present in the laws and life of Christ, while demanding sacrifice, imposing 
restraints, and limiting our freedom, will grant us genuine liberty. As the Lord himself 
says, The Truth shall set you free (Jn 8:32). But the Truth is Christ, and so we must obey 
“only what Christ wills,” we must think “only what He thinks,” and we must love “only 
what He loves.”789  
Perhaps St. Paul says it best: Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ 
Jesus (Phil 2:5). We also know from Paul that letting this mind of Christ be in us, or 
possessing a Christ-form mind, goes beyond external imitation of what He did in His 
earthly ministry. It is conforming ourselves to His entire life,790 but especially to his 
humility in the Incarnation. For when Paul says, Let this mind be in you, which was also 
in Christ Jesus, he continues: who emptied (kenosis) Himself, taking the form of a 
servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as man (Phil 2: 5-7). That 
you may be filled unto all the fullness (pleroma) of God (Eph 3:19). We find out, then, 
                                                          
788 Sheen, 206-207. 
789 Sheen, 208. Later on, Sheen writes: “We never reach the heights of unity until there is a fusion of 
love, of thought, and of desire, a unity so profound that we think with the one we love, love with the one 
we love, desire what he desires, and this unity is found in its perfection when the soul is made one with the 
Spirit of Christ which is the Spirit of God.” (258). Mersch makes similar comments to Sheen on our need to 
imitate Christ. Indeed, he will say that our imitation of Christ is the perfection of the moral law, which 
consists in acting, feeling, willing, and thinking as “He would have done and as He actually does within the 
soul, from the first vigorous stirrings of Christian life.” (91). It requires death, but “the death it requires is 
the exact contrary of eternal death: it is a complete detachment from self and from sin and leads to the 
attachment to good.” (289).  
790 See for example, Phil 2:1-11; Gal 3:5; 2 Cor 5:4; Col 2:12; Eph 4:9. 
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that genuine liberty is the freedom to live as Christ humbly chose to live, so that we 
might also be filled with the fullness of God. It is this liberty that makes one a Christian. 
Again, following the apostle, we can say without reservation over any possible loss of our 
freedom: I live, now not I; but Christ liveth in me. And that I live now in the flesh: I live in 
the faith of the Son of God who loved me and delivered Himself for me (Gal 2: 19-20). 
And in nothing shall I be confounded, but with all confidence, as always, so now also 
shall Christ be magnified in my body, whether it be by life or by death. For to me, to live 
is Christ; and to die is gain. (Phil 1:20-21). Emile Mersch describes this as the reduction 
of “ourselves and our thought to the thoughts and consciousness of Christ.”791 In this 
reductive process, Christ is the primary actor. Christ draws us to Himself; He makes us 
one in Him; He grants us life through Him. But we still must act along with Christ. The 
activity we need to perform in order to accomplish this reduction of ourselves and our 
thought is cooperative with that done by Christ. We are even able to say that it is its 
effect, as long our activity is good. Mersch relies on Augustine to make this point: “The 
members of Christ must understand, and Christ must understand in His members, and 
Christ’s members must understand in Christ; for head and members are one Christ.”792 
Augustine will argue that this double understanding of Christians in Christ and Christ in 
Christians demands a double passion: 
How great must the surface of a man’s body be, if he can be killed by all men? 
But here we have to understand that there is question of us, of our Church, of 
Christ’s body. Jesus Christ is one man, head and body; the Savior of the body and 
the members of the body are two in one flesh and in one voice and in one passion; 
and when wickedness will have passed, they will be one in repose. The passion of 
Christ is not in Christ alone; or rather, it is in Christ alone. For if you take Christ 
as head and body, the passion of Christ is in Christ alone. But if you take Christ as 
the head alone, the passion of Christ is not in Christ alone. If you, any person now 
                                                          
791 Mersch, 86. 
792 In Ps. LIV.  
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listening to me, are among Christ’s members, or even if you are not among my 
auditors (although actually you hear me, if you are one of Christ’s members), 
whatever you suffer at the hands of those who are not among the members of 
Christ, was lacking to Christ’s sufferings. This is why your suffering is now 
added, because it was then lacking. You are filling out the measure, you are not 
making it flow over. You are suffering as much as ought to be your contribution 
to the complete passion of Christ, who has suffered as our head, and who now 
suffers in His members, that is, in us. Each of us, in his little way, is paying into 
this common treasury what he owes, and we all contribute our share according to 
our means. The measure of suffering will not be full until the world comes to an 
end.793  
 
Our full conformation to Christ will take place in the next life, and will consist in the 
inability to sin and the inability to even wish to sin. Augustine believes that there “he will 
not be able to will evil, and yet he will not be deprived of his free will. In fact, his will 
will be much more free, in that it will be in no way subject to sin. For the will is not to be 
blamed, nor should we say that it was no will or that it was not free, when we so will to 
be happy that we not only do not will to be wretched, but are quite unable to wish to be 
(postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit; nec ideo libero carebit arbitrio. Multo 
quippe liberius erit arbitrium, quod omnino non poterit servire peccato. Neque enim 
culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati esse sic 
volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus).794 
Only then will we understand how good a human being is which is “capable of not 
                                                          
793 In Ps.61; PL 36, 730. The Council of Trent makes similar comments about the importance of 
Christ’s passion and its prolongation or extension in our passion. See Session XIV, c.8.  
794 28.105. This is similar to Augustine’s claim at City of God 5.10, where he notes that there is a 
difference between the necessity “according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or 
such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner,” and the necessity according to which we say that 
events are fixed in the sense of already happened, or not within our power. Augustine thinks we should not 
“have any dread of that necessity [i.e., necessity understood as that anything be of such or such a nature, or 
be done in such and such a manner] taking away the freedom of our will.” On Augustine’s theological 
anthropology, it is necessary that human beings are created in the image of God, because God made them 
that way (Gen 1:26); they are meant to be conformed to the image of His Son (Rom 8:29); and such 
conformation can only be done in a Christ-like manner, or by in a sense re-living the life of Christ in our 
own lives with the help of the grace of the Holy Spirit. The kind of necessity Augustine speaks of is thus 
not freedom-destroying, fatalistic or deterministic. Rather, it is liberating because it leads to the full 
perfection of man.  
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sinning, though one would be better which was incapable of sinning.” Only then will we 
understand how good that immortality is in which man was “capable of not dying, though 
that which is to be is of a higher order, in which he will be incapable of dying.”795 These 
men who are incapable of sinning and who are incapable of dying will have “no will to 
sin.”796   
Have any of fallen humanity accomplished the good works of Christ in such a 
way as to perfect themselves to the point where there can be no further addition, to where 
they are exactly as good as God wants and knows them to be in Christ, to where they 
have no will to sin? Augustine answers no, once again citing the apostle as proof. Out of 
all men, there is none in the present life who were privy to as many great revelations as 
Paul. Yet Paul himself says, Lest I should be exalted above measure through the 
abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh, the messenger of 
Satan to buffet me. For this thing I besought the Lord thrice, that He would take it away 
from me. And He said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made 
perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:7-9). Augustine takes it to be obvious that, “if there were 
already in the apostle that perfection of love which admitted of no further addition, and 
which could be puffed up no more, there could have been no further need of the 
messenger of Satan to buffet him.”797 The very fact that the messenger of Satan was able 
to buffet him proves that the love of God and neighbor that Paul possessed was not yet 
perfect. It was still in the process of being strengthened by God day by day (2 Cor 4:6). 
                                                          
795 28.105. 
796 29.111. 
797 On the Grace of Christ, 12. 
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Not only that, but we must not forget how imperfect Paul was when he was 
known by the name Saul. The case of the radical conversion of Saul of Tarsus is 
recounted in Acts 9 and is discussed by Augustine many times in his Sermons to teach his 
flock about the literal self-sacrifice required to be one of Christ’s followers. In Sermon 
116.7 (418),798 for example, Augustine explains to his congregation that before his 
conversion Saul had no good merits whatsoever; he was in fact “crazy with fury” in his 
zeal to uphold his ancestral traditions, in the name of which he persecuted Christians; he 
was bloodthirsty and hateful. Yet on the road to Damascus, Saul received a divine 
intervention in the form of a question from God: Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me? 
(Acts 9:4). While Saul could not harm the head of the body of Christ in heaven, he was 
nonetheless harming its members here on earth. But what good was this doing Saul? It is 
hard for you to kick against the goad (Acts 26:14). Augustine takes this to mean that in 
persecuting the members of Christ, in kicking against the goad, Saul was really only 
harming himself. God’s question to Saul made him realize that we are all part of one 
body, whether we be Christian or Jew, man or woman, slave or free. It made him realize 
that the universal ontological community of nature we all possess, insofar as we are all 
human beings, should be joined with an economic effort on our part to effect an equally 
universal moral communion, in which we know and love the same ultimate Good that is 
God the Father and Christ whom He has sent, through the love of the Holy Spirit. The 
realization of the strong community that is shared among human beings, and that is meant 
to be strengthened through knowledge and love of God and neighbor, was not forced 
upon Saul. It was merely sparked by a question, to which Saul could either freely answer 
                                                          
798 See also Sermon 168.4, 416.  
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back as Saul was wont to do, or as we know St. Paul did.799 God’s intervention did not 
take away Saul’s will to choose the kind of life he wanted to live, the character he wanted 
to develop, or the choices he wanted to make. Rather, all it did was free Saul from the 
many sinful obstacles preventing him from confessing God in his heart.  
What St. Paul accomplished in freely turning to God is something that we can too, 
provided we let God into our hearts by believing in Him and Christ whom He has sent. 
The way we do this is by denying ourselves so that we may confess God. Saul denied his 
self, his “Saul-ness,” and became St. Paul. As we have seen, the apostle will recommend 
that we imitate this self-sacrifice, but only insofar as he himself imitates Christ (Phil 
3:20). Augustine thinks that we all must exercise the same kind of self-sacrifice exercised 
by Paul, and that Christ speaks of in the Gospels, e.g., at Jn 12:25: Whoever loves his soul 
let him lose it; and at Mt 10:39: And whoever has lost his soul on my account will find it. 
Or in Augustine’s own words, “deny yourself, man, woman, so that you may be made an 
angel. Deny yourself, mortal creature, so that by confessing God you may earn the right 
to live forever. Look here; you love this temporal life; you don’t want to deny it, and you 
wish to deny God; God, whom you’ve denied, whom you have refused to confess, 
withdraws from you; and you will continue to have the temporal life, which you refused 
to deny.”800 One ought to recall St. Paul’s distinction between the psychikoi/pneumatikoi, 
which fits well with Augustine’s claim that, while God wants you to live the eternal life 
of the angels—to be pneumatikoi—He will nonetheless respect your decision to remain 
living the temporal life you love by denying God. But having made this decision, God 
will justly withdraw from you. He will leave you as the psychikoi you have chosen to be 
                                                          
799 Sermon 116.7. 
800 Sermon 313D.2, around 419. 
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and are naturally on your own. To deny God therefore is to deny yourself the 
amelioration of your human nature required to enjoy eternal life. In a related Sermon, we 
receive an extremely succinct definition of the meaning of deny yourself that links it with 
Augustine’s idea of liberty. According to Augustine, “Deny yourself” means “Don’t you 
live in yourself,” and “Don’t you live in yourself” means “Don’t do your own will, but 
that of the one who is dwelling in you.”801 How can the words of Christ not come to 
mind? Yet not what I will, but what you will be done, Father (Mt 26:39).  
It is the person of Christ, His thoughts, His willings, His actions, and His love, 
that is the answer to the problem of predestination in Augustine’s mature theology of sin 
and grace—the answer that he would give to his Christian contemporaries, i.e., most 
notably the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseilles—and that has been continually decried 
since then as leaving no space for the liberty of man under God’s providentially guiding 
hand. Christ was totally free, because He wholeheartedly says “yes” to the Father, even 
“yes” to death on a cross. He was totally free because He totally willed the will of the 
Father. To the wisdom of men, this may appear as irreligious and ugly nonsense. But as 
the apostle says, the wisdom of God confounds the wisdom of men (1 Cor 1:27). It is our 
Way and our Truth and our Life and our Liberty. For all who walk in the footsteps of 
Christ, who live the way that He humbly chose to live, some understanding of the 
mystery of how God’s grace perfects human nature in free co-operation with it is 
achievable. For those who do not, no such understanding will be gained. In the words of 
Fr. Mersch, citing heavily from the Gospel of John, the mystery of divine and human 
interaction may be  
                                                          
801 Sermon 330.4. See also City of God 14.4. 
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... above our understanding (Jn 1:18; 5:37; 3:12; 6:46; 17:25); but in Christ it 
draws near to us and becomes something familiar. Jesus never speaks of it as a 
cold and distant truth made known to us to humble our minds. On the contrary, 
He exhibits it as a light (1:9; 3:19-22; 12:32ff., 44ff.), as a life (1:4; 3:16), as a 
vision that God grants us (6:44; 14:7; 17, 19; 15:26;16:13). Our part is to open our 
minds to the light that is offered (1:6, 10; 3:19, 32; 5:34, 38), to believe (20:21), 
to love (8:42; 14:20-23), to obey the commandments (7:17; 15: 10), to make 
ourselves docile (5:24; 6:37, 40, 44, 65; 8:47), above all to attach ourselves to 
Christ (7:28; 8:19; 14:6, 20; 17:2, 3, 7, 8, 24); then we shall acquire a certain 
understanding of the incomprehensible. This understanding is not the fruit of an 
accumulation of concepts, but comes from living contact with the living truth, 
because I live, and you shall live (14:19).802  
 
We are only free when we willingly attach ourselves to Christ. For Augustine, freedom in 
the sense of total independence, or complete control over one’s self-development, is 
illusory; and freedom in the sense of the freedom to sin, or in having alternative options 
for doing, thinking, and willing what is evil, is using the term freedom in an equivocal 
sense, like when one speaks of a slave as free, or when one speaks of someone who is 
dead as if he is alive. In short, such a person is not even talking about the same reality as 
Augustine, but rather a false “freedom” not deserving of the name. As Augustine learned 
all too well from St. Paul, Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in wantonness and 
impurities, not in strife and envying; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no 
provision for the flesh and its desires (Rom 13: 13-14). This is the true liberty of man and 
his eternal life.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
802 Mersch, 407. 
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